

CONTENTS.

	Page.
1. Table of Contents	1-5
2. Report of the Committee	6-72
3. Appendix I—Summary of Recommendations	73-82
4. Appendix II—Letter of Sir John Simon to His Excellency the Viceroy, dated the 6th February 1928	83-85
5. Appendix III—Figures of Population.. .. .	86
6. Memorandum by the Honourable Sir Sankaran Nair, Kt., C.I.E., the Honourable Raja Nawab Ali Khan and the Honourable Sardar Bahadur Shivdev Singh Uberoi	87-156
7. Minute of Dissent by the Honourable Sir Arthur Froom	157-179
8. Minute of Dissent by the Honourable Raja Nawab Ali Khan	180-182
9. Minute of Dissent by Nawab Sir Zulfiqar Ali Khan, Kt., C.S.I., M.L.A., and Dr. Abdullah Suhrawardy, M.L.A.	183-214
10. Memorandum by Sir Hari Singh Gour, Kt., M.L.A.	215-364
11. Minute by Rao Bahadur M. C. Rajah, M.L.A.	365-388
12. Report of Mr. Kikabhai Premchand, M.L.A.	389-428

Report
of
Indian Central Committee

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

INTRODUCTION.

	Page.
1. The Report	6
2. Appointment of the Statutory Commission	6
3. Resentment in India	6-7
4. Appointment of the Indian Central Committee	7
5. Functions of the Committee	7-8
6. Method of Inquiry : in India	8
7. In London	8
8. Material at our disposal	8-9
9. Intricacy of the problem	9

PART I.]

[HEADS OF INQUIRY.

CHAPTER I.

Working of the System of Government.

10. The existing system	10
11. Political situation in India at the date of the Montagu-Chelmsford Report	10
12. Events leading to change of atmosphere	10-11
13. Working of the System of Government : Dyarchy	11
14. Method of forming the Cabinet	11
15. Relations of Ministers with Executive Councillors	11-12
16. Reaction of Dyarchy on the Electorate	12-13
17. Other influences affecting the Electorate	13
18. Working of Dyarchy	13-14

CHAPTER II.

Growth of Education.

19. Growth of Education	15
20. Conditions in England in the middle of the 19th century	15
In Cape Colony	15
In Canada	15
21. Report of the Auxiliary Committee	16
22. Functions of education in relation to representative government	16
23. Primary Education : Government declarations in favour of	16-17
24. Progress achieved before the Reforms	17
25. Mr. Gokhale's Compulsory Education Bill	17-18
26. Progress since the Reforms	18
27. Secondary and Higher Education	18-19
28. Our conclusion	19

CHAPTER III.

Development of Representative Institutions.

29. Indian Councils Acts of 1861 and 1892	20
30. Morley-Minto Reforms	20
31. Absence of real responsibility	20-21
32. Local Self-Government : Early Stages	21
33. Lord Ripon's Pronouncement	21
Effect in urban areas	22
34. In rural areas	22
35. Electorates	22
Lord Ripon's policy not given effect to	22-23
36. Growth of Local Self-Government since the Reforms	23
37. Conditions before and after 1920 contrasted	24
38. Our conclusion	25

PART II.

THE PROPOSALS.

CHAPTER IV.

*The Provinces.**Question of Sind and Burma.*

	Page.
39. (i) Separation of Sind from the Bombay Presidency	26-27
(ii) Separation of Burma from India	27

Provincial Executive.

40. Present structure of the Provincial Executive: Dyarchy	27-28
41. Unitary system of Government recommended	28
42. Strength of the Cabinet	28
43. Joint responsibility	28-29
44. Composition of the Cabinet: Question of a Muslim Minister ..	29
45. Statutory Provision for inclusion of Muslim in Cabinet not recommended	29-30
46. Working of the Cabinet	30
47. The Governor not to be a member of the Cabinet	30
48. Law and Order in Bengal	30-31
49. Our proposals regarding the same	31
50. Desirability of securing stability of Ministries: Votes of want of confidence	31-32
51. Salaries of Ministers	32
52. Position of the Governor	32-33
53. The Governor and the Cabinet	33

Provincial Legislature.

54. (i) Franchise: Recommendations of the Joint Report	33-34
(ii) Size of the present electorates	34
55. Size of electorate no criterion of fitness for Self-Government ..	34-35
56. Growth of the electorate	35
57. Growth of voting	35-36
58. Adult Suffrage impracticable	36
59. Our proposals	36-37
60. Future extension of the Franchise	37
61. Size of the Provincial Councils	37-38
62. The Official Bloc	38
63. Opinions of the Provincial Committees	38-39
64. and of the Provincial Governments	39-40
65. Our recommendation	40
66. Nominated non-officials	40
67. Communal electorates	40-41
68. The present position	41
69. Principles followed by us	41
70. Muslims	41
71. Abolition of communal electorates recommended	42
72. Representation in Provinces other than the Punjab and Bengal ..	42
73. (i) Representation in the Punjab	42-43
(ii) In Bengal	43
74. Sikhs	43
75. Depressed Classes: Definition of	43
76. Population	44
77. Method of selection of representatives:	44
78. In Madras	44
79. In other Provinces	44-45
80. Backward Classes	45
81. Indian Christians	45-46
82. Europeans	46

	Page.
83. Anglo-Indians	46-47
84. Karens in Burma	47
85. Indians in Burma	47
86. Non-Brahmins and Mahrattas	47
87. Commerce and Industry	47-48
88. Planters	48
89. Mining Industry	48
90. Labour	48-49
91. Landholders	49
92. Universities	49-50
93. Women	50
94. Life of the Provincial Legislature	50
95. Powers of the Provincial Legislature	50
96. Changes consequent on the transfer of all subjects	50
97. Financial Safeguards	50-51
98. The Governor and the Legislature: Veto over Provincial Legislation	51
99. Governor's power to authorize expenditure in emergencies	51-52
100. Question of a Second Chamber	52
101. Arguments against	52-53
102. Divergence of opinion	53
103. Experience of other countries	53
104. Our Conclusion	53
105. Constitution of the Senate in the United Provinces	53-54

Other Proposals.

106. Allocation of Provincial and Central Subjects	54
107. Financial Proposals	54-55
108. High Courts: Transfer of control to the Central Government	55
109. Constitution of the High Courts	55-56
110. (i) The Services: Present position as regards the Provinces	56
(ii) As regards the Central Government	56
111. Present position examined	56-57
112. Question of retention of Europeans in the Services	57
113. Our proposals	57-58
114. Special Provision for Bombay and for Madras	58
115. Protection of the Services	58
116. Local Army	58-59
117. Separation of Executive from Judicial Functions	59
118. North-West Frontier Province	59-60
119. Relations between the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council and the Provincial Governments	60 61

CHAPTER V.

The Government of India.

120. The Central Government: Present position	62
121. The working of the Central Government reviewed	62-63
122. Necessity for strengthening the Central Government: partial responsibility to the Legislature recommended	63
123. Reservation of Defence and Foreign and Political Relations: safeguards	63-64
124. Dyarchy in the Centre justified	64
125. Composition of the Governor-General's Cabinet	64
126. Legislative Assembly: Proposed strength	65
127. Appointment of experts	65
128. Composition of the Assembly	65
129. Electorates	66
130. Election of the President and the term of the Assembly	66
131. The Council of State	66

The India Office.

	Page.
132. Secretary of State	66-67
133. (i) Delegation of powers by the Secretary of State to the Govern- ment of India : Raising loans	67
(ii) Recruitment of the Services	67
(iii) Appointment of delegate to International Organisations	67
134. Limitations on power of Secretary of State	67-68
135. (i) The Council of India	68
(ii) Indian Under-Secretaries of State	68
136. Representation of India in Parliament	68

CHAPTER VI.

Miscellaneous.

137. The Army in India	69
138. Establishment of a Supreme Court	69-70
139. Fundamental Rights	70

Conclusion.

140. India's demands	70-71
141. Acknowledgments	71
142. Conclusion	71-72

APPENDICES.

I.—Summary of recommendations	73-82
II.—Letter from Sir John Simon to His Excellency the Viceroy, dated 6th February 1928	83-85
III.—Statement of Population of Provinces by Religion	86

INTRODUCTION.

To His Excellency the Right Hon. EDWARD FREDERICK
LINDLEY WOOD, Baron Irwin of Kirby Underdale,
G.M.S.I., G.M.I.E., Viceroy and Governor-General of
India.

YOUR EXCELLENCY,

Report. Having now completed the task which we were asked to undertake, as announced in a communiqué published in Simla on 25th September, 1928, we beg to present to Your Excellency this Report on the constitutional changes which we recommend for India. We request Your Excellency to take the necessary steps to forward our Report and make it available to the British Parliament. We do not desire that our Report should be published as an annexe to the Report of the Statutory Commission. Before proceeding with our recommendations we shall first make a few preliminary remarks on the events leading up to the appointment of our Committee and the scope and method of our work.

point-
nt of the
statutory
mission.

2. Section 84A of the Government of India Act of 1919 prescribes the appointment, at the expiration of 10 years from the passing of that Act, of a Commission for the purpose of inquiring into the working of the system of government set up under the Act and certain kindred matters and reporting on the constitutional changes which may be considered desirable. The question of advancing the date (December, 1929) of the inquiry came up for serious consideration more than once between 1924 and 1926 under pressure from the Legislative Assembly; but it was felt that the conditions requisite for accurate and dispassionate apprisement of the constitutional problem were then lacking. By the end of 1927 conditions throughout India were found to be more propitious and on 8th November, 1927, Your Excellency announced the decision of His Majesty's Government to constitute a Statutory Commission immediately; and at the same time foreshadowed an invitation to the Central Legislature to appoint a Joint Select Committee for the purpose of collaboration with the Statutory Commission. It was also suggested that a similar procedure should be adopted by the provincial legislatures.

3. The announcement in India—long advocated and anxiously awaited—of the appointment of the Statutory Commission aroused a storm of indignation and protest. The decision of His Majesty's Government to confine the personnel of the Commission to the members of the two Houses of Parliament was held to constitute an insult to Indians, and an arrogant repudiation of the claim which had been put forward that they should be given a predominant voice in the determination of the future

constitution of their country. A large body of opinion denounced the appointment of the Commission and expressed their determination to stand aside from its work. This attitude found expression in the following resolution passed by the Legislative Assembly on the 18th February, 1928 :—

“ This Assembly recommends to the Governor-General in Council to inform His Majesty's Government that the present constitution and scheme of the Statutory Commission are wholly unacceptable to this House and that this House will therefore have nothing to do with the Commission at any stage and in any form.”

4. Four days later the Council of State decided to participate in the labours of the Statutory Commission and this lead was followed subsequently by the provincial councils, with one exception, namely, in the Central Provinces. In accordance with this decision the Council of State elected three representatives, the Honourable Sir Sankaran Nair, Kt., C.I.E., the Honourable Sir Arthur Froom, Kt., and the Honourable Raja Nawab Ali Khan, to sit with the Statutory Commission. A fourth member of the Council, the Honourable Sardar Bahadur Shivdev Singh Uberoi, was nominated by Your Excellency to represent the Sikhs. In consequence of the boycott declared by the Assembly, Your Excellency nominated five members of the Assembly, namely, Nawab Sir Zulfiqar Ali Khan, Kt., C.S.I., Sir Hari Singh Gour, Kt., Dr. Abdulla Suhrawardy, Mr. Kikabhai Premchand and Rao Bahadur M. C. Rajah to form, with the representatives of the Council of State, the Indian Central Committee.

Appointment
of the Indian
Central
Committee.

5. The functions which this Committee were expected to perform were more precisely described in the letter of Sir John Simon, the Chairman of the Statutory Commission, to Your Excellency, dated the 6th February, 1928, which we quote in extenso in an appendix to our Report. The Committee was to sit in “ Joint Free Conference ” with the Statutory Commission for the purpose of scrutinising and elucidating “ from the Indian side, on free and equal terms,” the memoranda and evidence which would be presented to the Statutory Commission ; and opportunity was thus to be provided for the “ free exchange of views and mutual influence.” Finally, the Committee was to be “ entitled to report its conclusions to the Central Legislature.” Sir John Simon added :—“ There are well-known statutory means by which documents emanating from the Joint Committee and presented to the Central Legislature can be forwarded and made available to the British Parliament.” We lay particular stress on these words, for it is not too much to say that but for the assurance that the report of the Indian Central Committee would be made available to the British Parliament, independently of the report of the Statutory Commission, the Council of State would not have decided to co-operate with the latter body, and

Functions
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Functions
of the
Committee.

the boycott by the Central Legislature would have been complete. The scope of our task, therefore, is that laid down for the Statutory Commission, namely, to inquire—

“into the working of the system of government, the growth of education, and the development of representative institutions, in British India, and matters connected therewith, and to report as to whether and to what extent it is desirable to establish the principle of responsible government, or to extend, modify, or restrict the degree of responsible government then existing therein, including the question whether the establishment of second chambers of the local legislatures is or is not desirable.”

**Method of
Inquiry:
in India.**

6. We must now refer briefly to the method which was adopted to carry out the functions assigned to us. The Committee met for the first time for preliminary discussion at Simla on the 26th September, 1928, and later met the Statutory Commission at Poona, where the sittings of the Joint Free Conference commenced on the 12th October. From this date until the 18th March, we travelled through India and Burma, visiting in turn each of the provincial capitals and holding sittings at Poona, Lahore, Karachi, Peshawar, Delhi, Lucknow, Patna, Shillong, Calcutta, Rangoon, Mandalay, Madras and Nagpur. In all the provinces, save in the Central Provinces, we had the co-operation of committees appointed by the provincial legislatures. We held final sittings in Delhi between the 21st March and the 4th April, when members of the Central Government gave us the benefit of their views, and a final conference was held with the provincial committees.

in London.

7. We re-assembled in London on the 7th June, and during the following six weeks we held joint sittings with the Statutory Commission for the elucidation of questions connected with the Army in India, the Secretary of State and other matters. We had the privilege of hearing the views of Members of the Council of India and of certain of the senior Permanent Officials in explanation of memoranda which had been prepared by them, while Field-Marshal Sir Claude Jacob, Secretary of the Military Department of the India Office, Major-General J. R. E. Charles, Director of Military Operations and Intelligence, War Office, and Lieutenant-General Sir Andrew Skeen, late Chief of the General Staff in India, kindly attended to give the Conference the benefit of their opinions on military problems. We had the further advantage of hearing the views of Sir Basil Blackett on Finance problems, of Sir A. Selby-Bigge on Education, and of Sir Michael O'Dwyer and Sir R. Craddock on the questions connected with Services. Sir A. Chatterjee, High Commissioner for India, also appeared before the Conference.

**Material at
our disposal.**

8. While it is true to state that a voluminous mass of memoranda was presented to us and a large number of witnesses came forward to give evidence before the Joint Free Conference, we were conscious throughout our tour in India that a large and

influential section of Indian opinion was deliberately boycotting the Commission. An important consequence of this boycott must be referred to. It is generally correct to state that the Indian Central Committee required little study of unofficial memoranda, little examination of witnesses, to make them acquainted with the views of their countrymen as a whole or with the demands of particular communities or sections of opinion. It is equally true to remark that we were sufficiently well acquainted with the ideas of that section of Indian opinion which refrained from co-operating with the Commission. This, however, was not the case with our English colleagues. They can have had few opportunities of acquainting themselves directly with the sentiments of this important group. In their case the effect of the boycott cannot have been other than to leave them with an incomplete picture of the feelings and sentiments of the Indian people. On the other hand, the Statutory Commission had ample opportunity of reading publications, statements and speeches of every shade of opinion in India. It might also justly be claimed that its members, who are men with practical constitutional experience, have had the advantage of surveying some of the most acute of the Indian constitutional problems from a detached and dispassionate point of view. The labours of the Statutory Commission and of the Indian Central Committee have thus been complementary and mutually interdependent. Neither is complete without the other.

9. We are conscious of many imperfections in the presentation of our case, but limitations of time combined with the natural intricacies of the problems with which we are dealing have rendered it a matter of much difficulty to set forth both the considerations which have led us to our various conclusions and the arguments by which we support them, in a form that shall be at the same time sufficiently concise to be readily intelligible, and sufficiently full to present an adequate picture. It is our earnest hope that in a combination of the ideas of the two bodies, which for twelve months have laboured side by side, may be found the solution of one of the gravest and most intricate problems which it has ever fallen to the lot of man to solve.

Intricacy
of the
problem.

Part I. HEADS OF INQUIRY.

CHAPTER I.

WORKING OF THE SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT.

The existing system.

10. The reformed Government constituted under the Government of India Act came into being in 1921. It is not our intention to review in detail the course of events since that date but to refer briefly to some of the more salient features of dyarchy and to point out some of the more important consequences which resulted from it. We must first give a short account of the political situation at the time when the Government of India Act came into force ; for a description of the atmosphere in which the new Governments began to operate is essential to an understanding of the subject.

Political situation in India at the date of the Montagu-Chelmsford Report.

11. When the Montagu-Chelmsford Report first appeared, Indian opinion as a whole was critical but not hostile. Delegations from the leading political organisations of the country appeared before the Joint Select Committee ; and the evidence given by them shows that although exception was taken to the provisions by which the element of responsibility introduced into the Councils was hedged round with safeguards, there was no desire to boycott or to wreck the Reforms. Indeed, the moderates or Liberals, who included many of the best respected names in Indian politics, enthusiastically welcomed them. The nationalists, although emphatic in proclaiming the inadequacy of the measure of responsibility introduced in the provinces, showed no desire to keep away from them. It is known that Mr. B. G. Tilak, who was then the leader of the advanced nationalists, was himself prepared to stand for a constituency. This was the position in 1919 when the Reforms were on the anvil. Within a year, however, the whole political atmosphere underwent a complete change, and goodwill and friendliness gave place to suspicion, distrust and racial hatred, which combined to produce a situation of serious unrest.

Events leading to change of atmosphere.

12. The events which contributed to bring about this change were :—

(i) The enactment of the Rowlatt Bill in the teeth of the united opposition of all Indian elected members of the Imperial Council ;

(ii) The incidents in the Punjab leading up to and resulting from the shooting at Jallianwala Bagh ; and

(iii) The Treaty of Sèvres.

The Rowlatt Bill led to intense agitation which, combined with Muslim indignation over the Treaty of Sèvres, resulted in a

serious outbreak in the Punjab necessitating the proclamation of martial law. Certain incidents which occurred under the military regime, particularly at Jallianwala Bagh, increased the tension. Added to this, the arrest and detention of political suspects without trial in Bengal in 1924, however necessary that may have been, combined to create an atmosphere in which the Reforms had little chance of success with all parties.

13. The system of government which came to be launched under such unfavourable auspices, was itself complicated and unnatural. The Provincial Governments consisted of two halves ; on the one side was a Cabinet consisting of Ministers responsible to a Legislature, the majority of the members of which were elected representatives of their constituents ; and on the other an Executive Council, appointed by the Secretary of State and not responsible to the Legislature. Half the members of the Executive Council consisted of permanent officials, the other half of non-officials who might be and, in some cases were, adherents of the party in opposition in the Legislature. At the head of the administration stood the Governor, armed with extensive powers to veto or pass legislation and, in some cases, to restore rejected items of expenditure against the will of the legislature.

Working of
the System
of Govern-
ment :
Dyarchy.

14. In selecting the Ministers, Governors of different provinces adopted different methods. In Madras, the Governor adopted the ordinary constitutional procedure of sending for the leader of the majority party in the legislature and asking him to form a government. Elsewhere, Ministers were selected largely on a consideration of their personal influence in the legislature or because they represented a particular community. A somewhat curious instance of the perversion of the intentions of the authors of the Montague-Chelmsford Report occurred in one province where it was found more convenient to provide the leader of the strongest party in the legislature with a seat in the Executive Council and in the Ministry. That he should have been content to leave his party unrepresented in the Ministry indicates clearly the comparative importance attached to the two halves of the Government.

Method of
forming the
Cabinet.

15. It had been the intention of the authors of the reformed constitution that the two halves of the government, while consulting together, should be separately responsible for their own spheres. In practice, however, the result was far different. One consequence of the relationship between the two halves of the Government was that they found themselves, in some respects, mutually dependent upon one another. The Ministers found it convenient to cultivate friendly relations with the official bloc, upon which they could generally rely, and on which they were sometimes dependent for their retention of office. On the part of the other half of Government there was a natural disinclination to rely on the extraordinary powers vested in the Governor

Relations of
Ministers
with Execu-
tive Coun-
cillors.

and to arrange an amicable *modus vivendi* with the Ministers. As a consequence, the Ministers learnt to rely upon the official bloc and inevitably came to be regarded as, in some respects, a part of the bureaucratic government and jointly responsible with them. One effect of this was to loosen the ties which bound Ministers to their followers. While the Ministers looked to the official bloc for support, their followers deemed it unnecessary to yield consistent support to their leaders ; nor did they feel the necessity for any rigid system of party discipline. In fact, there has been little symptom of the formation of regular political parties ; and it is one of the strongest criticisms that may be advanced against the system of dyarchy that it has done little, if anything, to foster the growth of political parties. On the reserved half this relationship resulted inevitably in a certain vacillation and lack of consistency. Where circumstances rendered it desirable that the support of the Ministry should be secured for a particular policy, the latter were sometimes in a position to secure a modification of the policy of the reserved half as the price of their support.

Reaction of
Dyarchy on
the Electro-
rate.

16. The legislature was representative of a small electorate untrained in the arts of self-government. The natural ignorance of the voters was however in some respects compensated for by an organisation which lent itself readily to political usage. Throughout India the masses of the people are accustomed to look to the leaders of their various communities for guidance in many of the ordinary affairs of their daily life. At election time, therefore, the task of the candidates was, in some respects, simplified. They dealt with the leaders of the different communities while the latter, in turn, explained matters to their followers and influenced the direction of their votes. On the other hand, the system of dyarchy involved candidates in certain difficulties. The chief interest of the average voter throughout the greater part of India was in matters falling within the purview of the Revenue and Irrigation Departments or connected with the administration of justice ; and hence there was, in many parts, a tendency on the part of the electors to regard their local representative rather as a channel through which to obtain redress of their grievances against the reserved departments than as a representative whose duty it was to care for their interests in the spheres in which responsibility had been entrusted to the Legislative Councils. To this extent dyarchy was calculated to give the average voter a totally incorrect idea of the real implications of a system of responsible government.

Further evil consequences resulted from the fact that the local legislatures had no direct responsibility for those departments which concern the most vital interests of the electors. There was a not unnatural tendency on the part of the latter to regard the Ministers as of inferior status to the members of the Executive Council and to adopt an attitude of irresponsibility towards the new system of government. However wrongly

they might exercise the franchise the bureaucracy was there to see that no real harm befell them. Thus, from the very earliest days of responsible government, the voter was deprived of the most powerful incentive to a wise and responsible use of his vote, because his most immediate interests were not involved in the exercise of the franchise.

17. Certain other influences, not directly arising out of the Reforms, were at work to render more difficult the task of the men who took upon themselves the burden of government. The masses of the people of India have long been accustomed to believe that England will never relax her hold upon the country ; that she will always retain her army of occupation ; that her agents will always be at hand to maintain law and order ; and that no conscious effort towards this end is required on their own part. For generations they have been taught to look to a foreign bureaucracy to care for their needs ; they have been deprived of all incentive to think of the Government as an institution which it is the duty of every citizen to defend. In these circumstances it is difficult for the politically-minded and educated classes to convince the electors that there is any need for them to exercise their powers in a responsible manner. If those who are the natural leaders of the people of India are to be given a fair chance to educate their countrymen in the task of government, England must make it clear beyond the shadow of a doubt that she intends without delay to implement the undertaking given in August, 1917. The most effective means of advancing the political education of the masses will be by conferring upon them real responsibility. Thus, they may learn by experience that if they fail to exercise wisely the political power conferred upon them, their own interests will suffer.

Other
influences
affecting the
Electorate.

18. In spite of defects inherent in the system and of difficulties arising from circumstances beyond control, a surprising amount of success may be claimed for the new system of government. In all the provinces, save the Central Provinces and, to a lesser extent, in Bengal, men of goodwill have been found prepared to give dyarchy a fair trial, however short it may have fallen of their aspirations. Inside the legislative councils the forms and conventions of parliamentary procedure have been readily adopted. Debates have, as a rule, been conducted at a high level both of eloquence and of decorum. The record of legislation passed is one that bears tribute to the enthusiasm with which the new legislatures have approached their task. The spread of education, the development of co-operative societies, the increased provision of medical relief, are largely due to the influence and, indeed, the pressure exerted by the legislatures. If in some cases there has been a disinclination to impose fresh taxation it must be borne in mind that the ministers have had no real financial responsibility and further

Working of
Dyarchy.

that the provinces have been labouring under a sense of grievance against the Central Government in connection with the Meston settlement. In this connection we may point out that as long as there is a distinction between reserved and transferred subjects provincial legislatures may be expected to be more ready to make financial provision for the latter than for the former. In some respects, therefore, the reserved departments have lost more through the natural hostility or indifference of the legislatures than they have gained through a protection that has often proved illusory. In this brief review we have perforce omitted to refer to many interesting and instructive features of dyarchy. Perhaps we may fairly sum up the position by saying that, whatever the merits or demerits of the system, it has exhausted its powers for good and that there is a general consensus of opinion both among officials and among leaders of Indian opinion that if there is to be orderly political progress in India fundamental changes must be made in the present system of government. In our opinion there is no safe halfway house in the Provinces between dyarchy and full responsibility. We cannot do better than conclude by quoting from the Report of the Reforms Enquiry Committee of 1924 the following wise words which represent the views of the then Governor-in-Council of the United Provinces : " Concessions which fall short of complete provincial autonomy will placate no section of the opponents of the existing system ; they will secure neither stability nor contentment ; and they will lower the efficiency, already impaired, of the administration.

CHAPTER II.

GROWTH OF EDUCATION.

19. The next topic to which we turn our attention is the growth of education. For purposes of the constitutional inquiry under Section 84A of the Government of India Act, the aspect of the question which demands consideration is whether the backwardness of education and the illiteracy of the mass of the people should be regarded as impediments to the growth of responsible government. It may be conceded that the successful working of parliamentary institutions presupposes an electorate capable of taking interest in the proceedings of the legislature and of exercising control over its representatives. On the other hand, in actual fact the grant of the privilege of self-government and the extension of the suffrage have often times not followed, but preceded and stimulated, the growth of education. Parliamentary government in England dates back to the time of Walpole ; but it was not until the second quarter of the nineteenth century that the first seeds of state-aid in education were sown ; and it was not until the Reform Act of 1832 that the attitude of Parliament towards elementary education underwent a change. It is worthy of note that the English Elementary Education Act of 1870 was passed three years after, and not before, the Reform Act of 1867, which added one million voters—mostly urban labourers—to the electorates.

20. According to the report of the Education Committee of 1845, only 16 per cent. of the school-going children in England were able to read the Bible, while the rest could not even spell their names. Similarly Professor Keith points out that when Great Britain offered responsible government to the Cape Colony, the chief officials in the Colony submitted a memorandum deprecating the proposal on the grounds, *inter alia*, of racial cleavage and *the lack of education, even among Europeans*.* To quote one more example, the Durham Report states as follows, with reference to the state of education in Lower Canada :—“ It is impossible to exaggerate the want of education among the inhabitants ; no means of instruction have ever been provided for them and they are almost universally destitute of the qualifications even of reading and writing.”† We are, therefore, of opinion that the state of education does not by itself furnish a sure test of fitness for responsible government. As, however, the growth of education is one of the tests prescribed by Parliament for determining India's fitness for political advance, we propose briefly to review that growth during the last 10 years.

Growth of Education.

Conditions in England in the middle of the 19th century.

In Cape Colony.

In Canada.

* Keith : “ Responsible Government in the Dominions ” ; Second Edition, Vol. 1, page 29.

† Report on Canada, page 18.

Report
of the
Auxiliary
Committee.

21. In dealing with this subject we have had the benefit of an exhaustive review by the Auxiliary Committee of the Indian Statutory Commission. In appointing that Committee the Statutory Commission made it clear that they were "primarily concerned with education and its organisation in British India in relation to political and constitutional conditions and potentialities of progress." (*Vide* minute of Appointment on page 2 of the Report.) The Committee, however, took the view that a review of the growth of educational institutions on these lines would be too narrow ; and in their handling of the subject they have travelled somewhat outside the scope of their reference. We do not propose to follow the Committee over this latter ground ; but shall confine ourselves to the aspect of the question indicated in the terms of reference to the Committee and in Section 84A of the Government of India Act.

Functions
of educa-
tion in
relation to
repre-
sentative
govern-
ment.

22. As the Committee rightly point out, the function of education in relation to representative government is to produce a popular electorate capable of exercising intelligently the primary functions of citizenship, namely, to choose representatives with knowledge and intelligence and to understand the actual machinery of voting ; and secondly to produce a smaller body of persons, included in the larger, capable of furnishing representatives on legislative and local bodies and officers of the Central and Local administrations. The system of primary schools should be so designed as to produce a competent electorate ; the system of secondary and higher education to produce competent and trustworthy representatives and officials. Accordingly, we now turn to a consideration of these systems as they operate in India and the extent to which they fulfil their purpose.

Primary
Education ;
Govern-
ment de-
clarations
in favour of,

23. The interest of the British authorities in India in education dates back to the time when the Calcutta Madrasah was founded by Warren Hastings and the Sanskrit College at Benares by Lord Cornwallis ; but it was not until 1853 that Parliament for the first time investigated seriously and sympathetically the development of Indian education. Mass education had, up to that time, been regarded by the East India Company as a problem impossible to tackle ; and the only means they adopted of reaching the masses was by educating the literary classes and letting education filter down through them. The Education Despatch of Sir Charles Wood in 1854 for the first time imposed on the Government of India the duty of creating a properly articulated system of education from the primary school to the university. On the transfer of the Government of India from the East India Company to the Crown, the policy laid down in 1854 was confirmed in a despatch of 1859, which advocated the adoption of further steps for the promotion of primary education. Primary education was again placed in the forefront of the terms of reference to the Education (Hunter) Commission of 1882 ; and in the Government Resolution of 1884, dealing with

the recommendations of that Commission, the elementary education of the masses, its provision, extension and improvement, were stated to require the " strenuous efforts of the State in a still larger measure than heretofore." When the subject came to be reviewed again in 1904, Lord Curzon's Government declared that primary education had received insufficient attention and an inadequate share of the public funds ; and that primary education should be made a leading charge upon provincial revenues. Lastly, in 1912, His Majesty the King Emperor made his famous declaration on education in the following terms :—

" It is my wish that there may be spread over the land a network of schools and colleges, from which will go forth loyal and manly and useful citizens, able to hold their own in industries and agriculture and all the vocations in life. And it is my wish, too, that the homes of my Indian subjects may be brightened and their labour sweetened by the spread of knowledge, with all that follows in its train, a higher level of thought, of comfort, and of health. It is through education that my wish will be fulfilled, and the cause of education in India will ever be very close to my heart."

24. The primary education of the masses has thus been repeatedly declared, during the last seventy-five years, to be the special care of the British Government in India. It is, therefore, worth while to examine the progress achieved in this direction during that period and to see how far it has kept pace with the repeated declarations of policy. The population of British India, according to the census of 1921, is 247 millions. In 1917, that is, sixty-three years after the despatch of 1854, and on the eve of the Government of India Act of 1919, only 6.4 millions, that is, 2.59 per cent. of the total population, were receiving instruction in recognised primary schools. The total expenditure in the same year on primary schools amounted to 2.93 crores of rupees. When we compare this amount with the total disbursements for the year of the Central and Provincial Governments, namely, 156.86 crores, or the expenditure on the army, namely, 46.14 crores, the true measure of the interest displayed by the Government in mass education becomes apparent. It is not surprising in the face of these facts that public opinion in India was profoundly disappointed with the rate of progress achieved and became openly sceptical as to the professed intention of the Government in the matter.

Progress
achieved
before the
Reforms.

25. This attitude was confirmed when a Bill, introduced by the late Mr. G. K. Gokhale into the Imperial Legislative Council in 1911 to make primary education compulsory with the consent of the local authorities and the local governments, was turned down by Government on the plea, *inter alia*, that there was no popular demand for the measure. This plea was signally refuted when the popular representatives were given the opportunity of implementing their intentions in the matter. But,

Mr. Gok-
hale's Com-
pulsory
Education
Bill.

in the meanwhile, the Government of India categorically declared in 1913 that for financial and administrative reasons they refused to adopt the plea of compulsion in primary education.

Progress
since the
Reforms.

26. With the passing of the Government of India Act of 1919, education became a transferred subject, in charge of a minister responsible to the council. Forthwith education became the special care of the councils and a powerful impetus was given to its expansion. By 1927 the number of pupils in primary schools rose to 9.24 millions, an increase of 44.4 per cent. during the decade. The expenditure on primary education, which amounted to only 0.96 crores in 1892 and gradually rose to 2.93 crores in 1917, jumped, during the next decade, to 6.95 crores, an increase of 237 per cent. Large sums were demanded by the ministers and voted gladly by the legislative councils. With the exception of Burma, all the provinces accepted the principle of compulsion in the matter of primary education. In the words of the Committee, "India, as a whole, has realised that the goal of universal primary education cannot be attained without the adoption of the principle of compulsion." So far as the education of boys is concerned, Madras has already gone more than half way towards the goal of universal primary education, while Bengal, Bombay and the Punjab have gone nearly as far, and in all other provinces considerable advance has been made. The old-time apathy of the masses towards education is being rapidly broken down; there is a real desire for education and many parents, however poor, are now prepared to make sacrifices in order that their children may be educated. There has been a social and political awakening of the women of India and an insistent demand on their behalf for education and social reform. Rapid progress has been made in the number of Muslims receiving education, and the Depressed Classes are beginning to respond to the efforts that have been made to improve their condition. On all sides there is a desire on the part of the leaders of public opinion to grapple with the complex and difficult problems of education.

Secondary
and Higher
Education.

27. In regard to secondary education, the Auxilliary Committee are of opinion that the present system "is already making a real contribution towards the building up of a directing class." "Of the general excellence of material," they state, "in Indian secondary schools for boys those of us who have lived in the country can speak with confidence With adequate adjustment in the secondary school system and with the strengthening of the present efforts to brighten and enrich the school life of the pupils, the schools in India should be able to contribute in increasing measure to the well-being of public life in the country." With regard to higher education, which has of late been subjected to much criticism in India, the Committee close with an equally hopeful note. "There are signs," they state, "that the university and college authorities in

India are beginning to realise more fully the value of corporate life and social activities. There is a growing feeling that education is not merely a matter of lectures, books and notes, but of the living contact of personalities, of students with students, and of students with teachers. Opportunities for corporate life are being extended by college societies, by hostels and halls of residence, by games and healthy recreation, college days and reunions, socials, old students' gatherings, college societies and magazines, these are now the rule rather than the exception. In a number of universities, there are social service leagues which encourage in the student a sympathy with his less fortunate fellow citizens and which impress upon him that it is a duty and a privilege to give them a helping hand."

28. We are of opinion that these facts constitute a complete vindication of and a conclusive argument for carrying forward to its final stage a system which has produced these results. The meagre progress achieved in the pre-Reform period, the phenomenal expansion of education since its transfer to responsible ministers, the keen interest displayed by all sections of the community in their own education and the sacrifices made by them in that behalf are factors which we think more than fulfil the test which we started to apply. We are aware that there is much waste and ineffectiveness, that the results have not always been commensurate with the effort. The rapidity of the advance has led to defects of organisation which call for a remedy before the full fruit of the efforts is reaped. But the defects are unavoidable in the early stages of such a gigantic effort. Given time to take stock of the situation we have no doubt that those who have shown such enthusiasm for the cause will not allow their sacrifices to be in vain. We are, therefore, not dismayed by the debit side of the account. What is essential, in our opinion, is the fact that the sudden transfer of responsibility from the bureaucracy to the people of the country led to no shrinking on the part of the latter, but rather to a keen determination to seize the opportunity and to turn it into splendid achievement.

Our
conclusion.

CHAPTER III.

DEVELOPMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE INSTITUTIONS.

Indian
Councils
Acts of 1831
and 1892.

29. The Indian Councils Act of 1861 was the first enactment by which representatives of Indian opinion were admitted to a share in the legislatures of the country. A few Indians were nominated as additional members of the legislative councils of Madras, Bombay and Bengal, but their position was purely advisory and no share of responsibility was conferred upon them. The Councils Act of 1892 for the first time introduced, tentatively and cautiously, the principle of election in the legislative councils of Madras, Bombay, Bengal and the United Provinces. The official majorities in the councils were maintained, but a majority of the unofficial seats were filled by nomination on the recommendation of local bodies. In practice the local bodies elected representatives, since their choice was respected by the local governments in filling up the nominated posts. In the Legislative Council of the Governor-General the same principle was even more sparingly applied, four seats being filled on the recommendation of the unofficial members of the four provincial councils and one on the recommendation of the Calcutta Chamber of Commerce. The Authors of the Joint Report note that the working of the councils established by the Act of 1892 had, on the whole, been favourable, the criticisms as a rule being moderate and valuable suggestions being not infrequently received.

Morley-
Minto
Reforms.

30. The next landmark of importance was the Morley-Minto Reforms of 1909. The principal features of the constitutional changes then introduced were the definite introduction of the elective principle based on representation by classes and interests; the official recognition of the claims of the Muslims to separate electorates; and the acceptance of the principle of indirect election by municipalities and districts boards as the method of selection of the majority of the unofficial members of the legislatures. In Bengal alone did the elected members form a majority of the council; elsewhere the majority was composed of official and nominated members. In the Governor-General's Council, where a small official majority was retained, the elected members were chosen partly by special constituencies and partly by the unofficial members of the nine provincial councils.

Absence of
real respon-
sibility.

31. The evolution of the councils had now reached the point at which representative Indians were admitted to an increasing share in the legislatures and the principle of election was definitely established; but the authors of the Morley-Minto Reforms specifically disclaimed any intention of establishing a system of parliamentary government in India. All real power

and responsibility still vested in the bureaucracy. The share of Indians was confined to criticism of the action of the authorities over which they had no effective control. In framing the various Acts referred to above the advice of individual Indians was doubtless sought, but little regard was paid to Indian public opinion. The enactments in question represented rather the views of Englishmen as to the means which, in their opinion, should be adopted to carry out what was commonly referred to in England as "the responsibility of England for the government of India." No real responsibility was conferred on Indians and in the absence of this all-important element of responsibility in the provincial and central legislatures it cannot be contended that, prior to the introduction of the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms, the British Government had afforded to the people of India any real opportunity for learning the art of self-government in the domain either of provincial or central administration.

32. Nor were the conditions materially different in the sphere of local self-government. Although municipal government had existed in the Presidency towns from the early days of British rule, it was not until 1872-78 that the first substantial steps were taken towards establishing it on an elective basis, one-half the membership in Madras and Bombay and two-thirds in Calcutta being thrown open to election. In Bombay alone was the Corporation allowed to elect its own chairman; in Madras and Calcutta the power of nominating this functionary was reserved to the Government. For urban areas outside the Presidency towns legislation was passed about the middle of the nineteenth century permitting the formation, on the application of the inhabitants, of local committees to deal with municipal affairs, but the experiment failed generally. As a result of the Report of the Royal Army Sanitary Commission, 1863, which prominently directed attention to the unhealthy condition of towns, action was taken to do away with the voluntary principle and to recognise for the first time the desirability of a number of members of municipal committees being elected with the permission of the local government. In the Central Provinces alone, however, was the elective principle actually introduced; and it was not until 1870 that this principle was generally recognised in the municipal law of the provinces.

33. The great landmark in the history of local self-government is the resolution of Lord Ripon's Government in 1882, which for the first time recognised local self-government as "an instrument of political and popular education," and recommended the provincial governments to extend a net-work of institutions of local government throughout the country and especially in rural areas; to introduce in them a preponderance of non-official members, elected wherever possible; and to eliminate inside control as far

Local self-
government :
Early stages.

Lord Ripon's
Pronounce-
ment.

Effect in urban areas. as possible by the appointment of non-official chairmen. In the legislation which ensued the proportion of elected members was fixed at one-half in Bombay, two-thirds in Bengal and three-quarters in Madras, the North-Western Province (now the United Provinces) and Burma. In the Punjab the introduction of the elective principle was left to the discretion of the local government. Assam and the Central Provinces passed no new legislation.

In rural areas.

34. In rural areas, prior to 1882, local funds raised on a semi-voluntary basis or under Executive orders were managed by local officials or small committees, some of which had a nominated non-official element. In Bengal alone was the power taken under the law to get two-thirds of the members elected or nominated from amongst the ratepayers ; but, in practice, the method of election to these committees was not adopted. The resolution of Lord Ripon led to the creation of District and Taluk Boards in all provinces and smaller units in some of them, but the elective principle was only partially introduced in the composition of the larger bodies. Thus, in Madras and the North-Western Province the boards were either wholly or partly nominated ; in Bombay only one-half the members of each board could be elected ; while in Bengal election was applied in the advanced districts only. In the Punjab the Government retained the power to decide whether appointments should be by election or nomination ; the Central Provinces conceded the right to elect two-thirds of the members ; and in Assam the elective system was not applied to Indians but members of the European Planting Community were permitted to elect their representatives.

Electorates.

35. The formation of the electorates was scarcely designed materially to further the political education of the people. In Madras only to the Village Unions and to Taluk Boards in areas which had no village unions could direct election be made by taxpayers : the election to district boards could only be made by members of Taluk Boards from amongst themselves. Similar provisions, with slight variations, existed in Bengal and the North-Western Province. In the matter of the appointment of chairmen discretion was generally reserved to the Government to allow them to be elected or nominated ; but except in the Central Provinces official chairmen were as a rule appointed. The main aim of Lord Ripon's policy was to convert local bodies from "mere shadows," as Lord MacDonell calls them, registering the orders of the Executive, into vital links in the administrative chain, and as schools for training the inhabitants of the country in responsibility. To judge how far they fulfilled this function we cannot do better than quote the verdict of the Joint Report. "What happened," the Joint Authors state, "was that the educative principle was subordinated to the desire for more immediate results. The manage-

Lord Ripon's policy not given effect to.

ment of local affairs remained in the hands of those who were most competent to handle them, not from bureaucratic lust of power, but because no other agency readily presented itself and district officers never had the leisure nor were given sufficient assistance to create one. The broad fact remains that in a space of over thirty years the progress in developing genuine local self-government has been inadequate in the greater part of India." Had practical effect been given to the liberal sentiments which underlay Lord Ripon's pronouncement of 1882, the people of India would have been better prepared to carry out the responsibilities of self-government in the years following 1919.

36. The Pronouncement of the 20th August, 1917, and the Montagu-Chelmsford Report again focussed attention on the development of local self-government, and proposals were elaborated in most of the provinces which were intended to democratise local bodies and invest them with real responsibility. Under the Reforms local self-government became a provincial transferred subject, and from 1921 the practical application of the policy fell to the ministers. That the power was fully exercised is proved by the number of laws relating to local self-government which were passed by the provincial legislative councils between 1921 and 1926. In Bombay the franchise for the rural boards was extended, the sex disqualification removed, and increased powers given to the boards. The proportion of elected members in the larger municipalities was raised to four-fifths; women were given the franchise and the right to stand for election; and special provision was made for the representation of the depressed classes. In Bengal the Calcutta Municipal Act democratised the constitution of the Calcutta Corporation; removed the sex disqualification; and made the offices of both the mayor and the chief executive officer elective. In the United Provinces the qualifications for the municipal and the district board vote were reduced; the composition of the boards completely de-officialised; and increased powers of taxation conferred on them. No less than five laws were passed in the Punjab increasing the power and independence of the municipalities and lowering the franchise for the district boards. The nominated element in all local bodies was substantially reduced and the municipalities were encouraged to elect non-official presidents and vice-presidents. The result, broadly speaking, was to make the boards, both municipal and rural, predominantly non-official in all the Governors' Provinces and to reduce the control of Government to external supervision by the elimination of officers of Government from the position of chairmen. To what extent conditions in these respects were altered will be evident from the following table :—

Growth of
Local Self-
Govern-
ment since
the
Reforms.

Statement showing the percentage of Elected Members and Chairmen of Municipalities and Rural Boards in 1918-19 and 1925-26.

Name of Province.	Municipalities.				Rural Boards.			
	Percentage of elected members.		Percentage of elected Chairmen.		Percentage of elected members.		Percentage of elected Chairmen.	
	1918-19.	1925-26.	1918-19.	1925-26.	1918-19.	1925-26.	1918-19.	1925-26.
Madras . . .	55.8	76.7	69.44	96.25	22.2	85.4	16.49	94.17
Bombay . . .	48.9	78.3	40.52	92.3	49.7	75.4	None	85.55
Bengal . . .	62.9	64.2	85.21	93.0	47.4	61.3	69.82	96.29
United Provinces	85.2	86.9	74.69	85.88	74.6	93.4	66.66	100.
Punjab . . .	51.0	72.3	19.44	86.53	36.9	67.0	None	73.44
✓ Bihar and Orissa	✓ 59.9	✓ 77.9	✓ 40.0	✓ 91.41	✓ 86.1	✓ 73.4	✓ 56.56	✓ 91.12
Central Provinces	62.4	77.4	84.74	96.92	73.8	75.3	69.6	88.66
Assam . . .	53.1	78.1	60.87	60.0	63.0	69.7	5.26	68.42

Conditions
before and
after 1920
contrasted.

37. The broad facts which stand out from the above narrative are that for a space of thirty-six years from the date of Lord Ripon's Resolution local bodies remained in the leading-strings of officials, and little progress was made in the real training of the people in responsibility, even in local affairs; that the impulse for their present growth and democratisation came from the Pronouncement of 1917; and, finally, that the marked progress made since that date is due largely to the initiative of the ministers working with the full support of the reformed legislatures. The enthusiasm of both bore fruit to which reference has been made in the preceding paragraph. Great interest was taken by the people both in the elections to local bodies and in the work performed by them. The percentage of voters who went to the polls was 70 in municipal, and 52 in rural areas in Madras in 1925-26. and 65 in municipal, and 61 in rural areas in Bihar and Orissa in 1927. The position in the other provinces in this respect is not dissimilar. To the keen interest taken by the local bodies in education the report of the Auxiliary Committee bears eloquent testimony. Large sums were also spent by them on the extension of medical facilities and the improvement of public health. Their aversion to taxation had been a common complaint in the pre-Reform period. But with the broadening of their constitution they showed themselves remarkably alive to their responsibilities in this direction. The incidence of taxation per head of population in the municipalities rose in all provinces during the years 1918-1919 to 1925-1926, some of the notable increases being from Rs. 3-4-1 to Rs. 5-11-6 in Bombay; Rs. 2-3-0 to Rs. 3-7-7 in the United Provinces; Rs. 3-5-6 to Rs. 4-2-7 in the Punjab; and Rs. 1-8-9 to Rs. 2-2-0 in Bihar and Orissa. The rise in the

case of the rural boards was less noticeable, Bombay being a notable exception, with an increase from Rs. 0-2-7 to Rs. 0-5-1.

38. We find that the working of local bodies in recent years has been subjected to adverse criticism ; but it does not appear to be sufficiently realised by the critics that responsibility was suddenly transferred from trained officers, supported by adequate technical staff and with the resources of the revenue department generally at their disposal for purposes of inspection and check, to unofficial bodies operating in some cases with inadequate technical staff and in an atmosphere charged with resentment against, and suspicion of, official control. Where, in the first years of the reformed constitution, advice from experienced officials might have been of great value to local bodies, the conditions were such that the latter were as little likely to ask for it as the former were certain to feel diffident in offering it. Circumstances thus combined to render the task of local bodies, in these first years of their emancipation from official control, one of unexampled difficulty. It would be unsafe, as well as unfair, to attempt to draw too definite conclusions as to the future of local self-government from the history of the past nine years. To us the wonder is, not that these bodies should have failed in some instances to maintain their former efficiency, but that their general level of working should have remained so high. Many of the defects, in our opinion, were the inevitable result of the suddenness with which the transition from official tutelage to complete freedom was made. They do not connote an inability on the part of the people to manage their own affairs through the medium of representative institutions. Certain improvements in the machinery of local self-government are undoubtedly called for ; and in particular the relationship between the provincial governments and local bodies seems to require investigation. We have been greatly impressed with the necessity for the improvement—in some provinces creation would be a more appropriate word—of the machinery through which local governments supervise and co-ordinate the work of local bodies. We desire to draw particular attention to this important question. In so far, however, as any inference as to the fitness of the people for responsibility in the political sphere can be legitimately drawn from their conduct of affairs in the sphere of local self-government, we think that the narrative outlined above fully supports and justifies the advance which we are going to recommend.

Our conclusion.

Part II.

THE PROPOSALS.

CHAPTER IV.

THE PROVINCES.

QUESTION OF SIND AND BURMA.

39. Before we deal with the question of the provincial governments two preliminary questions must be referred to : (1) the question of the separation of Sind from the Bombay Presidency and its constitution into a separate province ; and (2) the question of the separation of Burma from India.

Separation
of Sind
from the
Bombay
Presidency.

(1) *Sind*.—The population of Sind, according to the last census, amounted to 3,279,377, of which Muslims numbered 2,406,023 and Hindus 840,567. The evidence which was presented to the Joint Free Conference indicates sufficiently clearly that the great majority of the Muslim inhabitants of Sind desire its separation from Bombay and its formation into a new province. The reasons put forward by them in support of their proposal are principally of a sentimental character, but none the less potent. They argue that Sind is geographically, ethnologically and linguistically a unit distinct from the Presidency proper, all of which grounds of argument are substantially correct. We cannot, however, agree with their argument that the connection of Sind with Bombay has been of disadvantage to Sind, and in particular that the port of Karachi has suffered owing to the jealousy of Bombay. The principal arguments put forward by those—including the Bombay Government—who are opposed to separation, are of a financial nature. It is argued that Sind is too small, both in area and population, to support a separate government : that it would be impossible for Sind to support the expense of maintaining a staff of experts such as those whose advice she now enjoys as part of the Presidency proper. Further, the cadre of the public services would be so small that it would be difficult to obtain men of the right stamp. Special reference is made in this connection to the Sukkur barrage, the capital necessary for the completion of which has been provided by the Government of India. It is argued that that Government would not consent that the barrage and its connected irrigation should be handed over to a provincial government without insisting upon the right to exercise some control, with the object of seeing that funds for the service of the debt and repayment of the capital were provided.

Some of us are of opinion that the financial question is at present a definite bar to the creation of a separate province of

Sind. The majority of us, however, are of the opinion that if the people of Sind are prepared to face the financial burden and other disadvantages which seem likely to result from the constitution of a separate province, their wishes in the matter should be complied with. We, accordingly, recommend that Sind should be separated from the Bombay Presidency.

(2) *Burma*.—It is undeniable that there exists among the people of Burma a strong demand that Burma should be separated from India. Some of us are of the opinion that it would be inconsistent with India's claim for self-government to deny to the Burmans the right to separate from India, should they so desire. The proposal, however, raises questions of such vital importance to both countries that their consideration and settlement appear to the majority of us to be a necessary preliminary to a decision on the main question. The two principal questions for decision are those connected with defence and finance, and we have not the material before us to enable us to form a considered judgment on such intricate and debatable problems. We have had estimates placed before us which attempt to forecast the financial effect of the separation of Burma ; and protagonists of Burma's cause argue that she will benefit considerably by the change. On the other hand, it is claimed that large sums of Indian money were expended upon the conquest and subsequent development of Burma ; that Burma for many years was a deficit province maintained at the expense of India ; and that if Burma is now to cease to be a part of India, India can justly claim the repayment of large sums. As regards the question of defence, various problems are involved. The risk of invasion from the North-East is perhaps small at present ; but India must always be interested in the adequate defence of Burma from external invasion. The Burmans have not so far shown any great capacity for regular military service ; yet Burma, separated from India, would have no more claim to be garrisoned by the Indian Army than has Ceylon. If the Indian Army is to be withdrawn from Burma, by whom is the country to be garrisoned and what will be the financial effect of the consequent changes ? Such are some of the aspects of two vital questions connected with the problem of the separation of Burma. Until these questions have received full and careful consideration and a settlement of them has been arrived at, we are not in a position to recommend the separation of Burma from India.

Separation
of Burma
from India.

PROVINCIAL EXECUTIVE.

40. The nine provinces are now governed by a divided Executive, the Governor-in-Council controlling the reserved subjects, while the Governor with ministers is responsible for the transferred subjects. The alternatives before us are either to retain dyarchy, whether in its present or in a modified form, or to abolish the distinction between reserved and transferred subjects

Present
structure of
the Pro-
vincial
Executive;
Dyarchy.

and set up a unitary form of government. The present system was devised as a temporary expedient ; it is highly artificial, has many inherent defects and involves grave disadvantages. That the system has worked even moderately well since its inception is a tribute to the men who have worked it, rather than an argument in favour of its continuance. The King's Government has been carried on in spite of, and not because of, dyarchy. There is, in fact, a preponderating volume of opinion, both official and unofficial, in favour of the abolition of dyarchy and the institution of a unitary system of government in the provinces. Apart from the views of individuals, it is only the United Provinces Government and the Bombay Provincial Committee who, as a body, recommend the continuance of dyarchy. The Bombay Provincial Committee would retain the department of Law and Order as a reserved subject only for a period of five years, after which it should be open to the provincial legislature to demand the transfer of this last remnant of dyarchy to the control of responsible ministers. The United Provinces Government, while recommending the retention of a modified system of dyarchy, would widen the field of responsibility by the transfer of further subjects.

Unitary
system of
Government
recom-
mended.

41. In view of this consensus of opinion among those who have had first-hand experience of dyarchy, the majority of us have no hesitation in recommending that the Executive Government in the nine major provinces and in the Province of Sind, if separated from Bombay, should consist of a Governor, appointed by the Crown, and ministers responsible to the legislature. We consider that the distinction between reserved and transferred subjects should be abolished and that all subjects, save those specifically classified as central, should be provincial. The only exception we would make to this general rule is that in Bengal, following the recommendation of the local Government, we would retain law and order in charge of a member not directly responsible to the legislature.

Strength of
the Cabinet.

42. On consideration of the local conditions and the recommendations of the various Provincial Governments and Committees, we recommend that the Cabinet should consist of eight ministers in Madras, six in the United Provinces, five in Bombay, Bengal, Punjab and Burma, four in Bihar and Orissa and Assam, and three in the Central Provinces. The ministers should be appointed by the Governor in the manner indicated in the next paragraph ; and, except in one instance referred to hereafter, either be elected members of the local Legislature or obtain seats therein within six months from the date of appointment. We do not accept the suggestion that they should be elected by the Legislature.

Joint re-
sponsibility.

43. It is an essential feature of our scheme that there should be joint responsibility in the Cabinet. We therefore recommend that in appointing the ministers the Governor should follow the English constitutional practice of selecting the Chief Minister

and appointing the other ministers on his recommendation. It was suggested in the course of our deliberations that the Governor should appoint the ministers in consultation with the Chief Minister but not necessarily on his recommendations. This, however, would, in our opinion, be incompatible with joint responsibility, since it is essential for the latter that the Chief Minister should be in a position to select colleagues in whom he has confidence and not be compelled to accept men chosen by the Governor.

44. Two of our colleagues have urged that statutory provision should be made for the inclusion of one Muslim member in the Cabinet in provinces where the Muslims form a minority of the population. They argue that the interests of the community must be safeguarded within the inner councils of the Government ; and that this can be done most effectively by including in the Cabinet a representative of the community. They point to the fact that throughout the period during which the existing constitution has been in operation the Executive Government of every Province, save the Central Provinces and Burma, has almost invariably contained a Muslim member, and they desire that this recognition of the position of the community should be confirmed in the new constitution. Finally, they argue that questions connected with Muhammadan religious endowments, the appointment of Kazis and cognate matters must be handled by Muhammadan ministers.

Composition of the Cabinet : Question of a Muslim Minister.

45. The desire of the Muslim community for a share in the Executive Government of the country is natural and has our entire sympathy. We believe that no wise minister will ignore the accession of strength which the inclusion of a Muslim member will bring to his Cabinet. It is probable that the exigencies of the parliamentary situation will make the inclusion of a Muslim minister in the Cabinet virtually certain in most provinces. In any case it is very improbable that the position accorded to the community in this respect during the past ten years will be lightly ignored in the formation of future ministries. But a statutory provision for the appointment of a Muslim, irrespective of his capacity and the parliamentary support he is able to command, is, in our opinion, impossible of acceptance. The admission of such a claim would give rise to similar claims from other communities and interests, which it would be difficult to ignore. Such an appointment would be inconsistent with the assumption of joint responsibility by the Cabinet and would be destructive of its solidarity. In the words of the Punjab Committee, the selection of ministers irrespective of party considerations " would cut at the very root of the principle of responsible government."* The argument relating to Muslim endowments appears to us to be particularly dangerous. These

Statutory provision for inclusion of a Muslim in Cabinet not recommended.

* Report of the Punjab Reforms Committee 1929, para. 90.

endowments are at present adjudicated upon by judges irrespective of their religion. If the argument were sound that a Muhammadan minister alone should deal with them on the executive side, it might be claimed with equal force that a Muhammadan judge alone should be capable of handling them on the judicial side—a claim which has never been made and would, if allowed, be subversive of sound government. We, therefore, find ourselves unable to accept the proposal.

Working of
the Cabinet.

46. With regard to the internal working of the Cabinet, we propose that the Chief Minister should preside at the meetings and, save in Bengal in one particular respect, distribute the portfolios amongst the members of the Cabinet. He may appoint a member to preside in his absence, and such member will be the Vice-President of the Cabinet and possess all the powers of the Chief Minister for the time being. It should be within the discretion of the Chief Minister to appoint an official as secretary to the Cabinet, who should work under his orders or, in his absence, under those of the Vice-President. Rules for the transaction of the business of the local government should be prepared by the Cabinet and submitted to the Governor for his approval, and should become operative to the extent of such approval.

The
Governor
not to be a
member of
the Cabinet.

47. It follows from our proposals regarding the constitution of the Cabinet that the Governor will not be a member of it. It is desirable that the Governor, as a direct representative of the King-Emperor, should not become the subject of criticism in the Legislative Council, as would be the case if he is directly connected with the decisions of the Cabinet. There is, however, a more weighty reason for his exclusion. The transition from the present dyarchical constitution to full responsible government in the provinces necessitates the retention of certain extraordinary powers in the hands of the Governor. It is essential for the proper exercise of those powers that the Governor should be placed outside and above the Cabinet. It is our hope that with the growth of responsible government in the provinces the exercise of those powers will gradually fall into desuetude, leaving the Governor ultimately in the position of a constitutional ruler. The consummation of this ideal will be retarded rather than advanced by placing the Governor in the Cabinet.

Law and
Order in
Bengal.

48. The exception we have made in paragraph 42 relates to the portfolio of Law and Order in Bengal. Owing to the existence of acute communal tension in that province and its repercussions on the administration, a section of the Government of Bengal is of opinion that the handing over of the portfolio of Law and Order to an elected minister, responsible to the Council, would create "a large measure of distrust and apprehension, which would be unfavourable to the advance of the province."*

* Report on the working of the Reformed Constitution in Bengal, 1921-27, Part II, pages 15—16.

The Government of Bengal, therefore, recommend that the portfolio in question should be placed in the hands of an official minister, appointed by the Governor. The Government, including this official member, should, they suggest, be unitary in character, and proposals connected with the department of Law and Order which come before the Legislative Council should have been approved by the Government as a whole.

49. We are impressed with the danger pointed out, but apprehend that the solution recommended by the Government of Bengal would be unworkable and would make the position of the official minister vis-à-vis the members of the Cabinet and the Legislature full of difficulty. The alternative suggested by the Provincial Committee, namely, that of safeguarding the administration of the department of Law and Order by an elected minister by associating with him a board composed on communal lines, does not commend itself to us as either feasible or satisfactory. We have already recommended that Law and Order should not be a transferred subject in Bengal. In pursuance of this recommendation we now propose that the portfolio should be placed in charge of a member—not necessarily an official—appointed by the Governor. He will on appointment become an ex-officio member of the Legislative Council ; but will not, of course, be responsible to it. Save in this respect we recommend that the constitution and the working of the Cabinet in Bengal should follow the general lines laid down for the other provinces.

50. A question which has engaged our special attention is the desirability of guarding against the risk of too frequent changes of ministries. It is a well-known historical fact that governments tend to be most stable where the two-party system obtains in the legislature, while cabinets dependent on the support of groups separated by no very clear political principles change, often with kaleidoscopic rapidity. Until regular parties develop and the principles of responsible government are more widely understood throughout India, the risk to which we have alluded is one that must be faced. It requires little argument to make out a case for giving reasonable security of tenure to ministries in the years during which a system of truly responsible government is being inaugurated in the provinces. Various methods have been suggested by which this end might be attained. The American model—an executive appointed for a fixed period—we have rejected as being unsuited to Indian conditions and inconsistent with the form of government which we desire to see established. Our object is to give the ministers reasonable security of tenure, while ensuring that power to remove them shall be exercisable by the legislature when they have ceased to have its confidence. We, therefore, consider that adequate notice should be given before any motion of want of confidence is introduced. This provision will ensure that all members of the legislature will have a reasonable opportunity to

Our proposals regarding the same.

Desirability of securing stability of Ministries : Votes of want of confidence.

attend. We further consider that no motion of want of confidence should entail the resignation of a ministry unless two-thirds of the members present vote in favour of it. Some of us would have preferred that an absolute majority of the members of the legislature should be required in order to carry a motion of no-confidence ; but such a provision would, perhaps, render the removal of an unpopular ministry too difficult. We have, therefore, preferred the first alternative.

**Salaries of
Ministers.**

51. Following the almost unanimous recommendation of the provincial Governments and Committees, we recommend that the salaries of ministers and of the President of the Council should be fixed by an Act of the local legislature. We are aware that the reduction of salary by a vote of the legislature is one of the generally accepted methods of bringing censure on a minister and of removing him from office. But under our proposal it will be open to the legislature to secure this end by refusal or reduction of the grants required for the administration of a department. On the other hand, until constitutional usages and practices become more crystallized and appreciated in India, we think that there is some advantage in not keeping the ministers in a state of uncertainty as to the extent of their salaries from time to time, and in securing that the reduction, if any, will be carried by the deliberate will of the legislature expressed by a formal enactment and not by a casual vote.

**Position of
the Governor.**

52. The Governor of a province at present occupies a dual position and exercises a double responsibility. On the one hand, he is the executive head of a bureaucratic administration responsible only to the Parliament of Great Britain, and in this capacity exercises certain powers of superintendence and control over a legislature that is in part popularly elected. On the other hand, he exercises, vis-à-vis the Ministry and Legislature, special responsibilities unconnected with any of the subjects administered by the reserved half of the Provincial Government. The proposals which we put forward will, if adopted, have the effect of modifying profoundly the position of the Governor. With the transfer of all subjects to a responsible Minister certain of his existing functions will automatically lapse ; and we have to decide on the powers of control with which we wish to invest him in view of the altered circumstances. We have been impressed during the course of our tour with the Statutory Commission by the evidence of a widespread demand that the Governor should be the depository of certain extraordinary powers to enable him to deal with any emergencies that may arise. We have found a general realisation of the fact that in a situation so novel and complex as that produced in India by the constitutional changes consequent on the institution of the reforms, the future course of events cannot with any certainty be predicted or foreseen. There is a disposition in some quarters to regard the Governor as a *Deus ex machina* who will step in to assuage communal difference, solve all difficulties, and, in the

last resort, assume charge of the administration in the event of a breakdown.

While we are alive to the importance of investing the Governor with adequate powers to meet all emergencies that may arise during the time that the country is settling down to the exercise of the increased responsibilities of provincial self-government, we are no less impressed with the importance of making responsible government in the provinces a reality. The chief responsibility for the government of the province must rest with the Cabinet. The Governor, we consider, should normally remain in the background, armed with certain emergency powers of intervention and control, which we trust may gradually lapse through disuse, until he has assumed the position of a constitutional ruler in the British Dominions.

53. The Governor of the province should, we consider, exercise the ordinary constitutional power of dismissing the Cabinet ; but we would not vest in him any extraordinary power to dismiss an individual minister, as has been proposed in some quarters. In dismissing, as in appointing, a Cabinet, we consider that the Governor should follow the ordinary constitutional practice which obtains in self-governing British dominions. The power of the Governor to override the Cabinet we would restrict and confine within prescribed limits. For the purpose of maintaining peace and tranquillity in a province we consider that it should be open to the Governor to take any steps and, if necessary, issue orders in the name of the Government of the province to preserve peace and order. Where the Governor considers that an order issued by a minister should be overruled for the purpose of maintaining peace and tranquillity, he should have the power to do so. Similarly, where no order has been issued by a minister, the Governor should have the power to issue any order necessary in his opinion for the maintenance of peace and tranquillity. In this connection we consider that it should be open to the Governor to direct or prohibit the transfer of any district magistrate or district superintendent of police to and from any district. Apart from matters connected with the maintenance of peace and tranquillity, we consider that the Governor should not be given the power to override the decision of the majority of the Cabinet. If, however, he differs from the Cabinet on any question affecting (a) the religion or the religious rites of any class of British subjects in British India ; (b) any central subject ; or (c) the interests of another province, he should have the power to refer the question to the Governor-General, whose decision shall be final.

The
Governor
and the
Cabinet.

PROVINCIAL LEGISLATURE.

54. We now turn to a consideration of questions connected with the composition and powers of the provincial legislatures. The authors of the Joint Report laid emphasis on the existence of a wide and intelligent electorate as essential for

Franchise :
Recom-
mendations
of the Joint
Report.

Size of the
present
electorates.

complete responsible government and suggested it as one of the most important duties of the Statutory Commission "to examine the growth of capacity and responsibility in the electorates."* But, while they spoke of "a broad franchise as the arch on which the edifice of self-government must be raised,"† they recommended that its extent should be determined "rather with reference to practical difficulties than to any *a priori* considerations as to the degree of education or amount of income which may be held to constitute a qualification."‡ Acting on these lines and following largely the varying recommendations of the local governments, the Franchise (Southborough) Committee suggested electorates ranging from 1.2 per cent. of the population in the Punjab to 3.3 per cent. in Bombay, the figure in one province only, namely, Assam, being as high as 5 per cent. Owing to various reasons alluded to hereafter, these ratios have since altered, and the percentages based on the figures of voters in 1926 are as follows—

Name of Province.		Percentage of Total Population Enfranchised.	
Madras	3.2
Bombay	4.03
Bengal	2.4
United Provinces	3.5
Punjab	3.4
Bihar and Orissa	1.1
Burma	13.8
Assam	3.3
Central Provinces and Berar	1.23
Legislative Assembly		0.45

Size of
electorate
no criterion
of fitness
for Self-
Govern-
ment.

55. The smallness of the electorates has been made in some quarters a ground of criticism against the Councils, and it is argued that, until the latter become more largely representative, it would be idle to think of investing them with larger powers. It may, however, be mentioned that a system of parliamentary government existed in England before 1832, although the electorate was practically confined to the upper classes; and that even after the Reform Act of 1832 the proportion of the population enfranchised was less than 3 per cent.; it rose to 9 per cent. in 1867 and 16 per cent. in 1884. The growth of the electorate in other countries has been equally slow; but the smallness of the electorate has nowhere precluded the exercise of self-government by the countries concerned. We can conceive of no reason why the case of India should be different. It must also be borne in mind that the comparison of voters with the total population presents the size of the electorate in a somewhat unfavourable perspective.

* Report on Indian Constitutional Reforms, para. 264.

†Ibid. para. 262.

‡Ibid. para. 226.

The complete enfranchisement of women, even in leading European countries, is of recent occurrence. In India, owing to social customs amongst Muslims and Hindus, the number of women enfranchised is necessarily small and unduly lowers the general average. A more true picture is afforded by comparing the electorate with the adult male population, which virtually is the only class from which it is formed. Looked at from this point of view, the electorate comprises 46 per cent. of the population in Burma ; 11 to 13 per cent. in Madras, Bombay, the United Provinces, Punjab and Assam ; 9 per cent. in Bengal ; and 4 per cent. in Bihar and Orissa and the Central Provinces and Berar. The percentages, except in the last two cases, are not inconsiderable ; but, nevertheless, we recognise that a truly democratic government, such as we aim at establishing in our country, is inconsistent with the existence of a narrow franchise. We, therefore, propose that a substantial increase should be made in the size of the electorates.

56. The growth of the electorate during the last ten years and the popular attitude towards the exercise of the franchise, in our opinion, amply justify an advance. At the elections of 1920 there were potent influences at work hostile to the development of the electorate and to the use of the franchise. The registration of voters in 1920 showed an electorate of 5.3 millions in the provinces (excluding Burma, to which the reforms were not extended until 1923) and of 0.9 million in the Legislative Assembly. How far the registered strength was affected by the novelty of the work and by the Congress policy of boycott is not easy to determine ; but the registrations since 1920 have shown a steady growth in the electorate. By 1926 the electorate had risen to 6.4 millions in the eight provinces and to 1.1 million for the Assembly (excluding Burma) ; showing percentage increases of 20 and 22, respectively. The growth of population, increase of wealth bringing more citizens above the qualification levels, improved methods of registration and, lastly, the extension of female suffrage, have contributed to the increase. But it is undoubted that the change in the attitude of the political parties to the policy of council entry and the consequent quickening of public interest in politics have been potent factors in the increase.

Growth of
the elec-
torate.

57. The growth of the electorate is less significant of popular attitude towards franchise and the reforms generally than the growth of voting. At the elections for the Assembly in 1920, 25 per cent. of the voters in contested constituencies went to the polls ; in 1926 the percentage rose to 48. For the total electorate the figures in the two years were 20 per cent. and 36 per cent., respectively, the actual percentages in certain provinces being much higher, *e.g.*, 47 in the Punjab, 48 in the Central Provinces and 50 in Bihar and Orissa. Polling for the

Growth of
voting.

Provincial Councils has been equally heavy, the percentages in 1926 ranging from 39 in Bombay and 43 in Madras to 53 in the Punjab. For the contested constituencies in Bihar and Orissa in 1926 the percentage was 61, a remarkable figure for a comparatively backward province. On this point the remarks of some of the Provincial Governments are interesting :—

PUNJAB.

“ . . . the keenness in rural polling, even in districts previously regarded as backward and remote, denotes an ambition which can hardly be disregarded.”*

BENGAL.

“ There has been a slow but steady growth in the interest taken by the electorate in the elections and the working of the councils Considering the comparatively long distances that voters have to travel in the country to arrive at the polling booths, these figures appear to indicate that the interest taken in elections in rural areas is not less than in the towns.”†

Adult
Suffrage
impractic-
able.

58. We now come to our own proposals on the subject. We are of opinion that adult suffrage, though an ideal to be aimed at and reached by gradual stages, is impracticable at the present day. The number of persons now entitled to vote for the Provincial Councils is 8.25 millions approximately, and some of the local governments are opposed to an increase of this number on the ground, inter alia, of the inadequacy of the existing electoral machinery to deal satisfactorily with a larger number. According to the census of 1921, the population of British India, over twenty years of age, exceeds 128 millions. We believe that it would be impossible for an electorate of these dimensions to be handled adequately by the present or any other machinery that can be devised in the near future, until further experience has been gained in the handling of electorates of a more reasonable size.

Our
proposals.

59. With regard to the immediate extension of the franchise, two lines of advance suggest themselves, namely, to leave the question to the decision of the Councils, and secondly, to take the first step forward before the new Councils are constituted. Although we entertain no doubt as to the liberal intentions of the Councils in this behalf—the Madras Council has already declared itself in favour of adult suffrage—we consider that our demand for the transfer by Parliament of its responsibility over the whole field of administration in the provinces to the Legisla-

* Memorandum prepared for the use of the Indian Statutory Commission by the Government of the Punjab, Part IV, page 37.

† Report on the working of the Reformed Constitution in Bengal, 1921-7, Part I, page 132.

tive Councils can be made with greater reason if the Councils are representative of a wider electorate than less than 4 per cent. of the population as at present. We are further of opinion that the political education of the people can be most rapidly achieved through the channel of electorates and that "the gradual development of self-governing institutions" imperatively demands that the franchise should be more widely diffused than at present. We, therefore, recommend that the present electorate should be doubled immediately. Three Members of the Committee, on the other hand, are of opinion that there should be no change in the electorate for a period of seven years from the coming into force of the new constitution, as it would be unwise to widen the electorate at the same time that extensive changes are made in the constitution and the powers of the Councils.

60. With regard to future extension of the franchise, we recommend that the new Legislative Councils should have the power to raise or lower the franchise at the end of their second term, provided that any change shall not be carried into effect unless it is passed at a special meeting of the Council and is supported by not less than two-thirds of the members present. We further recommend that unless a more rapid advance is made earlier in the direction of adult suffrage, one-third of the adult population should be compulsorily enfranchised in 1941; two-thirds in 1951; and the whole in 1961. A minority of us would, however, prefer that the councils should be given the power, after the expiry of their second term, to increase the franchise, if they so desire, to not more than one-fourth of the adult population and thereafter at the same rate at the end of every two terms.

Future
extension
of the
Franchise.

We would exclude Burma from the scope of the above recommendations, since that province has already travelled a long way on the road to adult suffrage, the percentage of male voters to the population over twenty years of age being as high as 46.6. We, therefore, recommend that the question of further extension of the franchise in Burma should be left to the discretion of the Legislative Council.

61. The next question which demands our attention is the size and composition of the Provincial Legislatures. The present strength of the Legislative Councils does not, in our opinion, admit of effective representation of the various competing interests. The vast size of some of the constituencies—ranging from 4,000 to 8,000 miles in non-Muhammadan, to 37,000 square miles in Muhammadan rural constituencies in Madras, to quote but one example—makes electioneering difficult and expensive and any contact between the electors and their representatives remote and intangible. In order to make this representation more real, we recommend that the size of the constituencies should be reduced and consequently that their number should be increased. Bearing in mind the recom-

Size of the
Provincial
Councils.

recommendations of the Provincial Governments and Committees, we suggest the following numbers for the various provinces :—

<i>Name of Province.</i>	<i>Present Strength</i>	<i>Proposed Strength.</i>
Madras	132	150
Bombay (excluding Sind)	95	114
Bengal	140	200
United Provinces ..	123	182
Punjab	94	150
Bihar and Orissa ..	103	150
Central Provinces ..	73	125
Assam	53	75
Burma	103	120

These figures, taken in conjunction with our recommendation for the elimination of nominated members, involve no inconsiderable increase over the present elected representation in the Councils.

The Official Bloc.

62. In addition to elected representatives the councils now include official and non-official members appointed by the Governor. The official element was retained under the constitution of 1919 in order to make it possible for the councils to obtain "first-hand knowledge of matters"* likely to come before them. The joint authors of the Report on Indian Constitutional Reforms, however, wished to see a convention established whereby, on subjects transferred to the control of ministers, the official members would abstain from voting and leave the decision of the question to non-official members. "On other matters," wrote the joint authors, "except on occasions when the Government thinks it necessary to require their support, the nominated official members of the Legislative Council should have freedom of speech and vote."* Unfortunately, for reasons alluded to elsewhere, neither of the conventions has been established.

Opinions of the Provincial Committees ;

63. The existence of the official bloc, indiscriminately supporting the ministers, has obscured the responsibility of the latter to the councils and hindered the development of parties. It is, accordingly, not surprising that there should be more unanimity of opinion with regard to the abolition of this bloc than on almost any other point. Of the Provincial Committees, with the exception of the Bengal Committee, who would merely reduce its size, and of the Burma Committee, who would tentatively retain it for five years, all are unanimous in demanding the abolition of the official bloc. Some of the opinions expressed are noteworthy and will bear repetition. Thus, the Bombay Committee write :—

"So long as the ministers felt that they could rely on the official votes and the votes of nominated members, they

*Report on Indian Constitutional Reforms, para. 232.

have not felt any compulsion, and have made no serious efforts, to organise their own parties. Their followers, on the other hand, realising that the ministers could maintain themselves and carry through their policy independently of them, have not felt the same obligation to support them as they would have felt if the ministers had been entirely dependent on their votes for their existence. Party discipline has, as a consequence, always been very slack. The presence of the official bloc has thus had the effect of destroying to a considerable extent the responsibility of ministers to the elected portion of the Council, and in producing at times a feeling of irresponsibility among the elected members of the Council.*

The Punjab Committee state as follows :—

“ We consider that the presence of the official element in the legislatures is detrimental to the growth of initiative and responsibility amongst the non-official members, which is necessary to ensure a smooth and equitable working of the constitutional machinery.”† “ We also feel that the presence of the official bloc with a solid phalanx of votes has, to some extent, been responsible for keeping the communal issue alive in the legislature. With the disappearance of the official bloc the formation of a heterogeneous ministry, depending for its existence on the combined support of the official element and co-religionists of the respective ministers, will become impossible.”‡

64. The Governments of Madras, Bombay, Bihar and Orissa and Assam recommend complete exclusion of nominated official members, while those of the Punjab and the United Provinces would merely retain them for the purpose of speaking in explanation of ministerial policy, but not for voting in support of it. The Government of Burma would retain the official bloc pending a vote of the local Council, passed by a substantial majority, demanding its elimination. The Government of Bengal stands alone in recommending the retention of the official bloc, though in reduced numbers.

and of the
Provincial
Govern-
ments.

The Government of the Punjab state as follows :—

“ . . . while it (the official bloc) has assisted stability and promoted the interests of sound and impartial administration, its presence has, as we have already shown, produced an element of unreality in the responsibility of ministers, who have been able thereby to supplement deficiencies in the votes of their followers. If real progress is to be made in trying out the principles of responsible govern-

*Report of the Committee appointed by the Bombay Legislative Council to co-operate with the Indian Statutory Commission, 1929, para. 7.

†Report of the Punjab Reforms Committee, 1929, para. 82.

‡Ibid. para. 97.

ment, we feel that the official bloc should disappear as far as voting power is concerned."*

The Government of Bihar and Orissa state as follows :—

" . . . it is undoubted that the existence of the official bloc alone has made it possible to work dyarchy since the introduction of reforms ; without it there would have been no stability in the ministry . . . But a considerable price has had to be paid for this ; the knowledge that the ministers can count on the support of the official bloc has weakened the tie between the ministers and the council ; the ministers have been regarded even in their own subjects as part of the official government, and they have encountered a hostility which possibly would not have existed if the ministers had been recognised to be wholly dependent on the council. A further advance towards responsible government would seem to necessitate the removal of what is regarded as an obstruction between the ministry and the council and the disappearance of nominated officials . . . †

Our recommendation.

65. In view of the above opinions, we have no hesitation in recommending that the official bloc should be entirely eliminated. In order, however, to provide for the occasional appointment of experts to assist in the consideration of particular bills before the Council, we suggest that the Governor should have the power to nominate not more than two experts for the purpose of those bills. These members should be in addition to the normal strength of the Council but should not have the power to vote.

Nominated non-officials.

66. The nomination of non-official members has hitherto been justified on the ground of enabling the Governor to remedy the defects of election and secure the representation of communities and interests which would otherwise fail to obtain representation. As we propose to make full provision for the representation of all such communities and interests by election, we recommend that the nomination of non-officials be entirely done away with. As a result of our recommendation, except to the extent indicated in paragraphs 49, 65, 80 and 93, the Legislative Councils will consist of elected members only.

Communal electorates.

67. One of the most difficult and at the same time most pressing of the problems with which we have to deal is that of communal electorates. Throughout our tour in India the Joint Free Conference was confronted with insistent demands for the recognition of the special importance of particular communities as such, and arguments were put forward to support the plea that only by separate electorates or special representation, not only in the legislatures, but also in local self-governing bodies, can

*Memorandum prepared for the use of the Indian Statutory Commission by the Government of the Punjab, Part IV, page 39.

†Confidential Memorandum for the Indian Statutory Commission prepared by the Governor-in-Council, Bihar and Orissa, page 3.

the different interests of each community be safeguarded. Before we attempt to put forward our solution of the problem it will be convenient to set down the case as it now stands and to see how far the principle of separate electorates has hitherto been conceded.

68. At present the position is that Muslims have separate electorates in eight major provinces, while in Burma they are included in a separate joint electorate with all other Indian voters. The Sikhs in the Punjab have their own electorate, as have Europeans in Madras, Bombay, Bengal, the United Provinces, Bihar and Orissa and Burma; Anglo-Indians in Madras, Bengal and Burma; Indian Christians in Madras; and Karens in Burma. In Madras non-Brahmins, a majority community, are protected by the reservation of seats, as are Mahrattas in Bombay. Except in the cases mentioned above, the interests of particular communities are safeguarded by the nomination of representatives to the legislature.

The present position.

69. Before we deal with the case of particular communities we will refer to the general principles which we propose to follow within the limits set by practical considerations. The majority of us regard the principle of communal electorates as inherently vicious and unsound. We desire to see them abolished throughout India as soon as possible. We are prepared to recommend the retention of communal electorates only in exceptional circumstances. Where circumstances render it unlikely that a minority will obtain adequate representation without special protection, we would generally reserve seats for them in joint electorates. We would at the same time leave the members of a minority community free to contest seats in the general constituencies over and above those reserved for them.

Principles followed by us.

70. As already stated, the Muslims enjoy separate electorates in all provinces save in Burma. In the six provinces shown below they have been granted representation in excess of that to which they would be entitled on a population basis. In the Punjab and Bengal the Muslim share of the seats filled by election is less than would have been the case were population figures the sole criterion.

Muslims.

Province.	Present Muslim Representation in the Provincial Legislatures.		As it would be on a population basis.	
			(approximate only).	
Madras	13	7	
Bombay	27	17	
United Provinces	29	14	
Bihar and Orissa	18	8	
Central Provinces	7	2	
Assam	12	11	

Abolition of
Communal
electorates
recom-
mended.

71. Two main questions which we have had to consider are, firstly, whether the present system of separate electorates should be continued, and, if not, what other system should be adopted ; and, secondly, in either case, whether any special representation should be allowed to the Muslims over and above that to which they are entitled on a population basis, or which they might obtain in open election. It is beyond question that the majority of the Muslims throughout India desire to retain separate electorates, and claim that in the provinces in which they are in a minority they should be granted representation over and above that to which the mere counting of heads might entitle them. On the other hand, we are convinced that until Muslims and Hindus are brought together in common electorates there is little prospect of the evolution of a spirit of common citizenship, without which the system of responsible government cannot satisfactorily develop. It is a matter for regret that on this important and highly-controversial subject it has not been found possible to arrive at a unanimous conclusion. Some of us are strongly of the opinion that separate electorates which now form part of the electoral system, should not be abolished except with the consent of the community concerned. The majority of us, however, have held that wider considerations should be allowed to override the wishes of particular communities.

Representa-
tion in
Provinces
other than
the Punjab
and Bengal.

72. In setting forth our conclusions we will deal first with the provinces in which the Muslims are in a minority, viz. : Madras, Bombay, the United Provinces, Bihar and Orissa, the Central Provinces and Assam. In these provinces the majority of us are of the opinion that separate electorates for the Muslims should now be abolished : that they should be granted the privilege of having seats reserved for them in joint electorates either on a population basis or their voting strength, whichever may be more favourable to them, and further that they should be permitted to contest other seats in general constituencies beyond the number actually reserved for them. The retention of this system is recommended until the introduction of adult suffrage in any province, by which time it is hoped that the time may be ripe for the abolition of all special communal privileges. We believe that in some provinces at any rate the result of this system will be to place the Muslims in at least as favourable a position as they now are under a system of separate electorates, and that the way will be prepared for the growth of a better feeling between the two communities and the eventual abolition of all special privileges.

Representa-
tion in the
Punjab.

73. In the Punjab we have followed for the two principal minority communities, the Hindus and the Sikhs, the same principle which we have applied to the Muslims in provinces in which they are in a minority. For Hindus and Sikhs, therefore, in the Punjab we would reserve seats in joint electorates on a popu-

lation basis or on voting strength, whichever may be more favourable to them, without prejudice to their right to contest other seats in general constituencies. The Muslims in the Punjab will then be placed on the same footing as the Hindus in all the other provinces, save Bengal and Burma. For Bengal we would adopt a different principle. In this province the Muslims are in a clear majority and the position is not complicated by the presence of a third community, such as the Sikhs in the Punjab. We can see no valid reason for granting to the Muslims any special protection. As for the Hindus, they are sufficiently numerous and sufficiently influential to be allowed to take care of their own interests. Moreover, Hindu opinion throughout India is definitely opposed to the principle of special protection for particular communities, save in very exceptional circumstances. We therefore consider that in Bengal, as far as Hindus and Muslims are concerned, there should be no separate electorates and no reservation of seats, but that the two communities should vote together in a joint electorate.

In Bengal.

74. The attitude adopted by the Sikh community towards the question of communal representation in the legislature may be stated in a few words. The Sikhs are prepared to come into a general electorate with no special protection for their own community, provided that this principle is generally accepted. If, however, other communities are to be given special protection, the Sikhs demand that they should not be placed in a worse position. We accordingly recommend that until the introduction of adult suffrage, seats for the Sikhs, in all provinces in which they are in a minority, should be reserved in joint electorates on a population basis or their voting strength, whichever is more favourable to them, without prejudice to their right to contest other seats in the joint electorates. In explanation we may say that it is not our intention that the Sikhs should have representation in a province unless they have the minimum population necessary to entitle them to it.

Sikhs.

75. The term "depressed classes" is frequently used in a loose sense to connote not only members of the communities classed as "untouchable," but criminal tribes, aboriginals and other backward communities. It is necessary, therefore, to define exactly the sense in which we use the term "depressed classes" in our proposals for their representation in the legislatures. We would confine this term to those who are classed as "untouchable," leaving it to the local governments to draw up lists of the castes which fall within this category, as has been done by the Madras Government in the Madras Electoral Rules, Pt. I, Rule 3, Section 3, sub-section (b) (1). We consider that similar lists should be drawn up by all provincial governments, exclusive of Burma, where the problem of depressed classes is not found.

Depressed
Classes:
Definition
of.

Population. 76. Here we may refer to the question of the population numbers of those communities which are to be considered as "depressed" for the purpose of the special representation which we propose to assign to them. There has been considerable difference of opinion on this point, as is evidenced by the fact that the figures supplied to us by the several governments amount to 44½ millions, as shown in the margin, while the figures quoted by the Hartog Committee on Education amount to 29¾ millions. We may note that whereas the Hartog Committee quote a figure of 7.89 millions for the United Provinces, Part III of the Report on the working of the system of Government, prepared by the Government of the United Provinces for the Statutory Commission, states that "almost thirteen millions" of the total Hindu population of that province are regarded by orthodox Hindus as untouchable, *vide* paragraph 3 of 'Note on the position of the Depressed Classes.' For our own purposes we have adopted the figure of 44½ millions.

Population in Millions.
Madras ..6½
Bombay 1½
Bengal 11½
United Provinces 13
Punjab ..2½
Bihar & Orissa ..5
Central Provinces 2½
Assam ..1½

Method of selection of representatives:

77. As regards the method of selection of the representatives of the depressed classes, we have considered nomination, separate electorates and joint electorates. Nomination we have ruled out, partly on the ground that this method fails entirely in educative effect; partly because nominees lack independence and cannot always be expected to vote without regard to the supposed wishes of the authority who nominated them; and partly because the representatives of the depressed classes who gave evidence before us were generally opposed to the method of nomination.

In Madras.

78. As regards the second alternative, it is only in the Madras Presidency that it would appear to be within the bounds of practical politics to form separate electorates for the depressed classes. In the Southern Presidency this community is better educated, better organised and altogether politically more advanced than in any other part of India. Although we are generally opposed to any extension of the vicious system of communal electorates, the necessity for advancing the political education of the depressed classes is so urgent that we recommend that separate electorates should be formed from the castes named in the Madras Electoral Rule, referred to above, for a period of ten years, after which separate electorates should be abolished and seats should be reserved for them in joint electorates.

In other Provinces.

79. In other provinces, excluding Bombay and Assam where local conditions have made it convenient to adopt a slightly different method, we recommend that seats should be reserved for the depressed classes, as defined by the local governments, in joint electorates. We would allot them seats in the various provinces as follows:—

Madras	14	(10)
Bombay	8*	(2)
Bengal	8	(1)
United Provinces	10	(1)
Punjab	6	(0)
Bihar and Orissa	6	(2)
Central Provinces	8	(4)
Assam	9†	(0)

(NOTE.—The figures in brackets show present representation, which in every case is by nomination.)

In the Bombay Presidency we recommend that seats be reserved for the depressed classes in joint electorates on a population basis or on their voting strength, whichever is more favourable to them.

For Assam we recommend that nine seats should be reserved in the joint electorates for the backward and depressed classes in the Surma valley and for the indigenous primitive races and backward and depressed classes in the Assam valley. As in other provinces we would leave it to the local government to draw up a list of these classes.

80. Akin to the problem of the “depressed classes” is that of “backward classes”, among whom may be counted aboriginals, criminal tribes and others among the less advanced of the inhabitants of British India. In Madras and Assam one member is at present nominated to the Provincial Legislature to represent backward tracts. We would recommend the continuance of this representation, leaving it to the local governments to form an electorate, if possible, or otherwise to fill the seat by nomination. We would, further, give five representatives to the backward classes in the United Provinces, exclusive of the ten already allotted to the depressed classes. This special representation appears to be called for in view of the very large number of the inhabitants of the United Provinces who appear to fall within this category. One estimate puts the total number of the backward classes in this province, excluding the “untouchables”, at no less than sixteen millions. These five seats we would reserve in joint electorates for persons whom the local government may from time to time declare to fall within this category. In Bihar and Orissa, where several aborigines now find places in the Provincial Legislature through election, we would reserve three seats in a joint electorate for the aborigines and the backward and hill tribes.

81. Opinion among the Indian Christians on the subject of their representation by separate electorates appears to be divided. As we understand the position, Indian Christians would be prepared to abandon separate electorates, because they realise that it

*This is an approximate estimate only.

†This figure includes representatives of backward classes and indigenous and primitive races.

is a distinct disadvantage for them to be shut off politically from the bulk of their countrymen. If, however, separate electorates are to continue for other communities, they would desire to retain them for themselves. We have already stated our objection generally to separate electorates. We consider that Indian Christians, who as a rule have a higher percentage of literates than other communities, will be able to hold their own in joint electorates, if seats be reserved for them. We accordingly recommend that Indian Christians should have seats reserved for them in joint electorates and should be free to contest other seats in general constituencies. We would allot to them by this method seats as under :—

Madras	6
Bombay	1 in Bombay City.
Bengal	2
United Provinces	3
Punjab	2
Bihar and Orissa	2
Assam	1

Europeans.

82. It is clear to us that Europeans must continue to obtain their representation through separate electorates, if only for the reason that they are generally unable to speak the language sufficiently fluently to address a general constituency in the vernacular. We, therefore, consider that Europeans should continue to have separate electorates. We would grant them seats as under :—

Madras	2
Bombay	2
Bengal	7
United Provinces	2
Punjab	1
Bihar and Orissa	2
Assam	1
Burma	2

As regards the Central Provinces, where at present one member is nominated to represent both Europeans and Anglo-Indians, we would form a general constituency of Europeans and Anglo-Indians returning two members.

Anglo-Indians.

83. The case of the Anglo-Indians stands on a slightly different footing from that of either the Europeans or the Indian Christians. We desire that, as far as possible, Anglo-Indians should learn to consider themselves citizens of India having joint interests with the bulk of the inhabitants of the country. With this object in view we would, where possible, grant them representation in joint electorates by reservation of seats. Our proposals as regards the Anglo-Indian community are as follows :—

For *Madras* one member to be returned by a separate electorate and one seat to be reserved for them in a joint

electorate. In *Bombay*, following the recommendation of the Provincial Committee, we would give them two seats in a separate electorate. In the *United Provinces* we recommend three seats ; in the *Punjab* one ; in *Bengal* four ; and in *Bihar and Orissa* one ; in each case the seats being reserved in joint electorates. In *Burma*, where the Anglo-Indians at present have one seat, we would grant them two. For the *Central Provinces*, as already stated, we would give two seats to a joint constituency consisting of Anglo-Indians and Europeans.

In order that the members elected may be really representative of the Anglo-Indian community we would suggest that in the case of joint electorates the candidates should either be selected from a panel put forward by recognised Anglo-Indian associations, or that election should be conditional on obtaining a certain percentage of the votes, not only of the Anglo-Indians, but of the other electors in the constituency.

84. The Karens in Burma at present enjoy the privilege of electing five representatives to the Local Council by a separate electorate. We would continue this privilege to them and increase the number of their representatives from five to seven. Karens in
Burma.

85. We consider that Indian representation in the Burma Legislative Council should be on the same basis as at present, but that their number should be increased in proportion to the increase in the total membership of the Provincial Council. Indians in
Burma.

86. The non-Brahmins in Madras and the Mahrattas in Bombay have hitherto been protected by the reservation for them of a certain number of seats. It has become clear that the non-Brahmins in Madras stand in no need of any special protection and are well able to hold their own in general constituencies. We, therefore, consider that the reservation of seats for non-Brahmins in Madras should be abolished. As regards the Mahrattas in Bombay, the reservation of seats for them followed out of the reservation of seats for non-Brahmins in Madras. As in Madras, experience in Bombay has shown that the Mahrattas are sufficiently strong in the constituencies in which seats are now reserved for them to be able to hold their own. We do not consider that the reservation of seats for Mahrattas can any longer be justified, and we, therefore, propose to abolish this reservation also. Non-
Brahmins
and
Mahrattas.

87. We are satisfied that the presence of men, whether Indian or English, qualified to speak with knowledge and authority on the various questions connected with the development of commerce and industry, in India, adds a valuable, even an essential, element to the legislatures. Legislation connected with or affecting commerce and industry is likely to be increasingly important for many years to come, and we entirely agree that no legislative body would be complete without the presence of representatives of these interests. It is clear that few, if any, Europeans can Commerce
and
Industry.

ever hope to be elected by a general constituency in India, and if special electorates are to be retained for European commerce, it follows that we should not be justified in abolishing the special representation for Indian commerce. Similar arguments apply with almost equal force to the case of the planters and the mining industry. The following are our proposals for the representation of commerce and industry :—

In *Madras* we would increase the number of representatives of trade and commerce from five to six by allotting one additional seat to the Southern India Chamber of Commerce. In *Bombay* we would increase the seats from seven to eight and would allot the eight seats, four to Europeans and four to Indians, it being left to the Government of Bombay to decide the details of the actual distribution. In *Bengal* we would increase the number of seats from fifteen to twenty-one, which we would allot, fourteen to European and seven to Indian commerce. In the *United Provinces* we would increase the present representation from three to five. In the *Punjab* we would leave the present representation of two, of whom we consider one should be elected to represent commerce and the other to represent industry. In *Bihar and Orissa* we would increase the representation from one to two. In the *Central Provinces* we would leave the figure at two, as at present. In *Assam*, where there is one representative, we would leave the figure unchanged. As regards *Burma*, we recommend that three representatives should be allotted to Indian trade and commerce, in place of one elected member as at present. The other seats we would allot as follows :—

Burma Chamber of Commerce	4
Burmese Chamber of Commerce	2
Chinese Chamber of Commerce	2
Rangoon Trades' Association	1

Planters.

88. At present planters have separate representation in Madras, Assam and Bihar and Orissa. We would continue the representation in Madras as at present, with one planting representative. In Assam we would increase the number from five to seven, in Bihar and Orissa from one to two. In each case election should be by special constituencies.

**Mining
Industry.**

89. The mining industry at present has special representation in Bihar and Orissa and in the Central Provinces. We would make no change in the present representation, reserving two seats for Bihar and Orissa and one for the Central Provinces in special constituencies as at present.

Labour.

90. We have devoted considerable attention to the question of the adequate representation of Labour in the legislatures. We recognise that unorganised labour, which term includes the vast majority of the labouring classes in India, must remain unrepresented until the franchise has been lowered to a sufficient degree

to enable them to win representation in the general constituencies. We believe, however, that India is on the threshold of a great industrial development, and we regard it as of the highest importance that means should be provided by which organised labour may be enabled to make its wants known in the legislatures through representatives of its own. The best means of attaining this object will, we consider, be by establishing separate electorates for labour wherever possible. We would, therefore, propose the following representation for labour :—

Madras	1
Bombay	4
Bengal	3
United Provinces	2
Punjab	1
Bihar and Orissa	2
Central Provinces	2
Assam	3

In the case of Bombay, where industrial labour is more highly organised than elsewhere, we would propose to reserve four seats for labour in four general constituencies : one in Ahmedabad ; one in Sholapur ; and two in Bombay City. In Assam we propose that the three representatives should be elected by labourers employed on tea estates. In the other provinces we would propose to establish separate electorates for labour.

91. We consider that landholders should continue to have **Landholders.** representation through special constituencies. In view of the increase which we propose in the numbers of the provincial legislatures we would generally increase the numbers of the landholders' representatives, except in Bombay, as follows :—

Madras	7
Bombay (excluding Sind)	2
Bengal	5
United Provinces	16
Punjab	4
Bihar and Orissa	8
Central Provinces	5

Of the sixteen representatives in the United Provinces, eight should be elected by the British-Indian Association, six by the Agra Zamindars' Association ; and two by the Muzaffarnagar Zamindars' Association.

In the Punjab we would propose to form a joint electorate for the four landholders' seats, reserving one seat in this constituency for a Hindu ; one for a Sikh ; and two for Muslim landholders.

92. We would leave the representation of the universities at **Universities.** the same strength as at present, except in the case of the United

Provinces, where we consider that the existence of the three Universities of Allahabad, Agra and Lucknow should be recognised by giving them two seats instead of one. In the method of election of university representatives we propose a modification of the present system. We consider that, in order to secure a more adequate representation of learning and the return of representatives possessing special academic qualifications, the university franchise should be confined to members of the Senate, or, in the case of Dacca University, the Court of the University.

Women.

93. We are unanimously of opinion that steps should be taken to secure the representation of women in the provincial legislatures. Except in the case of certain advanced parts of India, it seems clear that women cannot at present expect to obtain representation to an adequate extent through the general constituencies. We, therefore, consider that in every province five per centum of the total seats in the Provincial Legislatures should be reserved for women. We would leave it to the local governments to determine how these seats should be filled. We would prefer that the method of election should be either through joint or separate electorates, but if this be found impracticable, we think that women might obtain representation by nomination.

Life of the Provincial Legislature.

94. There is a general consensus of opinion that the present term of the Councils, namely, three years, is too short to admit of the Councils or the ministers being able to carry out any sustained programme of work. We, therefore, recommend that the term should be extended to four years.

Powers of the Provincial Legislature.

95. Subject to the reservations made in this behalf in paragraph 98, we recommend that the legislative power in the provinces should be vested in the Governor, as representative of the King-Emperor, and the Legislative Council, and, in the case of the United Provinces, also the Senate. The local legislature should have the power to make laws for the peace and good government of the province in respect of all provincial subjects, excluding those subjects which are assigned to the Central Government of India. It should not, however, be empowered, without the previous sanction of the Governor-General in Council, to repeal or alter as to the province any law relating to a provincial subject enacted by the Indian Legislature, before the commencement of the new constitution.

Changes consequent on the transfer of all subjects.

96. With the transfer of all provincial subjects to the administration of responsible ministers, the power given to the Governor under Section 72E of the Government of India Act of 1919, to certify legislation essential for the discharge of his responsibility for reserved subjects will naturally disappear. The same result will follow in regard to the power under proviso (a) to Section 72D (2) of the above Act to restore grants refused by the Legislature in respect of reserved subjects.

Financial safeguards.

97. The control of the Legislature over legislation, and of the Legislative Councils over budgets, would thus become complete.

In regard to budgets, however, following the well-known principle of the British constitution* and the provisions of Section 72D (2), proviso (c), of the Government of India Act, we recommend that no proposal for the appropriation of any provincial revenues or other moneys for any purpose shall be made, except on the recommendation of the Cabinet. As a further safeguard, we would also retain, with a slight modification, the provision contained in Section 80C of the above Act, and make it unlawful for any member of the local legislature to introduce, without the previous sanction of the Cabinet, any measure affecting the public revenues of the province or imposing any charge on those revenues.

98. In accordance with our scheme of provincial autonomy, we recommend that the power to assent to or withhold assent from bills passed by the local legislature should vest in the Governor. While recognising the right of each province to legislate for its peculiar needs, we cannot, however, ignore the close interrelation between the provinces and the repercussions of legislation passed in one province on its neighbours, or even further afield. It is, therefore, desirable in the general interests of the country that the Central Government of India should be invested with the general power to co-ordinate and, if need be, to control legislation within the provinces. On the other hand, we regard it as inconceivable that autonomous provinces would submit to such control at the hands of a bureaucratic Central Government. We would not, therefore, allow any power of veto over provincial legislation to the Governor-General in Council until such time as the Central Government has been reconstituted in the manner proposed by us. If our proposals for the Central Government are accepted, all those departments which most intimately concern the provincial government will be transferred to the charge of ministers responsible to the Central Legislature. The Governor-General in Council acting in matters concerned with the transferred departments on the advice of his ministers will then occupy a position approximating to that of a constitutional ruler. In such circumstances we would allow to the Governor-General in Council power of control over provincial legislatures which we are not prepared to concede to the head of an irresponsible bureaucracy. We suggest that when the Central Government has been so popularised, the Governor-General in Council might have such power as is now exercised by the Governor-General of the Dominion of Canada. We would give him the power to assent to bills reserved for his consideration and to disallow provincial legislation within twelve months from the date of its receipt by him.

99. Vis-à-vis the Cabinet we have proposed to grant the Governor extraordinary powers to be used where necessary for the maintenance of the peace and tranquillity of the province. As an

The Governor and the Legislature ; Veto over Provincial Legislation.

Governor's power to authorize expenditure in emergencies.

* Anson—"Law and Custom of the Constitution." V Edition ; Volume I, page 284.

essential corollary of those powers we consider that the Governor should have the power in cases of emergency to authorize such expenditure as may be necessary for the safety and tranquillity of the province.

**Question of
a Second
Chamber.**

100. In discussing the constitution of the Provincial Legislatures we are naturally led at this stage to the question of second chambers. The establishment of such chambers is one of the points to which inquiry under Section 84A of the Government of India Act of 1919 is especially directed. The authors of the Joint Report, after weighing the arguments pro and con, negatived the proposal for their establishment ; but they were of opinion that the need for them may be the more felt "as provincial councils approach more closely to parliamentary forms."* As we now propose that responsible government should be set up in the provinces it becomes necessary to reconsider the question.

**Arguments
against.**

101. The practical objections to second chambers in the provinces have been succinctly stated in paragraph 258 of the Joint Report. We feel that the difficulty alluded to therein of securing in several provinces a sufficient number of suitable members for two Houses will somewhat increase with the enlargement of the size of the local and central legislatures under our proposals. The apprehension that the presence of large landholders in the second chamber might discourage other members of that class from seeking the votes of the electorate will probably be found to have been exaggerated. But the Joint Authors appear to us to have touched the root of the matter when they refer to the danger of a second chamber composed, as it is likely to be, predominantly of moneyed and landed interests, proving too strong a barrier against legislation affecting such interests. There is also no doubt that the existence of a second chamber renders the working of the legislative machinery more cumbrous and complicated than would be desirable, at least in the early stages of the new constitution. To these grounds may be added the following. To fulfil its proper function of a revising chamber, it is essential that the Upper House should contain men who are able to view their responsibilities from a standpoint different from that of the Lower Chamber. But it seems unlikely that such will be the case in most of the provinces. Again, where the second chamber agrees with the Lower House on any measure it seems unlikely that the Governor will be able to exercise his powers of veto in regard to that measure ; whereas we feel that in the case of measures, especially those dealing with the amelioration of the condition of women or the depressed classes, should the Lower Chamber in any province be disposed to take too conservative a view, the Governor, acting in the light of western civilisation, would be in a stronger position to exercise his power of veto, if he has not also arrayed against him the opinion of the Upper Chamber. We consider also that in the present financial state

* Report on Indian Constitutional Reforms, para. 258.

of the provinces the financial aspect of a second chamber, with its paraphernalia of officials and the travelling and other expenses of its members should not be ignored.

102. In arriving at a conclusion on this subject we are influenced in some measure by the lack of unanimity in the opinions presented to us. The Governments of Madras, Punjab, Bihar and Orissa, Assam and Burma are definitely opposed to second chambers ; while those of Bombay, Bengal and the United Provinces support them on grounds which do not carry much conviction. The provincial committees of Madras, Bombay, Bengal and the United Provinces support, while the rest oppose, the proposal. Non-official opinion has not expressed itself very clearly on the point ; but the Nehru Report recommends single-chambered legislatures for the provinces.

Divergence
of opinion.

103. If we turn to the actual experience of other countries we find that while, with minor exceptions, the unitary states of Europe have adopted the English model of two-chambered legislatures, there has been, according to Keith, "a decided tendency" in the Dominions of the British Empire "to create single-chambered legislatures in place of the original bicameral system."*

Experience
of other
countries.

104. On consideration of the above facts we come to the conclusion that a second chamber in the provinces is unnecessary at present and might give rise to practical difficulties. We would make an exception in the case of the United Provinces where the existence of a large landed aristocracy provides suitable material for a second chamber. Accordingly, we propose that such a chamber should be created in that province tentatively for a period of 10 years, on the expiry of which the matter should be further considered.

Our conclu-
sion.

105. We suggest that this chamber, which may be styled "Senate," should consist of 50 members, to be elected by the following constituencies :—

Constitution
of the Senate
in the United
Provinces.

<i>Name of Constituency.</i>	<i>Number of Representatives.</i>
British Indian Association	4
Agra Province Zamindars' Association ..	3
Muzaffarnagar Zamindars' Association ..	1
Indian Trade and Commerce	2
European Trade and Commerce	2
Depressed Classes	2
General Constituencies	36

Out of the thirty-six general seats we propose that seats should be reserved for Muslims in a joint electorate on the basis of their population or voting strength, whichever is found to be more favourable to them, without prejudice to their right to contest other seats. The franchise for electors in these con-

* Keith.—"Responsible Government in the Dominions." II Edition, Vol. I, p. 391.

stituencies should be the same as the present franchise for the Council of State. We suggest that the representatives of the depressed classes should be elected by the members of the provincial Legislative Council belonging to the depressed and backward classes. In regard to legislation, the second chamber should have concurrent powers with the Legislative Council, except that all money-bills should be initiated in the Legislative Council only. But budget and supplies should be voted by, and the ministry should be responsible to, the Legislative Council only. We suggest that differences of opinion between the two chambers should be settled at a joint sitting of both chambers, to be summoned by the Governor at his own instance, or at the instance of either chamber.

OTHER PROPOSALS.

Allocation of Provincial and Central Subjects.

106. If our general recommendations on the scheme of the provincial and central governments are accepted, it will be necessary to re-examine the classification of subjects in relation to the functions of government as central and provincial subjects, for the purpose of distinguishing the functions of local governments and local legislatures from the functions of the Governor-General in Council and the Indian Legislature. As we have not the necessary expert advice at our disposal to enable us to do so, we recommend that the existing classification should be examined by a committee, with the help of experts, so as to bring it into consonance with our recommendations.

Financial Proposals.

107. Since the passage of the Government of India Act of 1919 specified sources of revenue have been placed at the disposal of the provincial governments for the purposes of provincial administration ; while separate sources have been placed under the control of the Central Government. The provincial revenues depend upon sources which are not capable of any great expansion, while the development of the nation-building departments of Government will call for ever-increasing expenditure. It is essential for the successful development of the country ; for the spread of education ; for the placing of medical facilities within the reach of all ; and for the opening up of new roads, that power to raise the necessary funds should be placed in the hands of local governments. The chief expanding sources of revenue, income tax and customs, are in the hands of the Government of India. The majority of us are strongly opposed to the policy of financing provincial governments through grants-in-aid from the centre. So long as the provincial governments see that revenues raised in the provinces are at the disposal of the Central Government for purposes of which public opinion in the provinces may disapprove, we believe that it will be found impossible to impose extra provincial taxation. Nor do we believe that as long as the centre remains even partially under bureaucratic control the country will acquiesce in the imposition by the centre of the additional taxation which will certainly be

required. Both logic and practical considerations demand that the grant to the provinces of self-government should be accompanied by such re-adjustment of their financial relationship with the centre, as will leave them financially as well as administratively autonomous. The majority of us, therefore, consider that until the Government of India is constituted on a popular basis by the transfer of departments to Ministers, all the revenues of a province should be at the disposal of the local government. The provincial government, however, should be subject to the obligation to pay to the Government of India such amount as may be fixed and in such manner as may be decided upon by an impartial tribunal appointed conjointly by the local government and the Government of India. Under our proposal all revenues, including those from customs, income tax and salt, would vest in the government of the province in which they were collected. An impartial tribunal, on which the Government of India and the provincial government are equally represented, should then determine the amount of the contribution payable by a particular province to the centre. In assessing the provincial contribution the tribunal would be able to consider the actual financial position and requirements of each province; the rich province would be required to pay a larger amount than its poorer neighbour. No financial scheme that can be devised is likely to meet with general acceptance throughout India. The scheme that we have put forward is in accordance with the spirit of provincial autonomy which underlies all our proposals. We believe that its adoption will prove to be in the truest interests of the country as a whole.

108. We consider that the powers now exercised by the provincial governments in respect of the High Courts should, in future, be exercised by the Government of India; and that the same procedure should apply to the proposed High Court for the Central Provinces and Berar when it is created. The faith of the people of India in the integrity of the High Courts has been one of the bulwarks of British rule, which even the storm of political agitation has done nothing to shake. Anything tending to undermine this faith would be fraught with grave danger to the future government of the country. We therefore think it desirable that, with the introduction of responsible government in the provinces, the higher judiciary should be removed from the sphere of political influence. We believe that the risk of this influence will be minimised by the transference of relations to the Central Government as recommended by us.

109. Section 101 of the Government of India Act lays down certain rules for the constitution of the High Courts. It prescribes that not less than one-third of the judges of a High Court must be members of the Indian Civil Service. Up to comparatively recent years, all, or almost all, sessions judges were members of this service; there was therefore an ample field for the recruitment from the Indian Civil Service of judges of the High Courts.

High Courts .
Transfer of
control to the
Central
Government

Constitution
of the High
Courts.

Under present conditions, when many of the sessions judges are not members of the Indian Civil Service, the field of recruitment to the High Courts has become limited, and we consider that there is no longer any justification for reserving one-third of the seats in the High Courts for members of the Indian Civil Service. We, therefore, propose that the present provision to this effect should be rescinded. We would, however, retain the provision that one-third of the judges of the High Courts should be barristers, of not less than ten years' standing, and add that not less than one-third should be advocates, or vakils, who are not barristers. We recommend, further, that the Chief Justice of the High Court should in all cases be a barrister.

The Services,
Present
position as
regards the
Provinces.

110. We have given very careful consideration to the question of the position of the Superior Services under the new regime. The present position in regard to these Services is that as a result of the Lee Commission Report, recruitment for the All-India Services, which deal mainly with the reserved branches of administration, remains in the hands of the Secretary of State-in-Council, while that for the Services operating in the transferred field has been closed down ; and although the existing members of these Services retain their rights and privileges, power has been delegated to local governments to recruit and organise their Provincial Services to replace these All-India Services as they gradually disappear. With regard to the Central Services, control is retained by the Secretary of State in Council over the Political and Ecclesiastical Departments and over recruitment outside India to certain technical departments. But with these exceptions, the power to recruit, organise and control the Central Services has been delegated to the Government of India. The delegation by the Secretary of State, both to the Government of India and to the local governments, is made subject to certain general conditions designed to safeguard the rights of existing members of the Services ; to ensure impartiality in making first appointments by utilising the services of the Public Services Commission or of permanent boards of selection when appointment is made otherwise than by a competitive examination ; and, finally, to secure the observance of proper procedure and rights of appeal in disciplinary cases. Subject to these general conditions the organisation of the Services and the principles of pay and the conditions of service generally, and the methods of making first appointments, as well as ordinary administrative control, are entirely in the discretion of the governments concerned.

As regards
the Central
Government.

Present
position
examined.

111. The control of the Secretary of State in Council over the Services is generally regarded by the members of those Services and by potential recruits as an important safeguard against the possible consequences of unforeseen changes in India. But it is evident that control of this character over the agents of administration will be irksome to a popular government and tend to bring such a government into relations with the Secretary

of State which it is difficult in theory to justify. The control, moreover, is exercised on the ground of the Services in question operating mainly in the reserved field. But if, as we recommend, the distinction between reserved and transferred subjects is abolished and unitary governments set up in the provinces, it must necessarily follow that the Services now reserved must be placed under provincial control. To lay down that ministers responsible to a popularly elected legislature should be obliged to depend for the carrying out of their policies on an agency recruited and partially controlled by and owing allegiance to an outside authority would, in our view, result in conditions not less intolerable to members of the Services concerned than to the ministers themselves. As stated by the Government of Madras : " The province must be free to recruit its own servants as and where it likes : there can be no imposing upon it a body of men recruited under regulations, from sources and on rates of pay prescribed by some outside authority. " "

112. It has been argued that a proportion of Europeans of high quality is essential in the Indian Civil Service and the Police ; and that they will not be obtained unless these two Services remain under the control of Parliament. As we have had little experience so far of the recruitment to the new Provincial Services, it seems too early to assume that suitable Europeans will not be forthcoming for the provincialised Security Services. We trust that the importance of securing such recruits, at least for some time to come, will not be lost on the provincial governments and that the conditions of service will be devised specially to secure this end. But it must be borne in mind that even if the flow of European recruits were to cease altogether, a substantial number of Europeans would remain in the Services for a long time to come. The situation, therefore, will not be so grave as might be supposed. In regard to a similar contingency in the case of the other All-India Services, the Lee Commission were of opinion that the risk was not sufficient to outweigh the argument for carrying to a logical conclusion the constitutional change effected in the administration of the transferred departments. The same argument applies equally to the conditions visualised by us.

Question of retention of Europeans in the Services.

113. Accordingly, we recommend that, except in Madras and Bombay, the case of which will be considered separately, the provincial governments set up under the new constitution should be free to decide what proportion of the existing All-India Services should be continued on the present footing and to what extent these Services should be provincialised ; it being understood in either case that the existing members of the Services will continue to enjoy the protection already afforded to them. We further recommend that should the governments decide to provincialise the Services in question, due regard should be paid

Our proposals.

*Memorandum submitted to the Indian Statutory Commission, para. 38.

to the adequate representation therein of all communities, such as Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, Europeans, Anglo-Indians, the depressed classes and others, subject of course to the candidates for employment fulfilling the minimum requirements of efficiency.

Special
Provision
for Bombay.

and for
Madras.

114. In regard to Bombay we are prepared to go further and recommend that the remaining All-India Services in that Presidency should be provincialised on the lines already followed in the case of the Services operating in the transferred field ; all the prospects that the present members of those Services now enjoy being, of course, reserved to them. In Madras, on the other hand, we suggest that, while adhering to the programme laid down by the Lee Commission for the Indianisation of the two Security Services, namely, the Indian Civil Service and the Police, those Services should remain All-India Services as at present. The remaining All-India Services working on the reserved side in Madras should, however, be provincialised. In order to ensure that a Minister shall be able to count on having his policy carried out by officers belonging to the All-India Security Services, we propose that the Governor should be empowered to replace, on the recommendation of a minister, an officer of one of these Services by another member of the same Service.

Protection
of the
Services.

115. The authority vested in the provincial government in respect of the Services will normally be exercised by the Governor-in-Council. But in order to safeguard the members of the Services from political influence in the discharge of their duties, we recommend that no order affecting emoluments or pensions, no order of formal censure and no order on a memorial shall be passed to the disadvantage of any officer of an All-India or Provincial Service without the personal concurrence of the Governor. An officer belonging to an All-India Service, or appointed by the Secretary of State, will further be entitled to appeal to that authority against any such order.

Local Army.

116. The grant of complete responsible government to any province is bound up with the question of the maintenance of law and order and internal security generally. Experience has proved that civil disorders not infrequently arise which are too serious to be dealt with by the ordinary police force. At present the civil authorities have the right, subject to certain limitations, to call upon the military to aid the civil power. It is uncertain whether this right will be conceded to a responsible provincial government. As regards the use of British troops, it is obvious that provincial self-government will not be a reality as long as provincial governments look to a foreign mercenary army for the enforcement of their policy. Nor is it by any means certain that the British Government will agree to the use of British troops to enforce a policy for which they are not responsible and over which they have no control. On the other hand, the use of regular Indian troops involves certain risks. In time of communal tension it can hardly fail to happen that the sympathies of the men who compose the regular army are involved on one

side or the other. In our opinion, it is of the utmost importance that the discipline of the army should not be strained through its use to quell communal disturbances, and that other means than the use of regular troops should be found for dealing with internal disturbances in provinces which have been granted complete control over their own affairs. Further, there exists in India a very widespread belief that the British Government has no real intention of ever allowing the people of India to obtain genuine self-government ; that the army will continue to be maintained as a weapon in the hands of the British Government for the retention of India in subjection ; and that the alleged unfitness of Indians for high command will continue to be put forward as an argument against the final handing over into Indian hands of responsibility for the government of the country. It is, in our opinion, of the utmost importance that the British Government should lose no further time in affording to the people of India definite proofs that such suspicions are unwarranted. The grant to provincial governments of the right to raise a local army for the maintenance of internal security would be a long step in this direction, while at the same time obviating some of the risks which we apprehend from the use of regular troops. Financial considerations alone render it certain that no provincial government will raise a force larger than is actually required. The experiment—for experiment it will be—is not one that we would forthwith recommend for trial throughout India ; but we see no real risk and much advantage in its adoption in the South of the Peninsula. The majority of us accordingly recommend that it should be open to the Governments of Madras and Bombay to equip and maintain a local military force and a local militia. The minimum numbers of the force or militia, its equipment and qualifications, should be prescribed by the Government of India. The Viceroy and the Commander-in-Chief should always be entitled to inspect the troops and pass orders for their efficiency and maintenance ; but they should not be entitled to direct a reduction of the force or any other step which will render the force less efficient.

117. The separation of the executive from the judicial functions has long been a burning question in Indian politics ; but for various reasons, into which we need not enter, its solution has been delayed. With the conferring of responsible government on the provinces the separation of the two functions must be left to the sole discretion of the provinces. But we are of opinion that the introduction of this reform should no longer be delayed and suggest that immediate steps should be taken to formulate schemes to give effect to such separation.

Separation
of Executive
from
Judicial
Functions.

118. The population of the five settled districts of the North-West Frontier Province, according to the census of 1921, totals 2,251,340, of whom Muslims number 2,062,786 ; Hindus, 149,881 ; and Sikhs 28,040. No system of representative government has hitherto been introduced into this province and whether

North-West
Frontier
Province.

we have regard to its geographical position, to the warlike character of its inhabitants, or to their lack of experience of the working of representative institutions, it is clear that the future government of the province involves problems of the greatest importance. Quite apart from the factors to which we have alluded is the fact that the North-West Frontier Province is, and seems likely to remain, a deficit province. The introduction of any system of representative government would in some directions involve an increased expenditure, and thus widen the gap which at present exists between receipts and expenses. The financial problem is one for which we are not in a position to offer any solution. As regards the main question at issue, it appears clear to us that the time has arrived when a beginning should be made of the introduction into the North-West Frontier Province of a system of representative government. We accordingly recommend that reforms should be introduced into the North-West Frontier Province on the lines of the Morley-Minto Reforms. After a constitution on these lines has been in operation for a period of ten years we consider that the question should be further examined, with a view to seeing what advance can then be made.

Relations
between the
Governor-
General
or the
Governor-
General in
Council
and the
Provincial
Govern-
ments.

119. In formulating our proposals for the reconstitution of the provincial governments our main object has been to establish in the provinces governments that shall be fully responsible to popularly-elected legislatures and to endow them with a full measure of provincial autonomy. We now come to a consideration of the relations which should exist between the Governor-General, or the Governor-General in Council, and the provincial governments. In dealing with the question of the power of veto over provincial legislation we have made it clear that we are not prepared to recommend the granting of any extensive powers of interference with the provincial legislatures to a bureaucratic Central Government. This principle forms the basis of our recommendations on this subject. While, however, we would normally restrict the power of interference of the Governor-General within narrow limits, we would arm him with ample powers to deal with any emergency which may arise in the provinces.

The following are our proposals :—

(1) We are of opinion that the powers of superintendence and control of the Governor-General in Council should be exercised only for such purposes as may be specified ; and that whenever there is a difference of opinion between the Governor-General in Council and a Local Government, as to the right of the former to intervene in provincial affairs, the question should be decided in accordance with the decision of a tribunal or body nominated or appointed by the two governments concerned ; provided that if and when a Supreme Court is established in India, that body shall be the final judge in such matters. Pending the establishment

of a Supreme Court, we would provide that in case of disagreement between the two governments concerned as to the composition of the tribunal, the matter should be decided by a tribunal consisting of three or more persons holding the office of Chief Justice of a High Court in India.

(2) We would give to the Governor-General power to supersede a local government and carry on the administration in case of breakdown or inability to maintain law and order in the province. We would not grant a similar power in case of financial insolvency. We would, however, empower the Governor-General to take any steps that he may consider necessary to enforce the payment of any debt due by a local government.

(3) Where the Governor-General considers that an order issued by a provincial government should be overruled for the purpose of maintaining peace and tranquility, he should have the power to do so. Similarly, when no order has been issued by a provincial government, the Governor-General should have the power to issue any order necessary in his opinion for the maintenance of peace and tranquility in the province concerned.

Two further extraordinary powers we would grant to the Governor-General and the Governor-General in Council respectively, subject to the approval of the Secretary of State. Firstly, subject to the approval of the Secretary of State, we consider that the Governor-General should have power to suspend a provincial legislative council for such period as he may direct ; and while such order of suspension is in force, the Governor should have all the powers which the Governor or the Governor in Council might exercise with the consent of the legislative council.

Secondly, we consider that the Governor-General in Council should have the power, with the approval of the Secretary of State and by notification, to take any province under the immediate authority and management of the Governor-General in Council, and thereupon to give all necessary orders and directions respecting its administration and provide for it in any manner he thinks fit.

CHAPTER V.

THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA AND THE INDIA OFFICE.

The Government of India.

The
Central
Govern-
ment :
Present
position.

120. The Government of India Act of 1919, left the constitution of the Central Government practically unchanged. The authors of the Joint Report recognised that "it was no longer sufficient to administer India ; it was necessary also to satisfy her political aspirations."* But the only manner in which they thought this could be done consistently with their principles was to increase the Indian element in the Executive Government by the introduction of one more Indian member ; and to associate with the Government a Legislative Assembly with an elected majority. By this means they hoped to ensure "that the wishes of the country are accurately and regularly represented to the Government and that its action is adequately criticized."† No responsibility was offered to the members of the Assembly, it being clearly laid down that the beginning of responsibility in the Centre must be the sequel to responsible government in the Provinces.‡

The
working of
the Central
Govern-
ment
reviewed.

121. The question with which we are now confronted is whether and to what extent an advance on this position is desirable or necessary. To answer this question it is necessary to survey briefly the position of the Central Government vis-à-vis the Assembly during the last ten years. We believe that an impartial verdict on that survey must be that far from introducing "an element of strength into the Central Government,"§ as its authors fondly believed, the scheme has resulted in a weakening of the Central authority which can only be described as deplorable. The Government of India is technically responsible only to the Secretary of State ; but its immediate juxtaposition with an elected majority in its Legislative Assembly necessarily rendered it extremely sensitive to the expression of opinion in that Assembly. Its constitutional responsibility to an outside authority, however, made any consistent accord between it and the Assembly impossible ; while its natural desire to carry the Assembly with it in its proposals, coupled with the fact that it could not count on its stable support, made its own action uncertain and hesitating. Nor was the position redeemed by any compensating advantage in the shape of responsibility in the Assembly. The elected majority, unable to bend the Executive to its will and finding its decisions liable to be nullified by statutory powers vested in the Executive, naturally became restive and at times reckless. The irresponsibility in the Executive thus bred irresponsibility in the Assembly.

* Report on Indian Constitutional Reforms, para. 265.

† Ibid. para. 270.

‡ Ibid. para. 289.

§ Ibid. para. 265.

The situation is vividly described by an acute observer,* himself an ex-member of the Assembly, as follows :—

“ The position of the Executive vis-à-vis the Legislature, is far from comfortable or enviable The Government are therefore obliged to resort to all possible arts of conciliation, or exploitation of the differences between the different parties and sections. Opposition has to be overcome by coaxing and cajolery, or bought off by favours or concessions. From the point of view of the opposition, it may perhaps be considered desirable that the government should be kept in a dependent condition and a plaint mood. But there are limits to pliancy; and the statute prevents the opposition from obtaining the mastery of the situation. From the point of view of the administration, it is a source of weakness to the Executive that they should be liable to be defeated at any moment by an irresponsible legislature. Uncertainty as to the decision of the legislature and the want of an assured majority therein must affect that sense of confidence which is essential to firmness of administration and continuity of policy.”

The position, in our opinion, is intolerable and cannot be continued.

122. We have referred elsewhere to the need of a strong Central Government, co-ordinating and in a measure controlling the Provinces, to keep them from drifting apart. We consider that the fuller the measure of autonomy to be exercised by the Provinces, the greater will be the need for a strong Central Government. We are, therefore, at one with the Authors of the Joint Report in their desire to “introduce a new element of strength into the Government.” We regard the suggestions which have been made to us to revert to the pre-reform Legislature, with an official majority, as wholly impracticable. Considerations of justice as well as political expediency forbid such a course. The only line open to us seems to be to introduce an element of responsibility in the Central Government so as to broad-base it on the support of the Legislature.

Necessity for strengthening the Central Government; partial responsibility to the Legislature recommended.

123. In making this recommendation we are not oblivious of the difficulties which stand in the way of establishing complete responsibility in the Central Government at the present day. We therefore propose to proceed in the first instance by the transfer of all subjects, except the defence of India and its relations with foreign and the Indian States, to the control of ministers responsible to the Legislature. As a safeguard in the administration alike of the subjects transferred and those reserved, we would provide that it should not be competent to the Legisla-

Reservation of Defence and Foreign and Political Relations; Safeguards.

*Sir P. S. Sivaswamy Aiyer ; Indian Constitutional Problems, page 333.

ture, without the previous sanction of the Governor-General, to deal with any measure affecting :—

(a) the public debt or public revenues of India or imposing any charge on the revenues of India ; or

(b) the religion or religious rites and usages of any class of British subjects in India ; or

(c) the discipline or maintenance of any part of His Majesty's military, naval, or air forces ; or

(d) the relations of the Government with foreign princes or states ;
or any measure

(i) regulating any provincial subject, or any part of a provincial subject, which has not been declared to be subject to legislation by the Indian Legislature ; or

(ii) repealing or amending any Act of a local legislature ;

or

(iii) repealing or amending any Act or Ordinance made by the Governor-General.

Dyarchy
in the
Centre
justified.

124. The proposal we have just made exposes us to a charge of inconsistency in recommending for the Centre the system of dyarchy which we have discarded in the Provinces. We admit the force of the charge ; but would state in extenuation that the subjects of defence and foreign and political relations which we have reserved—to use the current phraseology—are sufficiently distinct and separable from the other functions of the Central Government which we propose to transfer, not to produce any of the complications which the working of the system led to in the Provinces. Moreover, short of a complete transfer of responsibility to ministers, we can see no alternative to dyarchy which, despite its inherent defects, can, as experience shows, be worked with reasonable success, given a certain amount of good-will on both sides. We believe that if our recommendations are accepted, the requisite atmosphere for the working of the system will be created, and that as a half-way house dyarchy will be accepted and worked in a satisfactory manner.

Composition
of the Gover-
nor-General's
Cabinet.

125. We propose that the Cabinet of the Governor-General should consist of not more than two executive councillors and not more than six ministers. The appointment both of the councillors and ministers should be made by the Governor-General at his own discretion, but we recommend that at least half the members of the Cabinet should be Indians. We would further provide that one councillor or minister should be a member of the Council of State and the rest should sit in the Assembly ; and where they are not already members of the Legislature they should become such members ex-officio. Both the members of Executive Council and ministers should have the right to address either chamber of the Legislature, but they should only have the right to vote in the chamber of which they are members.

126. In an earlier part of this Report we have referred to the desirability of enlarging the size of our Legislatures. We now propose that the Legislative Assembly should consist of 300 members. For a population of 247 millions the number proposed gives a representation of one member to every 823,000 of the population. It is interesting to note that the corresponding figures for the British House of Commons, the French Chamber of Deputies, the German Reichstag and the American House of Representatives are 73,000, 65,000, 128,000 and 245,000, respectively.

Legislative
Assembly :
Proposed
strength.

127. In addition to the normal strength of the Assembly we suggest that the Governor-General in Council should have the power to nominate ten experts to sit and speak in the Assembly, but without the right to vote.

Appoint-
ment of
experts.

128. We have found ourselves unable in the time at our disposal, and in the absence of any such concrete proposals as we have received in the case of the Provinces, to work out in detail a scheme of distribution of seats. The general principle we have adopted, therefore, is to accord to each community or interest the same proportionate representation as it now enjoys, with additional weightage in the case of some important interests, including Muslims. In order to remove any inequalities in representation which this system of distribution might produce, and also to provide for the inclusion of such officials as may be necessary, we recommend that the Governor-General should be empowered to nominate twenty members in addition to the seven ministers and executive councillors. We propose that the remaining 273 seats should be thrown open to election and distributed in the following manner :—

Composi-
tion of the
Assembly.

	<i>No. of seats allotted.</i>			
Hindus	104
Muslims	79
Depressed Classes	12
Sikhs	6
Europeans	17
Anglo-Indians	3
Indian Christians	3
Landholders	10
Indian Commerce	8
Associated Chambers of Commerce (European)	3
Labour	5
Women	5
Burma	8
North-West Frontier Province	6
Delhi	2
Ajmer-Merwara	2
Total				273

Electorates.

129. Except in the case of Europeans, to whom we would concede separate electorates of their own on account of the language difficulty already mentioned, we propose that the seats allotted to the other communities and to labour and women should be contested in joint electorates. In the case of the depressed classes, Sikhs, Anglo-Indians, Indian Christians, labour and women, we would, however, suggest that should election by joint electorates present any insuperable difficulty, recourse should be had to indirect elections under such rules as may be framed by the Government of India. The constituencies for the landholders and Indian and European Commerce will, of course, be special.

Election
of the
President
and the
term of the
Assembly.

130. We propose that the President of the Legislative Assembly should be elected by the Assembly from amongst its own members and that the term of the Assembly should be extended to five years.

The Council
of State.

131. With the exception of an increase in its numbers, we propose to make no change in the constitution of the Council of State. As regards its strength, we propose that it should be increased from 60 to 100, and that the seats be distributed amongst the various communities and interests in the same proportion in which they are now held. We also recommend that the present proportion between the elected and nominated seats should be maintained.

The retention of the Council of State, composed on these lines and possessing all its existing powers, might appear somewhat incongruous with the revised constitution we have proposed for the Government of India. But while on the one hand it is unlikely that the use of the special and somewhat drastic powers of the Council will be invoked by a responsible Government of India, on the other hand the existence of those powers might prove a valuable safeguard in contingencies which cannot at present be foreseen. We are conscious of the magnitude of the changes we have recommended and the serious consequences which a breakdown of the new arrangements might entail. We therefore feel no hesitation in recommending a retention of powers equally drastic to deal with such eventualities.

The India Office.

Secretary
of State.

132. Under the Government of India Act the Secretary of State remains the source of power and authority in India. In him is vested the power of direction, superintendence and control over the Government of India and subordinate governments. As regards reserved subjects this power is unimpaired. We must, however, note that the code restrictions on the financial powers of the Government of India and Provincial Governments were relaxed very largely in 1921. Further, the Secretary of State has resigned certain of his functions into the hands of the High Commissioner, while his powers of control have been

considerably limited by the Fiscal Convention. While, therefore, the statutory powers of the Secretary of State remain unimpaired in theory, in practice they have been limited considerably since the introduction of the Reforms. Over provincial transferred subjects the powers of interference of the Secretary of State have been limited by rules issued under Section 19A, Government of India Act, and can be exercised only for certain specified purposes. In the exercise of his powers of control the Secretary of State's decision is generally final. In certain respects, however, he can only act with the concurrence of the majority of his Council. The most important respects in which his authority is so limited are (1) in connection with the Services and (2) in financial matters.

133. We have here some definite proposals to make in pursuance of the policy of transferring power, wherever possible, from the Secretary of State to the Government of India. We have had the advantage of hearing the opinions of high financial authorities on the question of the agency which can most conveniently be employed for the raising of loans on behalf of the Government of India. We have come to the conclusion that there is much advantage to be derived from bringing the Government of India into direct relations with the London money market ; and we therefore recommend that the power to raise loans should be vested in the Government of India, and that it should be left to it to employ such agency as may seem desirable for the purpose of raising loans.

Delegation of powers by the Secretary of State to the Government of India : Raising loans.

In connection with the recruitment of the Services, it is clearly inconsistent with the principles of responsible government that such recruitment should be vested in any authority outside India. We therefore propose that recruitment for the Services should be in the hands either of the Government of India or of the provincial governments as the case may be, and that the governments concerned should be free to choose their own agency for this purpose.

Recruitment of the Services.

A further question which we have considered is that of the appointment of representatives of India to international organisations, such as the League of Nations. Here again we consider that all such appointments should be made by the Government of India and not by the Secretary of State. It would be natural if the Government of India were to employ the High Commissioner for India as their agent in the matters to which we have referred, but we would not limit their discretion and would leave it to them to decide upon the agency which they may desire to employ.

Appointment of delegates to International Organisations.

134. The proposals which we have put forward will automatically involve certain further limitation of the powers of the Secretary of State. With the establishment of a unitary form of government and the transfer of all subjects to a responsible ministry, the rules under Section 19A of the Government of India Act

Limitation on power of Secretary of State.

will restrict the Secretary of State's powers of intervention over the whole provincial field. In the case of the subjects transferred to responsible ministers in the Central Government we consider that the same rules should apply. Moreover, we contemplate that further conventions, of the nature of the Fiscal Conventions, will tend to become established. As the power of the popular Assembly increases, the authority of the Secretary of State must wane.

The Council
of India.

135. This brings us to the Secretary of State's Council. On the question of the retention or abolition of the Secretary of State's Council the opinion of the Committee is divided. To some of us it appears that the Council is not only unnecessary, but positively harmful ; that its existence results in delay ; unnecessary duplication of work ; and unwarranted interference with the Government of India. Others of us look upon it as affording both a protection to Indian revenues against raids by the Chancellor of the Exchequer and a guarantee to the Services, the removal of which will act as a deterrent to recruitment for All-India Services. On a full consideration of the arguments for and against, however, we recommend that the Council of the Secretary of State be abolished. If, however, it is to be retained, we consider that it should be reconstituted in such a way that half the members are Indians selected from the members of the Central Legislature. This will, at any rate, ensure that popular opinion will be adequately represented in the Council. We further consider that so long as the Secretary of State is to discharge his functions of superintendence and control over any subject not transferred in the Government of India, he should be assisted by the appointment of two Indian Under-Secretaries of State, of whom at least one should find a place in Parliament.

Indian
Under-
Secretaries
of State.

Representa-
tion of
India in
Parliament.

136. We also consider that so long as India does not attain dominion status it is necessary that the Indian point of view should be represented in Parliament and that provision should be made for the representation of Indians in the British Parliament. We therefore recommend that means should be found and rules prescribed, if necessary, for the election of such members.

CHAPTER VI.

MISCELLANEOUS.

137. Our discussion of the constitutional developments in India inevitably leads to the consideration of the future position of the Army. It has been argued that a country which claims responsible government should be able to defend itself against foreign aggression and maintain internal order ; and India's claim to self-government has been challenged on the ground of her dependence on Britain for her defence in the last resort. We would point out that this test has not been invariably applied in the case of other British Dominions to which responsible government has been conceded. We are, however, prepared to answer that test ; but under conditions which must be fair and reasonable. To make India's advancement to her political goal conditional on her ability to undertake her defence on the one hand and, on the other hand, to deny her full opportunity to do so, or even question, as has been done in some quarters, the possibility of her ever being able to do so at any time, we regard as inconsistent alike with reason and fair play. If, therefore, the declared intention of Parliament to advance " the progressive realisation of responsible government " in India holds good, as it most unquestionably does, further opportunities should be given to her to man the Indian portion of the Army by her own sons as a preliminary to taking the entire defence of the country into her own hands. We, therefore, recommend that concurrently with the establishment of responsible government, on the lines recommended by us, a military college should immediately be established in India ; and that in other respects the recommendations of the Sken Committee should be carried out in the manner referred to in that Committee's Report.

The Army
in India.

138. In the three great federations of British-speaking peoples, the United States of America, the Dominion of Canada and the Commonwealth of Australia, a Supreme Court forms an integral part of the constitution, and although the Indian Commonwealth which we hope to see established will be formed by a system of devolution of power from the Centre, and not by the federation of independent states or provinces, the arguments in favour of establishing a Supreme Court for India are, in our opinion, not less cogent than in the cases referred to. A great deal of the appellate work of the Privy Council would devolve upon the Supreme Court in India, to the great advantage of litigants,

Establish-
ment of a
Supreme
Court.

both in time and money. The Supreme Court would decide disputes between one province and another, or between provinces and the Centre, and might be entrusted with authority to give rulings on interpretations of the constitution. It need not oust the jurisdiction of the Privy Council. The Canadian or Australian model provides precedents for regulating the relationship of the Supreme Court and the Privy Council in London.

We are convinced of the necessity for the establishment of a Supreme Court in India as an integral part of the constitution, and we recommend that a Supreme Court be so established.

Funda-
mental
Rights.

139. We are of opinion that it is essential to embody in the Government of India Act a declaration of certain fundamental rights. We propose, therefore, that a section should be enacted to the following effect :—

“ No subject of the King-Emperor shall by reason only of his religion, place of birth, descent, colour or caste, or any of them, be disabled from or prejudiced for the purpose of holding or being recruited for any office or post paid out of public funds ; or of adopting freely any profession, trade or calling, or engaging in any industry ; or acquiring any right, title or interest in any property ; or finding admission to any educational institution supported out of funds in the hands of the Central or Provincial Government or a local body ; or entering or using public roads, public wells and other places whatsoever so maintained ; and all orders and enactments placing any such disability now in force are null and void.

“ Provided that this provision shall not affect the Punjab Land Alienation Act or any similar Act for the protection of agriculturalists in India.

CONCLUSION.

India's
demands.

140. We have now set forth in detail some of the principal changes which we wish to see introduced in the system of government set up under the Government of India Act of 1919. In order that the true significance of those changes may not be obscured by the foregoing discussion of the detailed provisions, we desire to state in explicit terms what we consider to be India's minimum demands. We demand an explicit declaration on the part of the British Parliament that full dominion status for India is the goal at which it aims. We demand, further, that an immediate and substantial step should be taken towards the attainment of that goal by the conferring on the provinces of a liberal

measure of autonomy and by making the Government of India responsible to its legislature in accordance with our detailed recommendations. Lastly, we demand that provision should be made in the Government of India Act which will enable the above goal to be reached without the necessity for further inquiries by statutory commissions or other agency.

We are convinced that there is no safe half-way house between an immediate advance on the lines which we have indicated in our Report and an ultimate surrender by the British Government after years of agitation and bitterness to India's insistent demand. We make no apology for stating India's case in the plainest and most forcible manner, for we believe that this may be the last opportunity that a British Government will ever have of rallying to its side all the saner and more responsible elements of Indian opinion, and of strengthening their hand against the forces of disorder. We cannot believe that the British Government will be so blind to the teaching of history that it will fail to take advantage of this opportunity and, by an act of far-seeing and magnanimous statesmanship, set the crown on the great work that Britain has done for India.

141. Before we conclude we desire to express our gratitude to all those who have come forward to help us in our task. The provincial governments proffered their assistance freely and we are much indebted to the members of executive councils, ministers and secretaries in that behalf. Our special acknowledgments are due to the committees appointed by the provincial legislatures for their co-operation in elucidating the local evidence, and in furnishing us with their valuable advice on the form of the changes recommended. To them, and to all those who submitted memoranda and came forward to give evidence before us, we tender our warmest thanks. We shall be failing in our duty if we do not express our appreciation of the work done by Mr. H. H. F. M. Tyler, C.I.E., I.C.S., Secretary, and Messrs. S. N. Roy, I.C.S., and H. K. Kirpalani, I.C.S., Deputy Secretaries to our Committee, Mr. R. M. Palat, Barrister-at-Law, personal Secretary to our Chairman and the members of the staff. They have worked under great pressure ; and without their willing co-operation we should have found it difficult to complete our task. Lastly, we desire to express our keen appreciation of the hospitality shown to us in an unstinted measure throughout our tour in India and also of that extended to us by His Majesty's Government during our stay in London.

Acknowledgments.

142. Some of us do not agree with all the conclusions reached by the Committee : and in some cases, even where we agreed, we desire to put forward the arguments by which we support those

Conclusion.

conclusions more fully than could be done in the main report. We therefore sign the report subject to our minutes of dissent or explanation which are appended.

We have the honour to be,

Your Excellency's most obedient servants,

SANKARAN NAIR, Chairman.

A. H. FROOM,

NAWAB ALI KHAN,

SHIVDEV SINGH UBEROI,

ZULFIQAR ALI KHAN,

HARI SINGH GOUR,

ABDULLAH AL-MAMUN SUHRAWARDY,

M. C. RAJAH,

Members.

H. H. F. M. TYLER,

Secretary.

London, the 18th October, 1929.

APPENDIX I.

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS.

(*Note.*—This Summary is intended only to be a concise indication of the proposals ; and it should be read with the paragraphs of the Report, which are noted in the margin.)

*Question of Sind and Burma.**Paras.*

1. Sind should be separated from the Bombay Presidency and made into a new province.....39 (1)
2. Burma should not be separated from India39 (2)

Provincial Executive.

3. Excepting Law and Order in Bengal the distinction between reserved and transferred subjects should be abolished and all subjects, save those specifically classified as central, should be provincial.....41
4. The Cabinet should consist of eight ministers in Madras, six in the United Provinces, five in Bombay, Bengal, Punjab and Burma, four in Bihar and Orissa and Assam and three in the Central Provinces42
5. There should be joint responsibility in the Cabinet.....43
6. The Governor should select the Chief Minister and appoint the other ministers on his recommendation...43
7. The Chief Minister should preside at the meetings of Cabinet and, save in respect of Law and Order in Bengal, should distribute the portfolios amongst the members of the Cabinet.....46
8. Rules for the transaction of business of the local government should be prepared by the Cabinet and submitted to the Governor for his approval.....46
9. The Governor should not be a member of the Cabinet....47
10. The portfolio of Law and Order in Bengal should be placed in charge of a member, not necessarily an official, appointed by the Governor ; such member will, on appointment, become an ex-officio member of the Legislative Council.....49
11. Adequate notice should be given before any motion of want of confidence is introduced in the Legislative Council. No such motion should entail the resignation of a ministry unless two-thirds of the members present vote in favour of it.....50
12. The salaries of ministers and of the President of the Council should be fixed by an Act of the local legislature51

Paras.

13. The Governor should exercise only the ordinary constitutional power of dismissing the Cabinet.53
14. For the purpose of maintaining peace and tranquillity in a province the Governor should have extraordinary power to issue orders in the name of the government and, if necessary, to overrule his Cabinet53
15. It should be open to the Governor to direct or prohibit the transfer of any district magistrate or district superintendent of police to and from any district53
16. If the Governor differs from the Cabinet on any question affecting (a) the religion or the religious rites of any class of British subjects in British India ; (b) any central subject ; or (c) the interests of another province he should have the power to refer the question to the Governor-General, whose decision shall be final.....53

Provincial Legislature.

17. The present electorate should be doubled immediately59
18. The Legislative Councils should have the power to alter the franchise at the end of their second term ; provided that any change shall not be carried into effect unless it is passed at a special meeting of the Council and is supported by not less than two-thirds of the members present.....60
19. Unless a more rapid advance is made earlier in the direction of adult suffrage, one-third of the population should be compulsorily enfranchised in 1941, two-thirds in 1951 and the whole in 1961....60
20. The question of further extension of the franchise in Burma should be left to the discretion of the local Legislative Council.....60
21. The Provincial Legislative Councils should be enlarged61
22. The official bloc should be entirely eliminated.....65
23. The Governor should have the power to nominate to the Legislative Council for the purpose of particular bills not more than two experts.....65
24. The nomination of non-officials should be entirely done away with.....66
25. Except in the case of Europeans in all provinces, Anglo-Indians and depressed classes in Madras, Karens and Indians in Burma, communal electorates should be abolished.....82, 83, 78, 84 and 85
26. Seats should be reserved for other minorities in joint electorates. The members of a community for whom seats are reserved should be free to contest other seats in general constituencies.....69

27. In provinces in which they are in a minority Muslims should be given the privilege of having seats reserved for them in joint electorates, either on a population basis or on their voting strength, whichever may be more favourable to them ; and further they should be permitted to contest seats in general constituencies beyond the number actually reserved for them.....72
28. Seats for Hindus and Sikhs in the Punjab and for Sikhs in other provinces where their numerical strength entitles them to representation should be reserved in joint electorates on a population basis or their voting strength, whichever may be more favourable to them, without prejudice to their right to contest other seats in general constituencies73 and 74
29. In Bengal there should be no separate electorates for Hindus and Muslims and no reservation of seats, but the two communities should vote in a joint electorate73
30. Separate electorates should be formed for the depressed classes in Madras.....78
31. In the Bombay Presidency seats should be reserved for the depressed classes in joint electorates on a population basis or their voting strength, whichever is more favourable to them, without prejudice to their right to contest more seats in general constituencies79
32. In Assam seats should be reserved in joint electorates for the backward and depressed classes in the Surma valley and for the indigenous primitive races and backward and depressed classes in the Assam valley.....79
33. In the remaining provinces seats should be reserved for the depressed classes in joint electorates without prejudice to their right to contest more seats in general constituencies.....79
34. In Madras and Assam seats should be allotted to the backward classes, it being left to the local governments to form electorates if possible, or otherwise to fill the seats by nomination.....80
35. In the United Provinces five seats should be reserved for the backward classes in joint electorates.....80
36. In Bihar and Orissa seats should be reserved for the aborigines and the backward and hill tribes in joint electorates.....80
37. Indian Christians should have reserved seats in joint electorates81

38. Europeans should continue to have separate electorates in all provinces, except in the Central Provinces where a mixed constituency of Europeans and Anglo-Indians should be formed.....82
39. Except in Bombay, the Central Provinces and partially in Madras, seats for Anglo-Indians should be reserved in joint electorates.....83
40. The representation of Indians in the Burma Legislative Council should be on the same basis as at present ; but their number should be increased in proportion to the increase in the total membership of the Council.....85
41. The reservation of seats for non-Brahmins in Madras and Mahrattas in Bombay should be abolished.....86
42. Seats should be allotted to Commerce and Industry in all provinces by special constituencies.....87
43. Seats should be given to the planters in Madras, Assam and Bihar and Orissa in special constituencies88
44. Seats should be assigned to the mining industry in Bihar and Orissa and the Central Provinces in special constituencies.....89
45. Seats should be allotted to labour by reservation in general constituencies in Bombay and by separate electorates in other provinces.....90
46. Seats should be reserved for landholders in special constituencies91
47. The representation of the Universities should be at the same strength as at present except that one more seat should be allotted to the three universities of Allahabad, Agra and Lucknow.....92
48. The University franchise should be confined to members of the Senate or, in the case of the Dacca University, the Court of the University.....92
49. In every province five per centum of the total seats in the Legislative Council should be reserved for women. Election should be by joint or separate electorates, but if this be found impracticable representation may be given to women by nomination93
50. The term of the provincial legislatures should be extended to four years.....94
51. The legislative power in the provinces should be vested in the Governor and the Legislative Council, and in the case of the United Provinces also the Senate.....95
52. The local legislature should have the power to make laws for the peace and good government of the province in respect of all provincial subjects ; but

- it should not be empowered, without the previous sanction of the Governor-General in Council, to repeal or alter as to the province any law relating to a provincial subject enacted by the Indian Legislature before the commencement of the new constitution95
53. No proposal for the appropriation of any provincial revenues or other moneys for any purpose should be made except on the recommendation of the Cabinet.... 97
54. Without the previous sanction of the Cabinet it should not be lawful for any member of the local legislature to introduce any measure affecting the public revenues of the province or imposing any charge on those revenues.....97
55. The power to assent to or withhold assent from any bills passed by the local legislature should vest in the Governor.....98
56. When the Central Government has been popularised in accordance with the recommendations of the Committee, the Governor-General in Council may be authorised to assent to bills reserved for his consideration and to disallow provincial legislation within twelve months from the date of its receipt by him.....98
57. The Governor should have the power in cases of emergency to authorise such expenditure as may be necessary for the safety and tranquillity of the province99
58. A second chamber in the provinces is unnecessary except in the United Provinces, where a second chamber should be created tentatively for a period of ten years.....104
59. The franchise for electors for the Senate in the United Provinces should be the same as the present franchise for the Council of State. The representatives of the depressed classes in the Senate should be elected by members of the provincial legislative council belonging to the depressed and backward classes105
60. Seats should be reserved for the Muslims in the Senate in a joint electorate on the basis of their population or voting strength whichever is found to be more favourable to them without prejudice to their right to contest other seats.....105
61. In regard to legislation the Senate should have concurrent powers with the Legislative Council, except that all money bills should be initiated in the Legislative Council only.....105

62. Budget and supplies should be voted by, and the ministry should be responsible to, the Legislative Council only.....105
63. Differences of opinion between the two chambers should be settled at a joint sitting of both chambers to be summoned by the Governor at his own instance or at the instance of either chamber.....105

Other Proposals.

64. The existing classification of subjects into provincial and central should be re-examined by a special committee106
65. Until the Government of India is constituted on a popular basis by the transfer of departments to ministers all the revenues of a province should be at the disposal of the local government. The provincial government, however, should be subject to the obligation of paying to the Government of India such contribution as may be fixed by an impartial tribunal107
66. The powers now exercised by the provincial governments in respect of the High Courts should in future be exercised by the Government of India.....108
67. The reservation under Section 101 of the Government of India Act of one-third of the seats in the High Courts for members of the Indian Civil Service, should be abolished.....109
68. One-third of the judges of the High Courts should be barristers of not less than ten years standing and one-third should be advocates or vakils who are not barristers. The Chief Justice of the High Court should in all cases be a barrister.....109
69. Except in Madras and Bombay the new provincial governments should be free to decide whether the All-India Services should be retained or provincialised. Should the Governments decide to provincialise the Services in question due regard should be paid to the adequate representation therein of all communities113
70. In Bombay the remaining All-India Services should be provincialised. All the prospects that the present members of those Services now enjoy being reserved to them114
71. In Madras the two Security Services should remain All-India Services as at present, the remaining All-India Services being provincialised.....114

72. No order affecting the emoluments or pensions, no order of formal censure and no order on a memorial shall be passed to the disadvantage of any officer of an All-India or provincial Service without the personal concurrence of the Governor. Any officer belonging to an All-India Service or appointed by the Secretary of State will be entitled to appeal to that authority against any such order.....115
73. It should be open to the Governments of Madras and Bombay to equip and maintain a local military force and a local militia.....116
74. The Viceroy and the Commander-in-Chief should be entitled to inspect the local army and pass orders for its efficiency and maintenance; but they should not be entitled to direct the reduction of the force or any other step which will render the force less efficient.....116
75. Immediate steps should be taken by the provincial governments to effect the separation of executive from judicial functions.....117
76. Reforms should be introduced into the North-West Frontier Province on the lines of the Morley-Minto Reforms118
77. The powers of superintendence and control of the Governor-General in Council over the provincial governments should be exercised only for such purposes as may be specified and differences of opinion between the Governor-General in Council and a local government as to the right of the former to intervene in provincial affairs should be decided by a special tribunal.....119
78. The Governor-General may supersede a local government and carry on the administration in case of breakdown or inability to maintain law and order in the province, but not in the case of financial insolvency. But the Governor-General may take any steps that he considers necessary to enforce the payment of any debt due by a local government.....119
79. The Governor-General should have the power to overrule a provincial government for the purpose of maintaining peace and tranquility.....119
80. Subject to the approval of the Secretary of State the Governor-General should have power to suspend a provincial legislative council.....119
81. The Governor-General in Council with the approval of the Secretary of State should have power to take any province under his immediate authority and management119

The Central Government.

82. All subjects except the defence of India and its relations with foreign and Indian States should be transferred to the control of ministers responsible to the Legislature.....123
83. Without the previous sanction of the Governor-General it shall not be competent to the Legislature to deal with any measure affecting :—
- (a) the public debt or public revenues of India or imposing any charge on the revenues of India : or
 - (b) the religion or religious rites and usages of any class of British subjects in India : or
 - (c) the discipline or maintenance of any part of His Majesty's military, naval, or air forces ; or
 - (d) the relations of the Government with foreign princes or states ;
- or any measure
- (i) regulating any provincial subject, or any part of a provincial subject, which has not been declared to be subject to legislation by the Indian Legislature ; or
 - (ii) repealing or amending any Act of a local legislature ; or
 - (iii) repealing or amending any Act or Ordinance made by the Governor-General.....123
84. The Cabinet of the Governor-General should consist of not more than two executive councillors and not more than six ministers.....125
85. The appointment both of executive councillors and ministers should be made by the Governor-General at his own discretion.....125
86. Half the members of the Cabinet of the Governor-General should be Indians.....125
87. One executive councillor or minister should be a member of the Council of State and the rest should sit in the Assembly ; and where they are not already members of the Legislature they should become such members *ex-officio*.....125
88. Both the members of the Executive Council and ministers should have the right to address either chamber of the Legislature but they should only have the right to vote in the chamber of which they are members.....125
89. The Legislative Assembly should consist of 300 members..... 126 and 128

90. In addition to the normal strength of the Assembly the Governor-General in Council shall have the power to nominate ten experts127
91. Europeans should be returned by separate electorates...129
92. The representatives of all other communities and of labour and women should be returned by joint electorates129
93. In the case of the Depressed Classes, Sikhs, Anglo-Indians, Indian Christians, labour and women, should election by joint electorates present any insuperable difficulty recourse should be had to indirect elections129
94. Landholders and Indian and European Commerce should have special constituencies129
95. The President of the Legislative Assembly should be elected by the Assembly from amongst its own members130
96. The term of the Assembly should be extended to five years130
97. The strength of the Council of State should be increased from sixty to one hundred131
98. Seats in the Council of State should be distributed amongst the various communities and interests in the same proportion in which they are now held. The present proportion between the elected and nominated seats should be maintained131

The Secretary of State and the India Office.

99. The power to raise loans should be vested in the Government of India and it should be left to that Government to employ such agency as may seem desirable for this purpose133
100. The recruitment for the Services should be in the hands of the Government of India or of the provincial governments, as the case may be133
101. The appointment of representatives to international organisations, such as the League of Nations, should be made by the Government of India and not by the Secretary of State133
102. With the transfer of all subjects to a responsible ministry in the provinces the rules under Section 19A of the Government of India Act, restricting the Secretary of State's power of intervention, should be extended to the whole provincial field.....134

Paras.

103. In the case of subjects transferred to responsible ministers in the Central Government the above rule should apply134
104. The Council of the Secretary of State should be abolished. If, however, it is retained it should be re-constituted in such a way that half the members are Indians elected from the members of the Central Legislature135
105. So long as the Secretary of State is to discharge his functions of superintendence and control over any subject not transferred to the Government of India he should be assisted by the appointment of two Indian Under-Secretaries of State, of whom at least one should find a place in Parliament135
106. So long as India does not obtain dominion status the Indian point of view should be represented in Parliament. Provision should accordingly be made for the representation of Indians in the British Parliament136

Miscellaneous.

107. A military college should immediately be established in India and in other respects the recommendations of the Skeen Committee should be carried out137
108. A Supreme Court should be established in India138
109. A declaration of certain fundamental rights should be embodied in the Government of India Act139
110. Provision should be made in the Government of India Act which would enable full dominion status to be attained without the necessity for further inquiries by statutory commissions or other agency140

APPENDIX II.

The following is the text of a letter addressed by Sir John Simon, Chairman of the Indian Statutory Commission, to the Governor-General, dated 6th February, 1928.

“ In your speech to the Central Legislature on Thursday you laid renewed emphasis on ‘ full discretion as to the methods ’ which has from the beginning been left in the hands of the Indian Statutory Commission, and I myself as Chairman on landing in India next day authorised the issue of a statement on behalf of the Commission that it hoped without delay to announce the line of procedure which it would propose to follow. Evidence accumulates that throughout India there is much uncertainty as to the manner in which we may be expected to exercise our functions, and even considerable misunderstanding as to what we conceive those functions to be, while—amidst the many messages of welcome and encouragement—we note that speeches are being made and resolutions passed which are based on a complete, though doubtless genuine, misconception of our intentions. It is my plain duty, therefore, as Chairman to set out forthwith the true position as we regard it, and since on this preliminary visit there is not likely to be any formal sitting of the Commission when the statement could be made, I venture to address this letter to Your Excellency.

“ We understand that the Government of India and the Local Governments have been engaged for some time past in preparing material which they might put before the Commission. We have not seen these documents, and do not know how far they may consist of matters of fact and how far of matters of opinion, or whether they deal with past events or with suggestions for the future. But, whatever they are, instead of dealing with them by ourselves we wish to propose that they, and evidence given in explanation or amplification of them, should come before a ‘ Joint Free Conference,’ over which I should preside, consisting of seven British Commissioners and a corresponding body of representatives chosen by the Indian Legislatures (just as we ourselves have been chosen by the British Parliament).

“ We put forward the plan of a ‘ joint free conference,’ not only because we should welcome assistance of colleagues from the Indian Legislatures, but because we think it is only right and fair and in the truest interests of India and Britain alike, that opportunity should be provided for such memoranda and testimony to be scrutinised, and if necessary elucidated, from the Indian side on free and equal terms. We suggest, therefore, that the two Houses of the Central Legislature should in due course be invited to choose from their non-official members a Joint Committee, which might conveniently be seven in number, and that each Local Legislative Council should be asked to constitute a similar body. The Indian side of the Conference would

consist, when Central subjects were being dealt with, of those first named ; in a province, the Indian wing would primarily consist of provincial members, but, in order that the Central Joint Committee may not have a partial view of the material put before it, we should be glad if arrangements could be arrived at which would enable its members, or some of them, to be present as an additional element at provincial sittings.

“ We have no wish to dictate the composition of the Indian wing of the Conference in more detail, and we should greatly prefer that the precise scheme should be reached by agreement between the different elements in India concerned. Our main object will be met so long as the arrangement is one which secures that the Indian side of the Joint Conference includes, on appropriate occasions, those who are able to speak for Provincial Councils just as the Joint Committee would speak for the Central Legislature, so long as the members representing India and sitting with us do not amount to an unwieldy number. We assume, of course, that just as we ourselves are a body selected from all the British parties and both Houses of Parliament, so our Indian counterpart would be, so far as may be, truly representative.

“ Two matters remain to be dealt with—the question of evidence other than that above referred to, and the question of the Report. I wish to deal candidly and clearly with both.

“ Some of us have had considerable experience of the method of joint conference as applied to industrial and political questions, and it is quite clear to us that each side of the Conference will require from time to time to meet by itself. We see no reason, however, why evidence from public and representative bodies and from individuals should not normally be given to the Conference as a whole, just as evidence presented by or on behalf of the various Governments would be. If a case arises when this general plan cannot be followed, I should make no secret of it, and should ask my colleagues in Joint Conference, when, as I hope, they learn to have faith in my sense of fairness, to accept from me such account of the matter as I can give them on behalf of the Commission, with due regard to the reason why testimony has been separately received. I imagine that the Indian side may find occasions when they would think it well to act in the same way.

“ As regards the report it is, I feel, necessary to restate the true function of the Commission and its place in the general scheme which you announced last November. The Commission is in no sense an instrument either of the Government of India or of the British Government, but enters on the duty laid upon it by the King-Emperor as a completely independent and unfettered body composed of Members of Parliament who approach Indian legislators as colleagues. It is not an executive or legislating body authorised to pronounce decisions about the future of the government of India. Before these decisions can be

reached, the full process, of which the present investigation is a first step, must be completed, including opportunity for the views of the Indian Legislature among other bodies being presented by the delegations in London to the Joint Parliamentary Committee. The present Commission is only authorised to report and to make recommendations, and in this report we desire to include a faithful account of the opinions and aspirations prevalent in India, and of concrete proposals for constitutional reform so far as these are put before us. The British Commissioners therefore are bound to be solely responsible for the statement of the effect upon their own minds of the investigation. We shall report to the authority by which we have been constituted just as (if the Conference is set up) the Joint Committee would, we presume, be entitled to report its conclusions to the Central Legislature. It is obvious that these documents should be prepared and presented simultaneously. There are well-known constitutional means by which documents emanating from a Joint Committee and presented to the Central Legislature can be forwarded to and made available to the British Parliament. But if the Indian Joint Committee would prefer it, we would make its report an annexe to our own documents, so that both might be presented to the King-Emperor and made public at the same moment.

“Above all, I would urge that one of the merits of the method of Joint Conference is that, besides securing due recognition of equal status, it provides the opportunity for that free exchange of views and mutual influence which are best calculated to promote the largest measure of agreement that is possible.

“Our present visit is preliminary, and sittings of the Joint Free Conference, if it is set up, would not begin till October. But we make public our suggestions at once, not only in order to clear the air, but in order to show ourselves available for any conference about any matters of procedure which this statement does not adequately cover.

“The Commission is, of course, bound to carry through its task in any event and discharge to the full the duty cast upon it, but we are undertaking this duty only after having made it known that the method of collaboration on honourable and equal terms is open, and that we put it forward in all sincerity and goodwill. We will only add that in making these proposals we are confident that we are correctly interpreting the intentions of the British Parliament.

“The carrying out of our proposals will require at a later date that the Council of State, the Legislative Assembly, and the local Legislative Councils should be moved to elect their representatives who would take part in the Joint Conference, and the Commission will be glad if the Government of India will take such steps as seem appropriate for this purpose in due course.”

APPENDIX III.

Statement showing the Population of the Provinces by Religion.

Provinces.	Hindus, excluding Depressed Classes.	Depressed Classes.	Muslims.	Euro-peans.	Anglo-Indians.	Indian Christians.	Sikhs.	Buddhists.	Tribal Religions.	Others.	Total.
Madras ..	31,011,012	6,500,000	2,840,488	10,821	23,481	1,327,182	578,398	27,603	42,318,985
Bombay ..	13,336,327	1,478,393	3,820,153	33,593	10,404	220,920	122,937	325,492	19,348,219
Bengal ..	8,703,527	11,500,000	25,210,802	22,715	22,242	102,124	845,780	22,742	46,695,536
United Provinces ..	25,405,624	13,000,000	6,481,032	25,146	9,253	166,307	14,234	265,604	..	274,191	46,375,787
Punjab ..	3,579,888	2,800,000	11,444,321	21,549	4,177	303,324	2,294,207	237,558	20,685,024
Bihar and Orissa ..	23,161,118	5,000,000	3,690,182	6,261	4,104	246,764	1,881,009	12,751	34,002,189
Central Provinces ..	8,945,592	2,675,806	563,574	5,817	3,422	32,206	1,614,013	72,330	13,912,760
Assam ..	2,577,232	1,555,177	2,202,460	2,751	486	124,819	1,124,809	18,496	7,606,230
Burma ..	484,432	..	500,592	8,665	16,688	231,753	..	11,201,943	702,587	22,439	13,169,099
North-West Frontier Province.	149,881	..	2,062,786	8,380	200	2,020	28,040	23	2,251,340
Other minor Administrations (e.g., Ajmer-Merwara, Andamans and Nicobars, Baluchistan, Coorg, Delhi).	848,179	..	627,941	10,929	1,464	17,904	11,618	..	34,632	42,964	1,595,031
	118,202,812	14,509,376	59,441,331	146,637	95,921	2,775,323	2,347,499	11,467,547	6,904,165	1,056,587	246,960,200
							(a)			(b)	

(a) The total Sikh population of the remaining Provinces shown above is approximately 19,500 (included in the figure shown under "Others.")

(b) This includes Jains, Parsis, Jews, Aryas (a), and others.

MEMORANDUM

BY

The Honourable Sir SANKARAN NAIR, Kt., C.I.E., Chairman.

The Honourable RAJA NAWAB ALI KHAN.

The Honourable SARDAR BAHADUR SHIVDEV SINGH UBEROI.

CONTENTS.

	PARAS.
I.—Introduction	1-15
II.—Provincial Autonomy—The Executive Government should be under the control of an elected Chamber	16-30
III.—Financial Autonomy of the Provinces.—Customs, income-tax and salt should be entirely provincial sources of revenue	31-52
IV.—Communal Electorates	53-70
V.—Law and Order	71-78
VI.—Second Chambers in the Provinces	79-85
VII.—The Depressed Classes	86-89
VIII.—The Central Government.—Finance, including the military budget, should be under popular control	90-112
IX.—The Army	113-122
X.—The Punjab	123-125
XI.—The Franchise.—Adult franchise recommended ; should be introduced immediately into Bengal	126-137
XII.—The Services	138-140

I.

INTRODUCTION.

Political
evolution
of India
envisaged
in the
Montagu-
Chelmsford
Report.

1. The Montagu-Chelmsford Report and the despatch of the Government of India, No. 1, dated the 5th March, 1919, form the basis of the Reforms embodied in the Government of India Act of 1919. To understand the nature of the questions now in issue and the future political evolution therein foreshadowed, it is necessary to bear in mind the leading features of the Reform Scheme as described in those documents. With regard to the future political evolution of India the Montagu-Chelmsford Report states as follows :—

“ Our conception of the eventual future of India is a sisterhood of States, self-governing in all matters of purely local or provincial interest, in some cases corresponding to existing provinces, in others perhaps modified in area according to the character and economic interests of their people. Over this congeries of States would preside a Central Government, increasingly representative of and responsible to the people of all of them ; dealing with matters, both internal and external, of common interest to the whole of India ; acting as arbiter in inter-State relations, and representing the interests of all India on equal terms with the self-governing units of the British Empire. In this picture there is a place also for the Native States. It is possible that they, too, will wish to be associated for certain purposes with the organisation of British India, in such a way as to dedicate their peculiar qualities to the common service, without loss of individuality. But it seems to us axiomatic that there cannot be a completely representative and responsible Government of India on an equal footing with the other self-governing units of the British Commonwealth until the *component States* whose people it represents, and to whom it is responsible, or at least the great majority of them, *have themselves reached the stage of full responsible government* The dominating factor in the intermediate process must be the rate at which the provinces can move towards responsible government.”

Provinces
and
responsible
Govern-
ment.

2. After pointing out that the conditions requisite for responsible Government—administrative and electoral experience—were lacking in their completeness, the Joint Authors state their conclusion in the following words :—

“ The provinces are the domain in which the earlier steps towards the progressive realisation of responsible Government should be taken. Some measure of responsibility should be given at once, and our aim is to give complete responsibility as soon as conditions permit. This involves at once giving the provinces the largest measure of independence, legislative, administrative and financial, of the Government of India which is compatible with the due discharge by the latter of its own responsibilities.”

Their
financial
independ-
ence.

3. Of financial independence they state :—

“ The existing financial relations between the Central and Provincial Governments must be changed if the popular principle in government is to have fair play in the provinces. The present settlements by which the Indian and Provincial Governments share the proceeds of certain heads of revenues are based primarily on the estimated needs of the provinces, and the Government of India

disposes of the surplus. This system necessarily involves control and interference by the Indian Government in provincial matters. An arrangement, which on the whole worked successfully between two official Governments, would be quite impossible between a popular and an official Government. Our first aim has therefore been to find some means of entirely separating the resources of the Central Government and the Provincial Governments.

"Because provincial settlements have been based, not on provincial revenues, but on provincial needs, a central control over provincial expenditure is not merely justifiable but inevitable. The Government of India could not allow a province to go bankrupt. But if the Government of India were responsible for provincial solvency, they must be in a position to control provincial expenditure; indeed, in view of their own competing needs, they could hardly avoid feeling a direct interest in keeping down charges. Again, as regards revenue, so long as the Government of India take a share in the proceeds, they have a strong motive for interfering in the details of administration. Their interest in Land revenue, for example, inevitably leads them to a close supervision over revenue settlements; and the control tends to become tighter in cases where expansion and development, as in the case of irrigation, depend on capital outlay.

"We start with a change of standpoint. If provincial autonomy is to mean anything real, clearly the provinces must not be dependent on the Indian Government for the means of provincial development. Existing settlements do, indeed, provide for ordinary growth of expenditure, but for any large and costly innovations provincial Governments depend on doles out of the Indian surplus. Our idea is that an estimate should first be made of the scale of expenditure required for the upkeep and development of the services which clearly appertain to the Indian sphere; that resources with which to meet this expenditure should be secured to the Indian Government; and that all other revenues should then be handed over to the provincial Governments, which will henceforth be held wholly responsible for the development of all provincial services. . . . Our whole scheme must be even and well balanced, and it would be ridiculous to introduce wide measures of administrative and legislative devolution and at the same time to retain a centralised system of finance."

4. As to legislative independence they proposed that there should be in each province "an enlarged legislative Council, differing in size and composition from province to province, with a substantial elected majority, elected by direct election on a broad franchise, with such communal and special representation as may be necessary". They were also of opinion that the provinces must be "secured against any unnecessary interference by the Government of India in the spheres of legislative and administrative business". After referring to certain reservations they say :—"We intend that within the field which may be marked off for provincial legislative control the *sole legislative power shall rest with the provincial legislatures.*"

Legislative independence.

5. As to the administrative devolution, they say :—

"The question of restraining the Central Government from administrative interference in the provinces is more difficult. We recognise that, in so far as the provincial Governments of the future will still remain partly bureaucratic in character, there can be no logical reason for relaxing the control of superior official authority

Administrative devolut

over them ; nor, indeed, would any general relaxation be approved by Indian opinion ; and that in this respect the utmost that can be justified is such modification of present methods of control as aims at getting rid of interference in minor matters, which might very well be left to the decision of the authority which is most closely acquainted with the facts. It is, however, in relation to Provincial Governments, in their popular aspect, that serious difficulties present themselves. So long as the Government of India is predominantly official in character and, therefore, remains amenable to the Secretary of State, its interference with any matters normally falling within the range of popular bodies in provinces involves a clash of principle which cannot fail to engender some heat ; and *the scope of which it is on all grounds desirable to keep within very closely-defined bounds.*"

Scheme of government in the Provinces described.

6. The scheme devised to carry out the above principles was to divide the Executive Government in the provinces into two halves, one consisting of what were called " transferred " subjects, administered by the Governor, with the advice of ministers who were elected members of the Legislative Council and were under its control, and the other consisting of " reserved " subjects, administered by the Governor, with the assistance of Executive Councillors, who were not subject to that control. This was the system named dyarchy. The legislative councils were expanded and at least 70 per cent. of the seats made elective ; the franchise was widened and separate electorates, returning Muhammadan and non-Muhammadan members, respectively, were continued and enlarged.

Hostile reception of the scheme.

7. The scheme in its essential features was a liberal one, but Indian hopes had been raised to the highest pitch ; and the end of the war was heralded by occurrences which dashed all those hopes. Turkey was treated in a manner which shocked Muhammadan opinion and aroused sympathy in the other communities. The Rowlatt Act and the occurrences at the Jallianwala Bagh were regarded as an intimation to Indians that they should no longer count upon the promises held out to them during the war. The situation was seized upon by Mr. Gandhi to start his campaign of non-co-operation, with the united support of the Hindus and the Muslims. The new constitution was ushered in while this campaign was gathering strength. A triple boycott of the schools, of the law courts and of the legislative councils was proclaimed by Mr. Gandhi, who declared that it was only by these means that Home Rule could be achieved. The Liberal Party entered the councils and for the first three years co-operated with the Government in carrying out a number of beneficial measures ; but before the end of the term of the first council they realised that they were not able to work the reforms satisfactorily without material modifications.

Reforms Enquiry Committee, 1924.

8. A number of Mr. Gandhi's followers entered the second Legislative Assembly at the end of 1923 and formed the Congress, or the Swaraj party, in the Assembly. Both they and the Liberals agreed to carry through the Assembly a resolution recommending certain fundamental changes in the Constitution.

A Committee, known as the Reforms Enquiry Committee, 1924, was thereupon appointed by the Government of India to inquire into the working of the Government of India Act and the rules thereunder, and to suggest remedies, consistent with the structure, policy and purpose of the Act, for such difficulties or defects as may be found to exist.

9. The Congress Party stood aloof from the inquiry. But the four non-official members of the Committee who differed from their five official colleagues belonged to the Liberal Party. The result of the evidence taken by the Committee is stated in the following terms in the Majority Report of the Committee :—

Findings
of the
Committee.

“ Generally speaking most of the Indian witnesses before us have attacked the present constitution as having been found *after trial* to be unworkable, and have advocated the immediate grant of provincial autonomy to the Provinces and the introduction of a measure of responsibility to the Legislature in the Central Government. So far as the Central Government is concerned, a common form which the recommendations of witnesses took was for the transfer to the administration of Ministers responsible to the Legislature of all subjects except :—

- (i) Political and Foreign Relations ; and
- (ii) Defence.”

The opinion of the minority was as under :—

“ With the exception of Messrs. Fazlul Hug and Ghuznavi, ex-Ministers of Bengal, nearly every non-official witness whom we have examined has pressed on us the need for provincial autonomy and of introduction of responsibility in the Central Government.”

Both sections of the Committee submitted various recommendations, but no substantial action was taken on them by the Government.

10. The attitude of the Legislative Assembly has since been one of undisguised hostility to the Government. As a protest against the attitude of the Labour Government in England the Finance Bill was rejected. There was virtual unanimity of Indian political opinion of all shades regarding the necessity for an immediate constitutional advance. A session of the National Congress was convened to make definite recommendations regarding the legislative provision necessary for such constitutional advance. A deputation consisting of the Rt. Hon. Srinivasa Sastry and Mr. Iswarsaran was sent to England to lay before the authorities the desire of India for a speedy appointment of a Commission of Enquiry. The sentiments expressed in the Legislative Assembly, repeated in the National Congress, were re-echoed and amplified in provincial conferences in various parts of India. The demand for constitutional advance was a dominant feature from this date in the activities of all Indian political parties.

Attitude
of the
Legislative
Assembly
and the
National
Congress.

The demand
formulated
by the
Assembly.

11. We might here state the demand as formulated by the Assembly. On the 7th September, 1925, a resolution was moved by the Home Member of the Government of India in which he asked the Assembly to accept the principle underlying the Majority Report of the Reforms Enquiry Committee referred to above and to give effect to the "detailed recommendations" therein contained for improvements in the machinery of Government. This was in fact giving the go-by entirely to the Minority Report. To that Resolution the Swaraj or Congress Party moved an amendment that immediate steps should be taken to move His Majesty's Government to make a declaration in Parliament embodying such fundamental changes in the constitutional machinery and administration of India as would make the Government of the country fully responsible. The amendment further recommended the holding of a Round Table Conference or other suitable agency adequately representative of all Indian, European and Anglo-Indian interests, to frame, with due regard to the interests of minorities, a detailed scheme based on the above principles. The leader of the Swaraj Party, speaking on the amendment, explained that what the Assembly wanted was that dyarchy in the provinces should be replaced by unitary responsible Government and that the Central Government must be made responsible to the Legislature except in regard to military expenditure and the Foreign and Political Relations. This has since continued to be the demand of all the parties, Swarajist, Independent and Nationalist.

Appoint-
ment of the
Statutory
Commis-
sion.

12. The demand for accelerating the appointment of the Statutory Commission in pursuance of Section 84A of the Government of India Act was long withstood by His Majesty's Government : but in 1927 they announced their intention to appoint a Commission under the Chairmanship of Sir John Simon "to inquire into the system of Government, the growth of education, the development of representative institutions in British India, and matters connected therewith, and to report as to whether and to what extent it is desirable to establish the principle of responsible Government, or to extend, modify or restrict the degree of responsible Government existing therein, including the question whether the establishment of second chambers of the Local Legislatures is or is not desirable." In India this was regarded as inconsistent, at least in spirit, with the declaration of 1917. This view received support from the fact that there was no Indian on the Commission and that, as originally intended, no report was to be submitted embodying the Indian point of view. The Indian political leaders resolved accordingly to boycott the Commission and, with exceptions, the boycott was effective.

The All-
Parties'
Conference
Report.

13. The Indian leaders lost no time in putting forward their own scheme. A conference of political leaders of all parties was summoned and a Committee appointed by them issued a report which was ratified by the Conference. They claimed full

responsible Government like that of the Dominions in the provinces and in the Central Government. For the solution of the Hindu-Muslim question, they recommended adult suffrage and in place of separate electorates for Muhammadans they proposed that there should be in future only joint electorates with reservation of seats on the population basis for Muhammadans where they were in a minority. They recommended full responsible Government as in the other provinces for the North-West Frontier Province, and in any new provinces that may be created. They recommended the constitution of Sind into a separate province. No reservation of seats for any community was allowed in the Punjab and in Bengal, where the Muslims were in a majority.

14. The acceptance of the Dominion status was declared by certain persons to be inconsistent with the resolution of the Madras Congress for independence passed in the previous year. The leaders of both the parties therefore came to a compromise and in December 1928 the following resolution was moved by Mr. Gandhi at the session of the Congress :—

Endorsed
by the
Congress.

“ This Congress having considered the constitution recommended by the All-Parties Committee Report welcomes it as a great contribution towards the solution of India's political and communal problems and congratulates the Committee on the virtual unanimity of its recommendations ; and whilst adhering to the resolution relating to complete independence passed at the Madras Congress, approves of the constitution drawn up by the Committee as a great step in political advance, specially as it represents the largest measure of agreement attained among the important parties in the country.

“ Subject to the exigencies of political situation this Congress will adopt the constitution if it is accepted in its entirety by the British Parliament on or before December 31st, 1929, but in the event of its non-acceptance by that date or its earlier rejection, the Congress will organise a campaign of non-violent non-co-operation by advising the country to refuse taxation and in such other manner as may be decided upon.

“ Consistently with the above nothing in this resolution shall interfere with the carrying on, in the name of the Congress, of the propaganda for complete independence ”.

An amendment moved by the Independence Party for severance from the British Empire was negatived largely owing to Mr. Gandhi's influence and the resolution moved by him was passed.

15. The scheme put forward by the All-Parties Conference satisfied only a section of the Muhammadans. Another and a much larger section wished to modify the scheme in certain respects mainly by the reservation of seats according to the population basis in Bengal and in the Punjab though the Muhammadans in these provinces are in a majority and by the reservation

Muslim
All-Parties
Conference.

for them of one-third of the seats in the Central Legislative Assembly. A Muslim All-Parties Conference convened at Delhi and presided over by His Highness the Aga Khan declared its disagreement with the All-Parties Conference, but at the same time demanded complete provincial autonomy, a federal constitution for India, the Central Government having only such powers as may be reserved to it, separate electorates for Muslims and representation for the community on the population basis where the Muslims were in a majority and representation of not less than what they now enjoy where they were in a minority. They also wanted one-third representation in the Central Legislature. They, of course, supported the scheme for the separation of Sind and the introduction of constitutional reforms in the North-West Frontier Province.

II.

PROVINCIAL AUTONOMY.

Para. 41 of the Report of the Committee.

**Transfer of
depart-
ments now
reserved.**

16. We have quoted above passages showing the intention of the authors of the Joint Report to confer immediately some measure of responsibility in the provinces and to grant complete responsibility as soon as conditions permitted. We have also described the scheme of Provincial Government based on partial responsibility. If, as we propose to show, the conditions requisite for complete responsibility are fulfilled, it naturally follows that the departments now reserved should be transferred to Ministers under the control of elected Councils.

**Factors
governing
the
transfer.**

17. Indian opinion is decisive on the point that there should no longer be any reserved departments, that the administration in its entirety should be under the elected chamber and that the Local Governments should have full independence of a Government of India which is not itself under the control of an elected chamber. In determining whether effect should be given to the popular demand we propose to consider the record of the administration of the transferred departments by the Ministers and the reasons for the transfer of the departments now reserved. Of the transferred departments the more important are those dealing with Local Self-Government, Education and Public Health.

**Record of
the admini-
stration of
transferred
depart-
ments.**

18. The Statutory Commission have been directed to report on the progress of education and the development of local self-government. The growth of education since 1919 has been exhaustively dealt with by the Auxiliary Committee appointed by the Royal Commission, by all the Local Governments and by the Indian Central Committee. We therefore think it unnecessary to go into the question at any length ; but shall only refer to a few facts to illustrate the difference in the handling of the education as well as the medical and health departments before and after the Reforms ; and to show that the activities of these de-

partments since the Reforms were very different in kind and of a more progressive, varied and beneficent character than before.

19. Since the passing of the Government of India Act, local self-government has been extended to villages by the Panchayats Acts. In Municipalities and Taluq Boards the franchise has been lowered and the electorates have largely increased. Presidents and Vice-Presidents of Local Boards and Municipalities have been made elective. The elective element in the Local Boards has been increased everywhere. Municipalities have been given full powers in the selection of their chief executive officers. Women have been made eligible for election both as municipal councillors and as members of District Local Boards. The control of primary education has been transferred almost entirely to Municipalities and Local Boards. There has been a growth of civic consciousness. Interest in elections has increased ; attendance of members at meetings has been satisfactory. Men whose one object is promotion of the public weal, men of experience and standing, are coming forward to play their part in civic affairs, and generally exercise a moderating influence. Expenditure on public health and conveniences such as drainage, water works, etc., has enormously increased. Even smaller municipalities have shown a tendency to push on schemes of drainage and water supply. The larger municipalities have financed big projects of this nature by means of loans raised in the open market. They have not hesitated to resort to additional taxation for the service of these loans.

Progress
in local
self-govern-
ment ;

20. Education has evoked both interest and endeavour. All parties are willing to meet the demand for it. Expenditure on education has increased enormously. A large number of questions at every session of the Council have related to education and particularly primary education. Some of the resolutions have recommended free and compulsory education, basing the demand on the need for educating the backward and depressed classes. Some resolutions contained demands for special concessions to these classes in the matter of admission to colleges and training institutions, special schools and appointments. These efforts to improve the depressed and similar classes have been successful in rousing them from their apathy and they are now vigorously putting forward their claims for increased facilities. Remarkable progress has been made in the education of Muhammadans. The most incessant demand in connection with education was for the introduction of a measure of compulsion and this has been met by the Primary Education Acts. The increase in the number of primary schools and pupils has been phenomenal. Female education has made great strides. A good deal of interest has been taken in the suggestion that a more practical turn should be given to the teaching in village schools, particularly by the introduction of lessons in agriculture. During general discussions of the budgets there is generally a complaint that sufficient

in educa-
tion.

funds are not allotted to education. Finance Bills have been passed on an assurance that monies were needed *inter alia* for education. No demand for funds for the spread of education has ever been refused. In the pre-Reform days the Government at Delhi or Simla, not in touch with local opinion, issued circulars full of wise maxims ; but the results achieved during the last ten years show that local efforts and enthusiasm have succeeded better than the well meant but futile efforts of a distant and foreign bureaucracy. On every side there is life and energy instead of apathy and listlessness.

The Councils and social progress.

21. As to the administration of the transferred departments, other than those dealing with education and local self-government, the Governments state that a liberal and progressive policy has characterised the administration. The Councils are ever ready to sanction grants for medical administration and sanitation. Their record in matters of general social progress is equally praiseworthy. The amelioration of the depressed classes has in particular received much attention from the Legislative Councils. Political rights of women and the rights of women and children generally, marriage, freedom of religion and conscience are some of the subjects dealt with by the Council in a liberal and progressive spirit. The grant to the depressed classes of the franchise for local self-government, and their admission into the public services have been liberally dealt with. Resolutions have been passed recommending the provision of grants-in-aid for infant and maternity welfare and for adequate maternity benefits to women workers in organised industries ; and prohibiting the employment of women during the period of such benefits. Bills have been introduced for the removal of Brahmin control over non-Brahmins.

The results summarised.

22. Thus on every side progress has been remarkable. Steps taken to spread education have been more far-reaching than ever contemplated by the Government before the Reforms ; in fact those steps were then opposed by Government as being impracticable. Local self-government before the Reforms was largely a misnomer ; officials being the Presidents of District Boards ; Staffs not under the control of Local Bodies ; budgets framed and settled by officials ; elected members not forming a majority. All this is now changed ; everywhere we find life, energy and enthusiasm. In social legislation the Councils have taken steps which the British Government consistently, and perhaps rightly, from their point of view, refused to take, but which were indispensable to the progress of the country. The expectations of those responsible for the Reforms of 1919 have been amply fulfilled.

Reasons for transfer : dependence of Ministers.

23. We now turn to the reasons for transferring the Reserved Departments to popular control. Under Dyarchy as it was worked, the Ministers were dependent upon the official vote. On this account they became indistinguishable from the

members of the Executive Council. This tended to weaken their followers' sense of allegiance, to lessen their sense of responsibility and to throw them back on the simpler and more popular policy of opposition to official measures. The Ministers thus remained in office without the support of the majority of the elected members, since the official bloc and the nominated members, with a small minority of elected members sufficed to keep them in office. The Government of the Transferred Departments was thus not always carried on according to the wishes of the elected members of the Legislative Council, but in unison with the official Executive on which the Ministers were dependent. So far as the latter are concerned, it cannot therefore be said that they were really in power, as was intended by the Reform scheme, but only to have exercised their influence. Agreeing with the Local Governments we are, therefore, of opinion that under the present system sufficient responsibility is not given to the Ministers in relation to transferred subjects. In a purely elected Council this responsibility is bound to be real as the Council will effectively control the Ministers.

24. It is now also recognised that it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to divide off absolutely the "reserved" sphere from the "transferred." It is practically impossible to administer certain departments satisfactorily by treating them as either wholly transferred or wholly reserved. In these circumstances it is hopeless to retain the distinction between the reserved and the transferred departments.

Inter-
relation of
depart-
ments.

25. The absence of joint responsibility amongst the Ministers is one of the causes of their weakness. But it has been found impossible in practice to insist on joint responsibility under the present circumstances. The Governments point out that the absence of well organised parties divided on broad questions of policy is inevitable under the present system. Dyarchy, with the dual control over Ministers of the Legislative Council and of the Governor which it necessarily involves, hinders the growth of such parties. There were, therefore, various groups in the Councils, out of which the Ministers were appointed. There could be no joint responsibility in a Ministry composed of members of different groups, following different principles.

Absence of
joint re-
sponsibility.

26. The groups on which the Government had to rely were, generally, communal in character. The result was that the Government often, if not invariably, became a communal machine. The police, for instance, came to be regarded in some cases as instruments of a communal Government for carrying out a communal policy. This intensified the feeling between the communities. In fact, to this cause is generally to be attributed the increasing bitterness between the various communities. If the system is allowed to continue we apprehend a widening of the gulf between the communities and consequent danger to the Government.

Depen-
dence on
communal
groups.

Complications of a joint purse.

27. Under the Reform scheme there was a joint purse for the transferred and reserved departments with the result that the two halves of the government had to distribute the funds amongst them. The Reforms resulted in a tightening up of financial control. Such a tightening up was not indeed necessarily connected with the Reforms. "It might equally well have been insisted on under a purely bureaucratic form of Government ; but, as a matter of fact in the pre-Reform Government neither was the Provincial Budget taken with equal seriousness nor was there the same financial watch over expenditure, as there has been under the Reforms. This was partly due to a division of responsibility with the Government of India, but mainly to the fact that neither the budget as a whole nor the detailed items of expenditure came under the same public scrutiny or criticism. That this tightening up of control has proved irksome cannot be denied. The old departments, especially those dealing with Public Works, which had been accustomed to budget in a manner indicative of little more than of the money they hoped to spend under favourable conditions, found it difficult to accommodate themselves to a condition of affairs in which it was of serious importance that there should be an accurate forecast of the money spent in a particular year ; nor were they inclined to regard favourably the introduction of an approximation to the English system of treasury control over expenditure. On the other hand the new ' transferred ' departments, full of zeal for the development of their own schemes, had a tendency to regard as unduly orthodox the protests of the Finance Department against the introduction of new expenditure at any period of the budget year, and as obstructive the criticisms made upon the schemes from the financial point of view."

Effect of financial stringency on transferred departments.

28. The Legislative Councils have all along been clamouring for a progressive policy in the transferred and what are called the nation-building departments. At every budget discussion the Councils generally reiterate the charge that the nation-building departments are being starved. The Government have not been able to meet the expenditure required for Primary Education. Many items for improved medical facilities considered urgent by the Medical and Health Departments have been refused year after year. The Governments' share of the contribution to municipalities for undertaking schemes of water supply and drainage has not been paid. The roads and buildings branch of the Public Works Department has been starved.

Its repercussion on reserved departments.

29. The inability of the Government to allot the necessary funds for the nation-building departments has produced a consistent belief that they are being starved to the advantage of the purely administrative or reserved departments. The result is the refusal of the Legislative Council to sanction even the necessary items of expenditure for the reserved departments. The debates in Councils show that this attitude is partly due to the feeling

that one half of the Government is not responsible to the Council and may be guilty of extravagant or arbitrary action.

The reserved departments are more or less controlled by the Legislative Councils so far as legislation and the provision of funds are concerned. For the reason given above they have been subjected, according to the Local Governments, to intolerable criticism in the Council, and it is scarcely possible to allow the process to be continued further. The Legislative Councils, having no responsibility as regards reserved subjects, give unrestrained vent to their criticism without fear of consequences. As the nation-building departments do not get sufficient funds, the popular party are unwilling to grant the funds which are necessary to carry on the administration of the reserved subjects. It is necessary, therefore, that the financial control, so far as all the departments are concerned, must be under the Legislative Council who alone, faced with the responsibility for the administration of both, would deal equitably with the claims of all the departments with the money at their disposal.

30. The Local Governments, with the exception of that of the United Provinces, are of opinion that *dyarchy must be abolished and real responsibility introduced*. It is necessary for this purpose that there should be no nominated members, official or non-official, and that the entire administration should be under the control of the Councils. We agree with them. Our conclusion.

III.

FINANCIAL AUTONOMY OF THE PROVINCES.

Para. 107 of the Report of the Committee.

31. If all subjects are transferred to Ministers under the control of Legislative Councils, it follows that the provinces must not be dependent on the Central Government for the means of provincial development. Hitherto, where the funds available for distribution among the transferred and reserved departments were not sufficient, the two had to accommodate themselves to the situation ; but if, after the transfer, the Legislative Councils find that they have not funds to carry on the government according to a reasonable standard, a difficult situation would arise. If the Councils find that the funds locally raised are taken by the Imperial Government, while the local administration is starved, we may expect that they will make a strong protest, as they have already done, against the appropriation by the Central Government of their funds ; and will seek a fresh and reasonable settlement with the Central Government. They will not allow the Central Government, as hitherto, to determine the amount which alone should be left to them. The problem stated.

The solution
in the
Montagu-
Chelmsford
Report.

32. The authors of the Montagu-Chelmsford Report anticipated this. They said that contributions by the Central Government to the Provinces will give the former a direct interest in keeping down charges ; while sharing the proceeds of taxation with the Local Governments will give them a strong motive for interfering with the details of administration. So they came to the conclusion that the resources of the Provincial Government must be entirely separated from those of the Central Government. The next step was to *estimate first* the expenditure of the Indian Government ; secure to them resources for meeting this expenditure and hand over all the rest to the Provincial Governments for the development of the Provinces.* They accordingly made customs, income tax, salt, opium, posts, telegraphs and railways central subjects. Land revenue was made a provincial subject.

Working
of the
solution
examined

33. In order to determine whether this arrangement has succeeded it is necessary to find out how far the Provincial Governments have been able to carry on with the revenues at their disposal ; and whether they require all the revenues now allotted to the Central Government ; subject, of course, to the obligation to pay to that Government the amount required to satisfy their *estimated* needs.

in Bengal ;

34. For a population of 46 millions, three millions more than that of Great Britain, the Government of Bengal has only left to it a revenue of Rs. 1070 lakhs (£8,000,000) out of a total of Rs. 3575 lakhs raised in the Province. From this revenue it has to provide for the following heads of expenditure, arranged in the order of their cost in 1925-26 :—Police, Education, General Administration, Civil Works, Justice, Pensions, Medical, Land Revenue, Jails, Excise, Public Health, Agriculture, Registration, Stationery and Printing, Forests, Industries. The spokesman of the Government of India stated in the Legislative Assembly as follows :—

“ We (the Government of India) have examined the case, both thoroughly and critically, and it appears certain that with every economy Bengal must have a deficit of not less than Rs. 1,20 lakhs. Even if we made no allowance for any extra expenditure for improvements in transferred subjects, such as are desired by Ministers, improvements which we are told are necessary if the reforms are to be a success, Bengal would have that deficit, even if it provided only the bare minimum expenditure required to carry on the ordinary administration of the Province.”

This is due to the fact that income tax and customs were assigned by the Reform Scheme to the Government of India, and in these sources is largely concentrated the taxable capacity of the Province. An analysis of the income tax assessments made in 1920 showed that over 90 per cent. of the income tax collected in Calcutta came solely from Bengal. Almost the

* *Vide* para. 3 above.

whole of the jute crop is grown in Bengal, but its revenue-producing value is taken by the Government of India in the form of export duty, income tax and railway receipts, and the Province gets nothing. The result is that one million pounds can hardly be found to spend on the education of 46 millions ; the Universities are barely able to exist ; the Police Department is starved ; inspectors and constables of the right stamp cannot be obtained for the pay available. No wonder that we have a series of riots. " Bengal found itself in a condition of continuous poverty, which prevented an expansion of expenditure on beneficial measures, which might have made a complete change in the attitude of the electorate, the Press and the Legislature towards the reformed Government. Not only were the Ministers unable to develop a policy of social amelioration, but it was even found necessary to increase taxation and curtail expenditure severely to maintain solvency and carry on the bare essentials of the administration. In these circumstances it would not be reasonable to base arguments on the facts that no progress has been made in education, that local self-governing institutions have hardly advanced, and that no advantage has been taken of increased opportunities of service. The Ministers themselves and their supporters who laboured strenuously to keep the constitution going as a working concern might well ask what real opportunities they have had. In the circumstances, therefore, the Government of Bengal must give first place in its proposals to a complete revision of the financial settlement. Unless this be conceded, the successful working of the new constitution will be impossible, however, good it may be in other ways. "

35. The income tax in Bengal in 1925-26 was Rs. 5,93,59,000 ; in 1926-27 it was 5,69,89,000, and the export duty on jute for 1926-27 was 3,89,13,000. These two important items all go to the Government of India ; Bengal does not get anything while she has important projects pending, for which the money required—Rs. 13,27,33,000—cannot be found. There are other lines of development, the more important of which are the development of agriculture in accordance with the recommendations of the Royal Commission, and the development of industries, both of which involve large expenditure. If Bengal's needs are to be satisfied, fiscal autonomy is indispensable, and the spokesman of the Government of Bengal has told us that they are unwilling to give anything to the Government of India until their own needs have been satisfied. The Provincial Committee also support the claim put forward by the Government, and they, in our opinion, are justified in doing so.

36. The Government of Bombay point out that in India, in Bombay ; according to the ideal stated in the Montagu-Chelmsford Report, the tendency is towards the model of the Australian or the American Federation ; that is to say, the Local Government

being the more important unit, the Central Government is to carry out only those functions which the Local Governments cannot carry out singly. The services which are at present allotted to the Central Government are Defence, Foreign Relations and Loans. Subjects like General Administration, Education, Police, Law and Order, are all provincial subjects. Their claims to expansion must prevail over those of the Central subjects ; but from the point of view of Bombay—and Bengal—the settlement, *i.e.*, the distribution of the provincial income between the Central and Local Governments has not given adequate resources for the functions assigned to the Provincial Government. Judged by this test, the settlement has been a failure. The income tax has been allotted to the Central Government. The taking away of such an important head of revenue from the scope of provincial taxation is contrary to the idea of federalism, as understood in countries like Australia and America. The type of federalism to which India is being led requires that “the provinces should have access to all the resources of the taxpayers within their boundaries.” The centralisation of the income tax denies to the provinces the power to tax the industrial and commercial wealth within their borders. Without that tax industrial provinces can never get adequate resources to meet the growing needs of progressive administration. Again, the centralisation of income tax makes the division of resources between the industrial and agricultural provinces most inequitable. Customs also is allotted to the Central Government. It has increased from 31 crores in 1921 to about 50 crores in 1927-28. What has been the condition of Bombay deprived of the revenues collected within the presidency ?

37. The period since the Reforms has been one of great financial stringency in this province ; and the Government of Bombay have been seriously handicapped in their administration. Except for a few departments they have been only marking time. Under the present Financial settlement they have before them nothing but a period of stagnation. The Legislative Council has all along been clamouring for a progressive policy in the nation-building departments, and if even a modicum of success was to attend the Reforms, it was most desirable that some expansion should be allowed in the nation-building departments, especially in Education and Public Health. Such expansion was not possible on account of the financial stringency which might have been relieved to a great extent if customs and income tax were not taken away by the Central Government. Whenever any new taxation measures were introduced in the Council, Government was compelled to win support for the measures by agreeing to use as far as possible the proceeds of such taxation for the nation-building departments. Bombay had thus to tax itself to attain any expansion that it desired in the nation-building departments. The figures of the growth of expenditure since 1910-11 are

discussed in Appendix A to the Government Memorandum, Vol. 1. The detailed review there given shows very clearly how Bombay's administration has been in most cases not only not progressing but either remaining stagnant or actually retrogressing. The same conclusion, the Bombay Government say, may be arrived at by a different line of approach. They point out that they have incurred commitments under the Primary Education Act, as regards building grants to schools and colleges, as regards medical facilities considered very urgent by the Surgeon-General, as regards grants-in-aid to municipalities for undertaking schemes of water supply and drainage, and buildings of all departments administratively approved. All these are old commitments for which the Government have incurred a moral responsibility. For want of funds they have not been carried out. The appropriation by the Government of India of the customs and income tax has been responsible to a great extent for this situation.

38. The Financial situation in Assam may be gauged from the following. On account of want of funds the province has not got a single college for the training of teachers or for higher education in agriculture, engineering, veterinary science or medicine. There is not a single hospital for women in the Province. Kala Azar has depopulated whole tracts and greatly reduced the population in other parts. Assam has the largest incidence of leprosy and the fewest facilities for its treatment; malaria is deadly. Communications within the Province are the poorest in India. The Province has arrears of expenditure in all Departments. Many pressing schemes of expenditure remain unattended to for want of funds. The Government say that new police stations, new schools, and water supply in urban and rural areas are required. Funds are required for various industrial and agricultural schemes and for expansion of primary education. In fact, the requirements of the future are infinite.

in Assam;

Such is the condition of Assam, due to her poverty. Her sufferings would not have been so acute but for the financial scheme, which transfers customs and income tax substantially to the Central Government.

39. The Central Government's appropriations of revenue earned in the Province are as follows :—

			Rs.	
1921-22	814,000	} Income Tax.
1926-27	3,038,000	
1926-27	1,400,097	} Petrol and Oil.
1921-22	198,000	
			5,000,000	} Export duty on tea.

The increases under the first two items and the whole of the last item should have gone to the Local Government. The Central Government remitted the tea duty. If they did not

in Bihar
and Orissa.

want it they should have made it a Local Government tax and left it to the latter to remit it if necessary.

40. The financial situation in Bihar and Orissa is thus described by the local government :—

“ The Province is at present faced with stagnation, if not with bankruptcy. If the state of bankruptcy is reached, an autocratic Government charged with the duty of maintaining the essential services to the neglect of popular demands will be essential. Even if bankruptcy is not reached, stagnation at the present stage will not only discredit the policy that brought into existence a province condemned to remain in a permanent state of inferiority, but must also prove a fruitful cause of local disaffection towards the established Government, of which full advantage will undoubtedly be taken by its opponents. In any case, India must be regarded as a single country, and one limb of the body politic cannot be allowed to deteriorate or it will affect the health of the whole ”

“ The position of Ministers in this Province is rapidly becoming an impossible one, and will continue to be so until they are provided with the means to keep pace with, if not to overtake, the rate of development in other provinces. The whole fate of the Reforms in Bihar and Orissa therefore depends in a very special degree on the conclusion of an adequate financial settlement. ”

What has mainly contributed to this is the fact that in their own words the Imperial Government have appropriated every source of expanding revenue as their own, while throwing so many expanded heads of expenditure on the Province. Immense mineral resources are the peculiar endowment of this Province, but the taxation paid by the exploiters of the minerals is taken by the Central Government in the form of income tax. They would not allow the Local Government to impose a tax on the coal exported. On the other hand though the Local Government derive no benefit from the exploitation of their mineral resources the burden of the expenditure in those areas falls on the Local Government.

Provincializa-
tion of
customs,
income tax
and salt
revenue
recommended.

41. We have taken two maritime provinces, Bengal and Bombay and two inland provinces, Assam and Bihar and Orissa for illustration. It is not necessary to go into details so far as the remaining four provinces are concerned as they lead to the same conclusion. The demands of the Provinces are enormous, for education, health, industrial development and other services. There is no limit to the expansion of those services or to the funds which may be legitimately used for them. In future when law and order and general administration, including the police and judicial departments, irrigation, etc., are transferred the demands will rise to an enormous extent and they should have the first claim in preference to the services ministered to by the Government of India. The only possible way to get out of the difficulty is to allow the provinces to retain customs, income tax and salt revenue collected within their limits and allow them to impose further taxation on industrial wealth.

Objections
to the
proposal
examined.

42. It has been objected to this that customs and income tax must be Central subjects on account of the necessity of maintaining a uniform rate throughout the country. That the

taxation in these respects should be uniform may be at once admitted ; but this can be done easily by a provision in the Statute empowering the Government of India to interfere with provincial taxation to secure such uniformity. Another objection is that the province in which the taxes are collected may not be the province justly entitled to them. Here again the difficulty can be got over easily. If there is any dispute between two provinces as to which should get the proceeds of customs duty or income tax, an impartial tribunal appointed by them may decide the question. If they cannot agree upon an impartial tribunal the Government of India may settle the question. This is no reason for the Government of India appropriating the amount to the exclusion of the two provinces. A third objection taken is that the Central Government requires the proceeds of this taxation ; and if deprived of them, it would have to make good the loss either by direct contribution from the other provinces, or by transferring to the Centre some of the revenues now raised in the provinces by purely provincial taxation. But the funds required by the Central Government have to be met by all the provinces equitably and this can be done only by an impartial tribunal appointed by the province and the Government of India to decide what amount each province should pay. In deciding this question all the expenditure which the Government have to incur legitimately will be taken into consideration.

43. But it is said that any disturbance of the existing arrangements is unnecessary on account (1) of the probable expansion of the revenues now collected by the Provinces ; (2) the possibility of their imposing further taxation ; and (3) the likelihood of the Central Government itself distributing any surplus out of the revenues already accruing to it or arising from fresh taxation. It is also said (4) that instead of the provinces taking the customs, income-tax and salt revenue the taxes in question may be divided between the Central and the Local Governments. A brief reference to these suggestions may now be made.

Counter-
suggestions.

44. As to (1) it has been already ascertained by careful enquiry that the revenues now available to the Local Governments are inelastic while, all increasing heads of revenue are assigned to the Central Government. Not only are the existing sources of provincial revenue not likely to expand in the future, the very reverse may be the case. It is possible that some sources of revenue like excise, allotted to the provincial Government might disappear altogether, while the necessary provincial demands are growing almost to an unlimited extent.

The sug-
gestions
examined.
Expansion
of pro-
vincial
revenues.

45. As to (2), no Legislative Council is likely to impose fresh taxation if the Central Government is allowed to appropriate the whole or part of the proceeds of such taxation. If there is any attempt in the latter direction, just as there is friction now between the transferred and reserved halves, there will be friction between the Central and Provincial Governments, and the Central subjects will follow the fate of the subjects now reserved.

Imposition
of fresh
taxation by
provinces.

Again, even if the councils are inclined to tax themselves they will find it inequitable to do so ; since if customs and income tax continue as Central they cannot take steps to distribute taxation over the urban and rural population, with the result that even if they are inclined to impose any taxation they will not do it. Another reason against fresh taxation is that increased expenditure from provincial revenues over the nation-building departments and the consequent moral and material development of the provinces would result in an increase in receipts from income tax, customs and railways. So long as the whole of these increased receipts go to the Central Government the Provinces would be disinclined to raise the wherewithal to pay for increased expenditure.

Distribution by
the Central
Government.

46. As to (3), it has been suggested that provincial resources may be increased by the distribution by the Central Government among the provinces (a) of any Central surplus that may accrue, with Central taxation at its present level ; such surplus being the result either of a growth of revenue, or a reduction of expenditure, or a combination of both ; and (b) of the proceeds of new or additional Central taxation imposed for the purpose of supplementing provincial revenues.

(a) Of its
existing
surplus :
system of
doles.

47. As to (a), that is to say, giving doles to the various provinces ; this was rejected in the Montagu-Chelmsford Report. Those who make this proposal are evidently unaware that the arrangement proposed is the same as, or similar to that which existed before Lord Mayo's time and which was dispensed with by him for various reasons. The objections which applied then would apply to the proposals now put forward, and we shall briefly state them. The demands of the Local Governments will be practically unlimited as there is no limit to their legitimate wants. Their constant effort will be to persuade the Government of India to give them as large a share as possible. The most importunate will get the largest share. The Government of India will be helpless to check the increasing demands as they have not the local knowledge needed for the same. Local economy will lead to no local advantage. There will thus be no stimulus to economy and avoidance of waste. The Local Governments will not adjust their expenditure to any fixed income and their demands will depend upon not what was absolutely required, but what they hoped to get. The more they ask the more they will possibly get. The Government of India will never be able to form an impartial or comparative estimate of the imperative needs of a province which have to be satisfied immediately. The result would be conflict of opinion between the Government of India and the Local Governments. It was recognised as long ago as 1860 that " in order to avoid these conflicts it is expedient as far as possible that the obligation to find the funds necessary for administrative improvements should rest upon the authority whose immediate duty it is to devise such measures."

48. As to (b), that is distribution by the Central Government of the proceeds of new and central taxation imposed for the purpose of supplementing provincial revenues, the suggestion is impossible. No Central Legislature will in future impose any taxation, the proceeds of which will be distributed by an authority beyond its control. They will not impose a tax, the proceeds of which are to be distributed by the Executive Government without any regard to their wishes. They would be still less willing to impose any taxation in a province when it is open to the Legislative Council of that Province itself to impose such taxation and when they feel that the imposition of such taxation by them will be resented by that province or at least would not be liked by it.

(b) Of the proceeds of fresh taxation.

49. As to dividing the proceeds of taxation or the scheme called the Divided Heads, we have already referred to the opinion expressed in the Montagu-Chelmsford Report, that this will tighten the grip of the Central over the local administration. It was therefore the first aim of the authors of that Report to find some means of entirely separating the resources of the Central and Provincial Governments. Before the Reforms of 1919 the following were divided equally between the Central Government and the Province where the income was collected; Land Revenue, Excise, Stamps, Income Tax, Forests, Major Irrigation. This arrangement was found very inconvenient because as the Government of India took a percentage of the proceeds of certain taxes they had a direct motive for interfering in the details of administration. The Provincial Governments therefore pressed very strongly for complete separation. They are still of the same opinion. In the memoranda submitted to us by the Government of India it is said that "opinion in India, official as well as non-official, has for many years advocated the complete separation of the sources of revenue of the Central Government and the Provincial Governments as an ideal towards which the financial policy of the Government of India should tend, and any suggestion for even a partial reversion to the system of divided heads might be regarded as economic heresy and would probably be received with considerable distrust by the Provincial Governments" In principle the division of sources of revenue can scarcely be defended, as any division of sources of revenue which even at the time may be equitable is bound to prove, either by expansion or contraction, inadequate or excessive to one or the other Government. If there is a setback owing to any special circumstance, like the failure of the monsoon, or a commercial crisis a serious disorganisation must result.

Divided heads.

A division of the taxes would be inconsistent with provincial autonomy. From an administrative point of view the objection has been well stated by the United Provinces Government. They say:—"On administrative grounds, too, we would oppose any return to the *old system of divided heads of revenue*, which

would in itself involve some measure of control by the Central Government over the branches of administration concerned with the raising of these revenues ; and the difficulty of divided control would be enhanced by the fact that the Local Government and its legislature would be dependent on control exercised by and through the Central Legislature."

Again any separation of revenue sources must operate unfairly as between various provinces. There is no valid answer to the argument that provincialization of Land Revenue, while customs and income tax are retained as Central subjects, is penalising the industrial provinces. Therefore as it is out of the question to make the Land Revenue a Central subject, customs and income tax should also be provincialised.

Other
alternatives
considered.

50. We have also considered three other alternative methods :—

(1) Payment to the Provinces of a fixed sum revisable at certain intervals. This method cannot be accepted as it would provoke recurring controversies and was found impracticable when quasi-permanent settlements were introduced.

(2) Payment to the Central Government of a percentage on the Provincial Revenues. This will never do, as the needs of the Provinces and their wealth will have to be examined.

(3) Payment to the Central Government of a contribution based on the population and the revenues of a province. This would be very unfair to the Provinces like Assam, Bihar and Orissa and the North West Frontier Province, which are poor and undeveloped. It would also require an inquiry into the wealth and needs of the Provinces. Further, it would introduce uncertainty into Provincial Finance.

Complete
Financial
Autonomy
of the Pro-
vinces indi-
spensable.

51. For the moral governance of India complete financial autonomy is indispensable. In 1919 Excise was made a transferred subject ; and a clear division of revenues with separate purposes between reserved and transferred departments was proposed by the Government of India to compel the Reformed Legislatures not to abolish the Excise Revenue and even to increase it, as the only good source of revenue for nation-building departments like Education, Health, etc. The attempt was happily defeated by the Joint Parliamentary Committee which insisted on a common purse with the result that the budget and the allocation of funds between the Transferred and Reserved Departments had to be settled by the Ministers and the Executive Council Members together. Nevertheless Indian Ministers were unable to carry out the Liquor Prohibition Policy as the revenue from Excise was necessary to carry on the Education and Health Departments, and as the reserved departments refused or were unable to supply the funds that would be required to replace the Excise. Moreover the Government of India made it impossible for the Ministers and the Councils to carry out the Prohibition Policy,

because the control of foreign liquor was in their own hands. In proportion to the decrease of country liquor, due to the carrying out of the national policy, there was an increase of foreign liquor consumption—more than a million gallons annually. The non-official members of the Council of State and Legislative Assembly have unhesitatingly condemned the policy of the Government in this respect. The official spokesman, the head of the Medical and Health Department has defended liquor consumption. A Foreign Government which for purposes of revenue and in the interests of England's liquor trade does not hesitate to tempt India to vice, and disregards the strong denunciation of Hindu and Islamic religions should not only have nothing to do with the liquor policy of the country, but should not be placed in a position to exert indirect pressure by taking away from the Provinces other sources of revenue and compel them thereby to retain liquor revenue. The Widows', Orphans' and Old Age Pensions, Health Insurance, Unemployment Benefits, Maintenance and Maternity Benefits must all remain a dream under a foreign government.

52. The system of Financial decentralisation which was inaugurated by Lord Mayo, largely developed by Lord Lytton, continued by his successors and to which a great impetus was given by the Reform Scheme of 1919, was not only one of the most beneficent but also an absolutely indispensable Reform. This is what Sir John Strachey, whom no one would accuse of pro-Indian sympathy, said on the subject: "I have already quoted the opinion of Sir Henry Maine on these measures of decentralisation. I believe with him that no more important and successful reforms have been made in Indian administration since the transfer of the Government of India to the Crown; but they have not reached their final limits. I have repeatedly insisted that the primary fact lying at the root of all knowledge about India is the immense diversity of the countries and peoples which it comprises, but it is a fact which centralisation of the Government ignores. While our Empire was being gradually built up, concentration and centralisation in the administration were often inevitable. Now that it has been constituted on a firm and peaceful basis, decentralisation is an essential condition of progress. The time will come when in regard to nearly all the ordinary matters of internal administration, each great province of India will be virtually almost a separate state. Not only will this result be obtained without the sacrifice of any part of that supreme authority of the Central Government which it is essential to maintain, but we shall gain a largely increased measure of political security. No Central Government, as Sir Henry Maine has observed, entrusted with the charge of such an unexampled undertaking as the Government of India, can escape serious occasional errors. Under a centralised Government there is danger of generalising a local mistake. Localised, a mistake can be corrected with comparative ease; it becomes dangerous

Sir John Strachey on decentralization.

in proportion to the area of its diffusion." These observations apply to centralisation of customs and income tax, quite as much if not more than to anything else. Complete Provincial autonomy, full freedom for development under different and varying conditions is essential. It would be lamentable if all this is prevented by reversing the policy followed for more than 50 years.

IV.

COMMUNAL ELECTORATES.

Para. 69 of the Report of the Committee.

53. Communal electorates and communalism in power have now been tried for the last 10 years, and the proof forthcoming from the provinces where those conditions have existed, *i.e.*, Bombay, Punjab, the United Provinces, and Bengal is conclusive to show that communal electorates should be abolished and communalism should no longer be installed in power.

Evils of
Communalism.

54. Some of the evils of communalism may be briefly mentioned. The transfer of law and order is opposed by English officials on the ground that it is dangerous to place officials under Ministers who have to obey the communities who elected them to the Councils. Appointments by the local bodies, whose members are elected on communal electorates, are made on communal lines. Similarly, taxes raised from all communities are utilised for the benefit of the communities who have the majority in the Councils and whose nominees, by means of separate electorates, hold positions of power. Boys of superior intelligence are denied admission or turned out of schools by representatives of communal interests, to make room for inferior boys belonging to their own communities, to the loss of the country. Judges are appointed not for efficiency, but on racial grounds. One Chief Justice exclaimed before us, with a gesture of despair, that he contemplates with dread the state of things a few years hence, as even now he and his colleagues had to recommend candidates for appointment on a communal basis at the instance of members of Government who owed their position to communal electorates. In the pre-reform days not a whisper was heard against Hindu or Muhammadan superior judges : there is scarcely one who is not now attacked on racial grounds. This is due to the pressure exercised by communal electorates. It is proved beyond doubt that one community places no reliance on officials belonging to the other communities. The debates in the Legislative Councils are on communal lines as is bound to be the case when members are elected by communal electorates. Communalism has infected national life. The increase of communal feeling due to separate electorates has been responsible for serious breaches of peace, for disaffection towards the Government on the part of that community which has not been favoured

by the Government, rightly or wrongly. The influence of communalism due to the separate electorates is apparent in everything done by those who owe their position to them, whether it be a "judicial decision, the giving of a contract, a report on the work of a subordinate, a recommendation for the enforcement of a penalty or the conferment of a favour". The state of feeling in the Punjab is described by the Governor himself in the following words :—

"We have, in the third place, a problem far more difficult than those I have described, because it deals with elements less tangible and factors less susceptible of direct approach or control. We have to find some remedy for the toxin of intercommunal dissension which to-day is vitiating our public and perhaps our social life. Let me be somewhat more precise here and use such frankness as is possible in one whose heartfelt desire is to allay and not to provoke discord. My reference is not mainly to communal rioting or open disturbance. There has been such in the past, but the province must take credit for the fact that it has of late escaped that open violence which has been exhibited in some towns of some of our neighbouring provinces. Disastrous as open disturbance may be, sinister as are its effects in prolonging the alienation of rival communities, it is not the whole of the problem, perhaps not even its gravest feature. My reference is rather to the fact that in every sphere of life and activity, in social matters, in almost every question of administration, in the management of local affairs, in the conduct of education, even in the current discussions of questions of law and justice, the communal question intervenes. The cause is, I am aware, deep-seated."

It is quite plain in these circumstances that the policy which has led to this result must no longer be followed.

55. Indian opinion on this question is sharply divided. The Hindu opinion is almost solid against separate electorates for Muslims. Muslim opinion, as already pointed out, is divided. An important section of which the chief spokesman is Sir Mian Muhammad Shafi, K.C.S.I., who was a member of the Government of India, maintain that separate electorates are essential to secure adequately the interests of Muslims. This section represents the All-Parties Muslim Conference held at Delhi. Another section of which the Maharajah of Mahmudabad, K.C.S.I., who was for some time a member of the Executive Council of the United Provinces, and Sir Ali Iman, who was for some time a member of the Government of India, are the leaders, represent the views of the All-India Muslim League, that separate electorates are not only against the interests of the Muslims and fruitful of evil, but are opposed to the interests of Indian Nationality. A third section stands midway between these two. The younger generation of Muhammadans is generally inclined to adopt the view maintained by the Maharajah of Mahmudabad and does not support the views of the extreme section who maintain that separate electorates are essential. This division of opinion exists also among the Muslim members of this Committee.

Indian
opinion on
Communal
Electorates

Conditions
of the
problem.

56. In dealing with the question of separate electorates for Muslims, it is necessary to bear in mind the conditions of the problem. The Muslims do not merely demand that separate electorates as they exist now should continue till they are given up by the community itself ; but they insist upon further and far-reaching extension of communalism. It is not also their case that they should have seats reserved to them on the voting strength ; that is to say, in the proportion which their votes bear to the total number of votes. Nor is it the case that they should be allowed to vote separately in separate electorates, and seats should be reserved to them on the population basis in all provinces. Both these demands the non-Muslims would be willing to concede.

Two of our colleagues support all the demands of the Delhi Conference and are not willing to continue the present arrangement, *i.e.*, retain the present proportion of seats in all the provinces. A proposal was made to them that in provinces where they were in a minority, the Muslims should be guaranteed seats on the population basis in separate electorates, and that they should have further a right to contest seats in other electorates ; that is to say, double votes were proposed to be allowed to them. This was not acceptable to them.

It was then proposed that in a joint electorate no Muslim candidate shall be deemed to have been duly elected unless he secures a majority of the Muslim votes polled, and not less than one-tenth of the total votes polled by Hindu voters ; and that no Hindu candidate shall be declared to have been duly elected although he has obtained the majority of votes, unless at least 10 per cent. of the votes polled by him are recorded by Muhammadan voters. This was also not acceptable to them. They insisted that the extreme Muslim demands formulated at the All-parties Conference held at Delhi under the presidency of His Highness the Aga Khan with reference to the question of the Muslim representation in the legislatures, services and cabinets of the various provinces should be accepted : in other words, (1) that in the Punjab and Bengal, where the Muslim population is in a majority, they should have a majority of seats, while in the provinces like Madras, Bombay, the United Provinces and the Central Provinces, where they are in a minority, they should have a far larger number of seats than they would be entitled to on their voting strength, or on the population basis ; and that in the Legislative Assembly they should have one-third of the seats reserved for them ; (2) that in the public services they should have appointments reserved to them ; that is to say, that judges, magistrates, etc., should be appointed, not with reference to their qualifications, but with reference to their religion ; (3) that at least one Muslim member in the Cabinet in provinces where they are in a minority should be guaranteed by statute.

57. These demands cut at the root of representative government. Political progress is impossible on this basis, and it is far better that nothing should be done now than that these demands should be conceded. Such is our opinion. We accordingly proceed to give a history of the question, and to state how it should be decided. Before the Government of India Act of 1919, when the functions of the Legislative Councils were only advisory, the members were naturally selected to put forward the claims of particular classes and not to come to any conclusions in co-operation with others. The decision of all questions was left to the Government. The result was the selection of those who put forward the claims of their own class without any regard to the claims of others. The members were really advocates and not legislators ; and hence Lord Lansdowne wrote in 1892 that " the representation of such a community upon such a scale as the Act permits can only be secured by providing that each important class shall have the opportunity of making its views known in Council by the mouth of some member *specially acquainted with them* ", not necessarily by some one competent to form a correct judgment.

Origin of
Communal
Electorates.

58. It was at the time of the Morley-Minto Reforms that the claim for communal electorates was advanced by the Muhammadans, inspired by certain officials. It was admittedly made on the ground that, while the Muslims are a distinct community with separate interests of their own which are not shared by other communities, no Muslim would ever be returned by the existing electoral bodies *unless he worked in sympathy with the Hindu majority in all matters of importance*. Lord Minto's Government promised the Moslems that they would be given separate representation. The Government of India said in their despatch No. 21, dated the 1st October, 1908, that these proposals were as a rule adversely criticised by the Hindus " who regard them as an attempt to set one religion against the other, and thus to create a counterpoise to the influence of the educated middle class."

Morley-
Minto
Reforms.

59. In 1915, however, owing to the attitude of England towards the Muhammadans outside India, there was a definite rapprochement between the Hindu and the Muhammadan leaders. All the elected members of the Imperial Legislative Council who were then present at Simla devised a scheme of reforms. This was accepted by the Congress and the Muslim League and amplified and modified in certain particulars. The portion of the scheme relating to the communal representation of Muslims reads as follows :—

The
Lucknow
Fact.

" Adequate provision should be made for the representation of important *minorities* by election, and the Muslims should be represented through special electorates on the

provincial Legislative Councils in the following proportions :—

Punjab	One-half of the elected Indian members.
United Provinces	30 per cent. of ditto.
Bengal	40 per cent. of ditto.
Bihar and Orissa	25 per cent. of ditto.
Central Provinces	15 per cent. of ditto.
Madras	15 per cent. of ditto.
Bombay	One-third of ditto."

Under this scheme while the Bengal Muslims were allowed only three-quarters and the Punjab Muslims nine-tenths of what they would have received upon a population basis, the Muslims of the other provinces received extremely liberal representation. But even the Bengal Muslims and the Punjab Muslims received more than what their voting strength entitled them to.

Montagu-Chelmsford Report and Communal Electorates.

60. In the Montagu-Chelmsford Report, paras. 228, 229 and 230 communal electorates were condemned.

" 228. The crucial test to which, as we conceive, all proposals should be brought is whether they will or will not help to carry India towards responsible government. Some persons hold that for a people, such as they deem those of India to be, so divided by race, religion and caste as to be unable to consider the interests of any but their own section, a system of communal and class representation is not merely inevitable but is actually the best. They maintain that it evokes and applies the principle of democracy over the widest range over which it is actually alive at all, by appealing to the instincts which are strongest, and that we must hope to develop the finer, which are also at present the weaker, instincts by using the forces that really count. According to this theory communal representation is an inevitable and even a healthy stage in the development of a non-political people. We find indeed that those who take this view are prepared to apply their principles on a scale previously unknown, and to devise elaborate systems of class or religious electorates into which all possible interests will be deftly fitted. But when we consider what responsible government implies, and how it was developed in the world we cannot take the view. We find it in its earliest beginning resting on an effective sense of the common interests, a bond compounded of community of race, religion and language. In the earlier form which it assumed in Europe it appeared only when the territorial principles had vanquished the tribal principle, and blood and religion had ceased to assert a rival claim with the State to a citizen's allegiance; and throughout its developments in western countries, even in cases where special reasons to the contrary were present, it has rested consistently on the same root principle. The solitary examples that we can discover of the opposing principle are those of Austria, a few of the smaller German States, and Cyprus. It is hardly necessary to explain why we dismiss these as irrelevant or unconvincing. We conclude unhesitatingly that the history of self-government among the nations who developed it, and spread it through the world is decisively against the admission by the State of any divided allegiance; against the State's arranging its members in any way which encourages them to think of themselves primarily as citizens of any smaller unit than itself.

" 229. Indian lovers of their country would be the first to admit that India generally has not yet acquired the citizen spirit, and if we are really to lead her to self-government, we must do all that we possibly can

to call it forth in her people. Division by creeds and classes means the creation of political camps organised against each other, and teaches men to think as partisans and not as citizens; and it is difficult to see how the change from this system to national representation is ever to occur. The British Government is often accused of dividing men in order to govern them. But if it unnecessarily divides them at the very moment when it professes to start them on the road to governing themselves, it will find it difficult to meet the charge of being hypocritical or short-sighted.

"230. There is another important point. A majority which is given special representation owing to its weak and backward state, is positively encouraged to settle down into a feeling of satisfied security; it is under no inducement to educate and qualify itself to make good the ground which it has lost compared with the stronger majority. On the other hand, the latter will be tempted to feel that they have done all they need do for their weaker fellow countrymen and that they are free to use their power for their own purposes. The give-and-take which is the essence of political life is lacking. There is no inducement to the one side to forbear, or to the other to exert itself. The communal system stereotypes existing relations."

61. So far as we are aware these arguments have not been answered. For these reasons the framers of the Joint Report refused to extend the communal principle beyond the communities to whom pledges were given, leaving the representation of other communities to nomination. In para. 15 of the Franchise Committee's Report it was recommended that separate electorates should be created for Hindus and Muhammadans in view of the general agreement in favour of communal representation for Moslems. In allocating the proportion of Muhammadan and non-Muhammadan seats the committee followed in general the agreement reached at the joint session of the Congress and the All-India League at Lucknow, in December, 1916, known as the Lucknow Pact, and considered that any departure from its terms would revive in an aggravated form a controversy which it had done much to compose.

Franchise
Com-
mittee's
Report.

62. The Government of India while agreeing in the condemnation of communal electorates, said that the then conditions of the country required their retention; but they were of opinion that the proportions laid down in the Lucknow Pact could not be taken to represent the right relation either between Muslims in different provinces or Muslims and the rest of the community. They took the view, however, that the Congress-League compact was an accomplished fact and a landmark in Indian politics which they could not possibly ignore; they felt, therefore, like Lord Southborough's Committee, that whatever the defects of the compromise it was not one that they ought to reopen. They, therefore, accepted the conclusions of the Committee in favour of the proportions agreed upon in the Lucknow Pact with one exception. They felt that the Muslim representation proposed for Bengal was manifestly insufficient; they doubted whether the claims of the Muslim population of Eastern Bengal had been adequately pressed when the Congress-League compact was in the making. They recommended, therefore, that the Bengal Muslims should be allotted 44 seats instead of 34, and left it for

The
Govern-
ment of
India's
recom-
mendation.

further consideration whether the addition should be obtained by enlarging the Council or by withdrawing seats from other interests or by a combination of both plans. One member of the Executive Council of the Governor-General was in favour of accepting the Committee's report. The Government of India refused to admit claims for separate electorates put forward by the other communities.

View of
the Joint
Select
Committee.

63. The Joint Select Committee, differing from the Government of India, accepted "the recommendations of the Franchise Committee in respect of the proportionate representation of Muslims based on the Lucknow Pact." On the subject of the representation of minorities the Joint Select Committee of Parliament contributed one suggestion. They said that it seemed to them that—

"the principle of proportional representation may be found to be particularly applicable to the circumstances of India," and they recommended that—

"this suggestion be fully explored so that there may be material for consideration by the Statutory Commission when it sits at the end of ten years."

When the subject came before the Parliament Mr. Montagu explained that no one objected to communal representation more than he did; he believed it to be a great mistake, but added that if communal elections were provided for temporarily in order to secure proper representation, he believed they were well worth having.

The case
against
Communal
Electorates.

64. This principle of communal representation is opposed to the fundamental principles of democracy. It compels a man to vote for one of his own community even though, in his opinion, he ought to vote for a member of a different community who might better represent his interests or national interests. Further a Government representing a particular community or communities is given the power of taxation over other communities. The other communities which had no hand in the election of the Government become simply their taxpayers to supply funds which may be used against their own interests and for the benefit of others. With the removal of the official bloc from the Legislative Councils, members of a majority community selected through separate electorates will, in all probability, have a permanent majority in the Legislative Councils of the future. The position of a minority community with a permanent hostile majority in the Legislative Councils, will naturally be unfortunate. They themselves will have no opportunity of becoming members of Government, with the result that no policy of their own will be carried out. This will continue, therefore, to intensify the feeling between the Hindus and Muhammadans. Again it is possible that in the future Councils the non-co-operation or the extreme left wing of Indian politicians might seek admission for

the purpose of paralysing the administration. If the Muhammadans vote in the joint electorate it is possible that they might prevent the return of many such members.

65. It is argued in reply to this that the Muhammadans returned by a joint electorate might not represent the true Muhammadan view when it is opposed to that of the majority of their electors. But this non-Moslem influence may be exercised even if the electorates are separate. It is in this connection to be remembered that the Hindus are split up into Brahmins, non-Brahmins, Caste Hindus and the depressed classes ; and from the evidence before us the feelings between them are not less bitter than those which exist between the Hindus and the Muhammadans. It is unlikely therefore that the voting will be on Moslem and non-Moslem tickets respectively. Moreover, it is unlikely that there will be only one Hindu candidate for election ; and the Muhammadans, therefore, may be able either to secure the return of one of their own community or of a Hindu who is not a rank communalist. To us the fact that a Muhammadan who belongs to the extreme left wing would be elected in a separate electorate is an argument for a joint electorate which would secure the election of a moderate Muhammadan who will be in favour of the policy of Turkey, Iraq and Cairo, and co-operate with a moderate Hindu. For it has to be remembered that it is comparatively moderate Hindus or Muhammadans who will be returned by joint electorates.

Some of the arguments in favour, examined.

66. It is often said that we must adhere to the promise made by Lord Minto's Government to the Muhammadan Deputation that waited on him in 1907-8. We will not bring forward the fact, which is now established beyond doubt, that there was no spontaneous demand by the Muslims at that time for separate electorates, but it was only put forward by them at the instigation of an official whose name is now well known. But the promise in itself is not adhered to either in letter or in spirit. Separate electorates at that time were only contemplated in the case of those Muslims who formed a minority in any province, whereas it is now insisted upon not only in those provinces but in Punjab and Bengal, where Muslims form a majority. Even now there might be some reason for granting their request if the Muslims confined themselves to those provinces where they form a minority. Further, that promise was made at a time when what was required in the Council was not representatives but persons who would be able to put forward all that could be said in favour of the community with as much force as possible. For this separate electorates were more favourable. At that time the Muslims were apathetic ; they had, so to say, no political consciousness. None of these reasons exist at the present time. Moreover a promise made by the Government ex-parte without having heard what the Hindus had to say cannot be pressed against the Hindus if it works injustice and for various reasons, is not in the public interest, but

Change of conditions since Lord Minto's time.

is harmful in its results. Again, when the promise was made the evils of communal electorates were not foreseen. The number of voters was not anticipated to be large, and the class of voters contemplated was much superior to the majority of the present voters in education and intelligence ; so that there was very little risk of communal questions permeating the masses.

Our conclusion :
Joint
Electoral
Reservations
of Seats.

67. We are, therefore, of opinion that special electorates should be dispensed with and a system of election by joint electorates should be introduced. If after sufficient experience has been gained, it is found that they should be dispensed with and separate electorates are required in public interests, it may be left to the Executive Government and the Legislative Council to reintroduce them without any further enquiry or legislation. But unless separate electorates are now dispensed with, we shall not be taking any steps towards our goal but going away from it. As already pointed out, reservation of seats in the Central Legislature, reservation of appointments in the Government Services and in the Executive Councils are some of the claims advanced by two of our Muslim colleagues. The continuance of the present state of things, or, in other words, election by separate electorates under the Lucknow Pact is not acceptable to them. Election on the population basis where the Muslims are in a minority, by separate electorates with an additional right to contest other seats in joint electorates, is also not acceptable to them. While dealing with the Madras Presidency it was proposed that we should retain the separate representation through separate electorates to the extent already conceded, but should refuse any further advance. This was rejected. No accommodation was therefore possible between those who put forward the Muslim claim and others who were opposed to this extreme demand. It was accordingly decided by the Committee that separate electorates should be abolished and joint electorates with reservation of seats substituted in their stead.

Safeguards
for
minorities.

68. It was argued against this resolution that the minorities throughout India desiring the continuance of separate electorates should be allowed to retain them until the majorities are able to satisfy the minorities that their interests are safe in the hands of those majorities. But this pre-supposes that the majorities are in a position, by their conduct and by their government, to give such satisfaction to the minorities. For this purpose it is necessary that Home Rule or Self-Government should be granted first, so that the Muslims, where they are in the majority, may satisfy the non-Muslim minorities that their interests are absolutely safe under the Muslim majorities ; and the Hindus in the provinces where they are in undisputed majority may prove to their Muhammadan fellow-subjects that they have no reason to regret their predominance. It is also necessary that the representatives of the majorities who have come into power should be persons who have got the will

to bring about rapprochement between the rival communities. It is difficult, if not impossible, to attain this object if the men who come into power owe their position to separate electorates, and feel bound to enforce the claims of their special communities against the other communities, rather than bring about equal justice between them. In order to carry out this suggestion, therefore, it is necessary to get rid of separate electorates; and to introduce joint electorates at once and give self-government to the provinces. In order to remove the fear that no Muslim may be elected by a joint electorate, we would propose that the Muslims should be guaranteed a minimum number of seats with liberty to win more. It is open to the Governor or the Secretary of State to veto any bill that may be passed by the Legislative Councils. It appears to us, therefore, that no real injustice can be done to Muslims in the face of these provisions.

69. If, in spite of this, the Government come to the conclusion that in those provinces where the Muslims are in a minority, they should be allowed separate representation they should not certainly be allowed any excessive representation. If the Lucknow Pact is invoked it must be taken as a whole and the Muslims should be given seats according to that Pact in all the provinces in India as therein contemplated, whether they are in a minority or in a majority. Otherwise, if any excess representation is given, it will not be fair and it will also embitter the feeling between the parties. It is surely irrational to give a party a privilege for insisting on what is really wrong in principle and what is admitted by themselves to be not the road leading to the goal of self-government. It is putting a premium on class conflict. Moreover, if this privilege is allowed to Muhammadans it cannot be disallowed to the other minority communities. One of the arguments, in fact the main reason, urged against the grant of provincial autonomy, is this difficulty, as neither community wishes the administration of justice and the control of the Police in particular to be under the control of a member of the other community.

Excessive
representation
opposed.

70. In the Punjab and Bengal where the Muslims are in a majority, there are strong reasons for disallowing separate electorates. Lord Minto's pledge does not extend to these two provinces. Separate electorates have been a contributory cause, if not the sole cause, of the widespread breaches of the peace in those provinces in recent years. Legislative Council members appeal to communal feeling for support. The number of voters has been increased so enormously in Punjab and Bengal that candidates find it to their advantage on account of separate electorates to rouse the masses on communal lines. Leaders of communities have stressed the communal point of view in their speeches and, with the help of religious preachers, have

Case of the
Punjab and
Bengal.

roused the fanatical instincts of the masses, who naturally resorted to physical violence. In provinces where the Muslims are in a majority there is no justification or excuse for communal electorates. Separate electorates were not intended for the majority communities. The pledge given by Lord Minto, therefore, has no application, nor is it required, for the protection of the Muslims. The elections to district boards in the Punjab and Bengal by joint electorates prove it if proof is wanted. The reason assigned for the continuance of separate electorates is unsatisfactory. It is said that elections by joint electorates would lead to bloodshed and ill-feeling. It is impossible to yield to threats of violence. On the other hand it shows a want of self-respect on the part of the majority community to demand separate electorates for their protection against a minority community.

V.

LAW AND ORDER.

Para. 41 of the Report of the Committee.

General
considera-
tions in
favour of
transfer.

71. The transfer of law and order has been very strongly objected to in various provinces. There are certain general considerations which have to be borne in mind in deciding this question. The declaration of 1917 lays down self-government as the goal. Any step that we now take towards the attainment of that goal must be one which would enable the people of the country to govern themselves. The ordinary people are more interested in the security of their person and property than in anything else. The people generally complain that they suffer from the iniquity of the subordinate officials. It is not possible for the higher officials to check the latter. But if law and order and the police are transferred to the control of the Legislative Councils the people generally will take great interest in the elections and will see that their representatives in the Councils take the necessary steps to secure the purity of the lower services and protect them against any oppressive conduct on their part. If the policy laid down in 1917 is to be carried out, the subjects which most concern the people of the country, will have to be placed under the control of the Councils. Until that is done there is no good saying that the voters do not take any interest in the elections or do not look to the character of their candidates. They naturally would not care for whom they vote as long as they feel that the candidates have no power to deal with questions in which they are most interested. If Parliamentary Government is to be a success in India law, justice and police, the subjects which would call for the devoted attention of the people of the country, must be

transferred. In 1919 and for some time afterwards objection was taken to the placing of the subject of law and order, including the police, under *Indian* control. It is satisfactory now to note that that objection is no longer pressed. Indian members of the Executive Councils have been, in various provinces like Madras, United Provinces, Assam, Central Provinces, etc., in charge of law and order and police, and it was expressly stated before us by high English officials that they did not complain of the administration of those departments by Indian members.

72. One of us is satisfied, after forty years' experience as a lawyer defending the parties to riots, and prosecuting them on behalf of the Government and again, as a High Court Judge dealing with cases of riots, that ordinarily a superior Indian police officer or Magistrate can take the necessary steps to prevent a riot. He can also get correct information, with reference to an impending riot. A non-Indian who however clever and intelligent, does not associate directly with the people of the country and with the leading citizens in the locality who alone can give him the necessary information, will not only be in an unfavourable position to form a true diagnosis, but is very often misled. The superior English officials are thus misled by their subordinates who are influenced by communal feelings. This is the reason why many of the riots that have taken place in India were not prevented. It is certainly so in the case of the most formidable of them in recent years. Indian Judges and the Indian members of the Legislative Councils have been foremost in demanding the enforcement of the law. The certainty that they will be upheld by Ministers and Legislative Councils, when law and order is transferred, is therefore a sufficient guarantee that Indian Magistrates and police officers will carry out the law and put an end to riots. It may be that men appointed by nomination for racial or class reasons may fail; but those who come in by competition or are appointed not for racial or class reasons but solely for efficiency and capacity, are not likely to fail in their duty. The Indian Magistracy and the police will be bolder in action, and strictly and severely impartial when they know that in that line of conduct they will be upheld by the Indian Minister and the Legislative Council and will not be censured by superior officers ignorant of the local conditions and under the influence of the apparent necessity of upholding caste or class claims.

Indian
Officers
better fitted
to deal
with riots.

73. The only objection which to our mind is real is the placing of these departments under the control of the communal Legislative Councils and Ministers who are the nominees of such Legislative Councils. As the earlier apprehensions with regard to Indian control have proved to be unfounded, there is reason to think that the apprehensions as to the future with regard to Ministers and the Legislative Councils will also prove unfounded. The objection is that the Councils will be dominated by sectional

Abolition of
Communal
Electorates
will lead to
impartial
administra-
tion of Law
and Order.

or communal feelings, that the Ministers will be compelled to act in accordance with the views of their supporters and therefore the administration might suffer. This objection can only apply to Ministers who come into power through separate electorates ; and it is therefore a strong argument for the abolition of separate electorates. If the Government get rid of separate electorates such objections cannot be raised ; and it is unfair that those responsible for separate electorates, or who would now press for their continuance, should put forward these objections.

Evidence
on the
point.

74. Failure to realise this fact has led to a good deal of confusion in the evidence. We shall quote the following passages from the evidence of an important witness. Mr. F. C. Griffith, C.S.I., Inspector-General of Police in the Bombay Presidency.

Col. Lane-Fox.

Q. 27. I suppose your main troubles are due to communal difficulties ?—A. At present, yes.

Q. 29. Do you find you can use only certain portions of your force in certain cases ? If there is trouble either of a Muhamman-dan or Hindu character, have you to use certain sections of your force to deal with it ?—A. No. *The rank and file are policemen first and Hindus or Muhammadans afterwards.* (The italics are ours.)

Q. 30. The fact that so many troubles are due to that particular question makes the proposal to make law and order a transferred subject instead of a reserved one more difficult, because the main trouble which might imperil law and order would be communal ?—A. Yes.

Q. 31. Therefore the Minister might sometimes be in a great difficulty, if it was a communal trouble which affected his own particular party ?—A. Yes.

The Chairman.

Q. 80. Then I would like you to tell me one other thing, so as to be clear and frank about it. Supposing that there is a sudden outburst of trouble of an intensely communal kind, which is your impression of the public feeling ? Is the ordinary public here equally satisfied if there is communal trouble, to have the police handled by an efficient police officer who is himself of either one conflicting party or the other, or does the public, in a case like that, show any desire to have the situation handled by an English policeman, not, I suggest, at all because the English policeman is any better man, but because he is neither of one side nor the other, by race or religion. Is that how you find it ?—A. I think that is so.

Q. 81. Tell us within your experience how you find it is ?—A. Within the last month or two we have had a serious outbreak of communal disorder in a place called Godhra, in this Presidency. It so happens that the Superintendent of Police there is

a Muhammadan. He is a very fine police officer, and also a very fine Muhammadan ; he is known, in fact, as the Maulvi Sahib, which I think is rather significant, because it means that he is a man who is really a true follower of his own religion. There was straight away an outcry from the leading Hindus of that locality, demanding his immediate transfer, and they even went so far as to suggest that he himself had prompted the riot, although he was not there at the time, and a lot of loose statements were made which must have made his position extremely invidious ; but he has been working very well indeed, and investigating the cases. We have given him the assistance of some officers who cannot be accused of communal bias one way or the other, both of whom are Parsis, just the same as we had to do at Broach for the actual investigation.

Q. 82. If I follow what you are telling us, which is certainly very interesting, the sort of difficulty you seem to sketch is not, of course, the difficulty that the Indian officer is not a perfectly upright and responsible person, but that his own circumstances expose him to suspicion and attack ?—A. Yes, exactly.

K. B. Bhutto.

Q. 125. On what consideration ? It would only make the position of a Minister difficult, or do you think at the same time you will not be able to maintain the efficiency of the police ?—A. I do not fear that, what I fear is trouble afterwards. I would envisage a situation where the Minister was elected and sent to the House by the constituency where the riot took place. He is, we will say for the sake of argument, a member of one of the two conflicting communities. No policeman would dare to act if he had doubts as to what might happen to him afterwards when the time came to sweep up the pieces. This is why, in broad outline, I think it would be extremely dangerous to transfer law and order at present.

Rao Sahib Patil.

Q. 169. I want to know your difficulty about transferring your department to popular control. Considering those difficulties, cannot you answer my question ?—A. The reason I gave before was that I did not think it right that a police officer should be placed under the orders of a Minister who might threaten his very office, his emoluments, his whole political career. The easiest thing in the world for him to do would be to sacrifice the police officer in order to maintain his position, and frankly, I do not feel that the time has come when we should be absolutely safe and certain that that would never happen ; and until I do have that feeling myself I should always be antagonistic to the transfer of the police department to a Minister who is responsible to the electorate.

Q. 178. Have you any experience of receiving complaints against European officers also in times of communal tension being partial to one side or the other ?—A. Yes, we have had.

Sir Hari Singh Gour.

Q. 235. You say you would not allow law and order to be placed in charge of an Indian Minister ?—A. Yes.

Q. 236. I suppose you have no objection to law and order being placed in charge of an Indian member ?—A. No.

Q. 240. With the experience you have of working under an Indian member you have no objection to law and order being administered by an Indian member ?—A. I should like to make it perfectly clear that my objection is not to the Indian, but to his being dependent upon popular vote. That is the difference. It is not anything racial and I should like to make this point very clear.

The position
examined.

75. These questions show, as pointed out, a misconception of the Indian position. Difficulties similar to these have been raised to the transfer to Indians of any control of the administration. They have been answered before. But as the Commission has examined no Indian witnesses who are competent to deal with these questions, it is only right that we should state what has passed before. It used to be stated formerly that Indians are incompetent by their character to deal with riots and other troubles of a similar nature. It was proved, however, before the Public Services Commission that while surrounding districts under English officials in Bengal were seething with disaffection and riots, the district under Indian control was peaceful—without any trouble. It has now been proved that Indian members of the Executive Council in charge of the administration of police and of law and justice in the provinces of Madras, the Central Provinces, the United Provinces and Burma, acquitted themselves to the satisfaction of all European officers, and the witness whom we have quoted states that he has no objection whatever to Indian members of Executive Councils on the reserved side dealing with these questions. (See Qs. 235, 236, 240.) His objection is only to transferring them to the control of the Councils, as now constituted, and there is a good deal of truth in this. After the reforms, when communal electorates were introduced and appointments were made on communal lines, the objection was raised by Indian politicians that the men so appointed were subject to communal influences, and that very often they were responsible for carrying out their duties under such influences. The Director of Public Instruction in Bombay puts this point very clearly. "The chief result of the Reforms is the emphasis they have given to differences of religion and caste owing to the system of special representation which they have set up." The obvious remedy, therefore, is the elimination of communal electorates and the substitution of joint electorates.

76. There has always been an objection against English officials on the ground that they act under the influence of subordinates and favour one side or the other, according to the communal influence of their subordinates. It is also a complaint against them that their main consideration is the enforcement of peace, even the peace of death, irrespective of the rights, even fundamental rights, of the parties involved. They are often swayed by a natural feeling in favour of the weaker party without reference to the rights of the other party. In some respects it is also alleged that they are animated by political bias. It is untrue, therefore, to say that as between the conflicting races of India the Englishman is invariably accepted as an impartial person. This fact appears from the statement of the Inspector General in Q. and A. 178, given above. It is admitted also in the memorial presented to us by the All-India Association of European Servants, where they state that though the services rendered by European officers, when communal troubles break out, are at the time gratefully acknowledged by those chiefly concerned, the advanced politicians almost invariably have fault to find with the measures taken to restore the peace, if they do not actually attribute its breach to "the machinations of Government and its European officers." The officers in question are thus not above impeachment. In the case of Indian officials that impeachment arises out of communal prejudice intensified by communal electorates and surely cannot avail those who are themselves responsible for communal electorates. So far as we can see, therefore, it cannot be advanced as a reason against the transfer of law and order. The only remedy is the elimination of separate electorates.

Charge of communal bias against officials is no bar to transfer of Law and Order.

77. Moreover, in the future Legislative Councils even if separate electorates are retained, all classes of Hindus-Brahmin, non-Brahmin, etc., are likely to be adequately represented. The future members of the Government will not be appointed by foreigners. They will have to secure the support of the majority of the Legislature to retain their position. They are not therefore likely to commit the kind of injustice that is implied in this charge. If it appears that in the peculiar circumstances of a province intolerable tyranny would still arise, the only remedy is that in such a province unless separate electorates are abolished, or the communities work in harmony, there should be no provincial autonomy. Those who demand it must agree to abolish separate electorates and accept joint electorates. Otherwise there should not be any substantial advance.

Communal bias unlikely to continue.

78. Again, the questions in which it is said that the Councils or the Ministers, will be actuated by communal considerations, are those which relate to riots between Hindus and Muhammadans and between the various classes of Hindus. Now it is important to inquire into the reasons of these riots, as they will indicate the solution of the difficulties. So far as the riots

Causes of riots examined; and conclusion.

on account of the playing of music before mosques are concerned, they are due to the failure of the magistracy and police to enforce the law. In the eighties of the last century this question first arose in Madras. The law was enunciated by the High Court, and riots due to this cause are practically a thing of the past in that Presidency. The law, as laid down by the High Court, has now been accepted by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council about two or three years ago, and its enforcement throughout India is bound to put an end to the trouble. The case is the same as regards cow slaughter. The Muslims are entitled to slaughter cows subject to any municipal regulations or laws. In all such instances Indian Magistrates and superior police officers, whether Muhammadan or Hindu, have seldom failed in their duties, and if communal tension is not to grow and these riots are to be put an end to, it seems essential, in our opinion, that the law should be strictly enforced. Indian officers are, in our opinion, better fitted to enforce the law and prevent riots.

VI.

SECOND CHAMBERS IN THE PROVINCES.

Para. 104 of the Report of the Committee.

79. Under the terms of reference we are required specially to report upon the question "whether the establishment of second chambers of the Local Legislatures is or is not desirable". Ordinarily the second chamber is intended as a protection against hasty legislation by the popular chamber, against tyrannical legislation against a particular class or minority, and against careless legislation. In India the question of the second chamber has to be dealt with on different lines and on different principles.

Earlier
proposals for
a Second
Chamber.

80. In 1919 the majority of the Government of India were in favour of second chambers in the provinces; not on any of the grounds stated above, but to enable the Executive Government to pass any legislation they considered essential. One member dissented from that view on the ground that the Governor himself should undertake the task which, according to his colleagues, would devolve on a second chamber. The question, according to him, was not whether it is necessary to create a second chamber in order to protect the people of the country against a popular chamber; but whether such powers as are required for protection against the popular chamber must vest in the Governor or in a second chamber created for that purpose. For it must be remembered that we cannot have both; since a Governor will scarcely venture to act against the united opinion of a popular chamber and of an upper chamber; it would not be safe for him to do so.

81. Now in the provinces where it is proposed to create a second chamber the Governor may be empowered if necessary to take part in the administration. He would, in any case, be entitled to veto a Bill passed by the popular chamber. He may also be allowed not to give his sanction at once but to reserve it for consideration. He would then have all the powers which may be exercised by a second chamber ; though we do not think anybody would suggest that there should be a final power of veto in a second chamber. Now we are not aware that there is a second chamber anywhere where the Governor has the above powers over the popular chamber. The case for a second chamber becomes weaker when we remember that, not the Governor alone but the Governor-General and the Secretary of State have got the power of veto over legislation passed by a provincial Council.

Arguments
against a
Second
Chamber.

82. Again, a second chamber in India would consist of the nobility, plutocrats and all other representatives of privilege, wealth and power. In the days that are coming we expect that the popular chamber would emancipate women from the tyranny of religious and customary laws, and give them equal rights with men in every department of life. Such measures would meet with strong opposition in the upper chamber and would, in all probability, be thrown out. But if it is the Governor in whom the power of veto is vested, the probabilities are that he, far from vetoing the measure, would render all possible support to the passing of the measure into law. Take again the case of any measure passed in favour of the depressed classes, untouchables or tenants. In all these cases an upper chamber would stand in the way of the popular chamber ; whereas if the power is left to the Governor the probabilities are that he would not veto the measure. Conversely if a measure is passed in the Council supporting orthodoxy against women, supporting wealth and influence against the weak and the helpless, an upper chamber is sure to support those laws ; but if it is the Governor who is to deal with them he would in all probability veto them. Thus, the question is whether the powers which are intended to prevent tyrannical legislation should be vested in the Governor—a representative of western civilisation who would act in accordance with the principles of that civilisation, or in an upper chamber who would represent orthodoxy, wealth and property, and would generally be opposed to real progress. There is scarcely any doubt about the right answer to this question.

Ditto.

83. An upper chamber may also be subject to the influences which we wish to guard against in the case of the popular chamber. The upper chamber itself may be stampeded into legislation by a popular wave of passion. Those who remember the course of the Rowlatt Bill will know what we mean. On that occasion every non-official member of the Legislative Assembly,

Ditto.

including nominated members and those who invariably voted with the Government voted against the Rowlatt Bill for the only reason that there was a strong popular agitation against the Bill which compelled them to vote against it. An upper chamber in such cases may not be a safeguard against hasty, impulsive or oppressive action.

Arguments
against a
Second
Chamber.

84. Again another reason is that if the upper chamber is endowed with these powers we will be placing the Governor in an awkward position vis-a-vis the upper chamber. The measure may have received his full consideration and support. We will be authorising the upper chamber to veto a measure which a Governor has considered necessary. For all these reasons we are of opinion that in principle an upper chamber is not required wherever the Governor is entitled to carry out the purpose for which an upper chamber is to be created.

Ditto and
Conclusion.

85. All the above arguments have reference to the question whether the Governor or a second chamber should act as a check on the popular chamber. Now, leaving aside the Governor and confining ourselves solely to the second chamber, the two important questions that arise for consideration are (a) what is to be the constitution of the second chamber, and (b) what are the steps to be taken to remove a deadlock between the two chambers? On the first question we are confronted at once by the fact that in any second chamber communalism is bound to be introduced; the Muslims, Sikhs and other minority communities will claim to have representation in it. If communal representation could be dispensed with in the popular chamber and confined to the second chamber, there might be something to say for the latter; but there is no chance of that. Those who claim communal representation in the second chamber insist on being allowed to retain such representation in the popular chamber. Again, if all the members of the second chamber are to be elected, we will be practically getting rid of responsible government. The ministers in the popular chamber can hardly be held responsible then for the proper administration of the various subjects which are entrusted to them. Moreover, we take it the franchise for the second chamber will be such as to bring into the second chamber men of property, commercial representatives, and men who have held high offices under the Government. Conflicts between the two Houses are likely to be frequent. Further, representatives of these classes now sitting in the popular chamber cannot reasonably be allowed to continue to sit there when a place is found for them in the second chamber. But this would be to their own detriment and to the detriment of the other chamber, which will not have the benefit of their counsel. The method proposed for removing deadlocks is a joint conference and a decision by the majority. This result is attained by the present constitution itself, under which all these members, that is, the men of property and repre-

representatives of commerce and industry, are elected by their own special electorates to the popular chamber. In all the proposals which have been placed before us, there is a provision for nomination by the Government of officials and non-officials. We have found that the official bloc and the nominated bloc have been responsible for the breakdown of the reforms. It is unthinkable, therefore, to re-introduce this system in an indirect form. On the whole we are against the establishment of second chambers in the Provinces except in the one case recommended by the Committee.

VII.

THE DEPRESSED CLASSES.

Paras. 78 and 79 of the Report of the Committee.

86. If it were possible to lower the franchise so as to give votes to the Depressed Classes, agricultural labour and Hill Tribes we would willingly accept the proposal ; but the official opinion is that the franchise cannot be so lowered. A special franchise for the Depressed Classes alone would not be fair. If the Depressed Classes are to have a special privilege in this matter, it will constitute a legitimate grievance to those who are admittedly much better fitted than them to exercise the franchise, whether we take education, property, or any other test. The latter should also get the same franchise, otherwise they will be left unable to defend themselves against the attacks of the representatives of the Depressed Classes. If by lowering the franchise or by adult suffrage all the classes are given representation, there will be no injustice.

Suggestions
examined :
Special
Franchise.

87. Separate electorates for the depressed classes are inadvisable. There is a great political danger that separate electorates will immediately expose the depressed classes to communistic influences. Again we have the experience of the Muhammadan separate electorates before us. They have been productive of mischief and admittedly they do not lead to self-government. The Muhammadans are strong enough to take care of themselves and therefore, while separate electorates have intensified the gulf between them and the Hindus, neither community has been crushed by the other. But in the case of the Depressed Classes the result will be altogether different. Under separate electorates, the caste Hindus being hostile to them, they will not be able to hold their own.

Separate
Electorates

88. In joint electorates, it is possible that for the first few elections the depressed classes will be entirely under the influence of their landlords and caste Hindus ; but increasing political consciousness will free them more and more from such influence. Further, there is no reason why in the matter of representation they should be given preferential treatment over labour and Hill Tribes. All these classes require the same degree

Joint
Electorates

of protection and representation. Lastly to brand certain classes as Depressed Classes is also to make them enemies to the other classes for ever, with no hope of religious or social uplift.

Nomination
recom-
mended.

89. As these classes under the present conditions will always act only under outside pressure, often very undesirable, Sir Sankaran Nair is of opinion that they should be represented by nomination. The evils of nomination in the provinces would now disappear as all subjects would be transferred. The Governor should be empowered to nominate representatives of these classes before the Council itself is formed so that the Ministers will have no voice in their nomination.

VIII.

THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT.

Para. 123 of the Report of the Committee.

Burden of
taxation in
England;
danger of
transferring
expenditure
in India.

90. The burden of the war debt is almost crushing England. She has mortgaged her future to meet this obligation, and every device will be adopted to lighten and ease her burden. The difference between devices legitimate and illegitimate is often indistinct. With interest combined with power it is only natural that she should try, if possible, to shift her burden to India, in a way which Indian public opinion would not support. England's prosperity depends on her exports: India's cotton duties were abolished in the interests of Lancashire. So far as coarser counts are concerned, her supremacy is over: so far as the finer counts are concerned the science and the industry of Germany and Japan have challenged her supremacy and it will soon be a thing of the past. Lancashire unemployment will be a strong temptation to the British Government to dump England's goods in India. In other respects also her share of the oversea commerce of the world has declined. Iron, steel, shipbuilding have suffered. The Governments and the people have not been able, in spite of strenuous efforts, to regain their old position so far as these are concerned. This loss of trade has materially contributed to the distressing problem of unemployment. In a situation like this, a vigilant Indian Parliament and a firm Indian Finance member, supported by that Parliament and able and willing to carry out its behests, are indispensable.

Unemploy-
ment in
England; its
repercussions
in India.

91. The burden of English unemployment has to be viewed in relation to economic conditions in India. England is examining the economic relations between herself and the various countries of the world, to discover ways of expanding her trade. Since the war she has lost a big share of her markets; her manufacturers and financiers are combining in close co-operation with her banks and trade organisations. They are supported by the British Government with its full strength. Members of Government act as commercial travellers. The organisation of

her industry is being improved and the competition between her and the other countries for the Indian market is proving destructive to India. Indian manufacturers are negligible ; we have scarcely any financiers ; our banks depend on English banks ; we have no powerful trade organisation. The Government is not giving us the assistance needed, and without such assistance no industry can be organised in India. The Inland carrying agencies, railways, etc., the shipping, both inland and foreign, are under foreigners in competition with *Indian* business. Railways are built for import from and export to foreign countries. Foreign goods can be conveyed cheaper to Indian markets than Indian-made goods. England and other countries are trying to exclude foreign goods that compete with home-made goods. We should have the same power to carry out that policy if necessary. Without a vigilant Indian Parliament in full control of her finances and commerce, not acting under the control of a Secretary of State pledged and bound to support England's interests and a reactionary Council, who have opposed and who will strenuously oppose Indian aspirations, India will continue down-trodden and oppressed, without manufacturers, bankers, traders and trade organisations able to hold their own in the markets of the world.

92. England, with all her resources and energy and large concerns controlling enormous capital, finds difficulty in competing with America in her own Colonies and Dominions although their sympathies are towards her. What chance has India got in this direction without control of her own destiny in finance and commerce. It is said, rightly or wrongly, that Indian industries do not get, while English industries do get, capital cheaply, because the banks are in English hands. Our gold reserves are not held in India, but in England, really for the benefit of England and very much to the loss of India ; the efflux of gold to India would otherwise intensify the situation in England. Compare this policy with that of England to prevent efflux of gold. No reform in the Indian financial system is now possible without a popular Parliament and a free Indian Finance member, untrammelled by the Council of the Secretary of State.

**Economic
weakness of
India.**

93. A powerful and growing party in England considers that for efficiency of production, the British Empire must become a fiscal unit to compete with the mass production of the United States, or of economically federated Europe. Indian wage levels and her standards of living are far below those in England. India is indirectly exercising pressure on the wages of the English workmen, and already attempts are being made by representatives of English labour, assisted for ulterior reasons by communists, to take steps which, in the opinion of Indian capitalists, will ruin Indian industries. One party in England wants complete inter-Empire Free Trade. The Dominions are, of course, able to and will take care of their own interests. But

**Empire Free
Trade ; risk
to India.**

India without a popular Parliament controlling her own finance and industries untrammelled by the Secretary of State and his Council, will not be able to take care of herself against an English Government which accepts that policy. Without India's adhesion inter-Empire Free Trade is impracticable ; but she cannot protest successfully against any step which would stand in the way of her own industrial development. England has practically reduced India to the position of a mere purveyor of agricultural produce for the industries of England. The Report of the recent Linlithgow Commission, if not intended, is certainly calculated to bring about that result. While fully desirous of co-operating with the English Government to foster her agriculture and increase her natural resources, India wants to foster industries which can be developed in India. She would resist anything which may interfere with this policy. For this purpose she wants not only full control of her finances and industries, but power to resist any economic or financial pressure that may be put on her. She also wants an Indian finance Member under Indian Parliamentary control. Then alone will our capital, our savings be used for our own national development and not for the benefit of other interests. We have already referred to England's attempt to raise Indian wage levels with a view, not so much to benefit India, as to approximate it to the English levels to benefit her own capitalists and workmen ; but England wants, if possible, also to get rid of any tariff which might affect her but which India might require on account of her lack of industrial experience and her subordination to England. There is little doubt that England will force Imperial Preference on India ; and without Indian independence in finance and industry India will not be able to secure any fair return. India wants, in these respects, to make the best bargain not only with all the other countries, but also with England. If Englishmen are in control they cannot be fairly expected to make any bargain with any foreign country on behalf of India which may interfere with their own commercial relations with that country, and it would be unnatural to expect Englishmen to do anything required in Indian interests which may not be to the advantage of, or may be injurious to, England. If control is left in their hands, we might expect a repetition of the story of the cotton duties.

**Military
expenditure,
in India.**

94. That taxation and expenditure should be entirely under Indian control without any interference by the Secretary of State or the Parliament, will also appear when we consider the Indian military expenditure. In connection with this matter there are two considerations to be borne in mind. There is no ray of hope for the reduction of the burden of the taxpayer in Great Britain except through disarmament. The Imperialist Party will therefore try to make good any deficiency in armaments by making India pay for them. The next great war, it is said, will be

fought in the East and the Pacific ; the military burden of India, already heavy, will then be increased to an intolerable degree.

95. It has been generally stated that the British element of the Army in India is treated by the War Office as part of their general reserve which would be available for Imperial purposes in an emergency. Indeed some persons go so far as to state that the War Office are deliberately keeping this reserve in the East at the expense of the Indian taxpayer. Attempts have been made in some quarters recently to controvert these statements and to maintain that the British element in the Army in India is calculated by the Government of India to meet its own requirements. This however is in direct contradiction to what Lord Curzon stated deliberately in the following words :—

Considerations determining the strength of the Army in India.

“ I have seen it frequently stated, even by high authority, in the course of the present war, that the Indian Army is raised, trained and equipped for service in India alone or upon its frontiers, and that the call to external warfare was therefore both novel and disconcerting. Such a claim would not only be indignantly repudiated by the Indian Army itself, but it finds no foundation in history. During the past half-century, the foreign campaigns in which that Army has been employed, greatly to its credit and glory, have extended from Egypt and even Ashanti on the West to China on the East, and have embraced most of the intervening countries. Even before this war began it was the pride of the Indian Army that its British units saved Natal in the Boer War of 1899-1900, that it rescued the Legations at Peking in 1900, and that on its banners were inscribed the names of hard-fought engagements in almost every part of the African and Asiatic continents.”

“ The Indian Army, in fact, has always possessed, and has been proud of possessing a triple function ; the preservation of internal peace in India itself ; the defence of the Indian frontiers ; and preparedness to embark at a moment's notice for Imperial service in other parts of the globe. In this third aspect India has for long been one of the most important units in the scheme of British Imperial Defence, providing the British Government with a striking force always ready, of admirable efficiency and assured valour.”

If Lord Curzon was right, and he knew what he was talking about, *prima facie* the military budget must be cut down by about one-third at once since we understand that one-third of the Army is kept for the maintenance of internal security, one-third for the defence of the frontier, and one-third as covering troops. According to this opinion the budget should be reduced from forty millions to less than thirty millions. At any rate, without an Indian Finance Member of the Government of India and without an elected popular chamber to uphold him, India's claim in this respect cannot expect to receive adequate consideration.

96. Assuming for the sake of argument that part of India's Army did not form units in the British scheme of defence, as Lord Curzon put it, it is plain enough that when India most needed her army, it was taken away elsewhere. On the outbreak of war, troops trained at her expense were not retained in India for her own purposes, but were dispatched to France. More than 500 officers of the Indian Army who were on leave in England

Utilisation of Indian Army by England during the war.

were used for the purpose of training British recruits not under Indian control, and it is stated that from the beginning of the war until the end of 1916 over 2,600 British officers were drawn from India for Imperial purposes apart from those who accompanied their units abroad. For all this India should have been paid, and would in all probability have been paid; at any rate, her claims would have been pressed if Finance had been a transferred subject, her Finance Member an Indian and the Government of India independent of the Secretary of State. It may be said that when British troops were taken away territorial divisions were sent to India. But India was entitled to the service of troops, recruited, trained and kept by her. If the territorials were sufficient, the others were unnecessary. The real truth is that England wanted her troops trained at India's expense to be sent back to form reserves of the Home Army.

Functions of
the Indian
Army :
Foreign
Aggression.

97. The foreign foes whom India has to fear are Afghanistan and Soviet Russia. The menace of Afghanistan disappeared with the rise of the Sikhs. That event shows at any rate that British troops are unnecessary to ward off an attack from Afghanistan. The danger from Soviet Russia is due to British Imperialism. That danger, if real, precludes disarmament in England. To carry out disarmament in England and not only refuse it in India but to increase the armaments there would seem to justify the suspicion that it is the policy of Great Britain to carry out disarmament not really in the interests of peace but only to assist the English taxpayer and transfer the burden of the increasing military expenditure to India. A stronger argument for bringing the military budget under Indian control can scarcely be imagined.

Internal
Security :
Retention of
British
Troops.

98. One-third of the Army in India is said to be kept to preserve internal peace and tranquillity. It is argued that for this purpose it is necessary to maintain a certain number of British troops in India; and the larger part of the British garrison of some 60,000 men, namely, 28 out of the 45 battalions, are allotted to internal security purposes. It has been stated before us that it would not be right to ask Indian troops to shoot Indians in riots, etc., and that therefore British troops are and have been employed for that purpose. As a matter of fact this is not borne out by recent occurrences. The British troops were employed to carry out measures for the suppression of plague in Poona towards the end of the last century, and it is from that episode that the alienation of the Indians from the Government took its origin. The British troops, we feel certain, will no longer be employed for similar purposes.

The next great event which required the use of troops was the disturbances which followed Lord Curzon's partition of Bengal. The Muslims were on the side of the Government, upholding the partition; the Hindus who opposed the partition were supposed to be the offenders; the troops employed were the Gurkhas and not the British.

In the Punjab riots also the troops employed were the Hindu Gurkhas.

One more instance is furnished by the Moplah riots in Malabar. The leaders there were both Muslims and Hindus. One of the latter is still in prison in spite of the repeated protests of the Legislative Council. On that occasion British troops were first employed ; and for assisting the troops the Hindus were attacked by the Moplahs, who considered it an act of treachery to themselves. The outbreak was finally quelled by Indian troops, the Gurkhas and the Kachins, who alone could follow the Moplahs into the hills. That British troops are indispensable for quelling riots and Indian troops are not employed for the purpose is not thus a fact ; in fact, it is now well recognised that it would be very impolitic to employ British troops ; because greater resentment is felt against the Government on account of anything done by British troops ; and if one may judge from the practice in recent times it has become the fixed policy of the Indian Government to employ Indian troops alone wherever possible.

99. Before the mutiny the troops were intended both for war and for maintaining internal peace ; but when the mutiny was quelled, the police force was created in order to keep the peace. If it has not been entirely successful for the purpose for which it was created, the fault lay with those who are responsible for the organisation of the force. There is little doubt that in Indian hands the police will be a force quite efficient for the purpose for which it was formed ; and the troops may be dispensed with except for purposes for which they might be employed in England. A vigilant Elected Chamber with an Indian Finance member, acting under its control, or an Indian Government free from influence of the Secretary of State would see to it that an efficient police force is organised and that troops are not kept to perform the duties which the police ought legitimately to perform. The military budget would thus be cut down by the amount required for the troops which are now kept for police purposes.

The Police
Force and
Internal
Security.

100. We shall now deal with the troops that are kept to deal with the frontier tribes. This service was performed according to all accounts not less efficiently than at present by the Punjab Frontier Irregular Force of about 12,000 men under the Government of Punjab. No British troops were required. The place of that force is now taken by the military at far greater expense ; the military budget has swelled on that account by a large sum. An Indian Finance Member under an elected Chamber would not have allowed this. He would only have allowed the retention in India of British troops sufficient for the purpose for which they ought to be kept and even with regard to them he would have followed the policy of the East India Company ; that is, English troops would have been recruited for permanent service in India, not to be sent back to England to form a reserve for England. When the East India Company was able to recruit English soldiers for that purpose in days when mortality among

Frontier
Tribes.

the troops was very much greater than it is now and life in India meant exile in a very unhealthy country, it should not be very difficult now for the Indian Government to get the troops which they want.

Capitation
Charges.

101. For these reasons the Indian military budget requires the careful scrutiny of the Indian Legislative Assembly and of an Indian Finance Member. But when we take into consideration the payments made in England, the case for Indian Home Rule becomes very much stronger. Take the question of the capitation rate, *i.e.*, the cost of raising, training, equipping and transporting annual reliefs and drafts from England. In 1907 the India Office, through their representatives, Sir J. Edge and Sir Beauchamp Duff, contended that the capitation rate ought to be abolished and resisted the claim of the War Office in respect of it. An arbitrator decided against them. The Government of India, however, continued to resist this claim up to 1928 when it was apparently decided that the questions involved should be submitted for the consideration of an independent tribunal. The result may be anticipated in the absence of real Indian representation. But here we only wish to emphasise the fact that for twenty years the Government of India have continued to pay large sums of money on this account, although denying all the time the validity of the claim advanced against India. If the military budget had been subject to Indian control and if India had a Finance Member of her own choice or the Indian Government had their way, they would not have made these payments. They would have insisted and obtained a decision of the questions involved. One can hardly expect, even now, a just decision unless there is a vigilant scrutiny of the hostile claim which can be made only by Indians acting under the Assembly's control.

Increased
rate of
Capitation.

102. Not only had India to pay the capitation rate while the case was sub judice; while she was contesting the claim, the capitation rate was also increased from £7 10s. per head to £11 8s., and she had to pay this money during the Great War, although at that time there was no transportation of the annual drafts and reliefs. Surely it was not for India's use that troops were raised and trained during the war-time nor was there any despatch of troops to India. No real representative of India would have allowed this payment to be made. Again in 1924 the rate of £11 8s. per head was raised to £28 10s., with retrospective effect from 1st April, 1920, and yet the Government in England are not satisfied. There are also further claims amounting to more than £70,000,000 or £80,000,000 all arising out of the fact that India sent her troops to the assistance of England. If she had not sent any, but retained her troops in India itself, nothing would have been payable to England.

103. The entire claim against India is based on the generous and voluntary offer made by the Legislative Council which contains a good number of Government officials, that India would bear the cost of her own troops overseas. It is on this

voluntary offer that England rests her claim for this huge contribution. It was only when an Indian Member of the Council of the Secretary of State pointed out to the Secretary for War that at the time India made a contribution of £100,000,000 to England there was an understanding that no further contribution would be asked for, that the English Treasury refrained from enforcing payment, and the English Cabinet agreed to leave for the present the outstanding war claims unsettled. The English Cabinet would not have come to this conclusion had the claim against them not been a strong one. This instance shows that the military budget should therefore be under Indian popular control if justice is to be done to India.

104. Without any hesitation India sent her troops to fight Germany with whom, as Lord Curzon said, she had no quarrel. Indians were not fighting for their own country or people, they were not engaged in a quarrel of their own making. The climate was entirely different to what they were accustomed to ; they had to face the severe northern winter. They had never before suffered heavy shell fire, had no experience of high explosives, had never seen warfare in the air, were ignorant of modern trench fighting, and were exposed to all the latest and most scientific developments of the art of destruction. They were confronted with the most powerful and pitiless military machine the world had ever seen. They were rushed to the battlefield immediately while the Canadian troops and British territorials were dispatched to the scene of action only after further training of several months. Naturally from the very start they suffered shattering losses. It is in the above terms that Lord Curzon describes India's efforts. Towards the close of the war, Brigadier-General Robinson says India was rationing about a million men besides making large shipments of foodstuffs to assist allied troops and civilians in the eastern Mediterranean. It was the wheat and rice which were badly needed by herself that she sent for the use of the allied troops and civilians. The English Government made a large profit out of this transaction as they received a far larger sum than what was paid to the Indian Ryot from whom the materials were purchased. When the Western Front was being barely held and the Eastern Front had collapsed, the King-Emperor, thanking India for previous efforts, appealed to her for further assistance. Mr. Lloyd George's cry of agony stirred India to her depths. India rose to the call, though weak and sinking under the efforts already made. But while her soldiers were returning home their welcome was the death wail of their brethren in the Punjab. The echoes of the appeal were lost in that lament.

India's efforts during the War.

105. We were told during the war that England was fighting for self-determination, freedom for all under foreign domination. Now we are told by men who seem to have gone to sleep during the War and woke up only recently, that we are unfit to manage local self-governing institutions, that we are not

Change of attitude towards Indians since the War.

fit to man our own services. At the beginning of the war we were armed with new modern weapons at Marseilles, and thrown into Hell Fire, while English territorials were held back for further training. Field-Marshal French then said that the Indian troops had saved civilisation. Now it has been discovered that we are unfit to fight and were unfit to fight when pushed forward to meet the German soldiers of 1915-16, that we have no military aptitude and are therefore unfit even to receive any military training.

Those who possess such a mentality cannot safely be placed in charge of India's destiny. We consider their allegations a strong ground for conferring Dominion status on India.

Danger of
a Naval
burden.

106. There is little doubt from the repeated attempts being made by the Admiralty that India will soon be called upon to pay her contribution for the Navy. Without Dominion status she will not be able to maintain the position taken up by Lord Morley who refused any contribution on the ground of the heavy military charges of India, her contributions to Imperial Defence as a whole being fully proportionate to her resources, to her interests and to the advantages she derives as a member of the Empire. For these reasons he refused to submit the question to arbitration. The Admiralty have again twice returned to the charge. This is an additional argument for Dominion status, or at least for the military budget being in Indian hands. Otherwise it would be practically impossible to save India from additional heavy burdens.

Difficulty of
disarmament
in England
while the
present
policy is
pursued in
India.

107. There can scarcely be any real disarmament by England as long as India feels herself under bondage, as long as the Government of India consider that India must be governed by the sword and the Cabinet in England feel, or are led by persons who feel that so far as India is concerned England is sitting on a volcano. England recruits and trains soldiers at India's expense ; she keeps them in India at India's expense to be utilised anywhere when needed ; they are brought back as Home reserves. There can be no real disarmament if this continues. In Geneva the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary speak of the total renunciation of war for settling disputes between nations, but in India their lieutenants threaten to settle internal trouble if necessary by the use of the latest instruments of destruction. We doubt whether a propagation of the peace spirit is possible as long as England's voice, spirit and action are different in Europe from those in India. To ensure unity of spirit it seems essential that the policy of the Government of India should be under Indian guidance and the military budget under Indian control.

Alternative
suggestions
for dealing
with Indian
military
budget ;
rejected.

108. It is said that instead of placing the military budget under Indian control, a certain fixed amount, say 45 or 50 crores, may be made non-votable by the Legislative Assembly and that only the excess over this amount may be submitted to the vote of the Assembly. The control of the Assembly can, however,

be easily evaded by including the less defensible items in the non-votable list and only those items of expenditure which no responsible Chamber would reject in the votable list. The only way to defeat this would be by subjecting the whole budget votable and non-votable to careful scrutiny, or in other words bringing the entire budget under the Indian control. Moreover, the right of the Assembly to deal with the military budget must be co-extensive with the duty and responsibility of maintaining an adequate efficient force. We are therefore unable to accept this proposal.

109. But we recognise that Dominion status cannot be granted to India while the army is not under her control. It may not be right to ask England to place British troops under our control in order to carry on a Government which may not be in consonance with English ideas or standards. If such be the case, and if England is so inclined, she can take the frontiers of India on the north-west and north-east under her own protection, and allow Dominion status to India. But we do not demand this : it must be done by England unasked and of her own free-will, if she finds that the conditions are favourable for such a step being taken.

110. Assuming, however, that England is not inclined to take such a step and that we are not to get Dominion status until we have an army of our own, the question is what constitutional changes are indispensable at the present day. We are of opinion that all questions relating to Finance, including the military budget, industry and commerce, must be in the hands of Indian Members acting under an Elected Chamber otherwise India will continue in the same miserable position in which she is at present, all her resources exploited, her finances used for purposes not necessary for her or not in the interests of her progress and industrial development with the necessary result of alienation of India from England and all its consequences. It is possible that if *full* provincial autonomy is granted and all the funds collected in a province are left to it with only an obligation to pay to the Central Government the funds that are needed for that Government, as may be settled by an impartial body, the tension may not be so acute and the Provincial field might be sufficient to absorb the energies of local politicians. The Local Governments may then be able to carry on the nation building departments and indirectly act as a check on the military extravagance and other uncontrolled expenditure of the Central Government by requiring some proof of the necessity of the contribution which they may be asked to pay. The constitution and the powers of the Central Government will thus depend mainly upon the constitution of the Provincial Governments. There is no doubt, however, that there should be an immediate move in the direction of responsibility in the Centre. The Committee have recommended that all the depart-

Suggested
changes in
the Govern-
ment of
India.

ments, except Defence and Foreign and Political relations should be transferred. We are, however, convinced that the military budget should be under the control of the Legislative Assembly. In this respect the Committee's recommendations should not be accepted.

Proposal to entrust the task of framing a constitution for the Central Government to the Legislative Assembly or a Special Committee.

111. At this stage we should like to make one suggestion. Taking into consideration the complexities of the problem of the Central Government we are of opinion that before any radical changes are introduced the whole question should be fully thrashed out with the co-operation of all important political parties in India. On general grounds it is desirable that the Indian people themselves should be given the largest possible share in the task of determining their own future constitution. For this purpose the Provincial Legislatures may be empowered to elect a certain number of members to the Legislative Assembly, chosen from the ranks of members of the Executive Council, either Provincial or the Viceroy's, ex-Ministers, and ex-Presidents of Provincial Councils ; or a Committee of experts consisting of leaders of parties in the Assembly and ex-Members of the Executive Councils of the Governor-General and the Provincial Governors, and certain officials with an English politician as President, may be appointed ; and the Assembly strengthened as proposed above, or the Committee of experts just referred to may be asked to draft a constitution for the Central Government and Legislature. Every proposal would be fully considered from every point of view ; and meantime the new Provincial Councils which it is assumed will be set up as a result of the recommendations of the Statutory Commission, will have got to work and the powers entrusted to them, and the manner in which those powers are exercised in the provinces will undoubtedly have re-actions on the discussions about the Central Government. There are other arguments, besides the one alluded to, which may be advanced in support of the proposal to entrust to the Legislative Assembly (or to the proposed Committee) the task of framing its constitution.

Further reasons for the above proposal.

112. In considering the problem of the Provincial constitutions, we have had, save in the case of the Central Provinces, the co-operation of the Provincial Councils ; and a large volume of evidence, both oral and written, has been placed before us. As regards the Central Government, not only no non-official witness has been examined, but the work of the joint conference has proceeded in the face of the active opposition of the Assembly. The Central Committee, it is true, is composed of members of the Central Legislature who are in a position to criticise suggestions put forward and to submit counter proposals from their own experience. But the Statutory Commission is completely lacking in this element of personal experience and is therefore ill-qualified on the very scanty materials before it to put forward proposals for the reform of the Central Government. It is essential that any measure of reform introduced

into the Central Government should be carefully considered and based upon adequate information, not only as to what has taken place in the past, but as to the probable consequences of any constitutional changes that may be introduced. We think, therefore, that the proposal we have made should be given effect to in preference to asking the Central Committee or the Statutory Commission to solve the problem of the future constitution of the Central Government. If, however, the Government do not see their way to accept our proposal for a fresh Committee or for the re-constitution of the Assembly by the addition of experts as suggested by us, we accept the recommendations of the Central Committee with the modification above stated.

IX.

THE ARMY.

Paras. 116 and 137 of the Reports of the Committee.

113. As to the free admission of Indians into the army as officers, there has been considerable controversy. Viceroy's have pleaded for Indians, the Civil Service have advocated their cause ; but practically to no effect. A Committee was recently appointed with the Chief of the staff in India as President, and Indian public men and Indian officers of the Army as members to inquire into the question. The main recommendation of the Committee for the establishment of a Military College in India, has not been carried out. On the one hand it is said that a college will be opened only when the Military College at Sandhurst can no longer accommodate Indian cadets ; and on the other hand conditions have been prescribed for the admission of Indians which make it practically certain that very few Indians will come to Sandhurst ; the age prescribed being such that no prudent Indian will send his son to England at that age.

Indians and
the Army.

We may take it then that so far as the army is concerned the English Government is not going to do anything substantial for Indians. The Committee have decided that in the provinces of Madras and of Bombay, local armies may be raised partly to allow of the free admission of Indians into the army and partly for other reasons. Before going into the larger question we shall therefore deal with this question of the local armies.

114. The grant of complete responsible Government is bound up with the question of the maintenance of law and order and internal security generally. Experience has proved that civil disorders frequently arise which are too serious to be dealt with by the ordinary police force. At present the civil authorities have the right, subject to certain limitations, to call upon the military to aid the civil power. It is uncertain whether this right either will or should be conceded to an autonomous Provincial Government. It is obvious that the use of regular troops

Case for the
establishment
of Provincial
Armies.

may provoke the gravest consequences. It was the employment of soldiers to carry out the plague preventive measures at Poona, the employment of troops to put down the agitation arising out of the Bengal partition, the employment of troops at Amritsar and latterly in 1924 to quell the Alkali disturbances that largely contributed to the present undesirable situation in India. In Madras we had recently the employment of the troops in Malabar which completely alienated the Muslims of that part of the country from the Government. It is desirable, therefore, that we should dispense with the use of Imperial troops altogether. A provincial army and militia will relieve the Imperial army of the necessity of providing troops for the maintenance of peace in the Province. It is often objected to the transfer of law and order that the British Government cannot allow their troops to be used in the enforcement of a policy with which they do not agree and which may be opposed to their views. No such argument can be raised after the constitution of a provincial army. In fact the only objection taken by some Englishmen to the transfer of law and order in the Madras province is that the Ministry might dispense with the Malabar Special Police which they say is really not police but military. Far from that fear being well founded, we believe that the Ministry will demand not only this special police force, but an army and militia. Moreover a local army will provide a training ground for the youth of the Country and the claims of the Mahrattas and the other classes to enter the Imperial army can be satisfied by this provision. The British Government and the British Indian administration have perhaps unintentionally emasculated the Indians by depriving them of the military training. Thousands of men, especially the poorer classes, have been thrown out of work by refusal to admit them into the army. There is little doubt that the people of the Presidencies would welcome the proposal for Provincial Armies.

In Madras :
Demand of
the Depressed
Classes ;

115. The memorandum submitted by the Depressed Classes of the Madras Presidency says that they want—

“ Representation in the Services.”

“(a) *Military*.—50 per cent. of the officers and the majority of the men in each unit of the army should be recruited from the Depressed Classes” ;

“(b) *Navy*.—do.”

The First Provincial Conference of the Depressed Classes passed this resolution :—“ This Conference requests the Government of India that recruitment for the rank and file of the army, navy and air forces should be made mainly from the Depressed Classes.”

The Adi-Dravidas of Southern Indian Districts maintain that it is their race that helped to bring the south under the British Government. They refer to the “ noble deed of the Pariahs

who contented themselves with *kanji* water, giving away the rice to the Britisher in the siege of Arcot," and point out that "the southern Indian blood that has been shed on the frontiers of Europe and the East in the war for civilisation has been their blood."

116. The North Arcot District Dravidian Association and non-Brahmin Caste Hindu Association point out that in the late German war it was their kith and kin that shed their life blood in the cause of the country on the battlefields of France and Belgium. They also say that "so far as this Presidency is concerned there were about fifty regiments of Indians including Pioneers, Infantry and Lancers and that number is now reduced to about two Pioneer regiments. As we have already indicated, this is a martial district and it stands second or third in its contribution to the fighting strength. The Government by the reduction of the army has made the South less martial. The reduction of the army has led to widespread unemployment. Those who were quite capable of serving in the army had to go to South Africa, Ceylon, etc., in search of employment. The Indian portion of the army should be maintained in its original strength. There must be compulsory military training for students in the colleges. The reduction of the Indian army and the absence of compulsory military training among students, have made the people unfit to defend their own country. Army and Navy are shut out to the educated Indians and this has led to the growth of unemployment among the educated."

Of other
communi-
ties.

There are other memorialists who complain of their exclusion from the army. We need not refer to the caste Hindus like the Velmas and the Reddies in the Telugu districts, the Vellalas, Maravans, Gowndans, etc., in the Tamil districts and others who have shown themselves always willing and anxious for enlistment in the army. A local army and a local militia will satisfy their ambition and in some degree mitigate the growing discontent due to the exclusion of the Hindus from the army, which can only be justified on the grounds that the British Government has no trust in them, an argument of which the consequences are bound to be deplorable.

117. The case of Bombay is perhaps stronger. The country was independent when it passed under British Rule. The Mahrattas had won their independence after a glorious struggle. The following are some of the statements in the memorials presented to us. The All-India Mahratta League state as follows:—

In Bombay :
Demand of
the
Mahrattas.

"We belong to a martial race. Our ancestors were at one time the masters of this country. Some British Historians admit that they did not receive or conquer India from the Moghuls but from the Mahrattas. Our people have fought on almost every front during the Great War. The greater part of the Indian army is recruited from our community. The British people need not question our

loyalty. We have served the Empire in every field to the best of our ability and borne the brunt during the war times more than many communities put together. We are a separate social unit. We are a martial people. We would like to preserve our identity. We would like to work out our destiny together. We request the British public to preserve and nourish this unity."

"The Mahratta recruits should form a substantial part of the Indian Army, and our Mahratta boys should have Mahratta officers in proportion to their strength."

The Mahrattas' manifesto runs as follows :—

"Before the annexation the Mahrattas were rulers of the Maharashtra. The Marathas have done more than any other community to accelerate the progress and prosperity of India. The Marathas owned a very large share of the land of the Bombay Presidency and the Central Provinces and pay more than three-fourths of the total land revenue of the State. The record of their military service is unparalleled in the History of India and Europe during the big International War."

"As the Marathas were the rulers and Masters of the Sea during the Maratha period we urge the British Government to recruit men from Maratha and allied castes and offer them the Commissioned rank with equal treatment of the British soldier."

Of the De-
pressed
Classes.

118. Equally emphatic is the claim of the Depressed Classes.

"From the days when our Presidency passed from under the umbrella of the Peshwa to the shelter of the Union Jack, the Depressed Classes have always found scope for their martial spirit in the ranks of the British Indian regiments, both in the fighting line and in subsidiary occupations connected with regimental needs and requirements. In the Great War, the testimony is unanimous in regard to our proved worth and merit."

"None dares deny the fact that even the most tyrannical and Brahmanical Peshwas were unquestioned enthusiasts in preserving and encouraging the martial spirit of the *Mahars*, whose regiments served the Mahratta Empire no less patriotically than what the Tommies do for their Fatherland—England. The hereditary military services not only enhanced the civic value of our race and furnished life with unique promises for generations together, but simultaneously did they raise the standard of our culture and polished habits, to make our forefathers quite easily overlook the petty handicaps of socio-religious prejudices. In the British regime we have been systematically deprived of all these avenues of ambitious careers, leaving the Mahars and other untouchables without any scope to make their life worth living. Instead of getting an uplift, we are daily being pushed down in all walks of life, though the diplomatic Red

Tape Trumpets of Government are louder than before in blasting the sonorous gospel of Equal Treatment and just political advancement."

" But the diplomacy of the present British Statesmen far differs from that of their predecessors. Finding India now securely in their political grip, they are fast elbowing into corners those who once they counted and worshipped as their ' friends in need '. The Government kept survived one III *Mahar Regiment*, perhaps as a fabric of ancient monument, till 1922, when under some pretence or the other, they got it perpetually disbanded, and now there is not a single Mahar regiment in existence. This action amounts to nothing less than a deliberate attempt to annihilate the martial spirit of the Mahars by reducing them to nonentity as other non-martial races of India. Thus, the *grateful* British Government have deprived the Mahars of the only avenue whereby they hoped to raise up their status as some useful units of the Citizens of the British Empire."

" To pull down the Shanwar Palace—the last strong citadel of Brahmanical Hierarchy in the Deccan, the British Government, finding all the Tommy regiments entirely useless and helpless, called on the Mahar regiments to do the needful. To be true to the salt Mahars loyally got what the Tommies could not. In almost all military operations in the Deccan, the Mahar regiments formed the backbone of British military enterprises. Now, however, the British Government is fast enrolling candidates from the *Brahmins* and other *non-military* touchables for training in Sandhurst Military College ; not straining their precious memory for a moment to remember what claims the Mahars hold for improved military training. The present policy of recruitment for Sandhurst is a bold negation in itself of what the Mahars did for the British Empire. Do the Government think that such an ungrateful action of theirs shall undermine the solid loyalty, which the untouchables in general have so long maintained without any grudge ? That the Government should be so much afraid of ' *putting* a severe strain on the loyalty ' of the Mahommedans, and also of the Sikhs in the Punjab and definitely throw a wet blanket on the aspirations of their *once brave friends* the Mahars, is certainly a very tragical phenomenon of British Diplomacy, correctly showing us which way the wind blows. Are we not as ' *distinct and important a people, with gallant and valuable element to the Indian Army* ' as are the Sikhs in the Punjab ? Are we not also as ' *conspicuously loyal* ' as the Muhammadans ? But, nay. The present policy of the Government refuses us the benefits of Sandhurst Training College. Why ? The Commission should please investigate, if they choose. We only point out where the shoe is pinching us."

Establish-
ment of a
Military
College in
India.

119. For the creation of local armies, as for other reasons repeatedly urged by Indians, Military Colleges in India are necessary. There cannot possibly be any objection to a Military College being established by the Government of India or by the Local Governments. It may be established in localities which are not ordinary recruiting grounds. Bombay and Madras Presidencies are not ordinary recruiting grounds now ; and therefore the establishment of a College there, cannot in any way interfere with recruitment. Our proposal will not therefore affect the supply of students for the existing military colleges. The college should be entirely under Indian control. Its finances should not be included in the ordinary military budget. It is an essential condition for success that the officers must be chosen by Indians. These men will train the students. The objections put forward to this scheme are not substantial. It is said that pupils will not be forthcoming. This objection is due either to ignorance or unrelenting opposition to a Military College. Further, where is the harm ? The only result can be the failure of the experiment.

Objections to
Local
Armies
examined.

120. The objections to the creation of local armies appear to be based on the assumption that these armies or troops will form a portion of the Imperial army. They will not ; and therefore there is nothing in the objection that it would be unfair to confine the good stations or cantonments in comfortable conditions to one set of troops. The objection arising from the difference in the efficiency of these provincial and purely Indian troops and the Field Army also would not apply. For it is not suggested that the provincial army or the new army would be equal to the Indian Army. It is altogether a different army and would not interfere with or affect the efficiency of the Indian Army either in numbers or equipment.

If the troops of the Local Army are good enough to relieve the ordinary troops it would be a great gain to the Indian Army. If they are not the Indian Army does not suffer in any way and there is no change in the condition of things. There is no difficulty caused on account of their presumed bias in any trouble or riot. Such difficulty has not hitherto been felt in the case of the military police and it will not be felt when the officers are Indians.

Present and
potential
advantages
of Local
Armies.

121. On the face of them these objections are not substantial. Now consider the great advantages. The creation of Local Armies would relieve the British Government from the charge of bad faith ; it would allow the experiment as formulated by Sir Andrew Skeen to be made under favourable conditions ; it would allow of wholly Indianised units of every arm, units of cavalry, infantry, artillery, engineers and ancillaries concentrated in wholly Indian formations, who may be given some block of the frontier to look after as covering troops. When the time comes another portion of the frontier may be given and the Indian garrison expanded. When they had got the whole of the covering

troops area under their command or even before, Field Army Divisions may be Indianised with areas behind providing resting places, until India is completely in charge of its own defence on the North-West Frontier. The Commanding officers of all units should be Indians. The Brigadier as well as the Divisional General should also be Indians. It is essential for this purpose that the military officers in charge of the Military College should have nothing to do with the Indian Army or with the Indian Military Authorities. It should be for them to decide when their pupils may be placed in command of the troops or to be dispatched for work on the frontier. The function of the Commander-in-Chief should be to select the area on the North-West Frontier for them to look after. Precaution, of course, will be taken to see that any reverse sustained will not have far reaching results. We feel satisfied that they will do as well as any body of ordinary troops with similar training and conditions.

122. As to the general policy we would strongly urge that the proposals of the Skeen Committee should be carried out. This is essential ; otherwise the Government cannot meet the charge of bad faith. Efforts have been directed to show that the Skeen Report has not been substantially departed from ; but that all its main provisions are being carried out, that the Indians will not be prejudiced by the steps which the Government are now taking. All this, even if true, is no answer to the argument that it has been departed from in matters to which the Indians attach the greatest importance, the recommendations in reference to those matters having the unanimous support of the Skeen Committee. On the other hand, taken with the powerful opposition which has existed for years, the conclusion that can be fairly drawn is that the Skeen Committee Report was not given effect to in order to throw as many obstacles as possible in the way of Indians.

Plea for carrying out recommendations of the Skeen Committee.

X.

THE PUNJAB.

Paras. 73-74 of the Report of the Committee.

123. In considering the nature of the constitution suited to the Punjab, we have to observe that in our opinion there should be no separate electorates or reservation of seats in Joint Electorates for Hindus and Muslims ; but the Committee, while recommending the abolition of separate electorates, have allowed reservation of seats for Hindus and Sikhs who form minorities in the Province of Punjab. So far as the Legislative Council is concerned, we are of opinion that the Sikhs deserve special consideration and should receive representation according to their voting strength which would give them about 24 per cent. of the seats, though they have claimed 30 per cent. ; or on the population basis, whichever is more favourable to them without prejudice to their rights to contest more seats. Our reasons are that

Sikh Representation in the Legislative Council.

the Sikhs have in national interests suggested the abolition of communal representation. They contributed mainly to put down the mutiny of 1857. Both in men and money their contributions were greater than those of any other class and beyond their means in all the wars including the Great War. They pay about 40 per cent. of the Land Revenue and land cess.

Communal
representa-
tion in the
Cabinet.

124. With regard to the Executive, should the Government not see their way to get rid of communal electorates in the Punjab, we put forward the following alternative scheme in order to avoid the evils of communalism. We agree with the Local Government that there should be representation of all the three communities in the Executive Government. In other words, there should be one Hindu, one Muhammadan and one Sikh Minister. No doubt it will be said that this is an attempt to stereotype communalism even in the cabinet. But it is indispensable in the present conditions ; all parties want it. It has been suggested that the Governor should select the Chief Minister who has the largest following, and the latter should submit the names of colleagues who would represent the other communities. But we would prefer that the Governor should appoint each Minister separately. Representation of all the communities is necessary in the Punjab to secure a Government by general consent and to ensure equality of treatment for all communities. This will not be secured by leaving the nomination of his colleagues in the hands of a Chief Minister. The Governor should appoint Ministers from the elected members of the Legislative Council. We would leave it to his discretion to appoint another member who should be neither a Hindu nor a Muhammadan. He may be a Sikh or a Christian or an official who would be appointed for his special qualifications and not on account of any communal considerations. It would be open to the Governor to assign the administration of the Magisterial and Police Departments to the official or other member not being a Hindu or a Mahommedan. The official member's vote will be subject to the same restrictions as that of any other member of the Cabinet. It has been suggested that the Police should be an entirely transferred subject, as the Police administration under a responsible Minister would come in for less criticism than it is at present subjected to. It is also said that there is no serious difficulty in calling in the military, when necessary, by a Government in which Law and Order is transferred. We cannot agree with this view, as it does not meet the objections arising from the communal differences. Moreover, the suggestion is based on the proposal already rejected by us that the Chief Minister should nominate the other Ministers. We agree with the local Government that we cannot retain Law, Order and Police as a reserved subject under the Governor, transferring all the other subjects. Such reservation will render the Council hostile to the Government as a whole ; will necessitate the budget for this department

An additional
member.

Law and
Order not to
be a reserved
subject.

being made non-votable by the Legislature, and will make the Governor the subject of debates in the Council. Interactions between the various departments make it difficult, if not impossible, to make Law, Order and Police a water-tight compartment. All provincial subjects should therefore be administered by the Cabinet subject to the vote of the Legislature. The allotment of subjects other than Law, Order and Police to members should be determined by the Cabinet. The non-official members should hold office ordinarily during the term of the Council, and should not be removable by the Legislature except by a two-thirds majority vote. Even then they should have the right to ask the Governor for a dissolution of the Council. But the Governor should be allowed to demand the resignation of any member. This would enable him to enforce unity and joint responsibility and to carry out his own views when supported only by some and opposed by others. The Cabinet should stand or fall together, except in the case of dismissal of a member by the Governor. There should be joint responsibility to the Council, so that Ministers may have a common policy. There can, therefore, be no vote of no-confidence against a single Minister. They should be replaced as a body by a new ministry when dismissed by the Council.

125. It may be objected that there can be no joint responsibility unless it is left to a chief minister to nominate his colleagues ; and in particular that the three communal representatives may be opposed to one another. It is to ensure co-operation that the power is given to the Governor to dismiss in the last resort a recalcitrant member while the appointment by the Governor of the Ministers may secure the growth of the party system. This scheme gets rid of dyarchy and constitutes a great advance towards a system of responsible government over the whole field of administration. Questions no doubt will frequently arise in this province in regard to which the Governor may differ from Ministers as a body. He may feel satisfied that his interference is necessary, though the Ministers and the legislature may consider the other way. In such a case, if the matter is sufficiently important, he may dissolve the Council. If a fresh election results in a victory for the Council and the Ministers, and if the Governor considers that the issue is so vital that he must fight them—a very unlikely contingency—he may take over the whole administration. The scheme ensures, therefore, popular control when the members of all the communities work together, but not otherwise ; but the Governor is competent to act independently if the issue is considered by him to be vital. If the majority of the Cabinet do not agree with a decision of the Council on any issue they are not bound to act upon it unless they find two-thirds of the Council against them. The establishment of a system of joint responsibility resulting in joint resignation of all would be ample protection against any capricious or communal vote of the Legislative Council. The Governor will

The scheme analysed.

try to secure Ministers who will agree to act together and also in accordance with the will of the majority. The withdrawal of the official bloc will constrain Ministers to act together. On the whole, for Punjab this is the best system that occurs to us. Our colleague Raja Nawab Ali Khan is of opinion that to get rid of communal representation we should introduce adult suffrage here as elsewhere in India.

XI.

THE FRANCHISE.

Paras. 59 and 60 of the Report of the Committee.

Adult
suffrage re-
commended
for Bengal.

126. The Committee have recommended generally that the electorate should be doubled at once, and the Legislative Councils empowered to modify the franchise after a few years. They also recommend that one-third of the adult population should be compulsorily enfranchised at the end of every ten years, subject to what the Councils may have done before. We think that at least in the Province of Bengal, in order to ease the Hindu-Muslim tension, adult suffrage should be allowed.

Arguments
in favour of
adult
suffrage.

127. It would seem difficult, if not impossible, to do justice to the claims of Muslims, women and the depressed classes without universal suffrage. The depressed classes are in favour of adult suffrage and the evidence before us shows that there is a general feeling throughout India in favour of adult suffrage. *Prima facie* there are strong reasons for adult suffrage. One reason for adult suffrage is the necessity of the representation of various communities to protect themselves against others who are represented in the Councils. Thus, the tenants require representation to protect their interests against the landlords who are effectively represented in the Councils. Industrial labourers require representation to protect themselves against manufacturers and capitalists who are also specially favoured. Depressed Classes have to protect themselves against the orthodox Hindus. Muslims say that as they are backward in education, material prosperity and organisation they want protection against the Hindus. Women want it for purposes which need not be elaborated to an English Parliament.

Ditto.

128. The right to vote is a natural right in the same sense as the right of self-defence. The Legislature may pass laws affecting the security of person and of property. It is only right that a man should be able to protect himself against what he conceives to be a violation of his right to property or an attempt to interfere with his personal liberty. To prevent such laws from being passed is only to exercise his right of self-defence; and he can prevent such laws from being passed only if he is allowed to vote for a representative, who would defend his interests. To say, therefore, that he should not be a voter is, in one respect, telling him that he is not to be allowed to protect himself against

any attempt to violate his rights of person or property. It is idle to say that any community is efficiently protected by other communities. This argument is always used by the privileged classes against those who claim protection against them. The former would always maintain that there is practical difficulty in giving representation to the latter and that the time has not come for widening the general franchise.

129. In our opinion, universal franchise will go far to create a stable Government. In India during the last seven or eight years there is no class that has stood behind the Government. The great landlords failed to support the Government during the days of non-co-operation and the Khilafat agitation. The commercial classes went further and supported those movements. It is only the lowest classes who being desirous of getting rid of the old oppressive laws under which they suffer, need the support of the Government. The political consciousness of the lowest classes has been roused within the last few years. The Government know it to their cost that these men in the absence of any other guidance follow the leaders of the non-co-operation movement, or communist leaders. If they are allowed adequate representation in the Councils by adult suffrage they would not do so, but would fight their battles in the Councils. There is little doubt that increasing numbers would come to vote and the vote itself would be an education to them. If denied the franchise or adequate representation, it is possible that they might take the law into their own hands, as they have already done in some places by strikes against capitalism and by refusing to pay taxes to the Government, and by burning forests. Anything less than adult franchise is useless as in that case these classes will be influenced or terrorised and they will not be free voters.

Arguments
in favour of
adult
suffrage.

130. On the 19th March, 1928, the Legislative Council of Madras declared itself in favour of adult suffrage. The reasons given by the various speakers in favour of the proposal were :—

Ditto.

(i) A high franchise gives the wealthy classes an advantage. The other classes, though they form the majority of the population, have fewer votes.

(ii) Illiteracy of the masses can be removed only after the masses get political power.

(iii) Exercise of the vote is a source of education to the masses.

(iv) Elections will be purer with adult suffrage than they are now, as in the former case voters would be too numerous to be approached by corrupt means.

(v) The illiteracy of the masses is not an obstacle to political progress. There are many illiterate voters now exercising the franchise. Methods can be devised for the polling of their votes as is done now.

(vi) Illiteracy is not necessarily accompanied by a lack of good sense. On the other hand the illiterate masses of India have an inherited culture which would enable them to exercise their voting power intelligently.

(vii) A stake in the country is possessed not only by people who own wealth, but also by those who make it. There are many who make wealth without being able to keep it sufficiently to possess the present property qualifications. Such men should not be deprived of the vote.

(viii) The Depressed Classes who now come to the Council through nomination will have a stronger position in the Council when they come through election as they would be able to do under a system of adult suffrage.

Arguments
against.

131. Only one member opposed the motion. His arguments were :—

(i) Candidates put up by minority communities will be swept away by the large masses of the majority communities.

(ii) If voters are illiterate, they have to vote openly by telling the polling officer the name of the candidate they favour. This will mean that men of wealth and influence can compel the illiterate voter to vote for themselves.

To these the following arguments are added by the Local Government.

(iii) The machinery for carrying out elections will be strained to breaking point if all adults in this country with a population of about 300 million are given the vote. This difficulty is all the greater in view of the necessarily clumsy way in which alone the vote of illiterate voters can be recorded.

(iv) It is risky to give political power to large masses of illiterate men who are not in touch with current events and cannot therefore exercise their judgment efficiently in selecting representatives to deal with current issues.

The above
arguments
considered.

132. The third argument will be dealt with later. The first argument is scarcely of any weight since this is not a question of minority communities. The second argument comes too late, as the illiterate voter in every province now votes by openly telling the polling officer, in the presence of the rival candidates or their agents, the name of the candidate for whom he votes ; and no complaint has been made against this system. On the other hand, universal franchise will minimise the influence of wealth. Again, assuming the wealthy man gets the vote, it only means that the situation is unchanged. The fourth is the real reason ; and it is advanced by men of wealth and influence. But it is futile to say that an agricultural ryot cannot discriminate between those who will support his claims and satisfy his wants and others. The same applies to labour as it certainly knows who will advance its claims to a living wage, etc. The Hill Tribes know what their rights are and who will protect them ;

and women know those who will support their claims. In fact, we cannot imagine that any of these classes would not be able to discriminate between the candidates who seek their votes. Moreover, what is the sort of education that matters? Is it book learning, or is it the kind of political education which these classes are always receiving now through the vernacular newspapers and through the speeches of the politicians who move about the country? Even in Assam, a comparatively backward Province, the Provincial Committee recommends adult suffrage.

133. Another objection to adult suffrage on the merits that we have heard advanced is that under adult suffrage the Muslim is placed at a disadvantage on account of the reluctance of Muslim ladies to come to the polling stations. But for this purpose special facilities can be afforded and females appointed officers at the polling stations. The disadvantages due to purdah are common to both the Hindus and the Muslims. Moreover, such a custom should not be allowed to stand in the way of progress even of those who adhere to that custom, much less of those who do not observe it. Adult suffrage would be the best means of emancipating women. The women, irrespective of their religions, will combine to advance their interests and the interests of their children.

Another
objection
considered.

134. Assuming, however, that it is impracticable now to introduce adult suffrage throughout India, in Bengal it has become necessary to do so as early as possible, on account of the acute tension between Hindus and Mahomedans. The population of Bengal is 46 million out of which Muslims number 25 million and Hindus 20 million. The number of voters is only 4.8 per cent. of the total population. The distribution of seats between Mahomedans and non-Mahomedans in the general constituencies is based on the agreement, arrived at by both parties in 1916 at the joint session of the Indian National Congress and the All-India Muslim League, viz., that 40 per cent. of the *total elected Indian members* should be Mahomedans. This agreement is now discarded by all parties. Actually the elected Mahomedan members number 39 and the elected Hindu members 57; so that the percentage of the former is slightly over 40 per cent. The number of Muslim voters in 1926 was 529,995, while the number of Hindu voters was 623,217; the percentage of Hindu voters was 54, the Muslim voters about 46 per cent. The Muslims form about 54 per cent. of the total population of Bengal. Some members of the Bengal Government propose to lower the franchise in rural areas to increase the Mahomedan vote to more than 1,121,000 and the non-Mahomedan vote from about 540,000 to 900,000. It is not right to *lower* the franchise qualification in *particular areas* to bring about an equality. It may be lowered for other reasons. The proposal for lowering the franchise is supported by the Muslim Members of the Council and opposed by the

The question
considered
with re-
ference to
Bengal.

Hindu members on communal grounds. As will be pointed out, adult suffrage and joint electorates are the right solution of the problem.

The need for
adult
suffrage.

135. In Bengal the adult male population of about 12½ million have more than 1,100,000 voters, while with the same qualifications the adult female population of over 11,000,000 have only 36,906 voters. The women of Bengal observe Purdah and it is essential, therefore, that special facilities should be given to them to protect themselves. Give votes to them and all women will be emancipated. It is said that Purdah women will only act under male direction. A recent instance is interesting. The lady members of the Anjuman Khawateen-i-Islam, an association whose object is the emancipation of women, were forbidden by their husbands to go to a meeting to assist the sufferers from the recent floods in Sind. The command was ignored and the husbands subsequently capitulated. "When it is a question of determined wives getting their own way, East meets West," says "Truth."

Public
opinion in
Bengal re
adult
suffrage.

136. That in Bengal there is a widespread desire among the lower classes for adult suffrage or male suffrage seems clear. The memorial that puts forward the case of the workers most elaborately is that of the Kachrapara Railway Workmen's Union. (Registered under the Trade Unions Act.) They say, "nothing short of adult suffrage would really enfranchise the working classes, but unfortunately their illiteracy and hopeless economic position and indebtedness as well as their subjection to the landlords in their village homes and employers in towns and in the country, will not afford them a fair chance to exercise their franchise freely in their own interest." We have dealt with the question of illiteracy. Their economic condition is a reason for giving them the franchise.

The All-Bengal Namasudra Association claims that it is high time now that every adult male member of the community should be given the right of franchise without any restriction whatsoever, though they say that it will serve no practical purpose for years to come to invest the women of this country with the right of franchise. They number 2.1 million out of the twelve million in Bengal. The Mahishyas, an old dominant caste numbering 2,500,000 want universal franchise for men. The Bengal Depressed Classes Association, which claims to represent 11½ million of depressed classes, says that every adult male should be given the right to vote. The memorandum on behalf of the Gopalgunj Namasudra Association, the Gopalgunj Janasangha, the Depressed Classes and the ryots of Bengal says that every sane person above 21 should have a vote. The memorandum submitted to the Indian Statutory Commission by the Bengal Agriculturists and Tenants Association, in accordance with the resolution passed by the conference of agriculturists and tenants held at Barupur claims that every adult of either sex

should be entitled to vote in union boards, municipal boards and district boards, and that in the case of the Provincial Legislature every ratepayer should be a voter. The Indian Congress Committee have asked for adult suffrage, and many of the leaders of Muslim opinion in Bengal say, we believe rightly, that adult suffrage will solve the Hindu and Muhammedan problem.

137. We must acknowledge that the weight of the official opinion is that adult suffrage is impracticable in the present conditions of Bengal. This, of course, is always the official view. But we are unable to get over the argument in favour of adult suffrage, that any test that may be prescribed must give undue advantage to some who, as conditions go, would use their power to the injury of those excluded. In Bengal with adult suffrage the Hindu-Muslim question is likely to be solved, women will be emancipated, and the lower classes will be able to protect themselves. We accordingly recommend the immediate introduction of adult suffrage in Bengal. It should not be assumed that we underrate the difficulties. The difficulty of framing the electoral roll, of appointing polling officers, and detecting personation, are undoubtedly great. But considering the benefits of the scheme the difficulties have to be faced. The fact that this universal suffrage affords a solution to the Hindu-Muhammedan question is in itself decisive in its favour. The Muslims seem to be generally in favour of it, and we doubt whether the claims of women, of the Depressed Classes and the tenants and ryots can be adequately met except by adult franchise. We may, perhaps, restrict the franchise to men over 25 or 30.

Our conclusion.

XII.

THE SERVICES.

Paras. 110-115 of the Report of the Committee.

138. The Madras Government says :—" Responsible self-government if it implies anything implies that the province must be free to recruit its own servants as and where it likes. There can be no imposing upon it a body of men recruited under regulations, from sources and on rates of pay prescribed by some outside authority. The All-India Services in the provinces should be provincialised on the lines already being followed in the case of All-India Services operating in the transferred field, *e.g.*, the Indian Educational Service. All the prospects that the present members of these services now enjoy should be reserved to them "

Opinion of the Madras Government.

139. The situation is well understood by the Services themselves. In the preliminary memorandum submitted to the Indian Statutory Commission by the Bengal Association of European Government Servants and the Managing Committee of the All-India Association of European Government Servants, it is

Opinion of various Service Associations in India.

stated :—" Responsible self-government for India is the goal of the British Government. It is evident that the existence of officers under the control of the Secretary of State and not finally subject to the local authorities is inconsistent with any form of real self-government. When this goal is finally reached there can be no officers left who are still under this control ". And in summarising the essential points of their memorandum they say :—" Real self-government for India is inconsistent with the existence of the Superior Civil Services as at present organised ". Again, in the memorandum submitted by the Punjab and the Frontier Association of European Government Servants, it is stated :—" If the attainment of responsible government by India is indeed the goal of the British Government, we can see no justification for the retention by the British Government of power to enforce the rights of the services against the wishes of the future rulers of India ".

Our conclusion.

140. This principle was accepted and acted upon by the Lee Commission, who recommended that all the services in the transferred departments should be provincialised. In fact, any other conclusion is not possible. It is, of course, probable that the services may continue to be recruited for some years longer as at present, but no self-government is possible unless the services are provincialised and all officers are placed under the Ministers. If any European officers are required, there is little doubt that the new Governments will be able to obtain their services from the Government of India ; or would, even after full provincial responsibility is conferred on them, continue to recruit them.

SANKARAN NAIR.

NAWAB ALI KHAN.

SHIVDEV SINGH UBEROI.

MINUTE OF DISSENT BY THE HONOURABLE SIR ARTHUR FROMM.

I have signed the Report presented by our Committee because, although, on the one hand, there are several points on which I differ from my colleagues, on the other, there are many conclusions arrived at in which I am in agreement with them.

I will now proceed to set forward in detail my opinions where they are at variance with the recommendations embodied in the main report, but while doing so I should like to emphasize that I am at one with those who seek to further the advance of India towards the final goal of a self-governing Dominion within the British Empire in a manner which will be in the best interest of India.

There has been among us a failure to reach agreement on many fundamental questions. This perhaps was not altogether unexpected and may be regarded as illustrating the position in India as it exists to-day. The task is not only to frame a constitution for India suitable to Indian conditions but to secure a compromise and co-operation between conflicting interests, without which no constitution will ever work.

My Muslim colleagues have urged on the Committee the desirability of the separation of Sind from the Province of Bombay and its creation into a separate Province. The majority of my colleagues have concurred in this proposal. I recognise that some readjustment of Provincial boundaries may be found desirable in the future, but I am impressed by the financial arguments, put forward by the Government of Bombay, which clearly show that the separation of Sind from Bombay at the present time would mean an annual deficit in the financial administration of the former amounting to a prohibitive sum. It appears, therefore, if from this point of view only, that separation at the moment is not practicable, but I see no objection to a reconsideration of the proposal when the financial position permits.

Separation of
Sind.

Our visit to Burma with the Statutory Commission revealed an overwhelming and unanimous demand on the part of Burmans for separation from India. What also impressed us vividly was that the demand by the people of Burma received strong support from the Government of the Province, the Head of which was, until recently, a distinguished Member of the Government of India. The following is an extract from the Memorandum of the Burma Government :—

Burma.

“ The Burmese live in a country which geographically is distinct from India, and is cut off from it by hill, sea and jungle. The people of Burma come from a different stock.

and have a different history, a different religion, different languages, a different social system, different manners and customs, and a different outlook on life."

That this is a correct description of the location of Burma and of its people cannot be disputed.

So long as the Government of India was an autocratic Government, responsible only to the British Parliament, the Burmans appeared to acquiesce in their being tacked on to India, but since the British Government have announced their intention of establishing step by step responsible government in British India, they have pressed for separation, in my opinion, not without reason.

It has always been difficult to get Burmans to stand for the Legislative Assembly, where they have four elected seats which are rarely filled. They feel they have little or nothing in common with the Indian and find they have little inducement to make the long and tedious journey from Burma to Delhi or Simla, which occupies five or six days.

The Joint Select Committee, which reported on the Government of India Bill, did not advise that Burma should be included in the scheme of Reforms (*vide par. 8*), and that Burma was subsequently brought in appears to have been mainly for reasons of administrative convenience.

Again, the Government of Burma in their Memorandum put forward the proposition that the closer British India approaches to responsible Government, the less justification there is for a position in which Burma is included in British India, and I am in thorough agreement with that view.

I recognise that the present financial and military relations between Burma and India constitute a problem of some difficulty which will have to be faced in according separation to Burma, but I have little doubt that this problem can be solved on its examination by an authoritative body on which the interests of both India and Burma are represented and presided over by an impartial representative of the British Parliament.

The form of Government to be accorded to Burma, as a component part of the British Empire, after separation from India, will require special consideration, and I consider it outside the scope of our Report. I would make this reservation, however, that the interests of Indians and other communities, who have settled in Burma for many years, must be safeguarded when framing the constitution.

I have indicated already my agreement with my colleagues that it is generally desirable to develop self-government in the Provinces to the utmost practical extent. Throughout our tour, however, there has been much evidence of the vital necessity for maintaining peace and tranquility throughout India, especially in those Provinces where admittedly Communal

differences, often leading to serious riots, are most acute. There is not in India that universal respect and assistance for the guardians of Law and Order, common in Western countries, which brings to the aid of Government, irrespective of its political complexion, the bulk of public opinion in any emergency that may arise. My colleagues have recognised the risks entailed in making Law and Order a transferred subject, and I concur with them in the provision of extraordinary powers which they would vest in a Governor and the Governor-General, and believe such powers to be essential. I do not consider, however, these safeguards at present all-sufficient.

The difficulties which would face any Minister, be he Muslim or Hindu, responsible to the Legislature, in taking action on a communal disturbance, or indeed in administration generally, are very real. It is not over-stating the case to say that, whatever line the Minister might take, he would be suspect by the rival community, and I am convinced that the bulk of the people would prefer for the present that this Department of Government should be in the hands of an impartial authority.

At the same time I recognise that the unfettered reservation of this department of Government, owing to its intimate connection with the working of all others, would materially restrict the measure of self-government and adversely affect the increased sense of responsibility which we are aiming at. In short it is necessary to devise, without undue risks to the maintenance of peace and tranquility, some solution of this difficulty which would remove any impression of the continuance of dyarchy in the Provinces.

Of the many proposals which have been placed before us for the direction and control of Law and Order, an examination of the suggestion made by the Government of Bengal and recommended for that Province by my colleagues has been most helpful, and after the closest study of this and other proposals, I have arrived at the following conclusions :—

I am of opinion that the portfolio of Law and Order in all Provinces, save in Madras, to which I will refer later, should be in the hands of an official or non-official, not necessarily elected, appointed directly by the Governor. He would sit with and be a Member of the Cabinet, and with them have a seat in the Legislature. His policy would be discussed and agreed in the Cabinet, and would be placed before the Legislative Council as that of the Cabinet as a whole. He would have full responsibility with other Members of the Cabinet on all matters and, in the case of the appointment of an official, his administrative experience should be of considerable value. In the event of Government being defeated on any question entailing the resignation of the Cabinet, he would resign with his colleagues. Over questions of Law and Order on which he is unable to

come to an agreement with the rest of the Cabinet, reference should be made to the Governor, who, if necessary, would act under the special powers vested in him.

A special reference has been made above to Madras, in which Province I would make an exception to our proposals. The evidence we have received in Madras, from all quarters, did not disclose the same uneasiness as regards the transfer of Law and Order, and I therefore agree that, in that Province, the portfolio for its administration should be allotted by the Chief Minister in a similar manner as other portfolios. The success or otherwise of this policy in Madras will no doubt be closely watched by other Provinces and after a period of ten years I would not object to the special provision recommended for them being open to reconsideration by the Legislative Councils, and if so desired, withdrawn by a vote of two-thirds majority.

Salaries of Ministers.

I am in agreement with my colleagues in their recommendation that the salaries of Ministers (and of the Presidents of the Provincial Councils) should be fixed by an act of the local legislatures, alterable only by an amendment of such Act. We have recommended joint responsibility for the Cabinet and have provided machinery for a vote of no-confidence in the Ministry, and it is not desirable that there should be room for motions to reduce any individual Minister's salary, which form of baiting has been prevalent under the existing constitution for the Provinces.

I am of opinion that the salaries of Ministers should be fixed at a sum which will attract men of ability, enable them to live in a manner suitable to their high rank and place them above suspicion of bribery or corruption. These should be the main considerations to be taken into account when the Act referred to above is framed or amended.

Franchise.

I am unable to agree with my colleagues that the Franchise for the Provinces should be immediately doubled. The existing strength of the Electorates based on a percentage of adults is not inconsiderable, as will be seen from the following figures taken from our Report :—

	Per cent.
Burma	46
Madras	} 11 to 13
Bombay	
Punjab and the United Provinces..	
Assam	
Bengal	9
The Central Provinces and Bihar and Orissa	4

The existing Franchise includes many whose general education and status do not enable them to exercise their vote with a real sense of responsibility. Had there been a clean slate to write

on I should have deprecated even the advisability of placing the qualification as low as it is at present. The statistics given in our report show that there is a considerable and continuous expansion of the Electorate due to increasing numbers attaining year by year the standard of qualification now existing, and I consider that rate of advance generally satisfactory and sufficient for the present. I am averse to increasing the difficulties of newly-created Provincial Cabinets by a larger influx of illiterate and irresponsible voters with the possible lowering of the standard of representatives. The Report of the Education Committee shows that there has been advance in primary education, but at the same time points out that the advance is at present more superficial than real. I would prefer, therefore, to allow a further period to elapse before contemplating any change in the Franchise. It should be noted that all Local Governments are also of this opinion.

I consider, however, that provision should be made in the Statute for the periodical revision of the Franchise, and that this power, with certain restrictions, should be vested in the Provincial Legislatures.

I recommend, therefore, that there should be no change in the Franchise for seven years from the introduction of any new constitution. At the expiry of that period the Legislature should have power to increase the Franchise, should it desire to do so, to not more than 25 per cent. of the adult population. A revision under similar conditions should be provided for on the expiry of each subsequent seven years. Thus each Province, if willing, will be enabled to obtain adult suffrage at the end of 28 years. I am of the opinion that the demand for votes should come from the unenfranchised rather than it should be thrust upon them.

This recommendation may appear unduly ambitious in the light of the history of the growth of the electorate in the United Kingdom from less than 3 per cent. in 1832 to 9 per cent. in 1867, and 16 per cent. in 1884, full adult suffrage being only reached in 1929, nearly a hundred years after the introduction of the Reform Act in 1832. I believe, however, that the world is progressing at a more rapid rate to-day, and that this should be recognised accordingly.

I am of opinion that too much attention has been given to Western democratic practice in an endeavour to frame electorates which would be suitable to India and to Indian conditions as they are to-day. It has been found essential to recommend in many instances the continuance of special constituencies in order to secure desirable representation of various important interests, and I submit that this in itself is a strong recognition of the fact that it is not practicable to adopt wholesale in India the democratic precepts of the West.

Communal
Electorates.

After the most careful consideration of this difficult problem I have come to a definite conclusion that separate electorates and

special constituencies must be continued for the present, and that, not until majorities by their impartial legislation and by their just administration have won the confidence of minorities, can these special protective expedients be withdrawn and then only with the consent of those concerned.

India is not a Nation ; the growth of national spirit is still in its infancy and largely dependent on the British administration. To endeavour to force its growth by advanced democratic electoral machinery is more likely, under present conditions, to destroy rather than to foster a national outlook.

My colleagues recognise the necessity for protecting the representation of the smaller communities and have provided for them, in some cases, by separate electorates and, in others, by the reservation of seats in joint electorates. The larger problem in the majority of the Provinces is one arising from a consideration of the requirements of Muslims and the depressed classes, and here I repeat my opinion that, however desirable in theory general electorates for all may be, to be successful they must rest on the willing consent of all concerned. That consent is not at present forthcoming, and it would be impracticable, and a danger to progress, to force upon minorities totalling together nearly half the population of British India (Muslims 70 millions, depressed classes 44 millions, a total of 114 millions out of 250 millions), a system which they are not prepared to adopt. I hold the view, therefore, that the present arrangement should be retained for Muslims and extended to the depressed class, for the former on the basis of representation now existing, and for the latter on the basis of representation which my colleagues have agreed to.

My colleagues, when recommending that representation for communal interests should be either on a population basis or voting strength, whichever is more favourable to the community, have proposed with apparent logic to apply that formula in the Punjab to the Hindus and the Sikhs who are jointly in a minority in that Province. It appears to have been overlooked, however, that owing to the high percentage of Sikhs on the electoral roll, this would provide a majority representation for Hindus and Sikhs combined over the Muslims. I prefer that minority interests in all provinces should be safeguarded as at present by giving weightage to those interests in the Legislatures. In no case, however, should weightage be allowed to reduce a majority population to a minority of representation in the Legislatures or even to an equality.

Whilst on the subject of communal representation in the Legislatures, I desire to comment upon the present practice of communal representatives in the Executive Government and the Services.

I am convinced that any statutory provision for communal representation in a Provincial Cabinet is inconsistent with the

assumption of joint responsibility and impossible of acceptance. The provision for direct representation should secure to a minority adequate influence to prevent a Cabinet from overlooking its claims and will indeed often result in the selection of a Minister from a minority group.

Representation in the Services is a more difficult question. I would like to see the appointment of members of the Provincial Services through Public Service Commissions and dependent solely on merit, with the various communities in such educational position to secure proportionate representation without artificial aid. This, however, unfortunately, is not the position at the present time, and an intimate knowledge of Indian conditions forces me to the conclusion that the existing artificial methods, though unsatisfactory, must continue. I believe, though, that the rate of educational progress will enable these to be withdrawn within a reasonable period of time.

I agree with my colleagues that the representation of women in the Legislatures deserves recognition. It is well-known, however, that existing social customs at present restrict them from taking that active part in political life enjoyed by their sisters in the West.

Representation of women.

I deem it inadvisable, however, in the interests of their advance, to separate them from the male voter. There are women in India to-day who could gain election to the Legislature through their respective constituencies, and I would prefer to encourage them to use this channel. Should no woman secure election in this manner, the Local Government and the Governor-General in Council should have power to provide for their representation, but not necessarily to the extent of 5 per cent. recommended in our Report.

Three Local Governments and five Provincial Governments are definitely in favour of establishing Second Chambers. Those not recommending a bi-cameral legislature appear to be actuated for the most part by a belief in the practical difficulty of finding suitable material for an Upper House. During our tour we found a considerable body of opinion in favour of the establishment of Second Chambers, and this opinion is confirmed by history.

Second Chambers.

I think it would be apposite here to quote the views of such well-known authorities as Mill and Bagehot :—

“ A majority in a single assembly when it has assumed a permanent character, when composed of the same persons habitually acting together and always assured of victory in their own House, easily becomes despotic and over-weening, if released from the necessity of considering whether its acts will be concurred in another constituted authority. The same reasons which induced the Roman to have two

Consuls make it desirable that there should be two Chambers ; that neither of them may be exposed to the corrupting influence of undivided power even for the space of a single year."—Mill.

" With a perfect Lower House it is certain that an Upper House would be scarcely of any value. If we had an ideal House of Commons perfectly representing the nation, always moderate, never passionate, abounding in men of leisure, never omitting the slow and steady forms necessary for good consideration, it is certain that we should not need a higher Chamber. The work would be so well done that we should not want anyone to look over or revise it, and whatever is unnecessary in Government is pernicious. . . . But though beside an ideal House of Commons the Lords would be unnecessary and therefore pernicious, beside the actual House a revising and leisured Legislature is extremely useful if not quite necessary."—Bagehot.

The majority of my colleagues have declared their opposition to Second Chambers in all Provinces save in the United Provinces—" where the existence of a large landed aristocracy provides suitable material for a Second Chamber." It appears, therefore, that they too take their stand chiefly on the ground of lack of suitable material in the other Provinces, but I consider that a proper exploration into this question would reveal that their fears, at any rate as regards the larger Provinces, are more fancied than real.

A point in the arguments against Second Chambers, which has caused me to ponder more than any other, is the position of the Governor who on occasions might conceive it his duty to exercise his right of veto on some legislative measure which had been passed by both Houses. This admittedly would be more irksome for him than the exercise of his powers in connection with legislation passed by a single chamber only. The other side of the picture, however, is that the restraining influence of an Upper House would reduce to a minimum the occasions on which the Governor would feel himself called upon to interfere, and to my mind the latter consideration outweighs the former.

The rate of political advance has far outstripped the measure of social advance, and many of India's leading citizens will not at present contemplate seeking the suffrage of the Electorate. Second Chambers will afford the opportunity of bringing to the Provincial Governments men who, by their position among their fellow citizens and by their experience of the world, will be found able Councillors, but whose services would not otherwise be available. Further, they will be men freed from the turmoil and restrictions of party and communal politics, and able to consider problems on their merits.

Finally I am convinced that, under conditions existing in India, Secondary Chambers with revisionary powers will make an advance, towards self-government in the Provinces a more practical proposal.

I agree with the views of those Provincial Committees who consider the composition of the present Council of State a suitable basis on which to build up Second Chambers for the Provinces. The qualifications for both candidates and electorates should remain high.

I would suggest that Second Chambers should be permanent in order to secure continuity, a third of the Members being called upon to retire every five years, but without being debarred from seeking re-election or of being re-nominated. The first and second retirements should be decided by ballot. That there should be a proportion of Life Members is also worthy of consideration.

The majority of the Provincial Governments—Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, the United Provinces, the Punjab and Assam—in framing their proposals for provincial self-government, have declared emphatically that the Security Services, *i.e.*, the Indian Civil Service and Indian Police Service, must remain on an all-India basis and be recruited as at present. The Bombay Government's views on this important matter are somewhat indefinite and it is not referred to in their Memorandum at any great length beyond certain suggestions that safeguards should be provided for Government servants. All India Services.

The Madras Government goes further and states that, with responsible self-government "the Province must be free to recruit its own servants as and where it likes." At the same time even the Madras Government appears to have certain qualms as to the wisdom of its proposals as it goes on to say "A new Indian Civil Service for Central Government needs, and lent out by agreement on the lines of the present Indian Medical Service, might be possible."

Of the Provincial Committees, Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, Punjab and Assam are in favour of the retention of the Indian Civil Service and Indian Police Force as all-India Services in their respective Provinces. The Bombay Committee does not make any special reference to the question, but, seeing that they are in favour of continuing Law and Order as a Reserved Subject for some years, it follows that the Security Services would remain as they are. The Madras and United Provinces Committees oppose the retention, but each with one dissentient.

We therefore have before us a large majority of opinion that, at any rate for some time to come, the Indian Civil Service and Indian Police Force should be preserved in the Provinces on their present basis and I strongly concur in that opinion, which it would be extremely unwise to ignore.

The main argument put forward for the complete provincialisation of the Services, when all subjects have been transferred in the Provinces, has been that a Minister would not receive the same loyal support and conscientious work from an all-India Service Officer compared with what he would experience were the recruitment of the Officer, his pay and prospects, under the control of the Local Government. This argument has been refuted, however, both in India and by retired officials in England, and it has been pointed out that the Local Governments for many years past have gone on very well without having absolute control over their men, no difficulty being experienced on that account.

I hold the view that it is of the utmost importance to maintain the past high standard of efficiency and morality in the Services which will be working in the future under Ministers responsible to the Provincial Legislatures and I believe that the whole success of self-government in the Provinces will depend mainly on the material which will be available to work it. To abolish the Indian Civil Service or the Indian Police Service, or to tamper in any way with their present privileges and methods of recruitment, would to my mind prove a calamity. Both these Services have high traditions behind them, traditions which have helped their members over much rough ground and in many a tight corner, and to regard the past records as of no account would be deplorable.

It has been pointed out to us clearly that, under any other conditions of service and of recruitment than those now provided, the right type of British will not come forward to serve in India, and it has been stated that in the lately provincialized Services the standard has gone down. I consider it is essential that the British element in the Services must be maintained for many years to come and this opinion is held by many prominent Indians. I do not suggest, however, that the recommendations of the Lee Commission should be set aside, but I hold that the proposals of that body are as far as we should go. It cannot be denied that the British element in the Services is welcome to many in India as being neutral and in questions which take a communal turn, with resulting bitterness—unfortunately such happenings are more frequent to-day than they were in the past—the British official is appealed to as impartial, being of neither one community nor of the other.

I strongly recommend that the existing all-India Services be maintained throughout India, recruited as at present and, while doing so, I have no fear but that they will continue to give of their best under advanced self-governing Provinces as they have done under the various Governments in the past.

Of all the intricate problems which have been examined and discussed by our Committee, those of Finance, and the Financial relations between the Central and Provincial Governments, have presented one of very great difficulty.

Shortly after the commencement of our Sittings with the Statutory Commission, Sir John Simon declared that he and his colleagues did not pretend to possess any extraordinary knowledge of higher finance and stated that he had secured, therefore, the services of an expert, Mr. Layton, to assist the Commission and also the Indian Central Committee, who for their part did not lay claim to the special financial perception which the Commission so modestly disclaimed.

Mr. Layton joined the Joint Conference during our tour in India in order that he might acquire first-hand knowledge of financial conditions in the country. Since our arrival in England, Mr. Layton very kindly appeared before the Joint Conference to give us the benefit of certain provisional conclusions he had arrived at. He was careful to explain, however, that such opinions were not final and at the time of writing our report we have not had the advantage of his ultimate conclusions, which is to be regretted.

I am in complete agreement with my colleagues in opposing a policy of financing Provincial Governments by grants in aid from the Centre. Indeed, such a policy has not been in existence since the introduction of the present reforms, except in so far as the relief afforded, to certain more fortunate Provinces by the remission or part remission of their contributions to the Central Government, might be described as grants in aid. Provincial contributions, however, have been done away with, it is hoped, for good and all, and there is now no form of doles to the Provinces from the Centre.

While, however, I concur with my colleagues that Provincial Governments should not be financed by means of grants in aid from the Central Government, I am equally of the opinion that the Government of India should not depend for its revenues on subscriptions from the Provinces, as recommended in our report. This would in effect be a reversion to "Provincial Contributions," as established by the Meston Settlement, which were condemned, in and out of season, by Provincial Governments and commercial and other bodies, in fact by everyone concerned.

I am unable to subscribe to the suggestion of my colleagues that all the revenues of the Provinces should be at the disposal of their respective Local Governments. To take Customs alone, it is unthinkable that a Province which is the fortunate possessor of a large port should claim the Customs Duty levied on all merchandise landed at that port, regardless of the fact that a large proportion of the goods landed are not for the consumption of the Province alone, but passes into neighbouring territories. Then, it has not been refuted by anyone that the rates of Income Tax, Super Tax, Salt Excise should be fixed otherwise than at a uniform level throughout India and therefore determined by the Central Government, and I cannot conceive that they can be economically collected except by the Central Government. I do not contend that it

is unreasonable for the Provinces to lay claim to a share of these last-mentioned taxes and of others which may be brought into being.

It is generally agreed, and rightly so, that there is a real need in the Provinces for additional revenues in order that adequate development may progress in the various nation-building departments. At the same time it must be equally recognised that the sources of revenue at present belonging to the Central Government cannot be appropriated to the Provinces without their replacement by new or additional forms of taxation.

I submit that the time has come, in the opinion of some it is long overdue, for the adoption of many, though possibly not all, of the recommendations of the Taxation Enquiry Committee, made after an exhaustive enquiry by eminent men, which, for the most part, have been ignored. I do not forget that the Central Legislature refused to discuss the Report, but, as I have pointed out earlier in my remarks on this subject, if more money is to be spent in the Provinces, more money must be found. It cannot be squeezed solely out of the Central Government's present revenues.

Of all the financial proposals which have been submitted to the Joint Conference, I have been most impressed by those of the Bombay Government and they are well worth considering, though possibly some adjustments may be necessary in order to assist the poorer provinces.

I assume it will be found necessary to allot to the Provinces in some cases the whole, in others a fixed proportion, of old or new taxes collected by the Central Government, and I can see no objection to this from the provincial point of view. In the first-named happening the Central Government will be acting merely as a collecting agent. In the second, although the receipts may be divided, the province will know the exact proportion to which it is entitled, and here again the Centre will be a collecting agency. The old bugbear cry of "Divided Heads of Revenue" could not be resurrected with reason in either instance.

Another point which renders it essential that the Central Government should collect those taxes which are of necessity on a uniform basis throughout India is that—in cases of grave emergency the Government of India might find itself under the urgent necessity of obtaining increased funds. This it would be able to do by levying an indivisible surcharge on the taxes collected at the Centre.

That there must be some co-ordination between the Provinces and the Central Government in the matter of finance is irrefutable. The question of borrowings alone must inevitably lead to conferences otherwise the various provinces would be competing with each other in the money market for their loans.

It appears to me inevitable that some of the recommendations which are put forward by our Committee, and others which may be advanced by the Statutory Commission, will require the closest examination by small bodies of experts. I consider the question of finance should be one.

The Military aspect of the constitutional problem is one of great perplexity. There can be no disputing certain facts. India, through her geographical position, is very differently placed to any of the other Dominions. Her requirements for defence, with those for internal security, necessitate the maintenance of a standing Army imposing upon her existing revenues a financial strain that seriously curtails the funds available for expenditure on much needed work in nation-building directions. The technical experts say, not I think unreasonably, that the size of the standing Army, reduced in recent years, already envisages definite risks in view of the magnitude of the task with which it is faced, and that no Commander-in-Chief would accept the responsibility if the Army in India were further reduced either in size or in its present degree of efficiency. The Army.

Through lack of sufficient detailed information Indian and, I will add, some European opinion has believed that the Army in India is maintained at its present strength, not solely for Indian purposes, but also for Imperial purposes. From the statement placed before the Joint Conference by the Army Council, it is obvious that there is no justification for that belief, and I think it is only due to the taxpayer in India that the statement, or a similar one, should be given the fullest publicity throughout the country. The Army in India is entirely under the control of the Government of India, its size dictated solely by Indian conditions, and it is subject only to the final authority of the British Cabinet.

One of the particularly perplexing features of the problem is the presence in the Army in India of British troops. It must be recognised at once that the grant of full Dominion status to India must be accompanied by the withdrawal of British troops. In no Dominion, save for some temporary purpose, have British troops been permitted to remain after Provincial self-government has been granted. No one, save a few of extreme views, would to-day suggest that it would be practicable to withdraw them. Indian opinion generally recognises that position and the necessity for reservation of defence for some time to come.

The task of the Army in India is twofold :—

- (1) The protection of India from external invasion.
- (2) The maintenance of internal security, which includes duties in support of the police, and the military protection of strategic railways.

Whilst, in all portions of the British Empire, the Army forms in theory a final reserve to the Police Force, it is very excep-

tional that it is so used in practice. The reverse is the case in India. The Army is constantly and regularly called upon in support of the Civil Authorities and the number of troops maintained on internal security is largely dictated by the requirements of Provincial Governments.

I would examine the latter position first, since we seek as early as possible to establish self-government in the Provincial Sphere. My colleagues have questioned the desirability of employing regular troops of the Indian Army in communal and religious disturbances, which unfortunately are at present only too frequent. On all hands the neutrality of British troops in such disturbances has received widespread recognition and approval. It would, I think, be exceedingly unwise to withdraw this aid from Provincial Governments, and it is necessary therefore to make constitutional provision accordingly. The special powers which my colleagues would so wisely vest in the Governor for the purpose of maintaining peace and tranquillity appear to provide the requisite constitutional channel for the employment of British troops at such times when their quality of neutrality referred to above would be of particular value in the settlement of a disturbance.

My colleagues, however, express the hope, in which I concur, that time will lead to the special powers they propose vesting in the Governor being nullified through desuetude, and it is impossible to contemplate the continuance of such powers for all time. I am therefore of opinion that a commencement should be made at once to relieve the Army of internal security duties other, of course, than the protection of strategic railways, and to place these duties on the police. This would naturally entail a large increase in the strength of the present Police Forces in many Provinces and be beyond the capacity of existing provincial revenues. The provinces, with some degree of reason, say that the cost of the Army in India includes the task of internal security and that it is impossible to find in addition the money for increased Police Forces. I therefore recommend that within a period of five years, after the introduction of any new provincial constitution and after the new Local Governments have had experience of the problem, that a conference between the Provinces and the Central Government should be set up to examine the position and to see to what extent increased Police Forces in the Provinces would lessen the responsibility of the Military Authorities for internal security, so that by a corresponding reduction in the Military Budget the necessary finance might be made available to the Provinces. It is recognised that this will not lead to the release for other purposes of any of the money at present ear-marked for defence and internal security ; this appears to be outside the realm of practical politics but it will place our military expenditure in a truer light. At the same time the possibility of including in Provincial Police

Forces an adequate neutral element, to enable the replacement of British troops to be undertaken, should receive special consideration.

To turn now to the larger question of the Army in India from the point of view of India's Defence against external invasion. It must, I think, be admitted that the rate of political advance has and will continue to outstrip the rate at which it is possible to advance in the Military sphere. The establishment of a Dominion Army to replace the present Army in India must be a lengthy process. In view of India's Defence problems the Army must attain a real degree of efficiency, a stage army will not suit her purpose. Indians point out that they have established in other spheres a degree of efficiency that is parallel to that of the British Services and that there is therefore no reason to expect that they would not do so in the Military sphere. From the evidence placed before us by the Military Authorities, however, it appears certain that India could not at present, or indeed in the very near future, attain the requisite efficiency without outside assistance. Whilst experiments in Indianisation can be carried out in administrative spheres without heavy risks, in that errors can be corrected, that is not the position in the Army. Here the only test is the test of War, and errors once made in War cannot be corrected. There is, therefore, the greatest necessity for caution.

Certain steps have already been taken by the Military Authorities for the training of Indian Officers, and whilst I am convinced the training of Indian Officers once they enter the Regular Army must be left to the technical authorities, the existing rate of Indianisation does not give a sufficiently broad basis upon which to build up a Dominion Army. The problem is to bring the rate of Military advance in the Military sphere closer to the rate at which we are advancing in the political sphere without any serious fall in efficiency.

I am convinced that the first step is undoubtedly through some change in our existing educational policy, and I would recommend the setting aside of a definite sum by the Central Government for the purpose of establishing in each Province Schools on the lines of the English Public Schools, but necessarily adapted to Indian conditions. These should, in a measurable period of time, improve the quality of the candidates appearing for the Sandhurst examinations and enable us to fill up the full number of vacancies which the Authorities in England can offer us. It appears very necessary to develop to the utmost possible extent the capacity and education of those now offering for Viceroy's Commissions, so that at an early date it will be possible to give them Dominion Commissions. The College which the Military Authorities are opening for the higher training of existing Viceroy's Commissioned Officers might be

adapted for this purpose and arrangements made so as to receive recruits, not only from the existing ranks of the Army but also from Military and Civil Schools.

There has been an insistent demand in India for the establishment of a Military College in the country, and the College to which I have referred should be developed so as to give the requisite opportunity for the military training in India of officers for the Indian Army.

It appears to be generally necessary that the whole question of the existing organisation of the Indian Army should be examined by a Technical Committee with a view to seeing what changes would be required to make it a Dominion Army of the future.

Central
Government.

Throughout our tour in India we were told repeatedly that, with the proposed advance towards self-government in the Provinces, whatever form the Central Government might take in the future, it must be a *strong* Government. Not only the critics but also the supporters of the present Government of India have deplored it as weak and vacillating. This criticism, however, is not levelled in the main at the personnel of the Central Government but at the system, which is disclaimed as faulty and unworkable with satisfaction to anyone concerned. The unenviable position of a Central Government, faced with a permanent elected majority in opposition, can easily be realised even by those who have not first-hand experience of its workings. The Government when formulating proposals have always had to study beforehand their reception at the hands of a hostile majority who have frequently registered their votes, not on the merits of the resolution or legislation under discussion, but solely with a view of hampering the Executive. This is the situation which has now to be studied and it is a situation which doubtless all those who have declared for a strong Central Government have had in mind.

The recommendations of the Local Governments and Provincial Committees on this important subject are somewhat vague generally. Several of the latter suggest the introduction of some form of dyarchy with responsibility to the Legislature, some have no suggestions to make, holding that the question lay outside the purview of their report, while one Committee considers that the Central Government should be of a Federal type, with its position *vis-à-vis* the Central Legislature strengthened. Of the Local Governments, Bombay, Bihar and Orissa, Punjab and Bengal presumably did not feel themselves able to adjudicate on the matter, as they made no recommendations; the United Provinces put forward its proposals for its future Provincial Government on the assumption that there would be no radical change at the Centre; Assam prescribed a strong Central Government, with effective control over the Provinces in certain matters,

as an axiom preceding the introduction of Provincial self-government ; while Madras, whose recommendations for self-government are more far-reaching than those of any other Local Government, expresses itself in no uncertain manner as follows :—" Regarding the Central Government, the proposals we have already made postulate its functioning untrammelled by any of the limitations and difficulties of Dyarchy. That Government must continue in its present form until the time comes to replace it by a Federal body derived from the constituent Provinces and States."

Now, Dyarchy during the past eight years has been condemned on many sides, some politicians in India going to the length of declining even to try and work it. No one, I think, ever looked upon it as more than a transitional or educative expedient and it has generally been regarded as " a complex, confused system, rooted in compromise and having no logical basis." That any individual or body of men should now come forward and recommend the introduction of any form of Dyarchy in the Central Government, to my mind, is incomprehensible. Its outstanding deficiency has been a failure to establish a sense of responsibility. At the same time the present Central Constitution has proved unsatisfactory, and the problem to be solved is in what way should it be amended.

When full self-government, as time goes on, has been finally established in the Provinces and a complete awakening of the Indian States to their interests in all-Indian affairs has taken place, it appears incontestible that the form of the Central Government of India must become Federal, and it behoves us to endeavour to shape the Constitution towards that end.

The existing Constitution of the Legislative Assembly is faulty and is largely responsible for our difficulties of to-day. It should, I think, be recognised that direct election for a Central Parliament in a country the size of India must entail :—

(1) An Assembly which to be adequately representative would be of an unwieldy size and entirely unworkable owing to its numbers ; or

(2) An Assembly, such as is in existence to-day, composed of a relatively small number of representatives coming from few constituencies so vast in area as to make it impossible for the candidates to be in touch with and, in many instances, even known to their electors.

It should be remembered that India is a country the size of Europe (omitting Russia), with a vast population.

I am, therefore, of opinion that, for practical considerations and bearing in mind the necessity for a Federal Constitution in the future, the basis of representation in the Central Government should be election by the Provinces and at some future date also by the States. Election by the Provinces should be introduced

forthwith ; the number of representatives from each to be determined at a Joint Conference. My proposals entail the abolition of General Constituencies for the Legislative Assembly, to be replaced by election on a proportional basis by the Provincial Legislatures, rules being introduced to secure candidates truly representative of the various communities. I would retain special constituencies to ensure the representation of the smaller communities and of such interests as commerce, trade, labour, landed and agriculture, and would retain a proportion of nominations in the hand of the Governors and of the Governor General for special purposes.

I come now to the Viceroy's Executive Council, which is open to the following criticism. Its members are overburdened with their dual role of Parliamentary Ministers and Administrative Heads of Departments, and this should be remedied. They have insufficient opportunity, owing to pressure of work, of acquainting themselves personally with the opinion of leading men throughout the country, or of expounding, outside the Legislature, Government's policy. The portfolios of some of the members are too heavy. There is no direct connection between the non-official members of the Council and the Central Legislature.

I am of opinion that the number of the Council should be raised to ten and suggest the following distribution of portfolios :—

Home, Finance, Commerce, Foreign and Political,
Defence, Communications, Industry and Labour, Law,
Health and Lands, and Education.

Of these the first five should be filled at present by Europeans and the rest by Indians. It will be noticed that I have suggested a Member should be in charge of Foreign and Political, and thus relieve the Viceroy of this portfolio. The Commander-in-Chief should cease to be a Member of the Executive Council and a Defence Portfolio created, to be filled by a Civil Member, not necessarily a Member of the Indian Civil Service.

With a view to provide closer connection between the Executive and the Central Legislature, I recommend that some of the Members of the former should be drawn from the latter ; this also should tend to attract a higher standard of representatives and increase a sense of responsibility. In further pursuance of the policy I would advocate a Parliamentary Under-Secretary to be attached to each portfolio and to be selected from the Assembly. At the outset I would not preclude the appointment of past Members of the Central Legislature to the Executive Council.

I see no reason to retain the provision of Section 36 (3) of the Government of India Act which lays down that three of the Members of the Governor-General's Executive Council must be persons who have been for at least ten years in the service of the Crown.

Members of the Executive Council should definitely be relieved of their detailed work as administrative Heads of their Departments, which should be carried out by permanent officials. The present system, under which the Secretary of a Department is frequently changed, is, in my opinion, unsound.

The appointments to the Central Executive Council, or Cabinet, should be made by the Viceroy in consultation with the Secretary of State.

The Cabinet should divest itself of the aloofness and detachment which is apparent in the Executive Council to-day and its Members, being shorn of detailed administrative work, should establish close touch with public opinion and where there are differences should make it their special care to explain the point of vision of Government which understandably may not be apparent to the man outside.

Of the five Indian Members of the Cabinet two should be Hindus and two Muslims, while I make no reservation as to the fifth. The Indian Members will have an important part to play in assisting to influence the votes of the Assembly. Finally, the Cabinet should work together as a team, and once Government's policy on any matter has been decided upon, each Member should be prepared to argue and, if necessary, to defend that policy in the Legislature irrespective of what portfolio is directly concerned.

From the above it will be seen that I have endeavoured to foster the realisation by the Central Legislature of its responsibility, by bringing it into closer contact with the Central Cabinet. I have earnestly considered the feasibility of introducing responsibility in the Central Legislature on the British model. Apart, however, from the fact that I consider the introduction of such a form of Government in the Centre, while we are establishing self-government in the Provinces, would prove nothing short of a calamity and be likely to prejudice Provincial advance; I am of opinion that a cabinet directly responsible to the Legislature would be unworkable in a constitution which must assume ultimately a Federal character. While it may be possible to compare the position of a Province in size and numbers to that of Britain and to provide it with a Constitution based on that of the British Government, it is an entirely different matter to introduce a similar Constitution for the Central Government of India in view of the size of India, its vast population, its different races, and numerous languages.

For the present, the Governor General, and the Cabinet appointed by him, must remain responsible to Parliament, and it follows that the Governor General must retain his powers of veto and certification. As regards the latter, however, I would vary the existing procedure. Any measure, considered by the Governor General or the Governor General in Council as essential for the safety, tranquillity or interests of British India, should

be introduced in the first instance as a recommended Bill, instead of as at present, endeavouring to secure its acceptance by such expedients as cajolery, undignified persuasion and agreement to weakening amendments. This would not preclude a debate on it and the possible acceptance by Government of useful amendments after which, however, it would pass into law. The present procedure has brought Government into disrepute and has lost to it many loyal supporters who have been unable to see in the present methods any Government at all.

To strengthen the sense of responsibility other legislative measures introduced by Government would be left to the will of the Legislature to accept or reject as it thought fit, the Government reserving power to withdraw any measure which had been amended in such a manner as to render it unacceptable.

The Members of the Central Cabinet should be appointed for the term of five years, but subject to dismissal by the Governor General.

I would retain the Council of State as at present constituted, and with its present powers, as a useful revisionary body. I would suggest, however, that, similar to my proposals for Second Chambers in the Provinces, in order to secure continuity a third of the Members be called upon to retire every five years, but without being debarred from seeking re-election or of being re-nominated. Here, too, that there should be a proportion of life members is worthy of consideration.

The life of the Legislative Assembly should be four years.

The
Secretary of
State.

A description of the powers of the Secretary of State is set forth in our Report and I have little comment to make on what has been written. Undoubtedly as self-government in the Provinces progresses and is conducted on the right lines there will be less and less room or occasion for interference by the Secretary of State.

Similarly with the introduction of a Central Government, such as I have envisaged, on a stronger and sounder foundation, the interference of the Secretary of State as regards details should diminish almost to vanishing point and the government of the country left in the hands of men on the spot. It must not be forgotten, however, that the final control over the Government of India is vested in the Secretary of State, who in turn is responsible to Parliament, and while I recommend that interference in administrative details should be relaxed I do not forget that the Viceroy and the Central Cabinet will continue to account to Parliament through the Secretary of State. What should be aimed at is that the Secretary of State should work in harmony with the Central Cabinet and that his normal powers should take the form of suggestions before administrative or legislative action is taken by the Government of India rather than the shape of a

subsequent corrective mandate. One of the disabilities under which the Viceroy's Executive Council has been suffering has been their inability, on occasion, to take effective part in a debate owing to their being compelled to refer to the Secretary of State whenever a new situation has arisen.

This brings me to the Secretary of State's Council which, it is recommended, should be abolished. It is generally considered that the Council does certain work over again which has already been done in India, and undertakes other work which might be better done in India. Whatever be the fate of the Council of India, I am of opinion that the Secretary of State will require the advice of some persons with first hand experience of the conditions and customs of India, though in number not necessarily as large as that provided in Section 3 (1) of the Government of India Act. In this connection reference must be made to Section 21 of the Act which provides that the expenditure of the revenues of India, both in British India and elsewhere shall be subject to the control of the Secretary of State in Council. There are those who hold that the Government of India in India should be left to look after its own revenues and that in the event of a dispute between the Government of India and His Majesty's Government over the allocation of certain expenditure, the matter should be referred to an Arbitration Board whose decision must be final. Council of India.

My colleagues have recognised the necessity of embodying in the Government of India Act a declaration of certain Fundamental Rights and I desire to emphasize the essential need for some such provision. Fundamental Rights.

Throughout our tour statutory provision against discrimination both in legislation and administration has been insistently demanded by all Minorities—Hindus, Muslims, Depressed Classes, Europeans and Anglo-Indians.

Those responsible for the drafting of the Government of India Act, 1919, recognised the situation and sought to deal with this difficult question by introducing a special provision in the Instrument of Instructions to Governors. Discrimination in administration cannot, I think, be dealt with effectively by Statute and any tendency to such bias should be checked in the main by pressure from the minority communities for whom we have provided special representation in the Legislatures. For this purpose it is also essential that the Instrument of Instructions to Governors should be continued with its special provisions and similar Instructions might well be issued to the Governor General. To make these effective it may be found necessary to vest in these authorities special enabling powers to intervene in any administrative action which contravenes the spirit of those Instructions. Doubt, however, has arisen as to whether provisions in any Instrument of Instructions would be

effective in checking discriminatory *legislation*, but there is not the same difficulty in providing for this by Statute as there appears to be with regard to discriminatory administration.

In view of the granting of larger powers to the Legislatures I am of the opinion that any doubt on this matter should be removed by definitely prescribing the power of the Legislature in this respect by Statute. Whilst admitting the difficulty in drafting a suitable Clause it is not insuperable and indeed several draft Clauses drawn up by constitutional lawyers have been placed before the Committee by different Minorities. It must be recognised, however, that the general well-being of India will at times necessitate the introduction of legislation which might be held as coming within the category of discrimination and this should be provided for in the Section of the Government of India Act introduced to deal with the whole problem.

Anglo-
Indians.

After my election by the Council of State to the Indian Central Committee, His Excellency the Viceroy, finding it impracticable to make room for a representative of Anglo-Indians, desired me to ensure as far as possible that every consideration should be given to the claims put forward by that Community.

My colleagues are prepared to continue separate representation for Anglo-Indians and indeed in several cases have proposed an increase in their seats in the Provincial Councils beyond the ratio of the proposed increases in the total number of Councillors.

However, I recognise that mere representation in the Local Councils cannot solve the difficulties with which Anglo-Indians are faced to-day. Their numbers are not sufficient for them to claim with reason that quota of seats in the Councils which would enable their voice to be heard effectively on matters which affect them directly and are vital to their economic life.

One of the chief disabilities with which the Anglo-Indians are confronted in their competition with Indians for employment is that of education. The Indian has surpassed them in that respect in recent years. This appears to be largely due to the fact that the conditions of living of the poorer class of Anglo-Indians is such as to leave little money available for advanced education.

Until recent years Anglo-Indians found employment in large numbers in certain Government services such as the Customs, and Post and Telegraphs, and in the Railway services. We are told that such employment is rapidly passing from them and I consider that there should be some special enquiry set on foot to examine their general position in this and in all other respects.

The British regime in India has been responsible for the genesis of this community whose loyalty has been tried and proved on many occasions and their claims justify a special plea to Parliament.

Finally, I must point out that the changes proposed for the Governor-
Provincial Governments will throw increased responsibility on ships.
the Governors. Rightly or wrongly, there has been the im-
pression that the Governorships of the three great Presidencies
in India have at times been bestowed as a reward for party
services. Be that as it may, India will want in the future the
best men that Britain can produce and I would like to see the
names submitted for these appointments chosen by a special
non-party board, possibly drawn from His Majesty's Privy
Council. The Governors of the other Provinces should continue
to be selected as at present from the best men in India.

A. H. FROM.

London :

The 24th October, 1929.

MINUTE OF DISSENT BY THE HONOURABLE RAJA NAWAB ALI KHAN.

I regret I find myself in disagreement with the recommendations of my colleagues on two points :—(1) the introduction of reforms in the North-West Frontier Province and (2) the reservation of Law and Order in Bengal.

2. With regard to (1), my colleagues recommend that by way of a beginning the North-West Frontier Province should be given what are known as Morley-Minto Reforms. I entirely agree with the following remarks on this subject contained in the report of the All-Parties Conference :—“ Regarding the form of government in the North-West Frontier Province and in Baluchistan, we are of opinion that the status of these areas must be the same as that of other provinces. We cannot in justice or logic deny the right of any part of India to participate in responsible government.” The differentiation proposed by my colleagues between the North-West Frontier Province and the other provinces will not only have nothing in logic or justice to justify it, but will also become a source of dissatisfaction and bitterness. It is no part of statesmanship to make a province, whose importance from certain points of view is obvious, discontented and resentful. It will be unwise, I think, to make it smart under a sense of inferiority.

3. The point was made perfectly clear by Khan Bahadur Saaduddin Khan, one of the witnesses who appeared before us. I quote the following from his evidence :—“ Our position is that we want to sink or swim with India ; we want to be in the same boat. If Reforms is a good thing, as all of them say it is a good thing, then it should be increased. If it had been a bad thing, nobody would have said that further instalments should be due ; and if it is a good thing why should we be deprived of it ? I do not know that the conditions in this province are in any way worse than the conditions in the rest of India.”

4. It is well-known that Muslim political opinion throughout the country demands the extension of the Reforms to the North-West Frontier Province on the same lines as in the case of the other provinces. Without exaggeration this might be described as an All-India Muslim demand. It is important to note that this demand has the support of the Hindus at large. In the debate on the Budget on the 14th March, 1928, the Legislative Assembly without a division carried a token cut in the demand under the head “ North-West Frontier Province,” to express dissatisfaction at the failure of Government to grant a reformed constitution to that province. Lala Lajpat Rai, one of the foremost Hindu leaders, spoke in favour of the token cut and appealed to the local Hindus to abandon opposition to the extension of the Reforms to their province. In view of these

facts I am afraid I must decline to support the recommendation of my colleagues.

5. I may here observe that having regard to the racial characteristics of the Pathan, the fears of my colleagues may not be quite justifiable. Those who know him admit that he has a genuine strain of democracy in him. He follows his leaders, generally appointed by himself. Therefore with such adequate safeguards for the minority community in the province as the Committee has recommended for the minorities in other provinces, he should be allowed, in my opinion, to manage his own affairs like his brethren in other parts of the country.

6. As a concession, however, to the view of my colleagues, I am prepared to recommend that the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms should be introduced into this province for a period of ten years, at the expiry of which it should have the same status as other provinces. Even if this modest recommendation be found unacceptable I would most reluctantly recommend that the North-West Frontier Province should be amalgamated with the Punjab. This alternative will, I think, be more acceptable to the people of the province than the Morley-Minto Reforms which have been recommended for it. The deputation from the Advanced Muhammadan Party made this point unmistakably clear. Khan Sahib Sardar Gulhan Khan, the spokesman of the deputation, said :—" So far as the expenditure is concerned, I think, Sir, either we should have Reforms without any consideration being paid to the financial position or, if we cannot have it, as our spokesman said, then we want to be re-amalgamated with the Punjab."

7. I do not think it necessary to discuss the financial aspect of the question at length. There are many ways of solving the financial difficulty and different proposals have been made on the point from time to time. I would here invite attention to the views of the majority of the Bray Committee on the subject. They say :—" But more than half the expenditure is incurred not only on civil administration proper but in connection with the tribal tracts and border defence. The revenue of the tribal tracts is insignificant and expenditure on border defence yields no return in revenue. It is obvious therefore that if the expenditure on districts and tracts is taken as a whole, the expenditure in a time of rising prices must outrun the revenue. The largest increases since the formation of the province appear under the heads Political (28 lakhs) and Police (40 lakhs). These large increases are partly due to the larger forces of Border Militia and Frontier Constabulary now found necessary to counter the vast improvement in the armament of the tribes, and partly to the enhanced rates of pay of all ranks, which have had to be advanced *pari passu* with the increase in the pay of the Indian Army. Thus, the principal rise in expenditure has been incurred for the protection of India's land frontier

and for this it is clear that India as a whole must pay. It is out of the question for the frontier districts to bear the charge. It was not borne in the old days by the Punjab, for the Political head was always Imperial”

I am of opinion that if the entire financial system of the province is overhauled in the right manner the finances of the province will be able to bear the cost which the acceptance of my recommendations will entail.

8. I now come to the question of Law and Order in Bengal. My colleagues have recommended that, while every other subject should be transferred to ministers responsible to the Legislative Council, Law and Order should be a reserved subject in charge of a member not responsible to the Council. In other words, they propose to continue dyarchy in Bengal. Now, it is well known that dyarchy has been most strenuously and successfully opposed in Bengal during the last nine years. It seems to me to be a strange reply to the protests of Bengal that she, of all provinces, should be singled out for the continuance of dyarchy. Apart from this I think that if Bengal is treated on a footing different from that of the other provinces it will give rise to intense dissatisfaction which will be fatal to the working of the new reforms. Bengal has enjoyed the benefits of British rule and English education for a longer period than almost any other province in India. I, therefore, see no reason for treating it on an inferior footing.

9. If the Committee's proposal is accepted the position of the member in charge of Law and Order will become an impossible one as all criticism will be directed against him. The Committee have not proposed that the Governor should retain his powers of certifying legislation and restoring grants. Without these powers I do not see how dyarchy is to be worked and I am sure that if the problem were properly faced my colleagues would find good reason for changing their minds. The reservation of Law and Order would, in my opinion, lead to great difficulties and, in fact, bring the working of the whole machinery of government to a standstill. I am, therefore, strongly opposed to it.

NAWAB ALI KHAN.

MINUTE OF DISSENT

BY

NAWAB SIR ZULFIQAR ALI KHAN, KT., C.S.I., AND DR. ABDULLAH

SUHRAWARDY

(Members of the Indian Central Committee).

INTRODUCTION AND HISTORICAL SURVEY.

The unique and complex nature of the Indian problems is patent to all. Some Western idealists seek solution for them in the application of pure democratic principles to the future polity of India. In their zeal they ignore the special conditions of Indian life and imagine that since they have proved so successful in their own country they must necessarily produce the same satisfactory results in that vast sub-continent called India. We admire the benevolent intentions of these men, but we are not convinced of their practical wisdom. India is equal in area to Europe, excluding Russia, and its population is not much smaller than it, and although the affinities of European civilisation are undeniable and similar social ideals prevail almost everywhere, yet it is impossible to conceive a single Continental system for all Western countries. The Germans and the English belong to the same racial stock, but is it possible to imagine that the British would gladly accept the German rule over themselves and *vice versa*? In fact, after the war, even small and insignificant populations had to be liberated from alien rule in order to afford opportunities of self-expression to them.

This process of segregating nationalities and re-distributing territories was considered the sole means of establishing peace in Europe on permanent basis. Even this drastic rearrangement of the political map of Europe was not considered sufficient to guarantee peace in Europe, and the crushing authority of the League of Nations had to be imposed on it. India, with her antagonistic religions and incomprehensible social systems and different political ideals which her various races cherish, and the numerous languages and tongues which are used by them, cannot by any flight of imagination be considered as a single country, containing a single nationality, inspired by common communities and interests.

India is so remote from England, and its past history and present political situation are known only to those who make a special study of them, and therefore it is incumbent on us to describe in as brief a manner as possible the development of the present conditions with regard to the communities. This would, in our opinion, be essential for the just comprehension of the claims of the 70 millions of the Moslems in India. Our justification for this brief survey is that it would provide His Majesty's

Government with unvarnished facts and undeniable historical claims which alone would enable the British Parliament to uphold those traditions of justice and fair play for which the British people are so distinguished. Besides, it would save the Moslems of India all that bitterness and sense of grievous wrong which would be the inevitable consequence of ill-considered decisions strongly influenced by preconceived notions of India containing a homogeneous population. In any case we shall have the supreme satisfaction of having tried to induce those who sit in the judgment seats that it is essential to bear certain simple facts in mind in order to understand the present situation.

The invasion of the Deccan by Emperor Aurangzeb was as disastrous to the Moghul Empire as the occupation of and retreat from Moscow was to the French Empire. The catastrophe of the Grand Army raised nations and national aspirations against Napoleon and closed his career of glory and liquidated his empire. Aurangzeb's prolonged expedition exhausted his treasury and dispirited the Army, which resulted in the downfall of the Moghul Empire. The chaos which supervened after the last of the great Moghuls gave a great impulse to centrifugal tendencies among the distant governors.

There is hardly any doubt that the rising of a new spirit among the Hindus would have wiped out the British settlements in Calcutta, but the sublime breathing of history determined the rhythm of this epoch. Ahmed Shah Abdali, the King of Afghanistan, invaded India in response to the urgent appeal of the Moslems. He met the overweening arrogance of the Maharrattas at Panipat. It was a deadly struggle between Hindu ambitions and Moslem religious enthusiasm. The Hindu power and pride was shattered on the field of Panipat. The King withdrew from India after a grave warning to the Head of the Mahratta Confederacy that they would see him again in India if they dared to resume their crusade against Moslems with the avowed object of driving the Moslems out of India. Fate thus averted a great catastrophe which menaced their very existence in this country. The British, after this, had an easy task to deal successfully with the fragments of the Hindu Confederacy.

Nearly a century later another abortive attempt was made by the Hindus to rouse the Moslems against the British, but the British triumphed during the Indian Mutiny and the implacable spirit manifested by the notorious Nanasahib and others remained quiescent for nearly sixty years.

In 1920 the British had again to cope with the rising tide of Hindu ambitions. The Hindu tactics on this occasion were similar to those employed during the Mutiny. By clever manœuvring they won over to their side some credulous Moslems whom they made to fight their battles. The result was that, as in the Mutiny, so in the years 1921-22, the duped Moslems had

to bear the brunt of the fight. Eighty per cent. of those sent to jail were Moslems. The threatened resurgence of Hindu revolutionary spirit will afford opportunities to see whether they would challenge the might of the British Government single-handed. Their Bismarckian policy has been discarded, at any rate this has been openly declared by some apostles of the doctrine that Hindustan is only for Hindus. This school of thought embraces the entire student class as well as the professional and business men. The Press and the Professors inculcate Neitschian philosophy. Hindustan is to be purged of all non-Hindus even if they belong to the same race. Hindu nationalism is to fight its own battles, and would treat those with utter contempt who criticise its arrogant and selfish appropriation of the functions of Government. Hitherto the Hindus have never fought alone, in fact they have always employed the Moslems as the shock battalions. It is a perfectly novel venture and its experiment would not be devoid of interest for the non-Hindus.

This heroic resolve will find fruition in their dealings with the present rulers, but they have an additional programme for their aggressive activities with regard to the Moslem community. The Hindu Maha Sabha is started with the avowed object of subverting the political rights of the Moslems. Its two branches, known as the Shudhi and Sangathan organisations have for their aim the conversion of the Moslems to Hinduism by force or fraud, and of preparing the young fanatical Hindus by physical culture for the task of fighting the Moslems on the occasions of riots, which would be fomented according to the dictates of Maha Sabha's policy. The rivalry which Maha Sabha has so zealously launched has behind it the memory of conquest and subjugation. It is consecrated by the visible antagonism of mosque and temple, and is actuated by an implacable hatred of the Moslems, who, according to its political creed, must be exterminated. This grim determination has found tragic manifestation in communal riots at different places in India. At Arrah, Bettia, Gurmukhtesar, etc., etc., the Hindus were guilty of terrible excesses and their brutality sent a thrill of horror throughout the country. But for the vigilance of the British the Provinces of India would have become the scenes of terrible carnage.

People outside India have no idea of the extent of the communal tension. They only occasionally see the reports of sporadic rioting, but they can form no estimate of the daily increasing volume of mutual hatred and rancour. It has sundered social ties which before this were very strong and cordial. Joint political associations have all vanished and a few Moslems who participated in the Congress Meetings are steadily seceding from it ; even Ali Brothers, who lent such weight and validity to the Hindu claim that some of the most enlightened Moslems who were the supporters of the Indian Congress, have left that

camp in utter disillusionment and disappointment. They openly declare in their public speeches that Moslems can not repose any confidence in the Hindu bona fides, and that they must prepare and submit their own claims to a share in the reforms on the lines which would ensure their peaceful existence in India.

This is the acme of wisdom gained after bitter experience of the Hindu nationalism. The pugnacious tendencies of this nationalism have inaugurated an era of misery and sorrow. From one end of India to the other scenes of terrible bloodshed and destruction have been witnessed by panic-stricken people. Sickened by barbarous atrocities, Lord Irwin, the present Viceroy of India, made an earnest appeal to the members of the Central Legislature in August, 1927, to cultivate a spirit of mutual toleration. He said that during the seventeen months that he had been in India the whole landscape had been overshadowed by the lowering clouds of communal tension, which had repeatedly discharged their thunderbolts, spreading far throughout the land their devastating havoc. In less than eighteen months, so far as figures were available, the toll taken by this bloody strife had been between 250 and 300 killed and over 2,500 injured. A statement laid on the table of the Legislative Assembly at a subsequent date disclosed the astounding fact that from September, 1927, to June 30, 1928, there had been 19 serious Hindu-Moslem riots all over India.

The Hindu Press launched a campaign of persistent vilification of the Moslems, even the sacred personality of the Prophet of Islam was not immune from gross insults and defamations. The "Rajpal" case threatened to engulf society in a deluge of bloodshed and had it not been to the clever handling of the delicate situation by the Punjab Government, a veritable reign of terror would have resulted from it. As it was there were frequent scenes of tumult and riot. These violent and mendacious writings fanned the flames of communal hatred to a degree which caused the Governments of various Provinces the gravest anxiety concerning the preservation of peace. The Bengal Government hastened to declare, "The rising tide of communal hatred surging from the Press threatens to engulf the faint signs of unity that have appeared in recent years, and to destroy the foundations on which a few earnest builders have worked with so much care and patience." Since this pathetic statement was issued, the tone both of the Press and the public speaker, has become more inflammatory. They openly assert that the Moslem settlers in India must be expelled from it and the converted Hindus who form the bulk of the Moslem population must be reclaimed, so that India may once again be exclusively Hindu. These Hindu leaders have sown the seeds of trouble which are germinating all over India. In their leisure hours Hindu students attend gymnasiums to cultivate physical strength which is necessary for a final life and death struggle with the Moslems.

Some notion of the extent of the Hindu malevolence can be formed by reflecting on the frank though brutal expression of ideas expressed by a professedly impartial and neutral ruler described in the book entitled, "*The India We Served*," recently written by Sir Walter Lawrence. Writing about the late Maharajah Sir Partab Singh of Jodhpur, Sir Walter Lawrence says, "Tolerant as he was he hated the Moslems. But I never realised the depths of his hatred till I was leaving India. Sir Partab had come up to Simla to be present at a farewell dinner Lord Curzon gave to my wife and myself the night before we left, and after dinner Sir Partab and I sat up till two in the morning talking of his hopes and ambitions, and one of his ambitions was to annihilate the Moslem people in India. I deprecated this prejudice and mentioned Moslem friends known to both of us. 'Yes,' he said, 'I liking them too, but very much liking them dead' . . . and here was Sir Partab, my brother by adoption, the great and courteous Rajput gentleman, telling me with terrible truthfulness that now he had only two things to live for, to fall leading a charge of cavalry against the foes of the King Emperor, wearing the beloved brooch, and to wipe out the Moslems from India. Perhaps it may be said that higher education, with which he was not endowed, might have softened his inexorable attitude towards Islam, but I doubt whether education will change the outlook of the two religions and permit it to be less ferocious."

This venom existed in the Hindu mind when inter-communal rivalries had not reached the present stage, but those who have carefully studied Indian problems know that beneath the smooth surface of British rule are smouldering the antagonisms of centuries. Whatever sinister wishes are crudely expressed by the ruler of a state they find an echo in the subtle, thinly veiled speeches made by the prominent leaders of the Hindu Maha Sabha; in fact this malevolent spirit animates the entire Hindu population of India. To achieve this apparently difficult object devious devices are suggested, such as the economic pressure, the repeal of the Land Alienation Act in the Punjab, joint electorates, monopoly of services, creation of Hindu Swaraj in the Provinces and the occupation of the central citadel by creating an overwhelming majority in the Legislative Assembly and the control of the Viceroy's Executive Council by making one-half of it responsible to this virtually Hindu Assembly. The Hindu Maha Sabha's comprehensive activities would encompass all this, the Sangathan and Shudhi organisations would do the rest. They would fight and decimate the Moslems and convert those who would not be worthy of their steel. Education will also play its appointed role which is clearly visible in the Minute of Dissent written by the Hindu member of the Educational Committee.

The Shudhi activities are responsible for the conversion of a very large number of Moslems to Hinduism and in India it is

common knowledge that they resort to all kinds of expedients in order to mislead them. Cajolery and coercion are both employed to gain the object in view.

The Land Alienation Act in the Punjab is effectively protecting the Moslem Landholders. Mr. M. L. Darling, a distinguished civilian in the Punjab has calculated that the total debt of the Moslem peasants roughly amounts to 75 crores of rupees or nearly 50 millions sterling. The creditors are all Hindus. If the frantic efforts of the Hindus succeed in getting it repealed 90 per cent. of the Moslem peasants would automatically be disappropriated and their holdings occupied by the Hindu money lenders who have advanced money to these poor people on usurious rates of interest. Some idea of the methods of these Hindu creditors may be formed by those people in Europe who have studied the dealings of the money lenders with their debtors during the Middle Ages. A large proportion of the savings of these poor Moslems goes into the pockets of their creditors whose rapacity knows no bounds, even the domestic happiness of the people is not safe from them. The Hindu mind works out the problem in this way ; once the poor Moslem is dispossessed he at once becomes a mere serf and is thrown on the mercy of the man who takes his land. He has no visible means of livelihood, his wife, his children and he himself must either starve or he must accept conversion to Hinduism, and starving people are generally supposed to accept any conditions. Once this sturdy stock disappears, the backbone of the Moslem population in India will be broken.

The Hindus have thus cast their net all round in order to crush the Moslems. The Moslems on their part have to face these problems. Their efforts to conciliate the Hindus have unfortunately failed to produce the desired effect. Unity Conferences were held at Simla, Delhi, Lucknow, Benares and Calcutta and after prolonged discussions the weary peace-makers came to the conclusion that no good could come out of these unity conferences. The Moslems all over India realised that it was unavailing to make any sacrifices and to exercise self-restraint if their irreducible minimum was not acceptable to the Hindus. It would be an immense aid to peace and good relations if the Hindu politicians dropped all pious platitudes and freed themselves from formulas in which they have voluntarily become entangled in order to force the Moslems to make concessions which they deem unwise or unfair. The whole question boils down to the one reflection. The Moslems cannot placate the implacable.

These complicated problems have only to be stated to show that they call for careful handling on the part of the British Government. No language that we can use will convey an adequate idea of the fears which the Moslems in India have about their treatment at the hands of an unappeasable majority. In spite of the dictates of common sense and despite the friendly

advice of H. E. Lord Irwin, given at Bombay before his departure for England, the Hindu leaders have made no attempt to create confidence in the mind of the minority community. Their intransigence, the arrogance with which they treated the legitimate and reasonable demands of the Moslems, their savage attacks on defenceless Moslems on the occasion of riots, even in the Provinces where Moslems are in a majority, show that they are incapable of humane and orderly government. India which contains heterogeneous populations professing radically different religions and speaking different languages, and inspired by traditions and bitter memories of past and present rivalries, cannot by any means be considered to possess a homogeneous nation.

If to-day the British protection were withdrawn from India, this so called nation would tear its own body to pieces and the Civil War which would inevitably ensue would engulf the whole country in a pandemonium of bloodshed and destruction of property.

The Moslems in India number 70 millions, which is more than the present population of the German Republic. Are the vital interests of such a great population to be ignored? And can any British Government go back on its pledges so solemnly given to them, and can that Government compel an unwilling people to accept an ideal theory of democracy and thus endanger its very existence. Nothing but a series of miracles can transform the mentality of a whole nation which has been slowly built up by cruel experiences. The British Government, we feel sure, will not treat its pledges as mere scraps of paper, they must continue to vindicate their reputation for justice and fair play. The present situation and crisis call for the exercise of the highest wisdom, for any step hastily taken may become irrevocable and may put an end to the period of tranquillity and progress.

Once an injustice is done in framing a constitution for a country nothing can change it except a bloody revolution. But before such a violent method changes the laws of the Medes and Persians, an incalculable harm shall have been done to the paramount interests of seventy millions of Indian Moslems who have reposed full confidence in the promises of the British Government. They have enjoyed certain rights uninterruptedly ever since the inception of the reforms in India, and any arbitrary decision abrogating them would create a dangerous position, for the Moslems will look upon it as the betrayal of the faith which they had in the integrity of the British justice.

In the Indian Central Committee the same virulent spirit has reigned supreme. The Moslems where they are in a minority are not allowed to enjoy their present quota of representation in the Councils fixed by British Government with due regard to their position and importance in the country, for example in Madras they are 7 per cent. of the population but they are given 13 seats by way of weightage. This excess of Moslems does not in any way affect the overwhelming majority of the

Hindus, but the Hindu majority in the Indian Central Committee has arbitrarily ruled that the Moslems in Madras, and in fact in all the other provinces are entitled only to representation on population basis. We do not mind if a single rule is made applicable to all the provinces, but when the provinces in which the Moslems are in a majority such as Punjab and Bengal come to be considered, this general rule is withheld and there the Moslem majority is reduced to a minority.

We the two elected representatives of the Moslems of Bengal and the Punjab constituting the largest Moslem population of any single country, protested against this oppressive and despotic behaviour, but the representatives of the majority community arrogantly waived aside our vehement remonstrances and carried their resolution by the vote of their standing majority in the Committee. Throughout the discussions in the meetings of the Central Committee the one thing that comes out most prominently is that the Moslem interests and rights are treated with the utmost contempt and injustice.

No canons of democracy can condone the crime of reducing the majority into a minority, but this has actually been done by the ruthless spirit of Hindu nationalism.

Those who defame the character of the Holy Prophet of Islam are held up as the models of virtue and those who inflict the greatest injury on the Moslems are patriots and heroes. For more than two centuries this spirit of intense hatred has openly pursued its destructive course, and has constantly been gaining in strength and volume. The climax is reached when the will to destroy the Moslems reveals itself in the determination to subvert the Moslem right in the future constitution of India, by abolishing those safeguards which the British Government have deemed so necessary for preserving the rights of the Moslems.

We do not and none in fact can condemn the efforts of the Hindus to regain their independence. In fact the British people can say with pride that they have prepared the Indians as indeed several other peoples for self-Government. The South Africans, the Irish, the Australians, and Egyptians have one after the other secured the control of their own national life. India's claim to the same position ultimately cannot be denied, but the Hindus have to consider in their sober moments that they are not the only Community inhabiting India; Moslems number 70 millions and Depressed Classes about 60 millions, Christians and non-Brahmans are not negligible quantities. The sum total of minority Communities constitutes approximately half the number of the entire population, and this half fears that the majority Community is selfishly determined to monopolise all power in India and that it will use that power for its own advantage and to the detriment of the minorities. The Hindus must disarm these Communities of such fears and suspicions. They should understand that unless they win their confidence, India's political aspirations are an empty dream.

The meagre description which we have given of the real intentions of the majority Community will, we hope, give some idea of the relations subsisting between the two main but rival Communities. The Moslems in their every day life experience incredibly hostile opposition from the Hindus and this has naturally made them very apprehensive concerning their future. Some prominent Moslems, realising the dangers of the position in which the Moslem Community was placed, thought it was incumbent on them to take stock of the situation and to consult the leading men of all provinces in order to enunciate a definite and categorical policy. This project was at once carried out and an All-India Conference of the Moslems was convened at Delhi over which H. H. The Agha Khan presided. It was an unique and representative gathering of the most prominent and influential Moslem leaders in India. Men who had belonged to opposite camps among the Moslems were seen on the same platform in support of it. Its deliberations lasted for two days and the whole situation vis-a-vis the circumstances created by the acceptance of the Nehru Report by the Hindus of India was thoroughly discussed; and the following comprehensive resolution was unanimously passed, the entire gathering standing up to emphasise its importance.

RESOLUTION No. 1. ALL-INDIA MOSLEM CONFERENCE,
DELHI, 1ST JANUARY, 1929.

“Whereas, in view of India's vast extent and its ethnological, linguistic, administrative and geographical or territorial divisions, the only form of Government suitable to Indian conditions is a federal system with complete autonomy and residuary powers vested in the constituent States, the Central Government having control only of such matters of common interest as may be specifically entrusted to it by the Constitution;

“And whereas, it is essential that no Bill, resolution, motion or amendment regarding inter-Communal matters be moved, discussed or passed by any Legislature, Central or Provincial, if a three-fourth majority of the members of either the Hindu or the Moslem Community affected thereby in that legislature oppose the introduction, discussion or passing of such Bill, resolution, motion or amendment.

“And whereas the right of Moslems to elect their representatives on the various Indian Legislatures through separate electorates is now the law of the land and Moslems cannot be deprived of that right without their consent;

“And whereas in the conditions existing at present in India and so long as those conditions continue to exist, representation in various legislatures and other statutory self-Governing bodies of Moslems through their own separate electorates is essential in order to bring into existence a really representative democratic Government;

“ And whereas as long as Musalmans are not satisfied that their rights and interests are adequately safeguarded in the constitution, they will in no way consent to the establishment of joint electorates, whether with or without conditions ;

“ And whereas, for the purposes aforesaid, it is essential that Musalmans should have their due share in the Central and Provincial Cabinets ;

“ And whereas it is essential that representation of Musalmans in the various Legislatures and other statutory self-governing bodies should be based on a plan whereby the Moslem majority in those provinces where Musalmans constitute a majority of population shall in no way be affected and in the provinces in which Musalmans constitute a minority they shall have a representation in no case less than that enjoyed by them under the existing law ;

“ And whereas representative Moslem gatherings in all provinces in India have unanimously resolved that with a view to provide adequate safeguards for the protection of Moslem interests in India as a whole, Musalmans should have the right of 33 per cent. representation in the Central Legislature and the Conference entirely endorses that demand ;

“ And whereas on ethnological, linguistic, geographical and administrative grounds the province of Sindh has no affinity whatever with the rest of the Bombay Presidency and its unconditional constitution into a separate province, possessing its own separate legislative and administrative machinery on the same lines as in other provinces of India is essential in the interests of its people, the Hindu minority in Sindh being given adequate and effective representation in excess of their proportion in the population, as may be given to Musalmans in provinces in which they constitute a minority of population ;

“ And whereas the introduction of constitutional reforms in the N. W. F. Province and Baluchistan along such lines as may be adopted in other provinces of India is essential not only in the interests of those provinces but also of the Constitutional advance of India as a whole, the Hindu Minorities in those provinces being given adequate and effective representation in excess of their proportion in population as is given to the Moslem Community in provinces in which it constitutes a minority of the population ;

“ And whereas it is essential in the interests of Indian administration that provision should be made in the Constitution giving Moslems their adequate share along with other Indians in all services of the State and on all statutory self-governing bodies, having due regard to the requirements of efficiency ;

“ And whereas having regard to the political conditions obtaining in India it is essential that the Indian Constitution should embody adequate safeguards for protection and promotion of

Moslem education, languages, religion, personal law and Moslem charitable institutions, and for their due share in grants in aid ;

“ And whereas it is essential that the constitution should provide that no change in the Indian Constitution shall, after its inauguration be made by the Central Legislature except with the concurrence of all the States constituting the Indian federation ;

“ This Conference emphatically declares that no constitution, by whomsoever proposed or devised, will be acceptable to Indian Moslems unless it conforms with the principles embodied in this resolution.”

This resolution was acclaimed all over India which demonstrated in unmistakable terms the solidarity of Moslem opinion with regard to the various problems closely touching their tranquil and progressive life in India.

The Moslems belonging to the different stratas of society freely discussed and commented upon the cordial reception given by the Moslem Community all over India to the Royal Statutory Commission which they thought would impress the British people with the desirability of reciprocating the friendly attitude of the Moslems towards them. The unfriendly and aggressively hostile spirit exhibited by the Hindus afforded a great contrast to the Moslem behaviour.

The Moslems are awaiting with great interest the result of this co-operation and goodwill shown by them to the Statutory Commission.

SEPARATE ELECTORATE.

We have tried to trace the growth of the existing animosities between Hindus and Moslems and the influence they have exercised in determining the attitude of the Moslems with regard to the constitutional problems confronting India and England. The world's history does not record a single instance in which a test of such colossal magnitude was undertaken by any people in the past. It is not so much the magnitude which appeals one as the variety and nature of the conditions for which suitable solutions must be provided. The varying requirements of various Communities tax the ingenuity of the political physician. The patient hopes that the remedy applied will not prove worse than the disease itself. His faith in the skill of his physician will rest on the efficiency of his prescriptions given after a thorough and correct diagnosis.

The British administrators brought into existence novel political conditions which have set people dreaming about their future, they feel the urge of new aspirations such as they had never before experienced. The breezes from the West have besides touched the chords of a new life and enthralled the very soul of the people. All honour is due to the British people who prepare disintegrated people for great destinies.

We have no doubt that the practical wisdom of the British will not flag but will discover a workable scheme for the needs of the Indian peoples.

The All-India Moslem Conference has laid great emphasis on separate and communal electorates in its main resolution. In fact it declares that the Moslems will not accept any constitution by whomsoever framed which deprives them of this safeguard. The authors of the Montagu-Chelmsford Report enumerate the points which must be investigated and reported on by the Royal Commission to be appointed in the year 1929. One of these points is "The important matter of the retention of communal representation." While leaving the determination of this supreme question to the careful consideration of the Royal Commission, the distinguished authors give a clear lead to the Commissioners in these words : "At this point we are brought face to face with the most difficult question which arises in connection with elected Assemblies, whether communal electorates are to be maintained. We may be told that this is a closed question, because the Mohammedans will never agree to any revision of the arrangement promised them by Lord Minto in 1906, and secured to them by the reforms of 1909. But we have felt bound to re-examine the question fully in the light of our new policy, and also because we have been pressed to extend the system of Communal electorates in a variety of directions. This is no new problem. It has been discussed periodically from the time when the first steps were taken to liberalise the Councils. There has hitherto been a weighty consensus of opinion that in a country like India no principle of representation other than by interest is practically possible. Lord Dufferin held this view in 1888, and in 1892 Lord Lansdowne's Government wrote that "The representation of such a Community upon such a scale as the Act permits can only be secured by providing that each important class shall have the opportunity of making its views known in Council by the mouth of some member specially acquainted with them."

We note that in 1892 the small size of the Councils was reckoned as a factor in the decisions and that the contrary view was not without its exponents, but we feel no doubt that Lord Minto's Government followed the predominant opinion when, in 1907, they pressed for an important extension of the Communal principle. Thus we have had to reckon not only with the settled existence of the system, but with a large volume of weighty opinion that no other method is feasible.

Again in another place they reaffirm what is quoted above. "The Mohammedans regard these as settled facts, and any attempt to go back on them would rouse a storm of bitter protest

and put a severe strain on the loyalty of a Community which has behaved with conspicuous loyalty during a period of very great difficulty, and which we know to be feeling no small anxiety for its own welfare under a system of popular Government."

The Moslems have given proof of their unflinching loyalty to the British Government under extremely delicate and difficult conditions. They fought against their own co-religionists in spite of the proclamation of Jihad or Holy War by the Turks and despite the injunctions of their sacred Scriptures. No sacrifice could be greater and yet the reward they received was so meagre. It is perhaps an instance of poetical justice that they are threatened with the chances of being deprived of this special privilege.

If the unexpected happens the whole of the Moslem world will ring with the stories of the Moslem cause in India being betrayed by the British people.

During our tour in India not a single Moslem body or witness has asked for joint electorates, on the contrary there is a strange consensus of opinion in favour of separate electorates. This overwhelming unity of purpose and demand is irresistible. No parochial self interest or *arrière pensée* has been able to damage this unanimity. The 70 millions of Moslems have no trust in the bona fides of the majority Community. They fear that in a system of joint electorates their representatives will be merely the mandatories of the Hindus and will not be competent enough to protect the interests of their own Community. In the provinces like the Punjab and Bengal where the Moslems are in a majority the voting strength of the Hindus is greater and therefore the men returned to the Councils will not be in proportion to their actual numbers and they would, besides, be the nominees of the Hindus, because the state of indebtedness of the rural classes is so hopeless that the creditors, who are all Hindus, will exercise a tremendous pressure on the Moslem voters and only such men will be elected as are acceptable to Hindus.

The idea that Moslems will in their turn send Hindus of their own choice is absolutely misleading because the same causes which militate against patriotic Moslems getting themselves elected will operate against Hindus of desirable types and character securing success in the elections.

We have explained above how utterly impossible it is in the face of the paucity of Moslem voters and the deplorable state of indebtedness of the rural classes to send really representative Moslems in whom they can place implicit confidence. The indebtedness of the peasantry is such a tremendous misfortune that it paralyses the Moslem activities in all directions and places them at the absolute mercy of the Hindu capitalist who unfortunately knows only too well how to exploit this weakness of the Moslem masses.

It is the consciousness of this formidable force, added to which is the strong hope that perhaps the British Government would

support the idea of joint electorates, which makes the Hindus to adopt an uncompromising attitude. Numerous unity conferences produced no tangible results and the Hindus remained unmoved by argument and by appeal.

The Moslems, at the dictates both of reason and necessity, oppose the idea of joint electorates. They find by bitter experience that their safety lies only in continuing to enjoy the right of separate and communal electorates. This system has proved highly satisfactory, and the Punjab Administrative Report, 1907-8, bears strong testimony to it.

"The system of each religious Community electing its own representatives has been extended to Rewari and Ambala so as to equalise the number of Hindu and Mohammedan members. This system, where it has been tried in the Punjab, has proved popular and successful as it removes a frequent cause of friction and secures the representation of minorities." If these views held good in 1908, they have more force and reason in these anxious days. The distribution of population is such in the Punjab where, on the whole, the Moslems are in a majority that except in 12 out of 29 districts the Moslem members returned to the Council will be the creatures of the Hindus and Sikhs. The Moslem Community will never accept this situation which would be unavoidable if the Moslems are unjustly deprived of the right of separate and communal electorates.

The capitalist has already reduced him to penury by usury, he is backward in education, he is deficient in organisation, he has practically no share in the trade of the country and if on the top of it his political subjection to the Hindu Maha Sabha is completed by the system of joint electorates, then the 70 millions of Moslems in India will suffer from a crushing tyranny both economic and political. It would we hope be instructive to the uninitiated to know that the cunning device underlying the idea of joint electorates is the work of the Hindu politician who bore no burden of the Great War, in fact he was busily engaged in profiteering and built up huge fortunes by getting Army Contracts. While he was making and hoarding money the poor Moslem was shedding his blood in defence of the British Empire.

In August, 1906 a Committee of the Governor-General's executive Council was formed to consider a number of suggestions for reform, including among other matters, increased representation on the Indian and Provincial Legislative Councils. This Committee "gave special attention to the problem of Moslem representation. As a result of their enquiries the Committee found that the Moslems had not been sufficiently represented on the existing Councils, that the few elected members had not been really representative and that nominations had failed to secure the appointment of the Moslems of the class desired by the Community." (Government Blue Book on Communal representation in the Legislatures and Local Bodies.)

An all India Moslem deputation presented an address to H. E. Lord Minto on 1st October, 1906 in which it gave frank expression to their hopes and fears and sought a positive pronouncement from the Governor-General. Lord Minto in reply said, "I am as firmly convinced as I believe you to be that any electoral representation in India would be doomed to mischievous failure which aimed at granting a personal enfranchisement regardless of the beliefs and traditions of the Communities comprising the populations of this continent." This important and weighty pronouncement was made when Hindu Moslem rivalries and bloody conflicts had not assumed the present hideous aspect.

The second Reading of the Indian Councils Bill was moved in the House of Commons on 2nd April, 1909. In a later stage of this debate Mr. Asquith (afterwards Lord Asquith) said, "Undoubtedly there will be a separate register for Moslems. To us here at first sight it looks an objectionable thing because it discriminates between people and segregates them into classes on the basis of religious creed. I do not think that is a very formidable objection. The distinction between Moslem and Hindu is not merely religious but it cuts deep down into the traditions of the historic past, and is also differentiated by the habits and social customs of the Community."

We may add more authorities in support of our contention, but we think it is enough for us to say that practically all responsible British Statesmen have seen that it is natural that the Moslems should have the instinctive apprehension of dangers and difficulties of their position, and they accordingly provided safeguards against them. We may frankly say that anything built on the theory that they are non-existent or insignificant is doomed to failure.

The British Government are themselves pledged spontaneously and by their own free will to make good the declarations made by their predecessors. The Moslems thus hope that the obligations into which Great Britain has entered will be faithfully discharged.

The Hindus constantly deery against the insistent demand of the Moslems for separate and Communal electorates asserting that such a system is an outrage against democratic principles. We have shown above that these pious platitudes are merely a mask to cover their deep-rooted design to destroy the Moslems in India. They use these catch phrases in order to justify their arguments to those who believe that India is immediately ready to assimilate all western theories of democracy and that its population is perfectly homogeneous. We would not doubt the honesty of intentions, but we would like them to pause and reflect whether he is not falling into the net of the Brahmans when he accepts his brand new ideas of democracy. He ought to know that the entire Hindu social system is built on caste inequality and could the Brahmin honestly say that democratic

ideas as understood in the West were acceptable to a population which was graded in innumerable castes and accepted their inequalities as the decree of divine Providence which regarded about 60 millions of Hindus as "untouchable."

There is no society in the world so incredibly honeycombed in social inequalities, grades and degrees of touchability as the Hindus, and yet they masquerade before the Western people as a democratic nation.

It would be highly instructive to those who would like to be in possession of full information before definitely forming their opinion that even before the existence of the present Hindu Moslem tension and when the relations between the two Communities were cordial, the Moslem candidates had no chance of election in a mixed electorate.

The Blue Book, Vol. I, published in 1908, containing the proposals of the Government of India and Despatch of the Secretary of State says about Madras on page 16—"The statistics from 1893 to 1906 show the professional middle class holding 66.6 of the selected seats; the landholders 5.5; European Commercial Members 24.1; and the representatives of Indian Commerce 1.9. No Mohammedan has succeeded in obtaining a seat by election."

Dealing with Bombay it says—"The statistics from 1893 to 1906 show that the professional middle class obtained 50.7 per cent. of the election seats; the landholders 22.6; the Mohammedans 11.3." Whereas according to the population their percentage ought to have been 20. Continuing, it says—"As regards Mohammedans, the opinions sent up by the Bombay Government seem to indicate that nothing but separate representations will satisfy the Community and that they resent the idea of nomination."

About Bengal, it says—"The statistics from 1893 to 1906 show that 52.8 per cent. of the elected members have been drawn from the professional middle class; 13.2 from the landholders; 5.7 from the Mohammedans." Whereas according to the population they ought to have been 18 per cent.

About the United Provinces, it says—"Statistics from 1893 show the professional middle class holding 50 per cent. of the elective seats; landholders 20.6; Mohammedans none." According to the population they ought to have been 14 per cent. Continuing, it says—"In commenting on the working of the existing regulations, Sir James La Touche observed two years ago that no Mohammedan had ever been elected by a representative group."

About Eastern Bengal and Assam, it says—"Although the Mohammedans form a majority of the population of the province, they are at present comparatively unorganised, and they can only be adequately represented by means of a special electorate."

The above results and experiences as embodied in official documents, are extremely illuminating and should convince all

who wish to reach correct conclusions in order to deal out justice to all. If the result of joint electorates was so utterly disappointing and unfair in the case of the Moslems from 1893 to 1906, what would it be in these days when inter-communal strife and hatred is verging on civil war.

An unique instance of their perversity is enough to disillusion the British Government. While discussing the constructive proposals for various provinces in India, the Hindu members in the Central Committee by their majority votes decided that the representation should be on population basis, and this principle was adhered to in the case of all provinces in which the Hindus are in a majority, but when we discussed the Punjab in which the Moslems are in a majority, the Hindus made a volte face and reversed this principle. On our motion that the Moslems in the Punjab should get representation on population basis, they refused it and on division the three following voted for the motion :—

Sir Arthur Froom.
Sir Zulfiqar Ali Khan.
Dr. A. Suhrawardy.

Against the motion :—

Sir Sankaran Nair.
Sir H. S. Gour.
S. B. Uberoi.

This tie created an awkward situation for the Hindu members, but the chairman, Sir Sankaran Nair, used his casting vote, i.e., he used his vote twice and thus defeated the Moslems ; in fact the Hindus destroyed the very principle which they had established.

The manifestation of this malevolent spirit is but a symptom of what might happen if the safeguards provided for the minorities are abolished.

No wise man under these circumstances would think of abandoning the safe course which has been so far followed. It is undeniable that it removes all chances of clash and gives the minorities that sense of security which is so essential for the peace of a vast country with her diversified nationalities and her racial and religious differences.

In very truth there are no signs of the advent of that unity which is the first essential to the creation of a modern state.

If no arbitrary methods are adopted to force an unwilling people to accept a principle which they consider fatal to their very existence in India, and if the adoption of such principles is left entirely to their own choice and determination, all may reasonably hope that ultimately a workable corporation between Hindus and Moslems may give a chance for the re-establishment of inter-communal peace, and the convalescent Indian world may swiftly regain health.

The rights and claims of the Moslems to a careful study of their special interests and legitimate sentiments are sacred. The fruits of reasons and the benefits of justice must not be denied to them.

It is necessary that before the national life as a whole can work out a basis of self-consistency and harmony, these constituents problems will have to find their own solution.

WEIGHTAGE IN THE LEGISLATIVE BODIES FOR THE MOSLEMS.

On the occasion of the second Reading of the Bill in the House of Lords, the Secretary of State, Lord Morley, said—
 "The Moslems demand three things. I had the pleasure of receiving a deputation from them and I know very well what is in their minds. They demand an election of their own representatives to these Councils in all the stages just as in Cyprus, where I think Moslems vote by themselves. They have nine votes and the non-Moslems have three or the other way about ; so in Bohemia where the Germans vote alone and have their own register. Therefore we are not without a precedent and a parallel for the idea of a separate register. Secondly, they want a number of seats in excess of their numerical strength. These two demands we are quite ready and intend to meet in full."

Lord Morley than whom there has been no greater Statesman and Scholar, and a staunch Liberal during and after the Victorian era, felt compelled to recognise the justice of the Moslem case. He saw the imperative necessity of saving a Community from the onslaught of a majority which desired selfishly to satisfy its own lust of power irrespective of the claims of others.

An important Community which for eight hundred years had been the supreme rulers of India and which but for the withdrawal of Ahmed Shah Abdali after Panipat would again have regained paramount power in this country could by no magnanimous people be reduced to the status of serfs and dependents of noisy pen drivers. The Moslems are no doubt in a minority in this country, but their collective total of population is so great that no single country of the size of India has such a large number of people. It is more than a single nation of any country in the world. It belongs to a religion which has world wide prestige and which still has voice in the determination of world history, and we venture to say that if the British were to withdraw from India the Moslems would soon reassert their authority.

If the Moslems are given weightage only in those provinces in which their population falls short of 20 per cent., it would not reduce the overwhelming majority of the Hindus to any appreciable degree, and by way of reciprocity the Moslems would be prepared to concede to the Hindus the same privilege which

they demand for themselves, *i.e.*, weightage where their population is below 20 per cent. for example in N. W. F. Province, and Baluchistan. Lord Minto in his reply to the Moslem deputation admitted the undeniable political and historical importance of the Moslems, "And you justly claim that your position should be estimated not only on your numerical strength but in respect to the political importance of your Community and the service it has rendered to the Empire. I am entirely in accord with you."

Summing up their conclusions with regard to the representation of the Moslem Community and the necessary weightage to be given to it, the Government of India said—

"(4) Though a majority can always impose its will upon a minority, the effectiveness of a minority depends upon its being large enough to have the sense of not being entirely overwhelmed."

The Moslems in every province number by millions except in Central Provinces and Burma where they are only about half a million in either case. No sensible man would place these millions of human beings in a position of utter insignificance. Apart from the justice of the claim the Moslems will show their sense of fairness by meeting the Hindu demands to the same extent in their majority provinces by way of reciprocity.

It must be clearly understood that the Hindus do not require any weightage in the Punjab and Bengal, because their numbers in these two Provinces are almost on a parity with those of the Moslems. The Hindus in these places neither need, nor can the Moslems afford to give them any weightage there.

The Moslems in the Punjab constitute 56 per cent. of the entire population and in Bengal about 54 per cent., in both cases the margin is so narrow that it would be extremely risky for the Moslem majority to yield any ground, and it would be unreasonable on the part of the Hindus to ask for any addition to their numbers. Any effort to extort any seats from the Moslems would be a deliberate attempt to create Hindu majority even in the Punjab. The Moslems by their demand do not reduce the Hindu majority to minority and not even to equality.

The majority Report of the Punjab Committee has treated the Moslem Community with great injustice. They have reduced their majority to a single vote, *i.e.*, instead of 56 per cent. they want 51 per cent. representation in the Legislative Council, and the same ratio will probably be allowed in the local bodies. The Moslem Press and the Moslem organisations, have angrily repudiated this proposal. We desire to know if the Hindus would accept the position of their majority in any province being reduced to a single vote. We vehemently oppose this idea and strongly support the demand that full Moslem share of representation in the Legislative Council, as well as in the local bodies should be conceded to them.

MOSLEM REPRESENTATION IN THE PROVINCIAL CABINETS.

The adverse winds of communal bitterness and conflict compel us to strongly press the desirability of Moslem representation in the Cabinets of the various provinces. As we have advocated provincial autonomy and the abolition of dyarchy therefore the Governments of these provinces will be composed entirely of Indians who will be the elected Members of the Councils. In most of the provinces the Moslems are the minority Community, and even with the excess seats given by way of weightage they cannot wield such an influence as to harass the majority Community.

We consider that the inclusion of a Moslem Minister in the Cabinet is essential, for the simple reason that the population of Moslems in every province spreads over millions ; wise and far-seeing statesmanship would realise that these millions of people, which in any country in Europe would have great deference, nay, even respect paid to their wishes, must not be neglected and crushed by the insensate bigotry of the majority Community.

We have no hope that the confidence which we may place in the honesty and public spirit of the majority Community will at all be justified. The evidence given by the Moslems in all the provinces strongly urge that the Cabinets should comprise the representatives of their people. In fact, under the present arrangement the Governments of practically all the provinces have Moslem Ministers and members. There is great apprehension in our minds that if things are left to the discretion of the Chief Minister who would inevitably be a Hindu in most of the autonomous Governments the Moslems will have nothing to expect especially when the constitution does not provide for it. It may be said that this would be a constitutional dereliction or anomaly, but the most cogent reason against this assumption always is that India's case is unique, to which there is no parallel in the world, and therefore the special merits of this case call for special treatment. No flight of imagination can deem it possible that Westminster model will fit in the special conditions of India, and some device has to be thought of for meeting the situation. Once it is realised that millions of people cannot be left to the tender mercies of the revengeful rival Community, then the panacea can be discovered.

The supreme ideal to be constantly kept in view is the smooth and harmonious progress pursued in a spirit of mutual goodwill and devotion to common heritage. This, in our opinion, is only possible when the various elements of the population feel the urge of common interest, and common interests cannot appeal to those who are weak and are oppressed by the strong.

Those who will deal our Report will, we feel sure, be interested to know how the Hindu mind works in obedience to preconceived policy. In the meetings of the Indian Central Committee we proposed that in the Cabinet of the autonomous

Madras Presidency, Moslem representation must be included, and although we appealed to the Hindu members from various points of view of expediency, present practice and the dictates of astute statesmanship which would carry a dynamic minority with it, but our cry failed to secure a sympathetic response. The argument which they advanced against us was that they did not want Communal Cabinets, but the Chairman, Sir Sankaran Nair, conveniently forgot that he had included the following provisions in his own proposals for the autonomous Punjab :—

4. "The Cabinet shall consist of one Moslem, one Hindu and one Sikh Minister."

5. "The Governor shall nominate each Minister separately from the elected members of the Legislative Council. He may also nominate a fourth Minister as a Member of the Cabinet, not on Communal grounds, but for his special qualification. The fourth member shall be a Sikh or a Christian, an official or non-official."

6. "It shall be open to the Governor to assign the administration of the Magisterial and Police Departments to any Minister, except to a Moslem or a Hindu. The allotment of all other subjects shall be determined by the Cabinet."

At the Meeting, however, he moved the following resolution :—

"That the Cabinet should consist of one Moslem, one Hindu and one Sikh Minister, and also a fourth Minister, who shall be appointed not on Communal grounds, but for his special qualifications, and who would be neither a Hindu nor a Moslem, but who may be an official or a non-official."

This resolution fell through because Sir H. S. Gour's amendment was carried, but his numbers 4, 5, 6, are an epitome of his deep seated and innermost antipathy. We have stated above that he and his Hindu colleagues flatly refused to entertain our proposal for including a Moslem Minister in the Cabinets of the various provinces, obviously with the idea of inaugurating a purely Hindu Swaraj which would deal with millions of Moslems in every province in strict adherence to the preconceived and comprehensible plan of either reducing the Moslems to absolute slavery, or wiping them out altogether.

When he did not want any Communal Cabinets and left it entirely to the majority leader in the Council to form his Cabinet, why did he lay down another and contradictory law for the province in which the Moslems were in a majority and in which they had a chance of forming their own Cabinet according to the principle enunciated by him. There can only be one conclusion and no other, that he does not want even democratic laws to be observed in the case of the Moslems for the fear that by virtue of it the Moslems will enjoy the rights of majority. According to his scheme in the Cabinet of the Punjab province there would be one Moslem, one Hindu and one Sikh Minister, and the fourth

would be preferably a Sikh. Thus out of four Ministers there will be only one Moslem, who would naturally be a dependent of the three Hindu and Sikh Ministers and that in a province in which the Moslems are in a majority, the Moslems being 56 per cent. of the total population of the province.

It is not only a denial of their right, but by a combination of force and fraud the Moslems are to be destroyed root and branch. Apart from it the portfolio of Law and Order is not to be in charge of either a Moslem or Hindu Minister, but he does not include Sikh Minister in this category evidently hoping that it will go either to the third or fourth Minister, who would both be Sikhs. In this way the real power will be in the hands of the Hindus, who will be able to break the Moslem strength in a province which is Moslem par excellence.

We hope that we have made it clear that both reason and necessity demand that in view of the Hindu attitude, which is undeniably subversive and malignant, the inclusion of Moslem representation in the Cabinet should be guaranteed by the new Constitution.

We cannot repeat too often that in the face of such a menace to their existence as a Community, the Moslems can have no peaceful and progressive life in their country and it is this keen sense of insecurity and injustice which make some pensively to weigh the advantages of efficient dictatorship against the galling asperities of the so-called democracy.

In such a situation sentimental illusions will not avail.

Seventy millions of Moslems insist upon their rights and interests to be precisely defined and guaranteed and their Government insured to them in the provinces in which they are in a majority. They are as patriotic as the Hindus, in fact they have made more sacrifices to widen the boundaries of India's liberties than the Hindus, but they desire to be perfectly clear on this point that they do not want to be exterminated by Hindu Swarajists, who would be dominant all over India and even in the provinces in which they are in a minority.

India is the birthplace of all Communities, and these must find scope for the development of their own genius on their own lines and contribute to the amenities of political life by their unaided effort and converge in one possible point till in the process of time, corporate and political and social life is possible. Do not Ireland and Cyprus find life's possibilities greater now than when there was no clear definition of the separate rights of the various elements of the population ?

The longer a solution on these lines is delayed, the greater will be the danger of Communal conflicts and bloodshed. It is an open secret that India is divided into two armed camps and any violent method forcing an unwilling people to submit to conditions against which its very soul revolts, will ignite a fire which would be extremely difficult to extinguish ; but even if it is

put down by the heavy hand of the Military, can any calculation be made of the terrible havoc in life and property which it would necessarily involve. We venture to utter these warnings with the full sense of responsibility, and our duty towards our Country ends here.

SEPARATION OF SIND FROM BOMBAY.

The demand for the separation of Sind from Bombay has been insisted upon for a long time.

From all points of view political, religious, linguistic and racial, the expediency appeals to those who seek practical solutions for intricate problems. The conditions calling for a separate unit exist in almost ideal form there.

It has a homogeneous population ; from religious and racial standpoints there is no other province in India which is so free of impediments in the way of carving it out as a self-contained area. The population of the Moslems is overwhelming, and the Hindu element is only nominal. But this great population of the Moslems is kept down by the dwarfing influence of the Hindu masses in the Bombay Presidency, who deliberately adopt every means to repress the Moslem aspirations for self-expression. The Moslem masses realising their helpless condition in the face of Hindu capitalists who carry on a systematic policy of exploiting and dispossessing them of their lands, see no other way of emancipating themselves from the clutches of these people except by raising a distressing cry for separation. In fact if separation does not come soon the plight of the Moslems would indeed be pitiable. The authors of the Montague-Chelmsford Report raise no difficulties in the way of remodelling provinces and territories. " But we are bound to indicate " they observe " our own clear opinion that wherever such redistributions are necessary and can be effected by process of consent the attempt to do so should be made."

The consent of the vastly superior number of Moslems is not required as they demand it knowing that their prosperity and self-government cannot come unless they burst the chains which strangle their life.

The Hindu numbers are so insignificant that their acquiescence is hardly needed. It would be like asking the Germans in Poland whether they would object to the creation of an independent Polish State. The Moslem population of that province suffers from all the evils, inseparable from the conditions of a minority Community, whereas by virtue of their numbers and wealth they are entitled to form their own Government.

The Bombay Government raise no serious objection to its separation, they only feel doubtful of the success on the score of finances.

This difficulty however is bound to disappear in course of time. The great productive Sukkur barrage is calculated to pour money into the coffers of the Sind Government, and the cost of new administration will be met out of the enhanced revenues. Pun-

jab's wealth is due to its irrigational schemes, and we think similar conditions are in store for Sind.

The All-India Moslem Conference held at Delhi passed an unanimous resolution in favour of its separation. Even if for a short time a part of the expenditure is met out of the Government of India revenues, it would create no new precedent. Burma was fed for a long time out of the Indian revenues. We strongly urge the Government to constitute Sind a separate province and grant it a constitution. From the political point of view it is most desirable that Sind should have an autonomous status. If Sind, Punjab, Bengal, North-West Frontier Province, and Baluchistan have their own Governments which would necessarily be Moslem in character, with the rest of the Indian provinces having Hindu Governments, it will create a balance of power in India which is highly desirable.

This rearrangement of political power is elaculated to bring peace to the country because inter-Communal relations will become more harmonious and stable, and reciprocal regard for the welfare of their own nationals in the two divisions will stay the hands of those political firebrands who by their unbridled behaviour poison the fount of inter-Communal amity. Either part will be anxious to inspire confidence in the mind of the other by treating its co-religionists with justice and fair play.

In fact this arrangement is far better than the scheme of joint electorates which according to Hindu sophistry are supposed to bring unity to the Communities, but which we are bold to say will bring nothing but unhappiness.

We urge that this avenue of peace may be thoroughly explored.

REFORMS FOR THE N. W. FRONTIER PROVINCE AND BALUCHISTAN.

The famous announcement made on 20th August, 1917, in the House of Commons embraced the whole of the Indian Empire from Karachi to the borders of China in Burma and from Alimasjid on the borders of Afghanistan to Cape Comorin. It did not exclude any province from the fertilising rain of reforms which it brought and made no invidious distinction between province and province. All were equally treated, only Burma and N. W. Frontier Province were for the time being left out of the operation of the Act of 1919. Concerning Burma, the distinguished authors said in the report:—"Whenever proposals are published there will be an opportunity for the Government and people of Burma to say how far they regard them as applicable to their case. We therefore set aside the problem of Burma's political evolution for separate and future consideration." And with regard to the N. W. Frontier Province and Baluchistan they said, "For reasons of strategy the two frontier provinces must remain entirely in the hands of the Government of India. But inasmuch as our guiding principle, where the principle of responsibility cannot yet be applied, is that Government by consultation with the representatives of the

people, we think that in some if not all of these areas it would be well to associate with the personal administration of the Chief Commissioner some form of advisory council, adjusted in composition and function to local conditions in each case. This question we would leave to the further consideration of the Government of India."

Soon after the promulgation of the reforms according to the Government of India Act, 1919, the Burman people seeing that their fate was still hanging in the balance set up a violent agitation as a result of which they were granted a full-fledged constitution as in the other provinces of India and the agitation died down and normal conditions were restored to this distracted province. The N. W. Frontier Province living under the iron heel of the Frontier Regulations could not raise its voice to the same extent as Burma did, but there were audible mutterings of thunder which seemed ominous. The Government of India appointed the Bray Committee to enquire and report as to the application of reforms to this province. The Committee made a thorough investigation. They proposed that there should be a council with an elective majority, a minister and a member. The minority to be protected. The Province they proposed should continue to remain under the Government of India. These proposals have ever since remained in a state of suspended animation or rather they never were vivified. When we visited the Province in November, 1928, we had the advantage of knowing the views of the people there. Our definite conclusions after taking the evidence were that this Province should get the benefit of reforms just as the other parts of India did and that any further delay in granting them to it would lead to great discontent and agitation.

An old Afridi chief who entertained the Commission at tea at Jamrud addressing Sir John Simon, said, "You are going to give reforms to India, you must not forget us for we also want them. The fact must not be lost sight of that the peace of India depends on our attitude." There were several influential deputations whose members spoke in a highly earnest manner, angrily demanding reforms. The Khans no doubt opposed the idea of the introduction of reform into this province. But in these days it is mostly the voice of the people which carries weight. That the soul of the Frontier people is aflame no one doubts. Burma, on the Chinese Frontier, they know has got a full dose of constitutional reforms and he gets restive and smarts under the implied denial to him of the same privilege. The Islamia College at Peshawar is sending out every year scores of well trained and educated young men full of life and aspirations, and these youthful and ambitious men finding no opportunities for their exuberant energies get suspicious of the motives of the British Government and swell the ranks of the discontented as in other provinces. The people of the N. W. Frontier Province are a virile and manly race and they have as much right to

enjoy the blessings of civilisation as any one else in India. The Government has remained immovable long enough, and more delay in meeting the desires of the people will produce dangerous moods, the responsibility for which will entirely rest with the Government.

The conflict of intellect and the success of diplomacy in Central Asia and in the countries bordering on the Indian frontier depends largely on the preference which these people will give to the British or to the Russians, and therefore the British Government should give close attention to the psychology of these people and the spirit of the age. The satisfied people of the N. W. Frontier Province will help in the spread of pro-British mental contagion in the regions where British and Russian influences struggle for supremacy. Apart from these considerations it is always a sound policy and one which morality strongly sanctions that no unfair discrimination is made between these people and the rest of India.

The question of finance obtrudes itself on our attention in this Province also. We think that the obvious duty which the frontier men perform should entitle them to the gratitude of India. A sum of 18 lakhs used to be paid to the Amirs of Kabul as subsidy before the independence of Afghanistan was recognised. Cannot that amount be allocated to the Provincial administration for meeting the enhanced expenditure? In any case the growing revenues of the Central Government as Mr. Layton forecasts will prove sufficient to meet the demand. It cannot be forgotten that the Frontier Enquiry Committee have strongly recommended the extension of reforms to this province and the Indian Legislative Assembly passed a resolution in favour of it at Delhi in 1928 after a sensational speech by the late Lala Lajpat Rai in which he explained that the Hindu members gave their whole-hearted support to the grant of reforms to the Frontier Province. He further stated that Government often sought shelter behind the idea that the Hindus opposed the reform movement and therefore as a neutral and impartial Government they could not think of favouring the Moslems at the expense of the Hindus. But now as the Hindu representatives of all India supported the reforms the Government had no excuse left for refusing the demand of the Moslems. He said he was sure that even under these circumstances when the Hindu attitude is no longer ambiguous the British Government will still avoid the issue and deny the right of the frontier people to the reforms.

We think that after this speech the Government have no alternative but to close this controversy and prepare a liberal scheme of reforms for the N. W. Frontier Province. We think, however, that the people there are not yet ready to receive the brand new constitution which we are devising for the rest of India, but we strongly advise Government to give the Province the benefit of the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms.

SERVICES.

Modern education imparted in Indian schools and colleges has awakened the soul of the young men and has given them a new sense of self-esteem. In recent years the speed of education has been so accelerated that the output is far in excess of actual demand for recruitment in public services. In India the object with which the parents give education to their children is primarily for the purpose of securing posts in Government service. Lack of factories and industries where a large surplus of educated young men could find employment has thrown the entire weight of educated men on the shoulders of Government officials. It is quite clear that government offices can by no means absorb an unlimited number of young Indians, and when these educated seekers of jobs fail to get employment their disappointment exceeds all bounds. A great part of the agitation against Government is due to this. But education cannot be restricted and therefore avenues for accommodating the young sons of India must be explored.

Education, capacity and efficiency must have their reward in power in India as elsewhere. But unfortunately the communal poison destroys all sense of fairness and goodwill, and therefore the minorities in India clamour against the monopoly of the services by the majority community. Complaints which are constantly made to the heads of departments bring no relief, as those who occupy the citadel prevent the newcomers from entering it. In most of the departments of Government jobbery and open bias are rife. If this state of affairs continues there will be no amelioration in the condition of the minority communities. An impartial authority examining the list of employees in most of the departments of Government including the High Commissioner's office in London will find that it is the majority community which enjoys the loaves and fishes of the services. That this unfairness must cease is the desire of all who wish to do justice to the minorities.

The British civil servants have established a high standard of honesty and efficiency and India has every reason to be grateful to this devoted band of zealous workers. Every department is thoroughly organised and regularity and despatch in business are scrupulously maintained. The association of Indians with such men has given them a high sense of honour and responsibility. In the meetings of the Indian Central Committee efforts were made by the Hindu majority to make the services a preserve of their own young men, by means of provincialising the all-India services. They hope that as in almost all the provinces it would be the Hindu Swaraj, therefore it can impose its will effectively to exclude young men of minority communities from these provincialised services. We however strenuously fought for the cause of the minorities and got the words "adequate and effective representation of minorities" inserted in the resolution.

We are, however, afraid that the majority community will appropriate most of the judicial and executive posts and will thus greatly harass the minorities. On the occasion of communal fights if most of the officials are Hindus the Moslem and other minorities can expect no justice. We therefore think that till the Hindus and Moslems compose their differences the neutral element must remain to deal out equal justice to all. On occasions of Communal riots both Hindus and Moslems have earnestly demanded that British Police Officers should be appointed to investigate the cases and that British Magistrates only should be allowed to try the accused, and therefore the retention of the neutral element in such services is necessary.

The Lee Commission Report prepared a workable scheme, but in view of the insistent demand of the Indian public we would recommend that the Indianisation of the Service should be hastened.

✓ We propose that in every province there should be a public service commission which would regulate recruitment. We further recommend that one-third of the available vacancies should be filled by nomination in order to redress communal inequalities. ✓

CENTRAL GOVERNMENT.

Having conceded practically full autonomy to the provinces with the authority to run their own administrations without the uncalled for interference by the Central Government, there remains the most important work of constructing the Central Government itself which would keep India united, and prevent it from relapsing into confusion and chaos. The past history of India first during the purely Hindu period and later during the Moslems domination lasting for nearly eight hundred years, in the frequent changes of dynasties except when the Moghuls ruled the country, brings into prominence one unmistakable phenomenon that whether it was Hindu or Moslem ascendancy the weakening of the Central authority always brought into existence a congeries of states antagonistic and at feud with one another, with the inevitable results that revolutions brought with them, wars, bloodshed, dishonouring of women and destruction of families and property. After the happy and unique consolidation of India in the recent times under the auspices of the British Government it would be calamitous for all concerned except for those who have nothing to lose if the solid and material results of two centuries of incessant labour are destroyed in a veritable reign of terror such as was witnessed during the Maharatta period and before that when a change of dynasty came about by violent methods. It is the duty of all patriotic Indians to prevent a recurrence of these horrors, else our condition in India would be similar to China and Afghanistan in these days. It is not a very simple method to govern a continent and keep its peace, and unless there is stability and strength in

the central government the whole fabric of administration may crumble down. Afghanistan and China are experiencing terror without end, and the progress which had been made lately in Afghanistan has been wiped out only because the controlling hand in the capital became paralysed.

The United States of America, much larger in area than India, and with such an elaborate system of democracy, has the wisdom to realise the imperative necessity of investing the Central Government with extraordinary powers of control over the States comprised in the Commonwealth. It bristles with vetoes and limitations and yet the citizens of America do not look upon them as undemocratic.

If on account of communal differences or some other cause the autonomous Government in a province of India fails to function then who is to come to its rescue? In fact, in a country like India, with all the differences of race, language and religion and with the bitterest hatred against each other pervading the whole country, neither can the country be kept together nor the peace and progress of the minorities be guaranteed without effectually maintaining the authority of the Government of India. Even in the interests of provincial autonomy it is advisable to prevent the chances of deadlock and to diminish the potentialities for mischief of the majorities, that we may voluntarily and with one accord set up a strong Government in the centre to which all can look for protection and justice. Only in this way, we think, can the continuity of provincial autonomy and of safeguarding the essentials of future progress be possible. While preserving the functions of the Government of India as they are, we propose changes in its structure.

At present the Governor General's Executive Council consists of six members, and we have reason to believe that these members control huge departments and find no time to take part in the multifarious activities of the country and to remove those asperities which are inseparable from the life of rigid isolation. These members themselves complain that they are overworked. We therefore propose both in the interests of greater efficiency and quicker despatch of urgent business that the number of these members be raised to ten, out of these five should be Indians, three Hindus and two Moslems. The selection of these men should rest entirely with the Governor General. It would, in our opinion, be expedient if the Governor General make the selection from the elected members of the Central Legislatures, but if men of requisite ability and number are not available there then he may go outside this limit.

PROVINCIAL AUTONOMY.

The long consecrated phrase "The moral and material progress of India" affords indisputable evidence of the strenuous labour of the administrators of India on the one hand and the rise of the people in the higher spheres of national life on the

other. Neither the foreigner nor the Indian now looks upon this vast country as an eternal nursery. In fact the notion derived from the intensity of political life impresses even the superficial observer with the idea of a rapidly advancing and developing India. The Indian Universities are producing in daily increasing numbers orators, politicians, business men and journalists, who are conscious of their needs and have voices to give expression to them in a most effective way. Close contact with Europe and the literature of the West has sharpened wits and brought a whole world of new aspirations within the Indian's vision. It is only too natural that this awakening should bring with it new needs and wants which necessarily are in conflict with the existing situation, but astute statesmanship points to the imperative necessity of meeting the insistent call of the Indians for greater liberties in a spirit of sympathetic and liberal response. Any evasive policy is sure to wound vanity and become an accumulating source of irritation and discontent.

So far as human prescience goes the desirability of India and Great Britain cementing the foundations of their mutual confidence and friendliness is undeniable, and this is only possible if the British statesmen continue, perhaps in ever increasing measure, their effort to unfold before the eyes of the Indians a wider vista of constitutional reform and national liberties. The East is no longer unchanging, in fact the ambition of the Eastern nations to reach the stage of European evolution in the shortest time possible is most amazing. Indians look round and see neighbouring nations engaged in organising their national affairs without much extraneous aid. India, it is true, is peculiarly situated and her circumstances have no precedent in recorded history, and therefore her march towards the goal of her ambition must be supported by some strong and protecting agency. Egypt has got her independence and Iraq is promised a similar destiny in a short time.

We have not the least doubt that if Indian unity comes and intercommunal confidence is restored, England would put India on the same pedestal as the other constituent parts of her Empire, but thinking Indians themselves do not consider that in the present state of intercommunal hatred and antagonism it would be quite safe to exclude the one authority which would be strong enough to separate the fighting nations in India. But whatever reasons there may be for apprehending disaster, if the strong but friendly hand is removed, there is no denying the fact that both Hindus and Moslems have set their hearts on bringing the country into line with modern progress.

In our opinion British statesmen must satisfy this demand, and the best way to inaugurate self-Government is to instal responsible Government in the provinces. Speaking of autonomy in the provinces of India, Montagu-Chelmsford Report says : " The provinces are the domain in which the earlier steps towards the progressive realisation of responsible Government should be

taken. Some measure of responsibility should be given at once, and our aim is to give complete responsibility as soon as conditions permit. This involves at once giving the provinces the largest measure of independence, legislative, administrative and financial, of the Government of India, which is compatible with the due discharge by the latter of its own responsibility."

In accordance with the spirit of the above opinion and also in response to the clear enunciation of policy by most of the provincial Governments, especially when dyarchy disappears, the provinces of India should have autonomous Governments. The provincial committees are also practically unanimous on this point. We therefore strongly recommend that complete responsible Government should be conceded to the provinces. One thing which we most strenuously advocate and emphasise is that the Moslems must not be deprived of the right of forming their own Governments in their majority provinces. Moslems in Bengal, Punjab, North-West Frontier Province and Sind, have every right to run the administration in these provinces. No principles of democracy statesmanship and justice can deprive them of this privilege. The Moslems, we are certain, will manifest public spirit and practical good sense and wisdom by satisfying the claims of the minority communities, but they will under no circumstances consent to be reduced to minority or even to equality in these provinces. India's peace and progress can only be ensured if the just and legitimate claims of the Moslems are vindicated. The Moslems cannot tolerate two principles being applied to them. Wherever they are in a minority they will accept the majority claim to constitute its own Government, and wherever they (Moslems) are in a majority, they must similarly enjoy this democratic right. Any failure to scrupulously adhere to this democratic principle will not only be extremely invidious, but will destroy that sense of trust in the justice and impartiality of the British people which has established their great prestige among the nations of the world.

SECRETARY OF STATE'S COUNCIL.

In view of the enormous change in the administrative machinery of the provincial Governments and the consequent reduction of control of the Central Government over the principles and details of the autonomous Governments of these provinces, it is evident that the Government of India would in their turn be freed from that close and constant interference which the Secretary of State and his council now exercise.

The work at the India Office will ostensibly decrease both in quality and quantity. The Secretary of State's Council consists of eleven members, who according to their evidence given before the joint and free conference, are by no means overworked, in fact the want of sufficient work is seriously felt by all. There is no doubt that the British Parliament will remain the supreme authority and arbiter in matters concerning India, but there will

henceforth be fewer opportunities of intervention in the affairs of that country by the Parliament.

It therefore follows that the Secretary of State's Council, which is admittedly an unwieldy body, should be greatly decreased in its personnel. We think that the future Council should consist only of four members with the Secretary of State as the fifth and President of the Council. Out of the four members there should be two Indians, one Hindu and one Moslem. We want this small Council with equal numbers of European and Indian members for the reason that important matters will still be dealt with by it and a more or less impartial and neutral body is essential for giving right decisions. Provincial Governments under the new Constitutions will be controlled by capable and energetic Indians, and we hope that the strong claims of patriotism will compel them to realise the necessity of running the administration in the interests of all, and that communal bias will neither vitiate the intercommunal relations which are bitter enough already, nor pollute the comparative purity of the administration which they will take over. But we cannot yet say how the minorities in India will be treated by the majority community which so far has failed to inspire trust and confidence in their minds.

The future alone will show whether the safeguards which we think are essential at present are needed or not ; and therefore we recommend that in order to give the minorities a sense of security and continuous progress, an impartial authority may still remain in an atmosphere free from local influence and intrigue, and meet the exigencies of the situation in India with the strictest sense of justice.

We desire to disassociate ourselves entirely from the remarks made in paragraphs 3 and 8 and elsewhere in the Report of the Committee with regard to the boycott of the Indian Statutory Commission and its effect on the Joint Free Conference.

ZULFIQAR ALI KHAN,

A. SUHRAWARDY.

London,

7th October, 1929.

I may add a supplementary note.

A. SUHRAWARDY.

MEMORANDUM BY SIR HARI SINGH GOUR, K.T., M.L.A.

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

Foreword	Pages. 216
CHAPTER I.	
General Introduction (§§ 3-64)	217-241
The Problem stated (§§ 65-70)	242-243
CHAPTER II.	
REVIEW OF THE PUBLISHED SCHEMES.	
I. All Parties Scheme (§§ 71-81)	244-248
II. Extreme Moslem Demand (§§ 82-114)	248-262
III. Protection of the Minorities (§§ 115-130)	262-271
IV. The Depressed Classes (§§ 131-139)	271-274
CHAPTER III.	
REVIEW OF EDUCATION AND LOCAL BODIES.	
I. The Growth of Education (§§ 140-152)	275-280
II. The Development of self-governing institutions (§§ 153-158)	280-283
CHAPTER IV.	
THE SECRETARY OF STATE IN COUNCIL.	
I. The Secretary of State (§§ 159-164)	284-287
II. The India Council (§§ 165-175)	287-292
III. High Commissioner's Powers (§§ 176-178)	292-293
IV. Public Services (§§ 179-203)	293-306
CHAPTER V.	
THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.	
I. The Legislative Assembly (§§ 204-213)	307-310
II. The Second Chamber (§§ 214-222)	311-315
III. The Indian States (§§ 223-244)	316-326
IV. A Privy Council for India (§§ 245-253)	326-329
V. Supreme Court for India (§§ 254-264)	329-334
VI. The High Courts (§§ 265-269)	334-335
VII. The Army in India (§§ 270-285)	336-344
CHAPTER VI.	
PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS.	
Reforms recommended (§§ 286-289)	345-346
CHAPTER VII.	
OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS.	
I. Finality of the Constitution (§§ 290-292)	347-348
II. The Separation of Burma (§§ 293-311)	348-353
III. Reforms in the North Western Frontier Province (§§ 312-316)	353-355
CHAPTER VIII.	
Concluding remarks (§§ 317-319)	356
CHAPTER IX.	
SIR HARI SINGH GOUR'S NOTES OF DISSENT.	
I. Fundamental Rights (§§ 320-322)	357-358
II. The Separation of Sind (§§ 323-330)	358-361
III. A Second Chamber for the United Provinces (§§ 331-334)	361-362
V. The Reservation of Law and Order in Bengal (§§ 335-338)	362-363
V. The All-India Services in Madras (§ 339)	364

EXPLANATORY REPORT.

FOREWORD.

1. In drawing up this note I wish to make my position at the outset clear. All the points recommended by our Committee have been the subject of detailed discussion at our meetings which lasted for several months. They were settled in a series of resolutions which (with a few exceptions) were passed at my instance. Those in which I have the misfortune to differ from the majority of my colleagues are separately set out in my minute of dissent. These include :—

- (1) The Separation of Sind.
- (2) The retention of the All-India Services in the Presidency of Madras.
- (3) The establishment of a Second Chamber in the United Provinces.
- (4) The Reservation of Law and Order in the Presidency of Bengal, and
- (5) The Centralization of the permanent settlement therein ; and one or two minor points to which reference has been made in this note.

2. Being thus in general agreement with the majority of my colleagues in the conclusions which they have reached, I feel that the report of the Indian Central Committee should set out in detail the reasons by which these conclusions are supported. I also feel that following the line of other similar constitutional documents the Report must embody a historical retrospect of the constitutional developments in the country and set out in detail the reasons why other schemes had to be rejected and why that recommended commended itself to me and my colleagues who voted for it. I have, therefore, subjoined this explanatory memorandum in support of my recommendations, appending a dissenting note on the few points upon which I happen to differ from the majority of my colleagues.

CHAPTER I.

GENERAL INTRODUCTION.

3. It is provided in section 84A of the Government of India Act, that on the expiry of 10 years from the time of the coming into force of the Government of India Act, 1919 (hereafter to be called the Reforms Act), a Commission should be appointed "for the purposes of this section."

The Indian
Central
Committee—
its constitu-
tion.

"(2) The persons whose names are so submitted, if approved by His Majesty, shall be a commission for the purpose of inquiring into the working of the system of Government, the growth of education, and the development of representative institutions, in British India, and matters connected therewith, and the commission shall report as to whether and to what extent it is desirable to establish the principle of responsible government, or to extend, modify, or restrict the degree of responsible government then existing therein, including the question whether the establishment of second chambers of the local legislatures is or is not desirable.

"(3) The commission shall also inquire into and report on any other matter affecting British India and the provinces, which may be referred to the commission by His Majesty."

4. Accordingly, after a formal amendment of that section legalizing the acceleration of the date for the appointment of a commission, a Statutory Commission was set on foot by a Resolution moved by Lord Birkenhead, the then Secretary of State for India, in the House of Lords on 8th November, 1927. The personnel of the commission, comprising of seven members, was drawn solely from the two Houses of Parliament. In the course of the debate however, it was clearly stated that, as the British Parliament had appointed a Commission of seven members, it was open to the Indian Legislature to appoint a Committee of their own to co-operate with it, and that the two Commissions in co-operation with each other would collect materials for the drawing up of a report to be submitted to their respective appointing authorities, which should form the basis of further action by the British Parliament in accordance with the provisions of the Reforms Act.

Lord
Birkenhead's
views on the
inquiry.

5. Accordingly, in February, 1920, Sir Basil Blackett, then Leader of the Legislative Assembly, moved a resolution inviting that body to concur in the procedure for the appointment of its own members by election to co-operate with the Statutory Commission. The Resolution was, however, thrown out by a narrow majority on the ground that it was wholly opposed to the constitution and scheme of the Statutory Commission. A similar motion in the Council of State was, however, passed with the

Indian
Response.

result that on August 17, 1928, it elected three of its members as its *quota* of the Indian Committee to be set up in accordance with the intention of the Secretary of State as expressed in his speech in the House of Lords to which reference has already been made.

6. But as the Legislative Assembly had already thrown out a similar motion, His Excellency the Viceroy proceeded to complete the Committee by nominating five members to which another member of the Council of State was added. The personnel of the Indian Central Committee was thus completed partially by election and partially by nomination by the Viceroy.

7. There remained the question of its relation to the Royal Commission. Eliminating for the present the various stages through which it passed, its powers and functions were defined by Sir John Simon on the one hand, and His Excellency the Viceroy on the other; the correspondence between the two finally culminating in giving the Indian Central Committee co-ordinate jurisdiction in so far as the two became merged in a Joint Free Conference, a term which has been throughout applied to the English and Indian members acting in concert, while taking evidence both in India and in England. At the same time, the individualities of both the Commission and the Committee remained unimpaired, and the Committee continued to function as an independent body co-operating with the Royal Commission under the presidency of Sir John Simon. On the conclusion of its labours it was said that the Indian Central Committee was free to deliberate apart from the Royal Commission and to draw up its own report, which would be printed as an appendix to the Report of the Royal Commission.

Indian
Central
Committee
deliberation
independent
of the Royal
Commission.

8. The independence of the Indian Central Committee becomes thus clear : as it was to deliberate independently of the Royal Commission, formulate its own views and to draw up its own Report. In accordance with this procedure settled between the two wings of the Joint Free Conference, and indeed, some time before the procedure had been actually settled, the members of the Indian Central Committee held their sittings apart from the Royal Commission, to examine the evidence given by witnesses and the reports received from the Indian and Provincial Governments and Provincial Committees, as also numerous other documents submitted to the Joint Free Conference, which in the opinion of the Committee became germane to its discussions.

Work of the
Provincial
Committees.

9. Following the procedure adopted for elections of members to represent the Central Legislature, all the Provincial Councils instituted by the Reforms Act of 1919, were invited to elect their own representatives. The members so elected constituted the Provincial Committees and sat with the Joint Free Con-

ference in their respective provinces where evidence was taken. They generally reflected the views of their respective provinces and have submitted their reports embodying their own recommendation on the subjects of our inquiry ; while the official view is embodied in the recommendations of the Provincial Governments all of whom (except only the Government of the Central Provinces and Berar), moreover, furnished us with detailed memoranda descriptive of the progress of Reforms in their own Provinces.

10. The procedure followed by the Committee was to take up each Province in its turn, and formulate their views in a series of resolutions, of which a summary is appended to this Report.

These recommendations taken in the aggregate fall into three groups :—

- (a) Those general as applicable to all the provinces ;
- (b) Those special as applicable to some of the provinces ;
- (c) Those applicable to the Government of India.

A fuller reference to them will become necessary in the sequel.

11. In this connection it may be mentioned that the procedure which heralded the Reforms of 1919 was very different from the procedure now adopted. The reforms of that year were preceded by a declaration made on the 20th August, 1917, by Mr. Montagu, then Secretary of State for India, defining the objective of the British Government in India, in pursuance of which he visited India and informally interviewed several officials and non-officials, and drew up a Report to which Lord Chelmsford, then Viceroy of India, became a co-signatory. This Report is dated the 22nd April, 1918, and is popularly known as the Montagu-Chelmsford Report ; it will be referred to in the sequel as the Montagu Report. This Report became the basis for the draft of the Government of India Act which was piloted through the House of Commons by its author. He then pointed out that the pronouncements of 1917, to which reference has already been made, must be treated as a binding pledge to be fulfilled in the near future. To quote his own words :—

“ The pronouncements of the 20th August promise that substantial steps to the introduction of responsible Government should be taken as soon as possible. There is no use for pronouncements that are not fulfilled, there is no use for pronouncements which take geological epochs to fulfil, doubts are already beginning to appear. It is suggested already, unworthily suggested, wickedly suggested, but still suggested—that we made an announcement and declared the intention of His Majesty's Government in order to secure loyalty from the Indian peoples during the War, and that now we have achieved victory we are not going on with our purpose.”

Parliamentary
announcement
of
20th
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Scope of the
Declaration
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- (a) Those general as applicable to all the provinces ;
- (b) Those special as applicable to some of the provinces ;
- (c) Those applicable to the Government of India.

A fuller reference to them will become necessary in the sequel.

11. In this connection it may be mentioned that the procedure which heralded the Reforms of 1919 was very different from the procedure now adopted. The reforms of that year were preceded by a declaration made on the 20th August, 1917, by Mr. Montagu, then Secretary of State for India, defining the objective of the British Government in India, in pursuance of which he visited India and informally interviewed several officials and non-officials, and drew up a Report to which Lord Chelmsford, then Viceroy of India, became a co-signatory. This Report is dated the 22nd April, 1918, and is popularly known as the Montagu-Chelmsford Report ; it will be referred to in the sequel as the Montagu Report. This Report became the basis for the draft of the Government of India Act which was piloted through the House of Commons by its author. He then pointed out that the pronouncements of 1917, to which reference has already been made, must be treated as a binding pledge to be fulfilled in the near future. To quote his own words :—

“ The pronouncements of the 20th August promise that substantial steps to the introduction of responsible Government should be taken as soon as possible. There is no use for pronouncements that are not fulfilled, there is no use for pronouncements which take geological epochs to fulfil, doubts are already beginning to appear. It is suggested already, unworthily suggested, wickedly suggested, but still suggested—that we made an announcement and declared the intention of His Majesty’s Government in order to secure loyalty from the Indian peoples during the War, and that now we have achieved victory we are not going on with our purpose.”

Parliamentary
announcement
of
20th
August,
1917.

Scope of the
Declaration
of the 20th
August,
1917.

It is necessary to recall these weighty words at this juncture because there is a section of people who are inclined to treat the pronouncement as the mere enunciation of an ethical doctrine, the fulfilment of which must lie in the limbo of the future, and that even its partial fulfilment is not justifiable in view of the various circumstances which are mentioned as justifying no further reforms and upon which the greatest emphasis was laid in 1918 as justifying no reforms at all.

12. It is further necessary to recall the words not only of the then Secretary of State who spoke from his place as the official mouthpiece of Government, but also of one of the leaders of the Opposition, who now occupies the position of the Prime Minister of England.

13. When Mr. Montagu introduced his reforms, the country was already in the throes of a boycott organised in India to mark its dissatisfaction with what was in fact called the Fabian tactics of the British Government in making large promises with no intention of fulfilling them. It is to this aspect of Indian conditions that Mr. Montagu referred in the speech from which a quotation has already been made. The practically-minded Indian was not satisfied with the scheme of reforms formulated by Mr. Montagu, which eventually became embodied in the Government of India Act. India was hopeful of a better return for the great service she had rendered in the War, to which generous response was promised; and indeed, some fulfilment made in the fact that India was treated as a co-equal member with the self-governing colonies of the British Commonwealth in being made a co-signatory to the Treaty at Versailles and in her admission to the League of Nations as an independent member of the British Commonwealth. Mr. Montagu gave an assurance on behalf of the Government that the Reforms Act of 1919 was only a first small instalment of larger things to come. He said: "I cannot reiterate too often that the basis of this whole policy is its transitional nature. You might lead on to something else at the earliest possible moment."¹

At a later stage he said:—

"I can say—we can say—as I should like to say with the authority of the House to the people of India, the future and the date upon which you realise the future goal of self-government are with you. You are being given great responsibility to-day, and the opportunities of consultation and influence on other matters in which for the present we keep responsibility. You will find in Parliament every desire to help and to complete the task which this Bill attempts, if you devote yourselves to use with wisdom, with self-restraint, with respect for minorities, the great opportunities with which Parliament is entrusting you."²

¹ Debates, dated 5th June, 1919; Reprint, p. 17, Col. 1. ² *Ib.* pp. 26, 27.

14. It was then contended, as it has been contended since, that whatever may have been the intention of the declaration of Policy of August, 1917, no redemption of the pledge then given is possible unless India is able to defend herself. Referring to this objection Mr. Montagu said :—

“ Do not deny to India self-government because she cannot take her proper share in her own defence, and then deny to her people the opportunity of learning to defend themselves. ”¹

Contention that responsible Government is not possible unless India is able to defend herself.

15. On the passing of the Reforms Act of 1919, two subsidiary Committees were appointed, one known as the Functions Committee, presided over by Mr. R. Feetham from South Africa, and another the Franchise Committee, presided over by Lord Southborough. A meeting of the first Central Legislature took place on the 9th February, 1921, when it was formally opened by H. E. Lord Chelmsford and by H. R. H. the Duke of Connaught, the former of whom passed in review the whole policy of British connection with India. In the first stage culminating with the first Councils Act of 1861, the British Government were, he said, extending and solidifying their Dominions. In the second stage terminating with the Act of 1892, the main achievement of administration was in fact its construction and consolidation. The third stage was ushered in by the Morley-Minto Reforms which gave the enlarged Council larger power of criticism, but left the ultimate decision with the Government. The fourth stage was reached with the announcement of the 20th August, 1917, which recognised that “ British policy must seek a new point of departure, a fresh orientation. On the lines of the Morley-Minto Reforms there could be no further advance. That particular line of development had been carried to the furthest limit of which it admitted, and the only further change of which the system was susceptible would have made the legislative and administrative acts of an irremovable executive entirely amenable to elected Councils, and would have resulted in a disastrous deadlock. The Executive would have remained responsible for the government of the country, but would have lacked the power to secure the measures necessary for the discharge of that responsibility For the first time, the principle of autocracy which had not been wholly discarded in all earlier reforms was definitely abandoned ; the conception of the British Government as a benevolent despotism was finally renounced ; and in its place substituted that of a guiding authority whose role it would be to assist in the steps of India along the road that in the fulness of time would lead to complete self-government within the Empire. ”²

End of Autocracy.

¹ *Ib.* p. 431.

² Assembly Debates, dated 9th February, 1921 ; pp. 11, 12.

16. After His Excellency's speech, H. R. H. the Duke of Connaught read an inspiring message from His Majesty, in which occur the following words :

"For many years, it may be generations, patriotic and loyal Indians have dreamt of Swaraj for their motherland. To-day you have the beginning of Swaraj, within my Empire, and widest scope and ample opportunity for progress to the liberty which my other Dominions enjoy."¹

His Royal Highness himself gave utterance to a few words of his own : "Political freedom has often been won by revolution, by tumult, by civil war, at the price of peace and public safety. How rarely has it been the free gift of one people to another, in response to a growing wish for greater liberty and to growing evidence of fitness for the enjoyment. Such, however, is the position of India to-day" As His Excellency the Viceroy has observed, the principle of autocracy has all been abandoned. Its retention would have been incompatible with that contentment which had been declared by Her late Majesty Queen Victoria to be the aim of British Rule, and would have been inconsistent with the legitimate demands and aspirations of the Indian people and the stage of political development which they have attained."²

demand for a
Round Table
Conference.

17. But in spite of these pronouncements, and, indeed, long before these pronouncements were made, the political leaders in India had already effected a strong boycott of the reform constitution as a protest against its inadequacy. The whole organised campaign had been started mainly to prevent the return of candidates to the Provincial Councils and to the Central Legislature in the hope that the Government would yield to the popular pressure and scrap the constitution and offer some thing worth having. But, in spite of the boycott, both the Central and Provincial Legislatures become potent bodies for the transaction of business, though members thereto returned were not satisfied with the smallness of the reforms given, which were wholly incommensurate with the status and dignity of a great self-respecting country like India, in which for several years a strong agitation had been on foot to establish a visible form of democratic constitution. It will be seen in the sequel how little the British Government has responded to this call for national emancipation. But in spite of inherent defects of the constitution embodied in the Reforms Act of 1921, the co-operating members did whatever was possible, though they never failed to emphasize the inadequacy of the Reforms given and to ask for more. Two resolutions to this effect were successfully passed in the Central Legislature asking for a further advance. The first resolution, moved by Rai Bahadur Jadu Nath Mujumdar, was unanimously passed with the concurrence of Government. It was followed up by a

series of interpellations on what action the British Government had taken upon the insistent demand of the people of India. In July, 1922, Mr. Montagu resigned his post as Secretary of State for India, and he was succeeded by Lord Peel, who penned a dispatch which was intended to be a reply to the Assembly motion. The substance of this dispatch was that the Government of India Act contained within itself sufficient potentialities for expansion without requiring the intervention of Parliament. Acting upon this suggestion, one of us moved another resolution calling upon the Government to make good the promise contained in the Secretary of State's dispatch for the further expansion of the Indian constitution within the ambit of the existing Act. This resolution was carried, though resisted by the Government on the ground that the possibility of further extension of the present constitution within the comprehension of the Act was not possible without overhauling the entire machinery of Government. This attitude of the Government, and its inability to read the handwriting on the wall, raised a storm of opposition throughout the land, which resulted in the sweeping away of all but a few co-operators or semi-co-operators from the Legislative Assembly, while in the provinces themselves ministries rose and fell like a house of cards.

18. The Indian National Congress now took up a firmer attitude of non-co-operation and charged its members to return to the Assembly and local councils in order to exploit the machinery of constitutional obstruction to the farthest limit—to which it was carried in many places including the Assembly. In September, 1925, Pundit Motilal Nehru, who was returned to the Assembly at the head of the Swarajist group numbering 43 members or thereabouts, gave notice of a resolution which has become the war cry of the country ever since. The terms of this resolution are as follows :—

The
Assembly
Debate.

“ THIS Assembly, while confirming and reiterating the demand contained in the resolution passed by it on the 18th February, 1924, recommends to the Governor-General in Council that he be pleased to take immediate steps to move His Majesty's Government to make a declaration in Parliament embodying the following fundamental changes in the present constitutional machinery and administration of India :

(a) The Revenues of India and all property vested in or arising or accruing from property or rights vested in His Majesty under the Government of India Act or received by the Secretary of State in Council under any of the said Acts shall hereafter vest in the Governor-General in Council for the purposes of the Government of India.

(b) The Governor-General in Council shall be responsible to the Indian Legislature, and, subject to

such responsibility, shall have the power to control the expenditure of the Revenues of India, and make such grants and appropriations of any part of those revenues or of any other property as is at present under control or disposal of the Secretary of State for India in Council, save and except the following which shall for a fixed term of years remain under the control of the Secretary of State for India :—

(1) Expenditure of the Military Services up to a fixed limit.

(2) Expenditure classed as political and foreign.

(3) The payment of all debts and liabilities hitherto lawfully contracted and incurred by the Secretary of State for India in Council on account of the Government of India.

(c) The Council of the Secretary of State for India shall be abolished, and the position and functions of the Secretary of State for India shall be assimilated to those of the Secretary of State for the self-governing Dominions, save as otherwise provided for in clause (b).

(d) The Indian Army shall be nationalised within a reasonably short and definite period of time, and Indians shall be admitted for services in all arms of defence, and for that purpose, the Governor-General and the Commander-in-Chief shall be assisted by a Minister responsible to the Assembly.

(e) The Central and Provincial Legislatures shall consist entirely of members elected by constituencies formed on as wide a franchise as possible.

(f) The principle of responsibility to the legislature shall be introduced in all branches of the administration of the Central Government subject to transitional reservations and residuary powers in the Governor-General in respect of the control of Military and Foreign and political affairs for a fixed term of years.

Provided that during the said fixed term the proposals of the Governor-General in Council for the appropriation of any revenue or moneys for military or other expenditure classified as " Defence " shall be submitted to the vote of the Legislature ; but that the Governor-General in Council shall have power, notwithstanding the vote of the Assembly, to appropriate up to a fixed maximum any sum he may consider necessary for such expenditure and in the event of a war to authorise such expenditure as may be considered necessary exceeding the maximum so fixed.

(g) The present system of Dyarchy in the Provinces shall be abolished and replaced by Unitary and Autonomous Responsible Governments subject to the general control and residuary powers of the Central Government in inter-provincial and all-India matters.

(h) The Indian Legislature shall, after the expiry of the fixed term of years referred to in clauses (b) and (f), have full powers to make such amendments in the constitution of India from time to time as may appear to it necessary or desirable.

This Assembly further recommends to the Governor-General in Council that necessary steps be taken :—

(a) to constitute in consultation with the Legislative Assembly a convention, round table conference or other suitable agency adequately representative of all Indian, European and Anglo-Indian interests to frame, with due regard to the interests of minorities, a detailed scheme based on the above principles, after making such inquiry as may be necessary in this behalf ;

(b) to place the said scheme for approval before the Legislative Assembly and submit the same to the British Parliament to be embodied in a Statute."

19. As will be seen, the resolution indicates the line of advance and repudiates the authority of Parliament to legislate for India and calls upon the Government to convene a round table conference to draw up a constitution acceptable to India and embody the same in a Parliamentary Act, following the precedent of the Irish Free State from which the author of the resolution presumably drew his inspiration. The resolution (moved in the form of an amendment to the Government resolution) was debated in a full House ; it was sought to be moderated by conceding to Parliament its authority to legislate for India and demanding a conference or some other equally acceptable method of procedure for the fulfilment of the pledge made for the furtherance of Indian reforms in the near future. The Assembly rejected all these counsels of moderation and passed Pundit Motilal Nehru's resolution by 72 votes against 45 votes. An analysis of the voting shows that the elected members solidly voted for the resolution while it was resisted only by the officials and their nominees.

20. The resolution did not eventuate in any decisive action by the Government which appointed a mixed Committee of nine members with the following terms of reference :—

A Reforms Committee appointed.

" (1) To inquire into the defects arising from, or defects inherent in, the working of the Government of India Act and the Rules thereunder in regard to the Central Government and the Governments of Governors' provinces ; and

(2) To investigate the feasibility and desirability of securing remedies for such difficulties or defects, consistent with the structure, policy and purpose of the Act,

(a) by action taken under the Act and the Rules, or

(b) by such amendments of the Act as appear necessary to rectify any administrative imperfections.

21. It is noteworthy that none of the protagonists of the resolution, and indeed, no non-official member of the Assembly, except Mr. Jinnah, consented to serve upon this body, the terms of reference of which were too narrow to admit of a large extension of the reforms; and as for their further extension within the comprehension of the existing Act, the members felt that the time for it had long gone past; and that the country was thirsting for the long delayed reforms of the character demanded on the eve of the Montagu Act, and as that Act was in itself inadequate to meet with the requirements of Indian conditions, there was no need for a Committee of the kind appointed. However, as it was, after a long and strenuous examination of witnesses, the Committee published their report, a majority comprising five members mostly officials were in favour of no substantial advance, while the minority comprising four out of the five non-official Indian members—Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, Sir Sivaswamy Aiyer, Mr. Jinnah and Dr. Paranjpye penned a considered report in which they recommended a substantial advance and suggested the means by which it could be effected even within the existing constitution. They advocated the complete abolition of dyarchy and pointed out that the existence of dyarchy in the Governments would be prejudicial to the growth and strength of parties in the Councils. They complained that the Meston award had crippled the resources of the provinces, and that it had been the corner stone of the entire financial system for it had prevented ministries from developing nation-building to the extent which would have enabled them to have achieved any substantial results; and while they deprecated the substitution of another transitional system they wound up their recommendations with the following pregnant sentence: "To our mind the proper question to ask is not whether any *alternative transitional* system can be devised, but whether the constitution should not be put on a permanent basis, with provisions for automatic progress in the future so as to secure stability in the government and willing co-operation of the people. We can only express the hope that a serious attempt may be made at an early day to solve the question."¹

22. It will thus be seen that the signatories, who included some of the most prominent representatives of India, deprecated the restricted terms of reference and suggested that the Reforms Act had outlived its small and perhaps questionable utility, that that the time had come for the

grant of further reforms, and that such reforms should be permanent and such as the people would willingly work. It is a trite saying ascribed to Solon, that when he was congratulated on the best laws he had given to Athens, he replied, "Best they are not, but they are the best that the people would accept." The willing acceptance of the laws by the people is a certain pledge of their success, but this was wanting both in the Acts of 1919, and in the subsequent enquiries set on foot by Government under the pressure exerted by the Legislative Assembly. In the result the whole report was pigeon-holed, where it still lies enshrined, no action being taken even upon the smaller recommendations which the majority recommended, while those of the minority were entirely ignored. This apathy of the Government fed the flame of national discontent which was reflected in the ensuing elections which took place two years later. An almost complete overhaul of the personnel of the Legislative Assembly was the result. Of the members who had served in the first Assembly, only a handful were returned, and the majority of them were returned by communal constituencies. A few stalwarts, however, managed to retain their seats, not on account of any difference in their policy, but because of their local influence in the constituencies which had returned them to the first two Assemblies. The Government at last took action by accelerating the pace of the Statutory Commission, and in November, 1927, after a formal amendment of the Government of India Act, the appointment of a Statutory Commission within ten years, instead of on its expiry, was passed, and the personnel of the Commission announced to the House which was required to express its concurrence therewith.

23. Hopes had till then been high that the Commission would be a mixed one including members of the Central Legislature as well as those of the British Parliament. But these hopes were shattered by the appointment of a purely British Commission which became the subject of animated debate in the House of Commons. A strong plea for a purely Parliamentary Commission was argued by Lord Birkenhead, the then Secretary of State for India, who, however, tried to assuage the exacerbated feelings of the Indian politicians by assuring them that as the British Parliament was appointing its own Commission, the Indian Legislatures would be free to elect their own members to co-operate with the British Commission, and that the two would conjointly deliberate in the matter of further reforms. His *ipsissima verba* are well worth quoting here :—

"Now what would be the function of that Committee? It has been most irrationally assumed that they were merely to appear as witnesses before the Commission. That is not the case. They are invited in a spirit of great sincerity to co-operate as colleagues with the Commission. It is contemplated that they shall prepare in

Functions
of the
Indian
Central
Committee
defined.

advance of the arrival of the Commission if they find themselves able to do it this next cold weather, and, if they find themselves within that limited period unable to do it, a year later, their own proposals and come before the Commission and say 'These are our suggestions'. We have claimed, and they have claimed that the West cannot devise a Constitution for the East, that you cannot put Eastern wine into Western bottles. Well, if there be behind that claim, and I do not doubt it, sincerity and real feeling, we afford them an opportunity of confronting our Commission with their own proposals, which can be made public, which can be analysed, criticised, can be accepted or rejected, after that analysis and after that criticism. No greater opportunity was ever given than is afforded to the Central Committee in the first place by the suggestion that they should confront the Commission with their own constructive proposals.¹

"But observe our next stage It is well known that we intend that after the Commission has presented its Report the proposals of the Government thereon will be sent, in accordance with precedent, to a Joint Conference of both Houses of Parliament

. . . . It is our intention to set up a similar body. Supposing it to be the fact that in spite of the constant contact in India between the Central Committee at the heart of government and the Provincial Committees of the Legislatures in each Province to which the Commission will journey, that in spite of all those opportunities of ascertaining opinion the Indians have failed to make good their view upon the independent and unbiased judgment of the Commission, they are not even then compelled to acquiesce.

"They will on the whole have been given an opportunity which in my judgment has never been given in the whole history of constitution-making to any people who are in their position. We invite the Central Government to appoint a Committee to come and sit with our Joint Committee. They can examine the Report of the Commission. They are even given a function, if they could only understand it, more important than that of the Commission itself. When once the Commission has made its report, it has finished. But its critics remain, and its critics are most formally and specially invited to come and sit with the General Committee in Parliament and develop any criticisms or objections that they feel to the Report which the Commission has made."²

Mr. Ramsay
MacDonald's
view.

24. Lord Winterton, then Under Secretary of State for India, made a similar announcement in the House of Commons, and in the ensuing debate Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, then leader of the

¹Debates ; Reprint, p. 135.

²Debates, 24th November, 1927 ; Reprint, pp. 135, 136.

Opposition, and now the Prime Minister of England, while concurring with the appointment of a purely Parliamentary Commission made the following considered statement on behalf of his Party :—

“ We advised most strongly that if the wording used by the Prime Minister, in making his announcement, implied that the status between our Commission and the Indian Commission was to be the status between a Commission and the witness of a Commission, that impression ought to be removed at once. We must have no idea in our minds, and I hope the Commission when it goes out will not have a particle of an idea in its mind, that the representatives of the Indian Legislature are simply going to present a written report and temporarily wish ‘ good day ’ to our Commission, leaving our Commission to examine and discuss that report among themselves ; that later our Commission will call back the Indian representatives to sit at the other side of a table and answer questions put to them for the purpose of illuminating their proposals. That is not our intention. I am perfectly certain, and it should be made clear that it is not our intention. I hope the intention is—and I am sure if this intention is not carried out, the Commission that we are going to appoint to-day will not be as successful as it could be if properly handled—to go to India, and to see at once our colleagues appointed by the Indian Legislature, to get their statements, to exchange views with them, to negotiate with them—as a matter of fact to regard them just as honourable Members opposite sitting on a committee would regard honourable Members from this side of the House sitting on the same committee, using their common experience and common intelligence and common ideas for the purpose of producing the very best report a committee can produce.”¹

25. These words and the whole of Mr. MacDonald’s speech on this occasion when he accepted Lord Birkenhead’s motion and the terms offered by him to place the Indian wing of the Commission on exactly the same footing as the British Commission, leave no doubt that he contemplated that the two wings would confer as freely as if they were members “ sitting on the same committee using their common experience and common knowledge and common ideas for the purpose of producing the very best report a Committee could produce ”. Even after the report, the members of the Indian Committee were then expected to influence Parliament by sitting upon the joint Parliamentary Committee to confer with them, while the objective of the Commission was clearly adumbrated by Mr. MacDonald who was for conferring upon India the full dominion status without any of the huckstering devices and conditions which would mar the value of a free and generous gift of freedom by one nation to another. “ The Under Secretary of State for India ”, he said,

Promise of
Dominion
Status for
India.

¹ *Ib.* p. 183.

“referred to certain claims that were made, and one which he specified was this—I paraphrase him, and perhaps I make his point a little more absolute that he himself made it—that in dealing with people for whom we have been responsible in days gone by, we have now reached that point in their evolution when the time has come for us as a Parliament and a nation to say to them, what many of us have had to say to our children who have grown up, ‘You are going out into the world. I have done my best for you whilst you were under my wing and whilst I was responsible for you ; and now take the responsibilities of manhood upon yourselves, and God bless you in your future career.’ A nation like ours, that has taken upon itself the responsibility for peoples—primitive peoples, subject peoples, people who have fallen under our custodianship and trusteeship by accident, people whom we have brought there by force of arms—a nation like ours, in these democratic days when the spirit of nationality and self independence has become so powerful in the world, must make up its mind again and again to put itself in the position of the parent who blesses his departing child ; and how are we to do it ? It is said in this respect that if we were wise, if we were enlightened, if we were liberal, if we had really good fellowship, and goodwill, we would say to India, ‘Go, and go just as you like yourselves’. That is not good, that is not wise, that is not fulfilling the best service we can do to India, and, what is more, that is not guiding the destinies of a growing world aright.”¹

Mr. MacDonald has repeated these noble sentiments again and again and it may be assumed that he and his Party stand committed to their declared policy of establishing a full responsible constitution in India.

Central
Committee
joins the
Commission.

26. The Committee of the Central Legislature assumed office on the 10th October, 1928, from which date it has continued to function up to the date of the Report. While in India, it examined numerous witnesses and received documents and in England it examined many witnesses and perused the memoranda and documents prepared by the several departments of India Office. But these memoranda, documents and witnesses though numerous, are nothing compared to what would have been available to the Committee if it had not been confronted with the strenuous boycott maintained throughout its tour. Whatever province the Committee visited there were unmistakable signs of an organised boycott, and even in the out-of-the-way places and far-off countryside, through which the train of the Committee passed, signs of the presence of the boycotters was not wanting. It cannot be denied that the politically-minded India had organised and marshalled an effective boycott both of the Statutory Commission and its Indian Wing. Many leading politicians and publicists refrained from giving evidence, or the

conference any support. This practical boycott was even at a later stage strengthened by its extension to our social side. But in this respect the attempt failed, as wherever we went we received great courtesy, and in private, many of the boycotters freely expressed their views on what should be the line of advance for India. The fact is, that Mr. Montagu's pronouncement in the House of Commons had assured the people of India that there could be no going back upon the reforms, and that the next Parliament would bring them within a measurable distance of a full responsible Government. This partially accounted for the dearth of evidence of the intelligentsia in the country, but whatever may have been the reason, we cannot disguise from ourselves the fact that the evidence we have recorded does not fully represent the mind of an important section of the people of India. On the other hand, it is in many ways a partial and one-sided evidence given by persons some of whom must have designedly or undesignedly striven to gain profit for themselves and their community by the withdrawal of the evidence of eminent politicians, successful business men, and men whose opinions count and influence public opinion.

27. At the same time there were provinces where the boycott was not so severe or stringent, as for example Madras, Punjab, and Burma where all the available evidence, with a few exceptions, was readily obtained. The Committee is not, however, the loser by the boycott because the protagonists of that movement had already previously published their scheme of reforms which was laid before and obtained the sanction of the All-Parties Conference. Several leading Mohammedans were present at this conference and some of them like Sir Ali Imam, the Maharajah of Mahmudabad, and Mr. M. A. Jinnah, President of the Moslem League, have appended their signature to the document. Another bears the imprimatur of H. H. the Aga Khan and Sir Mian Mohamed Shafi and of our own colleague, Sir Zulfiqar Ali Khan. The common feature of these two conferences is the demand for Dominion status for India. But the one point upon which they differ is the question of Moslem representation and the adequacy of their safeguards. The Moslem League favours joint electorates with the reservation of seats while the Delhi Conference presided over by H. H. the Aga Khan has rejected this as inadequate.

Published
schemes.

28. Other notable bodies such as the National Liberal Federation, the European Association and the Associated Chambers of Commerce have also formulated a series of resolutions in which they have voiced their views and the European bodies deputed their representatives to give evidence before us, so that we have not only had the advantage of their memoranda, but also their oral evidence. The Indian National Congress which met in December, 1928, at Calcutta, have formally adopted the report of the All-Parties Conference, though notable Congress men like Mr. Mohamed Ali, an ex-President of that body, have

expressed their unequivocal dissent from the implications of the All-Parties Conference Report. Mr. Mohamed Ali latterly presided at the Moslem conference held at Bankipur, and while he accepted the system of joint electorates, he has hedged it with conditions which have rendered the acceptance of his proposals impractical. The Moslems who have stood by the Congress Report have not come forward to give evidence, nor have many members of the Indian Liberal Federation who also held their Conference about the same time at Allahabad under the Presidency of Mr. Chintamani who had concurred in the formulated views of the All-Parties Conference embodied in a document popularly known as the Nehru Report, and by which term we shall describe it in the sequel. The Nehru Report has subsequently undergone a revision and the reference will throughout be made to that Report as subsequently modified.

The Nehru
Report.

29. The Nehru Report is a long detailed document which seeks to work out in minute details the future constitution of India. Its leading principles are as follows. It demands the immediate establishment of responsible Government both in the Central Government and in the Provinces. It sets out a compromise arrived at between the Hindus and Mohammedans and recommends joint electorates with the reservation of seats, if so desired by the Mohammedans, in proportion to their population both in the Central and the Provincial Legislatures.¹ It recommends reversion to joint electorates in all except the two Provinces of Bengal and the Punjab, but as a set-off it provides for the immediate introduction of adult suffrage, the grant of the same measure of reform to the two Mahomedan Provinces—North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan and the creation of another Mahomedan province by the separation of Sind from the Bombay Presidency.² It supports these changes by invoking the aid of self-determination but at the same time makes the important condition that the separation of the Sind division of the Bombay Presidency should be made contingent upon the people of Sind shouldering their financial burden.³ The value of this document rests not so much upon the demand of responsible government as upon the terms of the compromise on which alone the Mahomedan co-signatories of the Report and their adherents would accept joint electorates in the minority provinces. The rest of the report deals with the necessary attributes of responsibility and sets out, as already stated, in great detail matter a good deal of which must necessarily find a place in a codified constitution for India. Mr. Jinnah's Moslem League strove to support this report in all its particulars but his ship was wrecked upon the shoals of joint electorates, the only point upon which the minds of the two communities of India have been agitated ever since the advent of the reforms.

¹ Report, pp. 51, 52.

² *Ib.* pp. 65, 66.

³ *Ib.* p. 67.

30. As this Report and the other reports of the conference to which we have already alluded will be the subject of our scrutiny at a later stage, we may for the present leave them alone. Another document to which reference must be made here is the Montagu Report. As we have been called into requisition for the purpose of carrying out the scheme of reforms adumbrated by that Report, we think it necessary to clear the ground by stating the points upon which the Report is explicit and the points which it omitted to consider or left out for future judgment. It will be seen that the Montagu Report mainly confined itself to reforms in British India and did not attempt to embrace the question of the Indian States and their inter-relation with British India. At the same time, its authors had realized that the changes contemplated in British India would react upon the Indian States and pointed out how they would react. They did not, however, do more than allude to the conflict that might arise between the two halves of India, much less offer a solution for averting or solving such conflicts. They hoped, however, that such conflicts would not impede the progress of British India, and as they were preserving intact the power of the Governor-General in Council, the Princes might, perhaps, they thought, rest content with the means which they have at present of securing the due consideration of their views. "But if the control of matters common to India as a whole is shared with some popular element in the government, it must be anticipated that those Rulers may wish to take a share in such control also. There is a stronger reason why the present stir in British India cannot be a matter of indifference to the Princes. Hopes and aspirations may overleap frontier lines like sparks across a street. There are in the Native States men of like minds to those who have been active in spreading new ideas in India. It is not our task to prophecy : but no one would be surprised if constitutional changes in British India quickened the pace in the Native States as well ; if the advanced Princes who have already set up the rudiments of representative institutions were impelled to develop them and if even the most patriarchal Rulers thought in time to clothe their authority in more modern garments. Our business, however, is to observe our treaty obligations and to refrain from interference and to protect the States from it. We must leave the natural forces at work to provide the solution in due course. If change comes in the Native States it can only be by the permeation of ideas and not as a direct result of constitutional changes in British India."¹

Reservations
in the
Montagu
Report.

31. While the reasons given by the distinguished authors of the Montagu Report were amply sufficient to justify the exclusion of the States from their consideration of the problems then arising in British India, it is clear that a change in the Government of India towards responsibility must necessarily entail the review of the position of the Indian States in relation to the Government of India.

Indian
States
Committee.

32. Fortunately for our purpose the Secretary of State had on the 16th December, 1927, appointed a small Committee, presided over by Sir Harcourt Butler, to examine and report on the relationship existing between the paramount power and the Indian States with particular reference to the rights and obligations arising therefrom ; and to inquire into the financial and economic relations between British India and the States, and to make any recommendations that the Committee might consider desirable or necessary for their more satisfactory adjustment. The appointment of this Committee was a direct result of an enquiry originated in consequence of a request made to His Excellency the Viceroy at Simla in May, 1927, when a representative group of Princes had asked for the appointment of an authoritative and representative committee to examine the relationship between themselves and the paramount power, and to suggest means for securing effective consultation and co-operation between India and the Indian States and for the settlement of differences between the two. The Princes had also asked for adequate investigation into certain disabilities under which they felt they were labouring.

Its decisions
and omissions.

33. It will be noticed that the terms of reference precluded the Committee from going into or suggesting any means for securing effective consultation and co-operation between British India and the Indian States or for the settlement of all differences other than political and economic between them. It also did not provide for the adequate investigation of the disabilities complained of by the Princes. Limited as the Committee were by the terms of reference and lacking the representative character for which the Princes had pressed, they could do little except make certain suggestions for the solution of the problems referred to them, and they have only incidentally referred to the excluded matters, adding that no proposals for establishing a new machinery had been placed before them, though they indicated changes in procedure based on experience which should lead to the redress of grievances and the settlement of outstanding questions. As for a closer co-operation between the two Indias, the authors of the Report left the door open for closer union, adding—

“there is nothing in our proposals to prevent the adoption of some form of federal union as the two Indias of the present draw nearer to one another in the future. There is nothing in our proposals to prevent a big state or a group of states from entering now or at any time into closer union with British India. Indeed, in the next section of our report we make suggestions which, if adopted, may have this result. These things may come. But it has been borne in upon us with increasing power, as we have studied the problems presented to us, that there is need for great caution in dealing with any question of federation at the present time, so passionately are the Princes as a whole attached to the maintenance in its entirety and

unimpaired of their individual sovereignty within their states,"¹

The other recommendations made by this committee to which we consider a passing reference here necessary are :—

(1) That the Viceroy and not the Governor-General in Council should in future be the agent of the Crown in all dealings with the Indian States.

(2) If there is a disagreement between British India and the Indian States an *ad hoc* committee should decide the dispute.²

34. On this point they referred to § 308 of the Montagu Report which had suggested the formation of such a Committee to decide such disputes.

The States Committee did not make any substantial contribution to the elucidation of the vexed question upon which the Government of India and the Indian Princes have been at variance. It was the contention of the Indian Princes that, being in treaty with the Crown, of whose paramount authority the Government of India was only the Agent, the Government of India was not the proper body to decide disputes arising between the Princes and itself. In other words, the Indian States questioned the authority of the Government of India to be both party and judge in its own case.

35. The question was, in certain of its aspects, distinctly raised and rejected by Lord Reading, with the concurrence of the then Secretary of State, on the subject of Berar. The decision of the Viceroy dated 27th March, 1928, made with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, will be found printed as appendix 2³ of the Committee's Report, with which that Committee is in entire agreement.

Its view on
Para-
mountcy.

36. Passing in review the several cases that had previously raised the same question, the Committee in one place observe that it is impossible to define paramountcy.⁴

37. But in another place they say : " The Paramount Power means the Crown acting through the Secretary of State for India and the Governor-General in Council who are responsible to the Parliament of Great Britain. Until 1835, the East India Company acted as trustees of and agents for the Crown ; but the Crown was, through the Company, the Paramount Power. The Act of 1858, which put an end to the administration of the Company, did not give the Crown any new powers which it had not previously possessed. It merely changed the machinery through which the Crown exercised its powers."⁵

38. In this view, the Crown being then paramount, it has acted in relation to the Indian States through the Secretary of State for India and Governor-General in Council who are responsible to the Government of Great Britain. In other words, these bodies are accredited agents of the Crown in relation to the Indian States.

¹ Report, § 78. ² *Ib.* § 70. ³ *Ib.* pp. 56-58. ⁴ *Ib.* § 57. ⁵ *Ib.* § 18.

Modern idea
of Sovereignty.

39. Historically, the Crown as such, has no direct control over the Indian States. Its power as such has long since passed to Parliament. The Austinian notion of Sovereignty has long since been superseded by the modern conception which regards sovereignty as divisible and sovereign rights distributable, amongst the members of its State, or amongst some members thereof, according to the constitution of the State concerned. Even assuming that the mediaeval notion of Sovereignty had still persisted, it does not follow that the Sovereign is not entitled to consult any person it pleases, or delegate some of his functions to him. In either view the fact remains, and the Butler Report emphasises it, that in practice the relations of Indian States with the Crown are managed by the Secretary of State and the Governor-General in Council.

40. The States may well claim that the former being the accredited agents of the Crown, the agency ought not, without their own consent, to be transferred, or materially altered by the transference of ultimate control from the English to the Indian Parliament.

Authority of
Parliament.

41. This raises the other large question as to whether the Parliament of Great Britain is competent to transfer its own authority and power to another Parliament constituted by it. That it has undoubtedly that power is amply demonstrated by the existence of the Dominion Parliaments which have been declared at the recent Imperial Conference as Sovereign bodies within their own spheres.

42. This question will have to be further discussed in the sequel.¹ For the present it is sufficient to state that the authors of the Montagu Report, though they do not actually advert to this aspect of the question, had nevertheless something of that kind in their minds when they advocated the establishment of a Privy Council in India.²

43. The question is by no means an easy one, but reference to it can no longer be avoided in the ensuing discussion where the inter-relation of the Indian State and the reformed British India will have to be considered. For the present, it seems clear that we cannot steer clear of the Indian States because the Indian States themselves have raised several questions which vitally affect the revenue and development of British India, and would in the near future bring the two into direct contest. Indeed, the Indian States are already pressing for a satisfactory settlement in respect of the maritime customs, the Income Tax, income from railways, mints, and coinage, posts and telegraph and the profits of savings bank, from Opium and Excise and other miscellaneous sources of revenue which vitally affect the revenues and general administration of British India.

44. The Butler Report has no doubt found a solution for some of these questions, but it is too early to state how far their solutions would be acceptable to the Indian States, and even if

¹ Ch. V (III).

² Montagu Report, § 287.

accepted by them, how far they would be in consonance with the interest of British India.

45. One fact is clear that if the Governor-General in Council now responsible to the British Parliament is made responsible to the Indian Parliament, it would affect the Indian States in the sense in which the Butler Committee have defined the power of the Crown, and as our proposals contemplate the transference of such power we cannot evade the discussion of the question of the relation of the Indian Parliament with the Indian States.

46. We have in a subsequent chapter headed "The Indian States" examined the question of our jurisdiction and set out our reasons why we could not avoid the question, much as we should have liked to do so if it were possible.

Having so far cleared the ground as to the subjects which our Committee feels constrained to go into, it remains for us to see what should be the line of progress which we should recommend as a next step in the evolution of the Indian Constitution.

47. The Nehru Report, and other reports and schemes published, have borrowed largely from the constitutions of other self-governing dominions of Great Britain, and an examination of these would show that they are themselves adaptations of the English form of Parliamentary Government to local conditions, and we cannot, therefore, bodily borrow them unless we can be sure that the local conditions in reference to which they were framed are similar, if not identical with our own.

References
to other con-
stitutions.

48. Take, for instance, the Nehru Report, which has been largely framed on the model of the Irish Free State Constitution which, in its turn, acknowledges all its inspiration to the Canadian Constitution.¹ Even the genesis of the Nehru Report borrows largely the procedure which culminated in the Anglo-Irish Treaty, to which the Irish Constitution of 1922 merely gave legislative expression.

49. As is well known, after the general elections of December, 1918, a conference of all the Irish Members was held on the 21st January, 1919, at the Mansion House, Dublin. These members were elected upon the issue of independence, and had taken a pledge that if returned, they would not take their seats in the British Parliament or acknowledge its authority to legislate for Ireland.

History of
the Irish
Constitution.

50. This Assembly drew up and promulgated a provisional Constitution for the country, ratified the establishment of the Irish Republic proclaimed in 1916, and established the Ministry responsible to the Irish Parliament. The newly established Republic began to function independently of England. It appointed its own Judges alongside of the British established Courts. The British Government watched the proceedings of the Irish Parliament, hoping that it would soon spend its force, which it did not, and when it threatened to be a real menace to the established authority it commenced to resort to the use of

¹ See the Irish Free State Act, Art. 51.

force, which the Irish met by converting their Irish Volunteers into the Army of the Irish Republic. The Republic and the British Army came to close grips, and then began a guerilla warfare, which continued up to 1921.

51. In the previous year the British Parliament had to pass an Act entitled "The Government of Ireland Act, 1920," which partitioned Ireland into Catholic and Protestant Ireland, and affirmed the authority of the Irish Parliament over Catholic counties which constituted the Southern portion of that Ireland, but the war still continued, with the result that Mr. Lloyd George arranged for a truce with the Irish forces, as a preliminary to peace negotiations which came into force on the 11th January, 1921, and on the 29th July it was agreed that the conditions of settlement between Great Britain should be embodied in the form of a treaty, to which effect in due course should be given by the British and Irish Parliaments.

52. After protracted negotiations between the representatives of the two countries, a compromise was reached which was ratified by the plenipotentiaries of the two countries, and the same was afterwards embodied in the Irish Free State Act.

53. A similar procedure was sought to be adopted in India when an effort was made to establish a parallel government. The British Courts were to be boycotted, and recourse was had to the Arbitration Courts, and a large number of volunteers defied the authority of the British Government in India and preferred to go to jail rather than submit to its jurisdiction. This did not, however, last long. Foiled in this attempt to parallel the Irish procedure, the Congress next resolved to convene an All-Parties Conference in which a constitution on the lines of the Irish Constitution was drawn up and published. This has come to be popularly known as the Nehru Report.

Conditions
of Peace with
the Moslems.

54. It will be seen that the condition which made the parallel Constitution for Ireland effective was the backing of the people of Ireland, who stood by that constitution and defied the authority of the British, and returned force for force. This was not possible in India. The Constitution, when it was published, at once set loose dissenting forces, and a large body of Muslims, threatened by their absorption, and fearing the relegation of their interests to a secondary place, seceded and formulated views of their own. The Moslem minority in India was a standing menace to the success of any Constitution drawn up by the major community. The latter knew too well that they could not hope to present even a united front without effecting a compromise acceptable to the Mahomedans. The chief bone of contention between the two communities was, of course, the apportionment of power. The Mahomedans naturally distrusted the Hindu domination; the Hindu naturally feared from the Mahomedan fervour. So long as the two communities are imbued with their religious intolerance all hope of a national government, in the

real sense of the term, is merely an ideal not immediately obtainable, not indeed, until both are sufficiently advanced and have recognised by experience the value of civic duty as distinct from religious allegiance. But as this would bring about a millennium not to be expected in our day or in our time, the two communities did the only thing they could do, namely, patched up their difference by a mutual give-and-take in which the rights given and the rights taken took no account of the realities of the situation, or of the effect they would produce upon those who were unfortunately made pawns in the game of such politics. Take, for example, the main question about the electorates; the Mahomedans naturally fear, as has been already stated, from preponderance of the Hindus in seven out of the nine provinces of India. Even in the two provinces of the Punjab and Bengal, where the Mahomedans are numerically stronger; the Hindu influence is stated to have dominated the situation (§ 75). A *pis aller* was found in advocating universal adult suffrage which would give the Mahomedans of the two Provinces a larger electorate, while as a part of the make-weight full measure of reforms was to be given to the North-West Frontier Provinces, where 95 per cent. of the population are Mahomedans. The Sindh division of the Bombay Presidency, where the Mahomedans number 74 per cent., was to be separated from the Bombay Presidency, while Baluchistan, another Mahomedan stronghold, was to be given similar reforms.

55. The authors thought that in carving out a new Province and in extending the full measure of provincial autonomy to the two existing backward Provinces they would create a Moslem India, the Hindu population of which should be held as a hostage for the good government by the Hindus in the rest. It may be a good compromise between the parties immediately interested in producing a plausible report, but the fact unfortunately remains that the authors thereof could not fail to have realized that India was not yet prepared for a universal adult franchise.

56. As is well known, literacy in the country is at the minimum, only about 5 per cent. of the male population being literate, while literacy amongst the female population is negligible, being only about 3 per cent., and literacy amongst the majority of even the so-called literates would be a euphemism if a stricter test applicable to Western countries were applied to them.

57. By tradition and habit the Indians have been strangers to representative democracy as now understood. It is due to the advent of the British, and their impact with the Western civilization and their education in the newly established Universities modelled upon those in Europe that the politically modern India owes her aspiration for Parliamentary institutions. However galling it may be to the feeling of our self-respect and national

pride, this fact cannot be ignored, and if Western institutions are to thrive in an Eastern soil, it is the intensive cultivation of the Western method of civic life and thought that would reduce the superabundance of froth that obscures the true perspective of the people of India.

58. The Nehru Report is in this respect an ominous document. If it were translated into action it would make the Hindu host-ages extremely uncomfortable in the Mohammedan Provinces, and by no means improve the lot of the Mohammedans in the Hindu Provinces. What is required in the country is a Liberal Government which would educate the people into the art of learning the art of self-government, but unfortunately the history of British connection with India has created vested rights and interests which have, for one reason or another, made substantial advance slow, if not impossible. A bold step in the direction of self-government, with all its attendant risks, seems the only alternative. He who wishes to swim must throw himself into the water ; he cannot learn it from the shore. All the problems and difficulties which confront India, and are magnified by its critics, can only be solved by giving India a fair opportunity of developing its latent quality for self-government. In politics, as in many other walks of life, the prime panacea for all such evils is—*Solvitur ambulando*.

As the Nehru Report is a compromise prejudicial to the true interests of India, so are also the resolutions passed by the All-Parties Muslim Conference.

59. The demand of the Mohammedans is that the numerical majority in the Punjab and Bengal should find its corresponding reflex in the legislative council and the cabinet, while in the other provinces, being in the minority, they should be given a weight-age. It is hardly necessary to add that if this were for one moment conceded it would at once and for all time establish an autocracy in the Punjab and Bengal Provinces, and create an oligarchy in the other Provinces which is the very antithesis of democratic rule. As John Stuart Mill says :—

“ A majority in a single assembly when it has assumed a permanent character—when composed of the same persons habitually together and always assured of victory in their own House—usually becomes despotic and overweening if released from the necessity of considering whether its acts will be concurred in by another constituted authority.”

60. If the Mohammedan claim were for one moment conceded, it would raise a storm of opposition in the two provinces of Punjab and Bengal, since the Mohammedans being in a fixed immutable majority safeguarded by statute there would be no element of democracy left, in that the opposition could never hope to turn the majority out and form an alternative government. Freed from this contingency, and sheltered by the citadel

of religious orthodoxy, the majority might easily become a veritable engine of oppression and misrule, against which the combined opposition would be impotent, and this is what the All-Parties Moslem Conference seriously advocate.

61. The creation of Communal Cabinets is open to the same, if not greater, objections, in that it places religious belief before political responsibility. A joint responsibility would be a myth in a cabinet arrayed in communal colours. The majority of the Committee have, therefore, wisely refrained from placing religion above politics. They are of opinion that the people of India should be taught the value of co-operation, and that an opportunity should be given to them to learn by experience what they have failed to grasp by precept.

62. It may be that the scheme proposed by the Committee leaves other alternatives, even more innocuous, out of account, but it cannot be charged to its discredit that it had failed to consider them. As will be seen in the sequel, other proposals were brought forward for insuring the largest measure of agreement with the least risk of the dangers which the two communities feared from a joint electorate. It is hoped that these proposals which were tentatively made to the representatives of the two communities in the Central Committee, might yet be revived and, if possible, given a trial in the constitution of India. (§ 120.)

63. These observations have been made for the purpose of illustrating the danger of borrowing a constitution from another country. Neither the Canadian, nor the Australian, nor indeed, the South African constitution presents an exact parallel to the conditions which obtain in India. It is true that in Canada the French and the English were at daggers drawn before the promulgation of the present constitution. It is equally true that the rivalry between the Boers and the English in South Africa has not materially abated, but in both countries racial difference, rather than religious rancour, divides the two communities. A parallel can, however, be found in some of the East European countries, such as Palestine, Jugo-Slavia, Greece, Albania and Egypt, where the Moslem population, the Jewish population and the Christian population are divided by their ostensible manifestations of religious differences, but in none of these countries has political power been apportioned between the followers of different religions upon the basis of their religion.

64. The subject has been several times considered by the League of Nations, a summary of whose conclusions have been set out under the Chapter headed "Protection of the Minorities" (§§ 115-130).

II.

THE PROBLEM STATED.

65. After these preliminary observations, the problems which confront the Central Committee may now be stated :—

(a) Following the language of Section 84A of the Government of India Act, the first question which the Committee has to consider is how far the system of government established in India by the Reform Act of 1919 justifies a further advance ;

(b) To what extent there has been the growth of education in the country ;

(c) What developments have taken place in the representative institutions in British India.

66. These are primarily the three questions addressed to the Statutory Commission appointed under the terms of Section 85A of the Government of India Act. An enquiry into the working of the system of government in India would necessarily entail not only an enquiry into the working of the government of India in the past, but also an enquiry into how the future government of India would stand *vis-à-vis* the provinces on the one hand, and the Indian States on the other ; while germane to the same discussion arises the question how far the establishment of a responsible government in India would trench upon the rights of the Indian States, and what measures and safeguards are necessary to make that government independent of or subservient to the interests of these States.

67. It should be remembered that under the provisions of Section 67 (2) of the Government of India Act, the Army, and the relation of the Government with foreign Princes or States, are excluded from the authority of the Legislative Assembly. Now it is a fact that the forces of the Crown in India are responsible for the maintenance of peace in the Indian States, and for maintaining the Indian Princes in their possession and power. So long as the Indian Army is under the control of the Governor-General, and is non-votable in the budget submitted to the Legislative Assembly, the question of the relationship between the Legislative Assembly and the Indian States does not arise, but if the Army budget is made votable it would give the Legislative Assembly at once the same power over the Army as it has over the Police.

68. Then again, if the subject of finance is transferred to a minister, and the Governor-General's Executive Council is replaced by a Cabinet of wholly or partially elected members responsible to the Legislature, it would equally thrust into the

Relation
with the
Indian
States.

What if the
Army
Budget
votable.

forefront the numerous questions affecting the revenue of British India in relation to the Indian States, some of which have already been enumerated before. The question of the Indian States must, therefore, equally have engaged the attention of our Committee.

69. There is one more point to which a passing reference seems at this stage expedient. It is an established principle of all federal constitutions that a neutral court should be established to uphold the constitution, to settle differences between the federal and the states governments and to judge fairly between the executive and the legislature. In all the major dominions, such as Canada, Australia, and South Africa, Supreme Courts have been established for this purpose. The Act of 1919 established a skeleton form of federal government in the country. So long as the Centre remained irresponsible to the legislature, there was not the same necessity of establishing an independent tribunal as there is now when the central executive itself is to be made responsible to the legislature. Most of the representative bodies, including the scheme of the Indian Princes, have recommended the establishment of some such Court in India. There is thus a consensus of opinion in favour of the establishment of such a Court, an opinion fortified by the cost and delay entailed by Indian appeals to His Majesty's Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. We shall have to examine in fuller detail our recommendation for the establishment of a Supreme Court in India. (§§ 254-264.)

A Supreme
Court for
India.

70. We shall next proceed to examine the condition of each province, and proceed to formulate our recommendations as to what advance we consider necessary. We shall also then examine the constitution of the Central Government and adduce reasons in favour of our recommendations. We shall then deal with the problem of the Indian States and other suggestions for the solution of the several questions that might arise, and have arisen, both in British India and in the Indian States. Lastly, we shall proceed to suggest measures for the reform of the Judiciary.

CHAPTER II.

A REVIEW OF THE PUBLISHED SCHEMES.

I.

THE ALL PARTIES' SCHEME.

71. We have made frequent references to the Scheme prepared by the All Parties' Conference. We have incidentally conveyed our own views thereon. But the hold it still has upon a certain section of our countrymen is our excuse for readverting to the subject. We have already given elsewhere the text of Pundit Motilal Nehru's amendment passed by the Assembly in the autumn of 1924 (§ 18). The main pivot of his motion, as we have said, lay not only in the demand for Dominion Status but in the further demand that in supersession of the procedure prescribed in Section 84A of the Government of India Act, the Government should convene a round table conference of the leaders of all shades of opinions with a view to settle the scheme of reforms acceptable to the people which should then be automatically enacted by the British Parliament. The demand was a replica of the demand of the Irish Nationalists to which we have already referred in some detail (§§ 49-52).

Lord
Birkenhead's
challenge to
India.

72. The British Government met this demand by suggesting that it was for the Indians to convene a round table conference of their own and formulate a scheme for a constitution which the British Parliament would consider, though it could not undertake to abrogate its own responsibility nor pass it mechanically. This view was reiterated by Lord Birkenhead when moving for the appointment of the Statutory Commission. He said :—

“ It is some times said by our critics in India that it is for a round-table Conference or a Congress in India to decide upon the form of Constitution suitable for themselves, and then for the British Parliament formally to pass it. This suggestion has not been lightly made. It has been seriously made by men who are entitled that their observations shall be seriously accepted. I can only make this comment. I have twice in three years during which I have been Secretary of State invited our critics in India to put forward their own suggestions for a Constitution, to indicate to us the form which in their judgment any reform of the Constitution should take. That offer is still open. It is most expressly repeated, as I shall show in a moment, in the proposals which we make for the association of Indians with the activities of the Commission. But let it be plainly said—it cannot be too plainly said—that Parliament cannot, and will not, repudiate its own duties, its own responsibility, in this matter. If anybody seriously supposes either here

or in India, that we are mechanically to accept a Constitution without our own primary and ultimate responsibility for judging upon it, they have no contact with the realities of the actual situation.”¹

73. The same Noble Lord had elsewhere used expressions which the Indian politicians construed to be a challenge to produce what may be deemed an “agreed scheme.” After some informal discussions, to which one of us was a party, it was decided to convene an All Parties’ Conference which held its sittings in Delhi, when after only a few hours’ discussions it became apparent that the main obstacle to the formulation of an agreed scheme lay in the Hindu-Moslem question, and that until that question was settled in a manner satisfactory to both parties there was no prospect of any such scheme. A similar dilemma had confronted us some ten years earlier when we were constrained to enter into what has since become known as the Lucknow Pact. One of us who was then present and had warned the then conference not to sow the storm has lived to reap the whirlwind of that ill-fated action. The Delhi Conference were again warned of the consequence that would flow from another short-sighted pact which might result in a semblance of agreement, but which would sow the dragon’s teeth from which the only harvest possible is the clash of arms, which would before long reduce an organised state to chaos and may not before long involve it into an irredeemable cataclysm.

Genesis of
the All-
Parties’
Conference.

74. But the Conference were faced with a situation from which there could be no retreat. They had challenged the Government to convene a round table conference ; the Government had adroitly turned the tables upon them and challenged them to try one for themselves. They had tried but they could not afford to fail. The challenge was to produce an “agreed scheme” ; that challenge could not be met otherwise than by the production of an agreed scheme. In the exuberance of passion reason has no place. In the conflict of interests reflection has no duty. Compromises are notoriously makeshifts everywhere. They seldom satisfy either side. They are seldom adhered to if, after they are made, one can discover a loophole for escape. Such was, at any rate, the case in the All-Parties compact. Rights were created, expectations aroused and assumptions made without advertence to the realities of the situation or their effect upon the entire body politic of India. However, whatever may be the consequence, both the laws of honour and chivalry demanded that the gauntlet thrown down must be taken up, and, whatever the consequence, the honour of India must be maintained by the production of an agreed scheme. It may be that the scheme was a simulacrum, a mere Dead Sea apple, but still it looked an attractive scheme. It had

¹ Debates : Dated 24th November, 1927 ; reprint p. 128.

brought the elephant of Hindu majority and the tiger of the Moslem minority to the brink of a common pool. It had made the two great peoples one when faced with a common misfortune. Such, at any rate, were the hopes of those who made another compact. Such, at any rate, were the fears of those who stood by and watched the game.

75. We have analysed this Report before. (§§ 54-58.) It safeguards the Moslem interests by the creation of a solid Moslem India in the West, while it ensures their preponderance in the Presidency of Bengal by the innovation of universal franchise and resort to other devices to which we would advert in detail.

Universal
Franchise.

76. The authors of the Report recommend the immediate introduction of universal adult suffrage. The primary reason which drove them to this view may be stated in their own words, for they say : " At present the voting ratio between different communities is not the same as the population ratio. Thus, in the Punjab, although the Muslims outnumber the Hindus and Sikhs combined, the number of their votes is far less than the Hindu and Sikh voters. This is due to the superior economic position of the latter. We are strongly of opinion that this anomaly should be made to correspond with the population ratio. With adult suffrage this happens automatically, but with any other restricted franchise the only possible way to do it is to have different electoral qualifications for different groups and communities. Thus the basis of representation of different communities cannot be uniform, and this may be considered a grievance by some groups. We were thus driven to the conclusion that the only solution is adult suffrage, and we have recommended accordingly." (1)

77. It is thus clear that the device of adult franchise was adopted with the object of levelling up the Moslem ratio in the two Provinces of Bengal and the Punjab, where, though numerically in the majority, they cannot muster the same voting strength on the property qualifications now governing the franchise. The authors draw upon the Ceylon Report for a parallel and improve on it by enfranchising all women, and not only those over 30 years of age. Now the Ceylon Report points out that Ceylon is only 1/60th part of India in size and has only a population of about 4½ millions. Their proposal would only enfranchise 1,850,000 persons whereas the Indian scheme would enfranchise nearly 100 millions, a truly colossal figure to reach every three or four years. Apart from its unworkability, there is the question of education and the attainment of sufficient political consciousness enabling the voter to understand the value of his vote. " The most advanced countries in the world", they say, " did not wait to achieve a hundred per cent. literacy before introducing adult suffrage. Why should India ? " The answer is that India has never had the political experience of the countries where adult suffrage has only come by degrees.

(1) Report pp. 92, 93.

78. The other safeguards intended to placate the Moslem Other
 opinion are :— Safeguards.

(1) Reservation of seats to Moslems on their population basis, they being free to contest other seats in the General electorates ;

(2) The grant of full autonomy to the North-West-Frontier Province and Baluchistan ;

(3) The separation of Sind.

As to the first, we have improved upon the recommendation which we trust may be found more acceptable to the Moslems, since our resolution concedes both to the Moslems and the Sikhs the reservation of seats on the basis of their population or their voting strength whichever is more favourable to them. Some of us regard the reservation of seats in favour of any community as the creation of a close preserve which is foreign to the notion of democracy. We know that our view is happily shared by several Moslem leaders themselves who are, however, unable to stem the tide of communalism by any appeal to dry reason. A *via media* had to be found, and it is found in the Nehru Report, which we were glad to adopt. At the same time we must not be understood to defend the system, or offer any apology for adopting it, for we feel convinced that the creation of preference is foreign to the notion that the same people must all possess the same rights. It has been said that in granting special seats to some classes, such as the landholders, and denying them to the communities, we would be lending ourselves to the charge of inconsistency. But we perceive no analogy between the two, since it is open to any citizen to acquire land and become a landholder, but one cannot without compromising with one's conscience join another community.

79. We are also at one with the Nehru Report that while there may be some justification for reserving seats to a minority, there can be no justification for extending that protection to a majority, because, as the Nehru Report has well put it :
 “ Reservation of seats for a majority community gives to that community the statutory right to govern the country independently of the wishes of the electorate, and is foreign to all conceptions of popular government. It will confine minorities within a ring fence and leave them no scope for expansion.”¹
 We have already given other reasons why we regard the reservation of seats to a majority as politically vicious and constitutionally inconceivable. (§§ 59-61.)

No reservation for the majority community.

We have looked at the question of constitutional advance in the two Provinces—the North-West-Frontier Province and Baluchistan—from a wholly different standpoint. For the advance we have proposed in the North-West-Frontier Province we have given our reason under that head.² No demand for any reform has come from Baluchistan nor are we

¹ Report, p. 43.

² Ch. VII (IX), *post*.

aware that that Province which borders on the neighbouring independent tribal states is thirsting for any measure of popular government. It has only recently been weaned out of an age-long paternal autocracy and it has a long way to go before its people will be ready for a radical change in the form of responsible government. It is not for us to say how far in sympathy with the general advance elsewhere recommended, an improvement in the machinery of administration of that Province would not be expedient. For it is a question upon which we have received no evidence, documentary or oral—and we must, therefore, refrain from passing our judgment upon the future constitution of a country which to us has remained a *terra incognita*.

80. The Nehru Report gives us no further light beyond the theoretical assumption that what is good for the Indian goose must be equally good for the Baluchistan gander. But it all depends upon the gander. "We cannot in justice and in logic," they say, "deny the right of any part of India to participate in responsible government,"¹ to which we venture to add, that we cannot in justice or in logic grow on the Himalayan hill tops the crops we can grow in the valley of the Ganges.

81. We have already dealt with the separation of Sind to which we shall advert again in the sequel.² Apart, however, from the communal solution which we have been able only to partially accept, there is a great deal in the Nehru Report with which, as our recommendations would show, we are in cordial agreement, and we feel that if the distinguished signatories to that Report had access to the materials which it has been our privilege to peruse, it may be that their own conclusions would have been similar to our own.

II.

THE EXTREME MOSLEM DEMANDS.

Delhi Moslem
Conference.

82. An organised dissent from the proposals made in the Nehru Report was expressed by the All-India Moslem Conference, popularly known as the Moslem Delhi Conference, which was organised by several Moslem members of the Central Legislature. It met at Delhi on the 31st December, 1928, under the presidency of H. H. the Aga Khan when a series of resolutions, hereinafter summarized, were adopted. In his presidential address H. H. the Aga Khan wisely recalled certain truisms which may be categorised thus :—

(1) "It is impossible for Moslems to live happily and peacefully in India if friction and suspicion are to prevail between them and the Hindus ;

(2) At the same time there can be no prosperity and self-government for India so long as Moslems are in doubt as to the safety of their cultural entity ;

¹ Report, p. 31.

² Ch. IX, *post*.

(3) So long as India is dependent upon England for protection the latter must continue to claim a dominant share and voice in the Government of India."

83. It is noteworthy that while His Highness emphasised the need for unity and referred to the subject of separate electorates he left the whole question to the "Moslem population of this country to consider and solve without any prejudices." Sir Mohamed Shafi then moved the main resolution which embodies the Moslem demands made at the Conference : Moslem demands.

(1) That India should be granted a federal constitution with the Central Government possessing only powers to be defined by the constitution.

(2) That the separate election of Moslems "is essential in order to bring into existence a really representative democratic government."

(3) That Moslems should have their due share in the Central and Provincial Cabinets.

(4) That Moslems should be ensured their majority in the provinces in which the Moslem population is in the majority, and that in the other provinces their representation should continue as now existing.

(5) That the Moslems should have 33 per cent. representation in the Central Legislature.

(6) That Sind be separated.

(7) That Reforms be extended to the North-West Frontier Province.

(8) That the Moslems be given adequate representation in all public services "having due regard to the requirements of efficiency."

(9) That no bill, resolution, motion or amendment "regarding inter-communal matters" be moved, discussed or passed by any legislature if a three-fourths majority of the members of either the Hindu or the Muslim community oppose its introduction, discussion or passing.

(10) That adequate safeguards be made for the "protection and promotion of Moslem education, language, religion, personal law and Moslem charitable institutions and for their due share in grants-in-aid."

84. It will be noticed that out of the ten points the first makes a constructive proposal as to the future constitution of India, while the remaining clauses deal with the Muslim share therein. So far as the Moslem demand goes it is categorically in favour of the grant of complete provincial autonomy with the control of the Central Government limited to subjects to be specified by the statute. First demand.

85. This demand is not conditional upon compliance with the other Moslem demands, though it is added that the Muslims will not accept a constitution unless it conforms with the principle

of their resolution. This statement is somewhat ambiguous in as much as it might either imply, what the lawyers would call a condition precedent, or merely a condition subsequent. That it was used in the latter sense would appear from the indignant protest addressed to us by Sir Mahomed Shafi who appeared soon after a Hindu Witness had ejaculated that his community wanted no reforms unless the conditions he had mentioned were to be complied with. Sir Mahomed said that the attitude of his community was not so unpatriotic as to thwart the progress of India merely because it did not meet with the wishes of any single community. At the same time, he made it plain that the Delhi resolutions stood as the demand of Moslem India.

86. In this connection, it is well to recall the circumstances which preceded the Delhi Moslem Conference. Till that body met the only organised communal body that voiced the special claims of the Moslems was the All-India Moslem League of which Mr. Mahomed Ali Jinnah is the life President. In subscribing to the Nehru Report, Mr. Jinnah threw the weight of his authority in favour of joint electorates. Other notable Moslem leaders, like the Maharaja of Mahmudabad and Sir Ali Imam adopted the same course from which a dissent, however, soon manifested itself in the issue of a manifesto over the signatures of some twenty-eight Muslim members of the Central Legislature declaring "that no scheme would be acceptable to the Moslems of India which did not provide effective and adequate protection of their interests." Following up this manifesto, several of the signatories organised a larger conference which met at Delhi as already stated. It was a counter move to the Nehru Report, and as we have examined the latter we feel constrained to equally examine the proposals of the Conference, which was to have been followed by other meetings so as to sound and voice the opinions of all Muslim India. This course is suggested by H. H. the Aga Khan in his Foreword prefacing the Conference Report. We are not aware that many such conferences were held. At the same time our itinerary has convinced us that widespread apprehensions undoubtedly exist amongst the Moslems of India that in the future constitution of India their community may not secure their due share of political power. That this is a perfectly natural apprehension aroused not only in the minds of the Moslems, but of all other minor communities, including the Depressed Classes, the Sikhs, the Europeans, the Anglo-Indians and classes such as the land-holders and representatives of large commercial interests. That any change from the normal stimulates curiosity and the timid begin to see daggers in the air is a well-known human failing; but it is a failing grounded on fear and we have to allay that sentiment so far as we can by argument and reasonable concessions. We cannot do more, and even if we did we should be imperilling the very purpose we have all in view, that India should rise to her full stature of nationhood and be once

more a shining example of a well governed contented country. It is with that sole objective in view that we shall apply our mind to the examination of the Moslem demand.

87. Our Committee have, it is trusted, wholly carried out the tenour of the first and last resolutions though we have been unable to give effect to the other demands in their entirety for reasons which call for an explanation which we propose to sub-join in the same order in which we have categorised the demands.

88. The crucial demand of the Moslems is in favour of a separate electorate. Our Committee spent most anxious days considering how to meet this claim without materially trenching upon the fundamentals of a "really representative democratic government" which is the avowed objective of the Moslem Conference. Now as we understand the meaning of democracy it seems to postulate the government of the people by the people through their accredited representatives, and, as such, it is wholly opposed to communal electorates; since such electorates have avowedly the purpose of returning their representatives who owe allegiance to their own community and none at all to the people. Since the Moslem Conference demand the establishment of a democracy in India we fail to understand upon what ground they are able to reconcile a demand for a separate electorate with the foundation of a democratic constitution. But technicality apart, we will assume that what the Moslems demand is not really democracy, but a less ambitious substitute for it—say a form of representative institution. Even in that case we are unable to find any precedent for the claim made. We have consulted all the literature available to us on the subject, and we have failed to discover any case in which two or more large communities return their representatives to the National Parliament upon the basis of communal constituencies. On the other hand, a perusal of all the constitutions of other countries available to us has convinced us that all popular governments owe their allegiance to the people as a whole apart from their religion, language or race.

89. As we shall show under the next heading the subject has engaged the attention of the League of Nations, who after exhaustive enquiries conducted over many years have reported considered conclusions which lend no countenance to even the allotment of seats in a joint electorate—a concession which we have made at the sacrifice of our conviction. We cannot justify even this departure, because, as we shall presently show, statesmen, politicians, international jurists and impartial observers of all shades of opinion are agreed on the mischief and danger arising from communal electorates. Our Moslem friends admit that separate electorates are not an ideal to be aimed at, but they wish to prolong the system on the ground that the special claim of the Moslems in India justify their retention. It becomes necessary, therefore, to examine their claim and the peculiar circumstances of India, to which reference is made by the speakers and publicists dealing with the question.

Separate
electorates.

League of
Nations.

Reasons for
the Moslem
demands.

Judging from the evidence taken on the subject in India, the claim of the Mahommedans to separate representation is based on the ground that as a community they are backward, both educationally and economically ; that as compared with the Hindus they have not had the advantage of English education, or, what comes to the same thing, they have not been able to take advantage of it to the same degree as the Hindus ; and that, therefore, they are not able to run an even race for political power with the better educated Hindus, who would swamp the councils and drive them into a corner if separate electorates are done away with. This argument postulates that the Moslems, being backward, should be given a larger measure of political power. The Hindus complain that if the Moslems, who are confessedly a backward community, are given an undue proportion of political power, they might act as a drag on the political progress of India, and that it is a political heresy to permit a backward community to rule or materially influence the policy of an advanced community.

Moslem
demand a
share in the
Public
Services.

90. The claim of the Moslems to a share of the public services, now extended even to a share in the Cabinet appointments, is repelled on the same grounds. The arguments of the Moslems do not seem to be quite consistent, for while at one time they claim special protection on the ground of their backwardness, at other times they claim it on the ground of their historical and political importance, but if so, it is all the more reason why they should be able to stand on their own, since the people to whom is to be entrusted the future government of the country would not be oblivious of their importance, because the Indians are conservative by instinct and do give historical and political considerations their due weight.

91. A more plausible argument, which has a great deal of force, is that of the religious antagonism between the Hindus and the Mahommedans. The Mahommedans complain that the religious feeling between the Hindus and the Mahommedan obscures their better judgment, and makes them take sides on questions, not upon their intrinsic merit, but upon extraneous grounds. That this is at times the case cannot admit of doubt, but the remedy proposed would aggravate the evil, for it would apportion the political power between two opposing sections of the Indian electorate, and in the tug-of-war between them the real issues would be obscured.

Reasons
criticised.

92. The reason given for separate electorates is therefore, a strong reason for doing away with them. Common electorates would not exacerbate, but alleviate communal conflicts, by making both communities feel their mutual dependence, while the perpetuation of communal electorates would constantly place before the electorates their religious differences and tend to fan the flame of religious animosity, leading to the disturbance of the public peace, and generally hamper the machinery of the Government. The Moslems, like all minorities, are entitled to

preserve their language, religion and culture, and the constitution given will provide for safeguarding these as is done in the treaties of various nations of Europe, without having recourse to separate electorates. That the Moslems want a share of the practical things—or, to put it in a more popular phrase, a share in the loaves and fishes of the office—admits of no doubt. It is a perfectly natural and intelligible ambition of a people, but the Moslems cannot forget that over and above the communal and individual claims there stands the integrity and efficiency of the State, and that it cannot be permitted to be shaken for the benefit of any community. It is a truism that every man wants the best value he can get for his money : the State is only an aggregate of individuals, and consequently the State has a right to expect and demand the best value for its money. It must, therefore, place efficiency above all other claims, whether it is in the public service or in the discharge of a political or public responsibility.

93. Considered, therefore, in this light, the Moslems have no right, nor indeed any justifiable claim, to separate electorates, and what is more, to the reservation of seats in the Cabinets or in the public services. But at the same time, we cannot lose sight of the hard fact that a strong political agitation has been set up in the country which cannot be dismissed upon *a priori* grounds. We shall have to work with the co-operation of our fellow-countrymen, and until they assume a more reasonable frame of mind, we shall have to accede to their demand, provided it is not too unreasonable. It seems to us that such a demand can be satisfied by conceding to them a reservation of seats on a population basis, and we have gone even further, so as to arouse in them a feeling of civic responsibility, by making them participants in a general election, that is to say, over and above the minimum seats reserved. Mahomedans shall be free to vote in the general constituencies in which they will be eligible to contest other seats. This is the utmost limit to which the dictates of reason and prudence can dilute the general efficiency of the administration. It contains within itself a germ for the decay of the body politic, but we hope that the antidote will be soon found in the growing feeling of solidarity and the spirit of patriotism which would lead the members of Moslem opinion to reconsider their position from the standpoint of a broader and a wiser statesmanship.

94. In this connection it must be borne in mind that the scheme of communal electorates, though condemned in the Montagu Report, and subsequently by several provincial Governments "as foreign to the spirit of responsible Government" was accepted by the Southborough Committee, not upon its own merits, but because both the Hindus and the Mahomedans wanted it in pursuance of their Lucknow Pact.¹ The

Lucknow
Pact spent.

¹ Report, §§ 231, 232.

pact has since been repudiated by the Muslims, and following their repudiation the Hindus have learnt to regret that it was ever made. That pact being out of the way, there is nothing left to justify communal electorates. The Government of India were always opposed to them, for in their Fifth Despatch on the Indian Constitutional Reforms they wrote : " We feel the objections of principle to the communal system as strongly as the authors of the Reforms Report, but see no advantage at this stage in reiterating them. India is not prepared to take the first steps forward towards responsible government upon any other road. The road does not lead directly to that goal, and we can only echo the hope expressed by the Committee that ' it will be possible at no very distant date to merge all communities in one general electorate '."¹

95. The communal electorates were thus admittedly a departure from the principle, made not in consequence of any promise given by Lord Minto in 1906, or Lord Morley in 1909, since neither contemplated making a radical change in the constitution of India which was for the first time promised by the Declaration of August, 1917, and brought into being by the Act of 1919. They were made because of the Pact and because both the communities wanted it. It was expressly made as a temporary device, and it was hoped that at the next revision it would not be necessary to continue it. Both parties to the Pact have now thrown up the Pact. The two parties no longer jointly ask for its continuance. The Hindus solidly oppose it. The bulk of the Moslems wish to continue separate electorates, not on the basis of the Lucknow Pact but upon a new basis more favourable to their community. They cannot be permitted to have it both ways. If they had adhered to the Pact there would at least be the saving grace of consistency in their favour. If they had claimed for their own majority what they were prepared to concede to the Hindu majority, there would have been the merit of fairness in their favour. But they choose to play for their own hand, and want the Hindus to settle with the other minorities as best they can. The Hindus might well exclaim that while they have done many things to be sorry for in the past, they cannot consent to make *hara-kiri* of the nation on this occasion.

96. One thing is certain, the Pact itself is dead. It was jettisoned in the Nehru Report ; it was repudiated in the Moslem League Resolutions, and every shade of Moslem opinion has condemned it as failing to achieve its purpose—a conclusion in which we heartily agree. We know the history of the Pact. It was made as a dramatic gesture of national unity. Neither party anticipated that it would be translated into a real ark of the covenant, and both sides are now agreed that even as a dramatic pose it was overdone, in that it made concessions and

¹ Despatch No. 4 of 1919, dated 23rd April, 1919, para. 18.

created hopes which were as hollow as they were incapable of any degree of fulfilment, and some of its protagonists were as amazed that their scheme was embodied in an authentic record as would be the members of the All-Parties Conference if their scheme were embodied in the Revised Reform Act.

97. It seems to us, moreover, that the great national questions cannot be decided upon the basis of preceding pacts ; we cannot hypothecate posterity for the sake of a doubtful peace in the immediate future ; we must decide each question upon its own merits and we must not forget, whatever we do, that *salus populi suprema lex*.

98. It has been suggested that pernicious though the doctrine of racial elections be, it might still be given a further lease of a short life by limiting it to, say, a period of five or ten years. We would have gladly yielded to this device were we sure that it would prove the panacea for peace in the country ; we fear that far from being so, such a course would keep alive, and even stimulate, a communal agitation of which the clause in question would be made a handy weapon. Whatever we do we should not commit the mistake, if we cannot avoid the folly, of prescribing for a transitory constitution.

99. We have applied our minds to the counter proposals made by our two esteemed colleagues, as protagonists of the extreme view. They probably do not see to what extent their two proposals defeat their own purpose. Sir Zulfikar Ali Khan's proposal claims weightage in favour of minorities, but when he was asked by Raja Nawab Ali Khan if he would extend his weightage to the Hindu minority in the Punjab, his reply was an emphatic negation. This and other contradictions apart, neither proposal strikes us as real goods intended for delivery.

100. It might be urged, and if it is urged it would not be without reason, that our solution of reservation of seats creates a *casus belli* sufficiently strong to keep alive and to feed the militant spirit. Dr. Suhrawardy's proposal says that if you want to take a hand in the management of my house, let me first manage yours and see how you like it. Dr. Suhrawardy's conditions for the eventual removal of communalism are calculated to perpetuate it. We suffer from no delusion in thinking that it will ever lead to the creation of a national spirit in the country ; we feel that our best security, if not our strength, lies in the righteousness of our ethics, since even hardened consciences sometimes quake before the white light of reason. In any case, our proposal is a *pis aller* which is not fraught with the same danger of fomenting communalism and it is a move in the right direction—that towards the ultimate establishment of a national unity.

Lord Minto's
promise.

101. In the evidence given in India some reference was made to Lord Minto's promise to give the Moslems separate representation ; that promise was fulfilled at the ensuing reforms against which the promise was made. It could not enure for all time even where the entire structure of the Government is altered. As Lord Chelmsford said at the opening of the new Legislature in 1921 :—

“ The conclusion at which we arrived was that British policy must seek a new point of departure, a fresh orientation. On the lines of the Morley-Minto Reforms there could be no further advance.”

It is only when such government becomes a possibility that an antithesis between the two becomes apparent. So long as the function of the councils was merely advisory and the keys of the administration were held by the bureaucracy the separate representation of the Mahomedans could only gratify their sentiment without endangering the machinery of administration. But the case becomes different when the sceptre of authority is transferred from the sovereign to the people. It is only then that the people must receive it with joined hands ; they cannot divide it without undermining the basis of authority. A new policy adumbrated by the declaration of 1917 called for a new outlook. The Montagu Report recognises this obvious fact, but though lamenting it, had to yield to the Lucknow Pact as a *via media* which it had to follow, though it did not approve of it. Ten years have since passed and the religious chasm between the two peoples, already wide, has become wider. It calls for the necessity of a bridge, and it is hoped that a declaration of their national unity, initiated by a common electorate, may accelerate a transition from the semblance to the real which all lovers of India desire to see. This fruition will become easier if the age-long social barriers to social intercourse and inter-marriage are removed. May the mother of Parliaments impart her tried wisdom in this respect to her youngest offspring, and may the child ponder over the thought that as the race is greater than the man, so the State is greater than the race, and whatever is conducive to its well-being and progress is well worth a small sacrifice both of the man and of the race.

Separation of
Moslem
India.

102. We have already commented upon the proposal to create a solid Moslem enclave along the Indus. If the frontiers of the Muslim world are proposed to extend from the Punjab to Karachi, there must be some policy behind the proposal on which leaders of both communities have so far preserved a discreet silence. But the fact remains, and has been pressed upon us that the Moslems want the altered boundaries because their co-religionists in Sind stand in the majority of 74 to 26, and the North-Western Frontier Province and Baluchistan are both essentially Moslem provinces.

But we have still to learn how the springing of full-fledged responsibility upon those Provinces will be conducive to the peace and good government in the rest of India, not excluding them. We should not be understood as in the least implying that comparatively newly acquired territories should not go forward ; but what we cannot realize is that reforms should be thrust upon a people who have so long only lived by the law of tooth and claw. To them the reforms would mean nothing. For them the reforms would mean only a figure of speech which may even retard their healthy development and growing self-consciousness.

103. We have already dealt with both sides of the question regarding the separation of Sind upon its own merits, which is further the subject of a note of dissent (Ch. IX (II)), and though the majority have applied to it the principle of self-determination, we leave its final solution to Parliament. For the same reason, we do not wish to advert here more fully to the question of extending the same measure of reforms to the North West Frontier Province.¹

Separation of
Sind.

104. The next demand that Muslims should be given adequate representation in all public services cannot be supported by any *a priori* ground, or the precedent of other countries. It is a general principle that as a man is wise in getting the best servant he can obtain for his money so the State, to be wise, must equally apply other people's money, of which it is a custodian and a trustee, by employing the best servants it can secure for them. All the same, the same rigid regard to axiomatic principles does not obtain in the case of States as it does in the case of individuals—and a departure from the normal would be justified if it is likely to be conducive to the better satisfaction of all its component communities. With this principle in our mind we have provided for the adequate representation of all communities in the public services, but we hope that in the application of this principle to individual cases or communities the primary condition of efficiency will not be sacrificed—for every child in the nursery knows that for want of a nail the shoe was lost ; and for want of a sufficiently efficient public service the peace and progress of the entire State might be placed in jeopardy. It is not so only in security services, since there can be no such thing as a security link in a chain of interdependent services, who are called upon to take concerted action and to bring into play all their reserve strength in the face of a crisis on an occasion of emergency.

Share of the
Public
Services.

105. In another chapter we have quoted the opinions of the several Provincial Governments who complain of the canker worm of communalism as eating into the very vitals of local bodies.² (§§ 156.) It is said that since both the Hindu and the Muslim systems are based upon rigid religious sanctions and for centuries the two communities have made religious

¹ See Ch. VII (III).

² See Ch. III (II).

combats their national pastime ; that their interest in politics is only a decade old, and would soon become a side issue when the combatants can safely rely upon a more easily moving war cry, and that, therefore, there can be no hope for the future of Indian Reforms and of weaning the multitude from their religious obsession unless the two communities combine and elect their joint representatives. It is only then that the religious mania will abate in favour of a sprouting national sense, and in course of time when posterity has acquired a sufficient political consciousness, it will thank those who, in spite of much public obliquity, and it may be sacrifice of personal predilection, have the courage to stand firmly by a principle which alone can contribute to the making of a nation. But not as theoretical visionaries of the future, but as hard practical men, how can we close our eyes to the havoc the introduction of communal electorates have wrought in the past ? And how can we in the face of the world opinion and the serious mischief they have already wrought during the last decade and their potentiality for endless mischief in the future recommend their continuance even for another term of years ? Such a course would be even more detrimental to the peace of India for it would become a fresh *causus belli* for communal tumults and widespread disturbances engineered by designing men who profit by the quarrels of other people.

Share in the
Cabinets.

106. The third demand of the Conference is that Moslems should have their due share in the Central and Provincial Cabinets. We have no doubt that they will get it, but what the resolution is stated to imply is that it should be made a part of the statutory safeguard in favour of the Moslems. It cannot be seriously argued that a Moslem Minister should be appointed in every Province, say for instance in the Central Provinces where the Moslem population is only a fraction over 3 per cent. We have made provision for the appointment of three Ministers there. If then the Moslem contention be conceded they would get one Minister while the remaining 97 per cent. must rest content with the other two. Such a demand cannot be characterised as merely unreasonable ; for it is grotesque. And those who make it would still clothe the cabinet with collective responsibility and make it responsible to the Legislature. How is a Minister responsible when he owes his appointment to the compulsion of the Statute, and not to the confidence of the Legislature, and what safeguards must the legislature secure against the vagaries of such a Minister if he does not possess, or possessing forfeits, the confidence of his colleagues ; why should the latter be turned out because he had misbehaved ? We have heard of vicarious punishments but the doctrine has never been carried to such a farcical length.

The demand is, of course, unprecedented, and those who make it must be well aware that no responsible body of men can seriously countenance it.

107. The fourth demand is even more unreasonable for what the demand amounts to is this ; that in the Provinces of Punjab, Bengal and Sind, if it is separated, the Muslims should be assured of the majority of seats in the Legislature, and in the other Provinces where they are in a minority they should continue to enjoy their present weightage. This is clearly a case of heads I win and tails you lose. For if the Mahommedans are to receive weightage in the Hindu Provinces why should not the Hindus equally receive weightage in the Punjab and in Bengal where they are in a minority ? The Mahommedan protagonists of this view repudiate the unfortunate Lucknow Pact which compelled Mr. Montagu to suffer separate elections. That Pact does not give the Muslims a decisive majority in these two Provinces, while in others, by way of a set off, it fixes a proportion in excess of their number. Under the Montagu Scheme this proportion is altered so that it is even more favourable to Musalmans as is apparent from the following table :—

Provinces.	Hindus.	Muslims.	Under the Lucknow Pact out of only elected seats, i.e., 70 to 75 p.c.	Under the Reforms out of the total.
			Per cent.	Per cent.
Madras	37,511,012	2,840,488	15	13·2
Bombay	14,814,720	3,820,153	40	34·2
Bengal	20,203,527	25,210,802	33·3	31·3
United Provinces ..	38,405,624	6,481,032	30	29
Punjab	6,379,888	11,444,321	50	47·8
Bihar and Orissa ..	28,161,118	3,690,182	25	23·6
Central Provinces ..	11,621,398	563,574	15	12·7
Assam	4,132,409	2,202,460	Nil.	30·7

108. The statutory insurance of a fixed majority for any community is, as we have already pointed out, the very antithesis of any form of popular government democratic or representative. It is a collective despotism unredeemable as all despotisms are by the dethronement of the despot. The election of the despots by the community is merely the elimination of those who might have shown themselves more tolerant of the opposition. Their retention in power is doubly insured by the statute and the *nexus* of religion. They might be guilty of the worst abuses, corruption, jobbery, organised oppression, intolerable tyranny, but the opposition would be powerless to correct the abuse or thwart their action. A revolution is the only thing left to them, but the statute transfers the duty of quelling it to the Central Government who *volens volens* must keep the despots in power, for even if they should pause, there are the 33 per cent. of the Moslems in the Central Legislature to force their hands—and 33 per cent. count.

One-third
Moslem
representa-
tion in the
Central
Legislature.

109. The demand that the Moslems should have 33 per cent. of the members of the Central Legislature is based on no intelligible principle. Why should the Muslims demand 33 per cent. when their number entitled them to no more than 27 per cent. ? And if they claim weightage, why should not the other minorities do the same ?

Separation
of Sind.

110. The next Muslim demand that Sind should be separated from Bombay and given a separate similar constitution can only be justified on the ground which underlies the entire fabric of the Muslim demand, namely, that the Muslims desire to partition off the Hindu from the Muhammadan India, and hold the Hindu minority in the latter as hostages for the good behaviour of the Hindus elsewhere. This is not democracy, not even a colourable imitation of it. It is the establishment of an armistice with all the strategic positions surrendered to the adversary. The effect of this proposal, if acceded to, would, as is apparent, make the Moslems in five provinces supreme and their government impervious to the criticisms, or the attack of the opposition. And yet H. H. the Aga Khan, in his presidential address, pleaded for mutual trust and confidence. For did he not say, "It is impossible for Moslems to live happily and peacefully in India if friction and suspicion are to prevail between them and the Hindus" ? Is the Moslem scheme calculated to remove or even reduce friction or allay suspicion ? It seems to us that the only panacea for engendering mutual confidence is to make the two communities inter-dependent. The extreme Moslem scheme makes for a perpetual cleavage and not for cohesion. Even the Moslem India would be at the mercy of such an oligarchy. For the Moslems who may feel oppressed by their own majority can never appeal to their Hindu brethren for assistance in their helplessness. And yet His Highness the Aga Khan charged the Conference "to organise all the Moslem members of each and every council into a body where exchange of views and ideas and communication of the same to the elector as well as the reception of the general desires of the masses would remain the main purpose and object." "In politically successful countries," he added, "from the Prime Minister or the President to the humblest voter, it is but one succession of nerve lines of communication".¹

Gag on the
Legislatures.

111. Of all the demands the ninth appears to us to be the most objectionable and least defensible, since we are seriously advised that the Imperial Statute should prescribe that no Bill, resolution, motion or amendment "regarding the inter-communal matters" shall be moved, discussed or passed by any legislature if three-fourths of the majority of members of either Hindu or Moslem community oppose its introduction, discussion or passing. In the first place, the resolution is silent

¹ Conference Report, p. 21.

as to who is to decide that the subject is one "relating to inter-communal matters." In the second place, suppose it affects two or more communities, can the majority of a single community, however small and insignificant, shut out from debate all such matter though the other communities comparatively large and important favour its passing. Thirdly, what is an inter-communal-matter? The Hindu and Mohammedan religions are all embracing, and their impact upon social and even economic questions are sometimes so subtle and so far-reaching that almost any subject worth the name might conceivably raise such an issue. Fourthly, how is a member to show that it is not an inter-communal matter if he is to be gagged at the outset? Fifthly, how can there be any progress by ruling out at their very threshold all progress and measures of social reform, however beneficial? Sixthly, if this resolution were adopted, would not the communities remain rigid and hide-bound living fossils of a by-gone age, and how is a national life to be evolved out of such statutorily made stagnant heterogeneous communities? Lastly, is it "democratic" to muzzle the voice of democracy by such an exasperating piece of legislation which renders the very mention of inter-communal matters taboo in a Legislature?

112. Arguments yield place to astonishment when such resolutions are solemnly passed at a public conference by a responsible body of men, many of them men who have justly earned a reputation for level-headed statesmanship.

113. Lastly, we happily come to a demand which we can heartily reciprocate for it is a righteous demand for the protection and promotion of Moslem education, language and personal law. We would commend this desire to "promote" the personal law not only of the Moslems but that of the Hindus, which is in many respects out of date and needs to be modernised. We do not know what is implied by the "promotion" of the Moslem religion, nor have we quite grasped the significance of the Moslem claim to a due share in grants-in-aid, since no grants-in-aid are made to Hindus, or, indeed, to any community as such, and we entirely deprecate any such grants-in-aid unless it be for affording special facilities for educational purposes.

114. We have commented at some length upon this set of resolutions, because they have even been pressed upon our notice by two of our Moslem colleagues, and outside our own rank there is a feeling widely entertained that the Delhi Conference has given the final password to Moslem aspirations and Moslem claims. Some of us who love that great community and wish it to grow up and rise in the scale of world's estimation feel sorely distressed at the intransigent attitude displayed in these and similar resolutions. We know that many Moslem leaders are out of sympathy with them, but we equally appeal to those who have their country's interest at heart to employ a larger vision and take a longer view of the political problems and remember that the tumult and turmoil of to-day is but transient and a passing

Protection of
Moslem
interests.

phase, and that the laws we make now should ensure and be for the lasting good of all communities taken in the aggregate—never even caring what little harm it may do or seem to do to some of them in the immediate future. Let them not move their hand from the plough because it buries in its furrows some harmless insects. Let them remember that if the plough swerves from its course there would be no harvest and many more insects would die of disease and distress.

III.

PROTECTION OF THE MINORITIES.

115. In his speech on the second reading of the Reforms Act, Mr. Montagu had charged the people of India that their ultimate destiny was in their own hands if they devoted themselves to use with wisdom, with self-restraint, with respect for minorities the great opportunities with which Parliament was entrusting them. We have shown elsewhere in this report to what extent India has responded to his invitation. In this Chapter we propose to explain our view regarding the minorities. Their question obscured all other questions during the course of our inquiry. Communal and class claims were everywhere urged with an insistence and volubility, not to say tiresome repetitions, that for the time being we wondered whether we were sitting as a constitutional Committee or only as a communal Committee to compose the communal differences. And frequent analogies were drawn by the witness from the class representation to which we stood committed as furnishing an argument for the retention of communal electorates. Some of us took pains to explain to the protagonists of this agitation that classes were one thing, communities another ; that while classes were fluid and open to any one to join, communities were rigid and did not admit of variation except by conversion which is a matter of conscience and, therefore, must be ruled out of the discussion.

116. All the same the question of minorities remains, and we have to adapt our constitution so that it does not prejudice their undoubted rights. That the minorities possess some rights of their own calling for protection admits of no doubt. But what those rights are and how they can be protected are questions upon which there exists a sharp conflict of views ; and all we can do is to take for our guidance the examples of other countries where similar questions have arisen and in which communal claims have been the subject of legislative protection. We shall in this note, first deal with the protection of Mahomedans, next with the protection of the Depressed Classes, and lastly with the protection of Indian Christians, Anglo-Indians, and other minorities.

Protection
of the
Mahomedan
Minorities.

117. The communal representation of the Mahomedans in the Indian Legislature and in public services has almost monopolised their contribution during the course of our tour throughout India, and as that claim is still stressed by two of

our colleagues on the Central Committee, it is necessary to examine it and see how far we are prepared to meet it. The claim of the Moslems was originally laid as one generally arising out of the protection of minorities, and it is in this light that it has been examined by several authorities ; but latterly, while the basis of the claim is still made on that ground the quantum of recognition is varied on the ground of the political and historical importance of that community. We wish to examine the claim in its dual aspect, and in order to make our position intelligible, we would sub-divide the subject as follows :—

- (a) Their claim considered as a minority ;
- (b) Their claim considered as an important minority community in India ;
- (c) Their claim on the ground of their political and historical importance.

(a)—This question has been considered in its general light. The question of the claim of minorities can only admit of one solution. It was stated as far back as 1922 by Mr. Noel Buxton who summarised the views of the League of Nations in his volume called “ The Depressed People and the League of Nations ”⁽¹⁾ in the following words :—

Solution of the question by the League of Nations.

“ There can be no better solution of the minorities problem ; democratic self-government is only possible if the various races co-operate in the task of government ; and roughly aspirations descriptive of each group can be fulfilled if they are limited in expression to culture : i.e., language, education and religion.”

118. More recently (as late as January, 1929), the same question came under more detailed examination at the hands of the same body who have published two short pamphlets on the “ Protection of Minorities ”⁽²⁾ and on the “ Protection of Linguistic, Racial or Religious Minorities by the League of Nations ”⁽³⁾ ; from the latter brochure we make the following quotations, which seem to indicate the attitude of the League. M. De Mello-Franco, in supporting the Draft Resolution to the effect already summarised above, stated :—

Protection of the minorities in other countries.

“ If the history of the treaties prior to the Treaty of Versailles be examined with regard to the question of minorities, it is easy to see that the origin of the protection of religious minorities is to be found in international documents far older than the Treaty of Versailles. The first treaty, however, which stipulated expressly that in any country a class of subjects should not be recognised to be inferior to other classes, not only for religious but also for racial reasons, was the Treaty of Paris of March 30th, 1856,

¹ London : J. M. Dent & Sons, pp. 86, 87.

² Official No. C-24. M., dated 18th January, 1929.

³ August, 1927.

concluded after the Crimean War. From that date, the question of racial or religious minorities received greater attention from Governments. It should be noted, however, that the question was only raised on certain historic occasions, such as that of the incorporation of the territory of one State with that of another, or that of territorial reconstructions resulting from war, or that of the constitution of new States, or that which resulted from struggles on the part of certain States against the oppression of other States. Examples of this were the Treaty of Berlin on July 13th, 1878, which imposed religious toleration on newly created States and on autonomous principalities (Bulgaria, Serbia and Roumania) as an indispensable condition to an international recognition of their existence ; and the Treaty of Vienna (May 31st, 1815) between the Netherlands, Great Britain, Russia, Prussia and Austria, regarding the reunion of Belgium with Holland.

* * *

“ A minority as defined by the treaties assuring its protection is not only a racial group incorporated in the body of a nation of which the majority forms a different racial unit. There is also a psychological, social and historical attribute constituting, perhaps, for the purpose, the definition which we are seeking, its principal differential characteristic. The mere co-existence of groups of persons forming collective entities, racially different, in the territory and under the jurisdiction of a State is not sufficient to create the obligation to recognise the existence in that State, side by side with the majority of its population, of a minority requiring a protection entrusted to the League of Nations.

* * *

“ The introduction into the laws of all countries of provisions protecting minorities would be enough to cause them to spring up where they were least expected, to provoke unrest among them, to cause them to pose as having been sacrificed, and generally to create an artificial agitation of which no one up to that moment dreamed. It would be rather like the imaginary illnesses from which so many people think themselves suffering the moment they read a book on popular medicine.

* * *

“ It seems to me obvious that those who conceived this system of protection did not dream of creating within certain States a group of inhabitants who would regard themselves as permanently foreign to the general organisation of the country. On the contrary, they wished the elements of the population contained in such a group to enjoy a status of legal protection which might ensure respect for

the inviolability of the person under all its aspects and which might gradually prepare the way for conditions necessary for the establishment of a complete national unity.

* * *

“ We must, he said, avoid creating a State within a State. We must prevent the minority from transforming itself into a privileged caste and taking definite form as a foreign group instead of becoming fused in the society in which it lives. If take the exaggerated conception of the autonomy of minorities to the last extreme, these minorities will become disruptive elements in the State and a source of national disorganisation.

* * *

“ The decision has been taken, not only to protect, as before, *individuals considered separately*, but to a certain extent to attribute rights to *minorities regarded as collective entities*. There is thus formulated for the first time the rights of minorities, as such, as organised unities. We no longer confine ourselves to considering that the rights of minorities are individual rights. The minority is regarded as a whole, and this minority is recognised, in a sense, to have a right of organisation or autonomy. This is a solution which perhaps is not without certain dangers ; for, if equality of treatment of all the inhabitants of a country is an element of political and social peace, the recognition of rights belonging to minorities as separate entities, by increasing their coherence and developing among them a sense of their own strength, may provoke them to separate themselves from the State of which they form part ; and, in view of the right of peoples to dispose of themselves, the recognition of the rights of these minorities runs the risk of leading to the disruption of States.”

Sir Austen Chamberlain associated himself with the views of M. de Mello-Franco, adding :—

View of a
British
Minister.

“ It was certainly not the intention of those who had devised this system, as M. de Mello-Franco has remarked, to establish in the midst of nations a community which would remain permanently estranged from the national life.”

This view was unanimously acceded to ; even M. Mehdi-Fraseri, representative of Albania did not place his country's claim on a higher basis : indeed, on the contrary, he admitted the injustice of the claim that the Albanian minorities in Greece should be subject to the normal procedure.

119. The subject of the claim for minorities has engaged the attention of British administrators from very early times. The question of the French and British subjects in Canada called for an expression of opinion on the part of Lord Durham, who

Minority in
Canada.

in a celebrated despatch which culminated in the new constitution now enjoyed by that country, referred to the bitter hostility existing between the two races which had been carried to the extent of complete social estrangement. The new constitution provided for a common electorate, and it is well known that the French and English are now on the friendliest terms, which would not have been the case if the cleavage which existed before the grant of dominion status to that country had been further widened by the creation of separate electorates. In the United States of America there are nineteen conflicting races, but it has been the policy of the United States to assimilate these races into a harmonious whole, and that purpose is in the process of fruition, consequent upon their subjection to a common electorate and a common constitution. The same view has prevailed with the framers of the South African constitution, where the conflict between the Boers and the British resulted in the South African War, on the close of which, while the two nations remained distinct and are up to the present moment antagonistic, they have nevertheless a joint electorate and neither has a claim for special protection on the ground of its linguistic, racial ethnological, cultural or historical differences. In New Zealand, where the Maoris are in direct contact with the whites, there is, we believe, no separate electorate.

View of the
Ceylon
Reforms
Committee.

120. In the case of Ceylon the question engaged the attention of Lord Donoughmore's Committee, who have done away with communal representation in the Ceylon Legislative Council, and wrote of it in the following terms :—

“ It is generally agreed that communal representation is least desirable when on a religious basis. Religious tolerance is essential in a country with any approach to democratic institutions and there should be no need for the protection for a particular faith which special representation of that faith in the Legislature implies. The main ground on which the claim for this representation is made is that certain laws and customs of the Muslims, based on their religion, differ from those of the larger communities and that disabilities in these matters might be imposed by the Legislature in the absence of Muslim spokesmen. It was, however, admitted by Muslim representatives who appeared before us that if this occurred it would be by no deliberate intention but through ignorance or misunderstanding. It is the hope of the Commission that the carrying out of the recommendations of this Report will not result in the absence of persons of the Muslim faith from the Legislative Council, but that these will obtain entrance as territorial members and not as religious representatives. Even if that were not to happen, however, we suggest that a representative body of Muslims, appointed by themselves to safeguard those special interests which are thought likely to be affected, would be in a position to make representation to the Legis-

lative Council, and would almost certainly secure fair and just consideration of any questions at issue. Apart from this, the increased powers suggested for the Governor in another part of the Report would be available to prevent injustice to Muslims as to any other minority community. This view may not be immediately acceptable to the general body of Muslims, but we are satisfied that there is little fear in the interests of Muslims themselves that communal representation for them should cease and that they should now be identified with the general electorate. It is interesting to note the disintegrating effect of communal representation on the community itself as illustrated by the case of the Muslims in Ceylon. . . . Their merging in the general electorate will link them up more definitely with the other communities of Ceylon as an element in a population which, though diverse in character, has yet a common country and should possess a common national consciousness."¹

"It was generally admitted, even by many communal representatives themselves, that the communal form of appointment to the Legislative Council was a necessary evil and should only continue until conditions of friendliness and acknowledgment of common aims were developed among the different communities. It is our opinion, however, that the very existence of communal representation tends to prevent the development of these relations, and that only by its abolition will it be possible for the various diverse communities to develop together a true national unity."

"Communal representation in Ceylon has no great antiquity to commend it, and its introduction into the constitution with good intention has had unfortunate results. As has already been suggested, it tends to keep communities apart and to send communal representatives to the Council with the idea of defending particular interests instead of giving their special contribution to the common weal."²

121. Finally, they recommended that communal representation, which has been baneful to the growth of civic responsibility and the development of a common bond of citizenship, should be done away with. Their reasons apply with equal, if not greater, force to the Mahomedans of India.

122. In the Montagu-Chelmsford Report there are frequent references to the Hindu-Muslim question, and while the authors strongly deprecate the recognition of communal claims to a separate electorate, they were constrained to give effect to them, because of the existence of the Lucknow Pact, by which they felt themselves bound.³

View in the
Montagu
Report.

¹ Ceylon Reforms Report, pp. 93, 94.

² *Ib.* p. 99.

³ Report, §§ 227, 231.

123. After careful review of the conditions prevailing in many countries the learned authors of the Report say as follows :—

“ We conclude unhesitatingly that the history of self-government among the nations who developed it and spread it throughout the world is decisively against the admission by the State of any divided allegiance ; against the State's arranging its members in any way which encourages them to think of themselves primarily as citizens of any smaller unit than itself.”¹

They then add :—

“ A minority which is given special representation owing to its weak and backward state is positively encouraged to settle down into a feeling of satisfied security ; it is under no inducement to educate and qualify itself to make good the ground which it has lost compared with the stronger majority. On the other hand, the latter will be tempted to feel that they have done all they need do for their weaker fellow-countrymen and that they are free to use their power for their own purposes. The give-and-take which is the essence of political life is lacking. There is no inducement to the one side to forbear or to the other to exert itself. The communal system stereotypes existing relations. We regard any system of communal electorates, therefore, as a very serious hindrance to the development of the self-governing principle.”²

124. Finally, however, as already stated, the authors of the Report had to accede to prolonging the system of separate representation, in spite of their condemnation, owing mainly to the existence of the Lucknow Pact. Its effect upon the local bodies and on the councils is reported to be throughout detrimental to their usefulness and efficiency.

125. In the course of the evidence given before us in India both communities admitted that the communal tension between the two great communities—the Hindus and the Moslems—had become intensified and that it had been the prime cause of frequent outbreaks of lawlessness. But while the Hindus as a body ascribed this growing tension to the introduction of separate electorates the Moslems as a body denied it, but a perusal of the several memoranda submitted to us by the Provincial Governments have convinced us that separate electorates have tended to inflame communal passions and communal representation in the local bodies has tended to growing communal bitterness. In our Chapter on the working of Local Self-Government we have quoted the opinions of several local governments, notably that of the Punjab, where communal electorates have converted the local bodies into cockpits for communal conflicts rather than instruments for the disposal of public business

Hindu-
Moslem
tension.

¹ Report, § 228.

² *Ib.* § 231.

resulting in their paralysis and which threatens to be permanent. A similar fate awaits the local councils where similar tendencies are growing to which some local governments ascribe their partial failure.

126. Thus the United Provinces Government reports : " communal feeling was strong, though usually latent in the second council. It is still stronger in the present legislature, though for tactical reasons the nationalists and swarajists have refrained from bringing forward any motion which would be regarded by the Muhammedans as a direct challenge—an attack, however, by a member of one community on a Minister or member of the Executive Council, belonging to that community is viewed with suspicion by the co-religionists of the latter, who generally rally to his support."¹

127. In the Punjab dyarchy was reduced to a mere communism, if we may coin a word, under which one community in power supported its members and ministers and kept at bay those similarly arranged to dethrone them. It warped the sound sense of the members and turned debates into racial forays. To quote the Official Report : " The growing bitterness of feeling between the Muslims and Hindus has, of course, had its effect on the proceedings of the council, and there have latterly been few debates in which the communal tone has not been prominent. Communal feeling in the council probably reached its highest point in Money-lenders' Bill in July, 1926, a few weeks after the rioting at Rawalpindi, which had resulted in many fatalities and much destruction of property."²

The Report proceeds to refer to the formation of two parties—the urban and the rural ; but these were submerged in the communal vortex and intrigues and compacts between groups formed in accordance with their communal or personal leanings. " The bonds of party discipline are loose, and on the occasion of important division it is seldom safe to assume that all members of a party will obey the party whip. On such occasions it is common to see small groups of members engaged in animated but confidential conversations in the lobbies and waiting rooms, and occasionally members are induced to absent themselves from the divisions or even to vote in opposition to the majority of their party by personal appeals. One may infer that the Punjab politician has still to learn the advantage of party solidarity."³

128. That the communal virus has infested not only the councillors and members of local bodies but is corrupting all grades of society from the highest to the lowest, was strikingly demonstrated by the Report of the Indian Bar Councils Committee who while recommending the formation of Bar Councils in all the High Courts, had to draw a line against Punjab, where owing to the prevalence of communalism it was considered unsafe to entrust the fate of legal practitioners to a Bar Council, and in

Official view
of com-
munalism.

¹ Report, p. 207.

² *Ib.* p. 256.

³ *Ib.* p. 257.

the subsequent debate on the Bill no attempt was made to controvert this fact or to remove the invidious exception which deprives Punjab of the privilege of an autonomous Bar. Sir Mahomad Shafi, who is a distinguished member of that Bar, could not be unaware of the intensity of feeling engendered, as the Official Report points out in another connection, by the periodical visualisation of the antagonism between the three rival communities who place the advancement of their own communal interest as the primary duty with which the fact of separate representation naturally charges them.

It is unnecessary to multiply quotations, because as we have shown statesmen, politicians, international jurists, the Provincial Governments and impartial observers of all shades of opinion are agreed on the mischief and danger arising from communal electorates, which were reluctantly conceded in the existing constitution owing to a *stare decisis* which no longer holds good.

Lord Minto's
assurance.

We have already dealt with the implications of Lord Minto's promise and pointed out that even if that promise were to enure for all time, a new constitution in consistence with it can only be worked even if some sacrifice has to be made.¹

129. But no such sacrifice is necessarily involved in the recommendation the majority of us have decided to make. For, as will be apparent from the terms of our resolution, we have given the Moslem minority protection by the reservation of seats on the basis of their population or upon their voting strength whichever is more favourable to them. In strict logic we were bound to extend the same principle to the Hindu minorities in the two Provinces of Punjab and Bengal, but while we have extended the principle to the Hindus in Punjab we have not done so in Bengal.

In all the provinces the reservations will, of course, apply only to the seats for contest in the general electorates, those reserved for special classes and interests being open to all alike. It is hoped that these latter may form a centre party and minimise the evil that must necessarily flow from the retention of communalism.

Protection
of the
minorities.

130. Though the Committee has given effect to its general resolution giving the Moslems proportional reservation of seats, it must not be understood that it came to this decision without carefully considering other proposals to safeguard the Moslem interests. A committee of one Hindu and all the three of our Moslem colleagues was appointed to explore other possibilities. This Committee held several sittings and after eliminating other

schemes fixed upon the two following as offering a practical solution :—

(1) That the contest be limited to a panel of candidates to be approved by the Moslems.

(2) That no election of a Moslem candidate be held good unless he secures a majority of the Moslem votes polled and at least 10 per cent. of the Hindu votes polled.

The second proposal was unanimously approved by the Committee which, however, broke up upon two of our Moslem colleagues insisting upon other concessions on the lines of the Delhi proposals to which we have already devoted a separate note.

On the whole we feel that if our Muslim brethren are to grow up it can only be by abandoning the chimera of communalism which will soon atrophy their mental vision and paralyse their national development.

IV.

THE DEPRESSED CLASSES.

131. The depressed classes belong to the lowest rung of the Hindu social ladder and number over forty-four millions or about 16 per cent. of the total population of British India. Treated as helots and subjected to every conceivable mark of humiliation by the upper classes, these unfortunate people have remained the submerged tenth of the population. Many of them have found refuge in conversions to other faiths, but the bulk of them remain loyal to their ancestral faith, pursue the lowly calling of their forbears and were till recently content to lead their secluded and degraded lives—contented because they were told that their present condition was but the logical sequence of their sins in the past lives. Reconciled to the irredeemable *Karma*, the Pariah became a byword for the outcast ; but an outcast had still some self-respect, which was denied to the Pariah who was every moment of his life subjected to growing persecution and social ostracism. Though technically a Hindu, he was denied entry even into the precincts of a Hindu temple, though in reality a citizen, he could not enter the public school or draw water from a public well or even walk on a public highway. Even his shadow polluted the Brahmin upon whose appearance he was to lie in the bush or hide himself behind a tree. Despised and downtrodden, the Pariah eked out his little life by engaging in servile and inoffensive pursuits. When the Great War broke out many of them entered the Labour Corps, and rendered useful service. Coming into closer contact with labourers of other races and experiencing the levelling conditions of field service, the Adi Dravida returned and brought home to his people the new knowledge of social conditions he had witnessed elsewhere. The War had altered the proletariat outlook in the West. Its repercussion began to be felt even in the remotest hamlet in the East, and the Pariah shook off his slumber and

Their
position.

began to demand at least those elementary rights which even the abjectest of mortals might claim. Resisted in his uplift, the Adi Dravida began to show a capacity for organisation, and, encouraged by the rising tide of the non-Brahmin movement and its triumph against Brahmanism, the Pariah too attained a class consciousness of his own ; and he has since succeeded in marshalling an army of sympathisers and co-workers even from amongst the caste Hindus ; so that when we visited the Provinces we found ourselves in the presence of several deputations of the depressed classes who demanded their due participation in the government of the country which was strongly supported by their erstwhile oppressors. These classes were, however, not so well organised when Mr. Montagu visited India, and he dismissed them with only a casual reference in his Report.¹ They were easily persuaded to join the general boycott which awaited the arrival of the Franchise Committee presided over by Lord Southborough.

**Communal
Electoralates.**

132. In this connection it must be borne in mind that communal electoralates though condemned in the Montagu Report and subsequently both by the Central and several Provincial Governments "as foreign to the spirit of responsible government" were accepted by the Southborough Committee who had no alternative but to accept the joint demand of the Hindus and Mahomedans in pursuance of their Lucknow Pact. The pact made no reference to the Depressed Classes, and as they were then neither sufficiently vocal nor organized, their representation was limited to nomination which has since been condemned by their deputations which appeared before us and their representative on our Committee. But their representation by nomination was the only method recommended by the Joint Committee who said that "the Government of India should, as it advises, be instructed to give such classes a larger share of representation by nomination, regard being had to the numbers of Depressed Classes in each province, and after consultation with the local Governments. This representation should, if necessary, be in addition to, but not in diminution of the general electoralates."²

**Reference
to the South-
borough
Committee.**

133. Following the recommendation the Southborough Committee wrote :—

"In assigning the number of seats in each Council to which non-official representatives may be appointed by nomination, we have been guided by the existence of the important claims or interests which could not be expected to obtain representation by any practicable system of election. Thus we have been driven to the expedient of nomination for the representation of the Depressed Classes, because in no case did we find it possible to provide an electorate on

¹ § 155.

² See note on cl. (7), Government of India Act (Official Ed.), p. 15.

any satisfactory system of franchise. We have indicated in each province the special interests which we consider should retain such representation.”⁽¹⁾

134. Their actual representation in the various legislative bodies is then, and under our recommendation would be, as follows :—

				<i>At present No.</i>	<i>As recom- mended by us.</i>
Council of State	Nil	Nil
Assembly	1	12
<i>Provincial Councils.</i>					
Madras	10	14
Bombay	2	8
Bengal	1	8
United Provinces	1	10
Bihar and Orissa	2	6
Punjab	Nil	6
Central Provinces and Berar	4	8
Assam	Nil	9
Burma	Nil	—

135. We feel impressed by the view taken by the spokesmen of the Depressed Classes that both their number and the method of their representation are inadequate and unsatisfactory. Their deputations condemned with one voice the selection of their representatives by official nominations. The officials have, on the other hand, shown that in most cases no other alternative is feasible. We have recommended the substitution of election—direct or even indirect—for the present system of nomination wherever possible. We could not do more, as we are not sure that a uniform method of election can be substituted *per saltum*. The Depressed Classes are found unevenly scattered throughout the country. They are to be found in every village where they are employed to perform menial service. It is true that they live apart, but still it may not be possible to form compact constituencies in so many geographical areas; and even if possible, other considerations may supervene to make them either unpracticable or difficult. We have, therefore, decided to leave the method of election or where this is not possible, selection to each local Government.

136. As we are deciding upon a mere reservation of seats in joint electorates, we hope that it might be possible for them to be returned by election in larger numbers than would have been possible under a scheme of separate electorates.

137. Our colleague, Rao Bahadur M. C. Rajah, has, however, ^{Reservation} convinced the majority of our Committee that an exception of seats.

Ib. They included in that class also Labour until “under trial conditions seem likely to give rise to Labour problems.”

should be made in the case of Madras where with the abject condition of his community they would not be safe in a joint electorate. Some of us have, with the greatest hesitation, yielded to his pressure, though we are far from convinced that his reasons justify the exception.

138. It will be remembered that communal electorates have been condemned by all statesmen and writers and they find a singular departure from every known constitution of civilised countries in the world. The Southborough Committee reluctantly accepted them in the case of the Moslems observing that whatever the defects of the compromise it was not one which they ought to reopen. That eventually weighed with the House of Commons when Mr. Montagu assured the House that it was only a temporary makeshift. The Reforms Committee, 1924, went into the question, and while they could not then recommend their abolition they cautioned against their extension. In the case of the Depressed Classes such extension would, we think, stand in the way of their own social uplift which would be accelerated by the Hindus being made to feel their dependence upon their votes. The zeal of the canvasser would soon obliterate the barrier of caste. It is doing so in the case of the higher castes. It cannot do otherwise in their case. But there are other reasons which we have categorised elsewhere.

Extent of
their repre-
sentation.

139. The next question to which we addressed ourselves was the one relating to the extent of their representation. We think that our proposal gives the Depressed Classes a sufficiently satisfactory representation.

It is not exactly in proportion to their numerical strength ; but a community cannot with the same breath proclaim its backwardness and then claim equality. Political power goes with the development of the political sense. Its acquisition is the result of numerous causes—tradition, habit, association, education and experience. Government is an art and can only be mastered *ambulando*. It cannot be copied from the books. A people ruled to a static civilisation which is secondary to religious beliefs can never advance beyond the reach of their religion, and their advance must involve their recognition that politics must be divorced from religion. But in India, where many people still lie under the thralldom of their religion, a political cohesion and a political advance are alike difficult. The Depressed Classes are already trying to shake themselves free from the shackles of the religion which consigns them to preordained perpetual slavery. It is a happy augury for their future. But they have a long way to go before they are able to catch up to the level of other Hindus in the matter of political education and experience. When that time comes there would be no need for reserving them seats, for they will be able to hold their own in an open contest. The non-Brahmins of Madras have set them an example ; we have, therefore, limited their reservation for a period of ten years.

CHAPTER III.

THE REVIEW OF EDUCATION AND LOCAL BODIES.

I.

THE GROWTH OF EDUCATION.

140. Under § 84A of the Government of India Act as amended by the Reforms Act of 1919, the Statutory Commission are charged with the duty (*inter alia*) of inquiring into the growth of education in British India. This inquiry was obviously to be made with a view to ascertain how far the people of India had been educated not only in general knowledge, but how far they had acquired the education which equipped them for the purpose of shouldering the responsibilities of self-government. Taken in its large sense education implies the systematic training and development of the intellectual and moral faculties. The development of neither directly results in the development of the political sense which is the fulcrum for political progress. It is probably towards this purpose that the section connotes an inquiry not only into the growth of education, but also into the development of representative institutions in British India, since the two taken together would be an assured augury for the future maintenance and growth of the responsible government of which a beginning was to be made in pursuance of the Act.

Meaning of
"Education."

141. In dealing with the subject of education we shall therefore keep these two points in view. That this was the intention of the Statutory Commission is clear from the reference to it which occurs in the initial chapter of an auxiliary committee presided over by Sir Phillip Hartog who, in setting out their own function, say :—"The Commission, therefore, regard themselves as primarily concerned with education and its organisation in British India in relation to political and constitutional conditions and potentialities of progress. In this sense, therefore, that the Commission desires the reference to the Auxiliary Committee on the growth of education to be interpreted."

Limits of the
Inquiry.

142. The Auxiliary Committee to which reference is made was the special committee presided over by Sir Phillip Hartog, appointed on the 31st May, 1928, before the formation of our own Committee, appointed by the Chairman of the Statutory Commission to report to it the result of an enquiry to be made on its behalf. It was consequently designated its "Auxiliary Committee." This Committee has submitted its report on which we were privileged to examine its members. Our own report on this head is based upon the conjoint consideration of their printed report and their oral examination.

Committee's
view on
"Growth"

143. In their preliminary observations the committee say that while they have kept in mind the fact that they are asked to deal with the "growth" of education, the term "growth" implies something more than past history; it implies development; growth in the past provides the basis of a forecast of the potentialities of progress in the future. In analysing the facts and figures submitted to us, we have therefore tried to see to what causes the acceleration or retardation of growth in the immediate past has been due, how these causes are likely to operate in the immediate future, and how the healthy growth of education may be promoted by the removal of defects.

Progress
made.

144. A perusal of this review convinces us that the growth of education taken in general has been decisively encouraging since the Reforms, and that its further growth has been retarded not on account of any policy on the part of ministers to whom the subject of education was for the first time entrusted under the dyarchical form of provincial government created under the Reforms Act, but owing to the lack of funds generally which overstrained the resources of all provinces as a result of the War, and the insufficient control over the provincial budgets entrusted to the ministers. Nevertheless, the following table drawn from the Review is sufficiently eloquent of the striking contrast in the momentum given to mass education since it became the subject of popular control.

Percentage of Population of School-going Age who are receiving Primary Instruction by Provinces.

Province and Population (in millions).	Boys.			Girls.		
	1917.	1922.	1927. (1)	1917.	1922.	1927. (2)
Madras (42.3)	39.2	42.5	59.0	10.1	11.8	17.5
Bombay (19.3)	37.2	45.1	49.2	9.7	12.9	16.8
Bengal (46.6)	39.8	37.2	45.1	9.2	10.6	13.2
United Provinces (45.3) ..	19.2	23.1	30.5	1.9	3.0	3.9
Punjab (20.6)	20.5	23.9	44.7	2.4	4.5	6.8
Burma (13.2)	28.2	20.9	23.0	14.0	12.3	18.4
Bihar and Orissa (34.0) ..	25.7	26.3	37.3	4.1	4.3	4.8
Central Provinces (13.9) ..	29.1	27.3	30.7	3.7	3.8	4.3
Assam (7.6)	36.5	29.5	36.4	6.0	5.1	6.8
British India (247.3)	30.3	31.5	42.1	6.7	7.7	10.4

It is pointed out in the earlier page of the Review that 14 per cent. of the total population may be taken as the average population of children of the school-going age of which 7.7 percentage of boys and 6.7 percentage of girls are stated to have been at school in 1927. The total expenditure on primary schools in British India stood only at .96 crores, whereas in 1927 it rose

to 6.95 crores, that is it rose sevenfold. The Review adds :—
 “ It will be seen that the expenditure has increased by six crores since 1892, and that two-thirds of that increase has been made during the last ten years. The fact that large additional sums have been demanded by ministers and that they have been voted gladly by the new Legislative Councils is in itself encouraging. These figures suggest that there is a considerable and growing demand, that real effort has been made to meet the demand by the improvement of existing schools and by the provisions of new schools. The Legislative Councils have shown clearly and effectively that they are in full sympathy with the movement.”¹

145. This is encouraging, but there is another side to the picture. Of 100 pupils who attended class I in 1922-23, only 18 were reading in class IV in 1925-26. In other words, although there is a fair start, there is a noticeable falling off of pupils in the higher classes, with the result that the effect on literacy judged by the initial entry of children in the schools becomes partially illusory. This serious setback is ascribed to two causes :—withdrawals and non-promotion which in the result implies so much waste of public money. It is difficult to ascertain with any approach to accuracy what percentage of the school-going children ultimately add to the literate population of the country, but we presume that it must have resulted in a marked increase. At the same time literacy must by no means be taken as the only task of education. As the education committee observe :—“ There are large numbers of persons in the country who, though not classified in the census as literate, not only manage their own affairs and those of their families competently but are fully capable of taking an intelligent part in public life. Inherited traditions, natural shrewdness and ability and practical experience assist many illiterate men to act as intelligent citizens and many illiterate women to be good wives and mothers, ruling their households with wisdom and success.”²

Limits of
Expansion.

146. This is the right view and will serve as a corrective to those who regard literacy as an essential equipment for the assumption of political responsibility. Education in the general sense of literacy and acquisition of general knowledge is scarcely a measure of political capacity which can only be acquired by practice. As Lord Bryce observes :—

“ The difficulties of education among backward races such as the Philipinos or the African Bantu tribes, or even among the ignorant sections of civilized peoples, such as the Russian peasantry, or the Chinese or the Indian ryots, will not, desirable as it is, necessarily qualify them to work a democratic government, and may even make it more difficult to work in its earlier stages. Attainment in learning

Lord Bryce
on the value
of Educa-
tion.

and science do little to make men wise in politics. Some eminent scientific men have been in this respect no wiser than their undergraduate pupils. There have been countries in which the chiefs of public services and the professors in Universities were prominent in the advocacy of policies which proved disastrous." "Knowledge is one only among the things which go to the making of a good citizen. Public spirit and honesty are even more needful."¹

The true place of education lies in that it opens a wider doorway to knowledge, but knowledge might be acquired by experience, and without practical experience there can be no advance in political institutions. Politics is not a science but an art, and can only be learnt by practice.

147. Holding this view, we consider that the question of the growth of education amongst the masses, how much soever necessary and desirable for their economic growth, must not be regarded as a *conditio sine qua non* to political development.

All the same, even judged by the narrower test of literacy, we may fairly assume that the reforms have given a definite and encouraging impetus to the banishment of illiteracy from the land, and that given more money and a more concerted policy the question of education need not make us apprehensive that the further development of the political sense would suffer from any lack of stimulus to promote literacy in the land.

We shall, therefore, rest content by adverting no more to the subject beyond recording our opinion that the Reforms have given a definite stimulus to the growth of education in British India, that judging from the figures the progress has been rapid, but by no means as rapid as one would have desired, and that its future would be assured if the ministers are better placed as to funds and a concerted policy is agreed upon and prosecuted with the sole purpose of imparting mass education with special reference to the communities and classes who lag behind in the race, and who should receive special encouragement proportionately to their illiteracy and backwardness in the past.

Communalism
in
Education.

148. It would not become us to make a wider digression by suggesting how and to what extent this is possible. The Education Committee have dealt with the question fully, and in their Review extending to 400 pages they have suggested various means for the promotion of literacy. While we are in general agreement with many of their suggestions, we feel constrained to have to record as our opinion that while every encouragement and assistance should be given to those who are backward, we should strongly deprecate the introduction of communalism in the schools by limiting the number of pupils of more advanced classes or communities to make room for those who belong to the back-

¹ Modern Democracies, pp. 88, 89.

ward communities. For we feel that if there is the slightest suggestion of communal partiality in the composition of public schools maintained out of public funds, it would leave an unhealthy trail which would poison the minds of those who, in their most impressionable years, are brought face to face with a human frailty, the effect of which would not be confined to the four walls of the classrooms.

149. While on the subject of mass education, we recall the insistence made in several quarters that such education should at least for a generation be made a national concern and not be left, as it has been left in places, to the spasmodic efforts of local bodies whose resources are limited, and who are reluctant to add to the local rates for education which the masses have not yet learned to prize.

150. It is suggested that all mass education should for the present be financed out of a general education cess, and that a Board of Education might usefully be set up to co-ordinate local effort, lend it a guiding hand by placing at its disposal the result of expert knowledge, and generally co-ordinate the work of educationalists in the several provinces. If the call upon our space were not limited we would fain have expatiated upon a subject so vital to the future growth of a nation. But all we can do at present is to draw the attention of those to whom may be entrusted the guidance of the future policy of educational reform to a view which has much to commend itself. The example of the American effort in the Phillipines is cited as one to emulate in this connection.

Line of
future
advance.

151. But whatever may be the manifold difficulties of the problem they have to be combated in favour of intensive education of the proletariat of the future. Not only mass education, but higher education would seem to call for an enlightened policy. Some of us who have maintained life-long associations with the centres of higher learning have received with mixed delight the recent multiplication of universities. While there is no higher or nobler call for the display of public munificence, we doubt whether the duplication of identical general teaching in the several universities might not be more profitably supplemented by specialisation of the universities in a few selected subjects of study.

152. If the universities can be persuaded to cry a halt to the outpouring of graduates who are annually thrown mercilessly upon the world bewildered and unable to earn even a starvation wage, and if their minds are diverted to the more profitable avenues for employment still open to young men who have specialised in the numerous subjects, the knowledge of which is conducive to the comfort of men, the universities will have performed the dual function of not only imparting learning, but also making its application profitable to their *alumni*. It is a trite saying that the mere possession of a degree does not make

Suggestions
for greater
co-ordina-
tion.

its possessor learned ; and even learned men have got to live and compete in the daily growing fiercer battle of life. It would, we think, be a course of wisdom if the several universities now represented on the Universities Board bent their minds to the solution of the acute problem of middle-class unemployment. Last year some of us were astounded to see deposited in a case in one of the courts of the Industrial Exhibition held in connection with the Indian National Congress at Calcutta, over a thousand applications in response to an advertisement for a post carrying a monthly salary of Rs. 40 (three pounds). Not a few amongst these numerous applicants were Masters of Art and possessors of honours degrees. A large horde of unemployed graduates is a danger to the peace of the State. It is meanwhile a lamentable waste of effort. Lives that might have been more profitably employed in the production of wealth, time that might have been spent in the preparation for a useful vocation are squandered in the aimless memorising of historical dates or Algebraic formulae which pass out of the memory as soon as the young graduates pass out of the senate hall after receiving their parchments. We have alluded to this subject because we do find the expert committee, no doubt from the combined effect of their limited reference and the lack of sufficient evidence not forthcoming owing to the stringency of the boycott equally extended to it, have not devoted to it the space which the importance of the subject called for.

II.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE INSTITUTIONS.

Awakening
of the
masses.

153. Our task in reporting on the development of Representative Institutions in British India has been considerably lightened by the carefully prepared reports of the Provincial Governments on the subject. We cannot say that we were fortunate in obtaining much detailed evidence to supplement the reports ; but such evidence as was forthcoming has convinced us that there has been notable development and improvement in the added interest taken in the meetings of the local bodies and the administration of their funds. From Madras, however, it is reported that a correct estimate of the success of local self-government cannot be formed owing to two factors, namely, the complete revision of the Acts dealing with them, and the increase of prices. Nevertheless the Government were able to say that " there has certainly been an awakening of the civic consciousness of the people as a result of the Reforms, and the policy of de-officialization, but it is too early yet to estimate results in the way of civic achievement."¹ To this is, however, added the following complaint which may be taken to be of a more general application. " There has been " it is said, " an unwillingness shown, which is not un-

¹ Report, pp. 6—34

natural to elected bodies who have had new powers given them, to face the unpopularity of imposing new taxes and even to collect sufficiently strictly most of which they imposed, or to enforce the law in dealing with appeals for remissions, but with better financial conditions, there is every hope that the policy of giving wider powers to local bodies will in the future be justified."¹

154. There is a reference to the non-co-operation movement which took the form of capturing all the local bodies, as far as possible, by the Swarajists, with the result that those became the forums for political debates which became deflected from their normal relevance to parochial questions. But in Madras it appears that the pendulum swung back to the normal, though in some other provinces politics still remain dominant in the municipalities and to a lesser degree in the rural bodies. For example, Bombay reports that the non-co-operation movement "has had a noticeable effect on the relations between Government and the Reformed Local Bodies. During the first three years after the introduction of the reforms, a fairly large number of the bigger municipalities such as Surat and Ahmedabad were frankly defiant of any Government interference and endeavoured to carry on their affairs without any Government assistance in the shape of grants-in-aid for education or for other objects. Whilst this phase lasted the relations of Government with these bodies were naturally strained, and in one or two cases municipalities were suspended. Since 1924 there has been a marked change. No Local Body now objects to taking Government grants-in-aid."² The influx of politics into the arena of local bodies was probably most marked in the Calcutta Corporation, the administration of which has been, after a short interruption, carried on "from a purely political instead of a civic point of view."³ The affairs of this body have often been the subject of serious comment. Its finances are reported to be unsatisfactory: "its closing balances have been greatly depleted and its borrowing capacity reduced in spite of the warnings given by its responsible executive officers."⁴

Effect of
non-co-
operation.

155. Fortunately conditions in the Mofussil local bodies appear to have been better "and practically nowhere did the political situation react on the details of municipal administration."⁵ Similarly, in the District and Local Boards "whatever their political sympathies most of the chairman and vice-chairman did their best to discharge the responsibilities imposed on them, even in some cases at the sacrifice of their private interests. Their difficulties were financial, not political, and were not to be attributed in any way to the reformed constitution." The oral evidence, such as it was, entirely supports this view. In the United Provinces both the local bodies appear to have shown some improvement. Up to 1924 municipal finances showed a

Financial
stringency.

¹ Report, 34, 35.

² *Ib.* pp. 114-116.

³ *Ib.* p. 161.

⁴ *Ib.* p. 162.

⁵ *Ib.* p. 163.

deficit but they have worked on the whole satisfactorily when they were not short of funds. The elections of 1925 are reported to have "turned very largely on personal and communal issues, the Swarajists who lost ground everywhere being replaced by candidates with strong communal proclivities."¹ The note comments adversely on the art of administration, on the confusion of accounts; but the Boards there were non-officialized only in 1922, and this fact is mentioned as a mitigating factor. The evil of communalism in the Punjab where it is said that with the introduction of communal elections in those bodies by a Moslem Minister who could not resist the claim of his co-religionists to a larger representation on them, they immediately "intensified the communal tension which reacted on the efficiency of local bodies owing both to the waste of time involved in communal disputes at meetings and the tendency to decide important questions on communal rather than on administrative grounds."² The Report points out that the nominal abolition of communal electorates by re-grouping the wards so as to ensure the same result has tended to aggravate the same evils.

Communal-
ism in the
Local
Bodies.

156. We have already adverted to the influence of communalism which acts as a canker-worm in the body politic reducing it to an inert mass and precipitating its disorganisation and dissolution. The testimony of the Punjab is a warning to those who endeavour to extend that principle to every branch of Government and even to the services and the schools. The influence of caste and communal rivalry is reported to be responsible for serious maladministration in the majority of the local bodies in Bihar,³ though the obsession of politics was equally another contributory cause. In this Province the re-tightening of official control would seem to be well justified. The local bodies are reported to have done very well in the Central Provinces, where the wide extension of the franchise stimulated interest in the elections with the result that in the General Elections of 1922 as much as 80 per cent. of the voters went to the poll in several cases, though the majority of them belonged to the non-co-operation camp. But in the following elections of 1925 personal or communal ties took precedence over politics. On the whole the report from this Province holds out a hope of improved administration in the future.⁴ A similar sympathetic note is struck in Assam where the following passage concludes this subject. "There are already indications that local bodies are beginning to realise that responsibility goes with power and that it is for the Boards now to work out their own salvation."⁵

157. There is nothing to note about Burma where, though a new District Council Act was passed in 1921, no financial arrangements were stated to have been made till the date of the

¹ Report, p. 196.

² *Id.* p. 248.

³ *Id.* pp. 431, 432, 451.

⁴ *Id.* p. 464.

⁵ *Id.* p. 496.

Report, while a new Municipal Act was then stated to be pending in the Legislative Council. Burma must then be regarded as an exception. It received the reforms some years later than the rest of India and it is not surprising that it had to wait for the reorganisation of its local bodies.

158. Both from the official reports and non-official evidence given we feel satisfied that there has been a sufficient growth of responsibility in the local self-governments, but that greater progress was retarded by the facts of inexperience, political and communal obsession, but that while the former was disappearing, communalism is still a live force in detracting from good and efficient local self-government.

Limits on
further
growth.

CHAPTER IV.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE IN COUNCIL.

I

THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

Historical
retrospect.

159. The position of both the Secretary of State for India and his Council in relation to the Government of India before the Reforms may be traced back to that of the Board of Directors of the East India Company from whom the Crown took over the government. but the old system continues to survive in the appointment of the Secretary of State whose functions corresponds to those of the President of the Board of Directors, while his Council has inherited some of the functions and tradition of the Board of Directors. As such, he was assigned the power "to superintend, direct and control" the government of India. As the Crewe Committee observed; "The substitution of administrative responsibility on the part of the Government for the superintendence it had formerly exercised caused a redistribution of functions in which the lines of inheritance became to some extent obscured; but the persistence of the dual principle can still be traced to the corporate activities of the Secretary of State in Council."¹

160. After the memorable declaration of August, 1917, when a new policy was decided upon, a re-examination of the power of the Secretary of State and his council became necessary, and it was so suggested in the Montague Report in which the authors recommended that the Parliament must be prepared to forego the exercise of its own power of control in respect of all matters in which responsibility is entrusted to representative bodies in India and "this process must continue *pari passu* with the development of responsible government in the provinces and eventually in the Government of India."² The Crewe Committee were appointed to recommend changes suited to the operation of the new policy—that Committee issued its report on the 21st June, 1919, six months before the Reforms Act was enacted and its effect upon the newly created Legislatures seen. But nevertheless it is useful to see to what extent that Committee advised changes in the powers of the Secretary of State and his Council.

Crewe Com-
mittee's
recommen-
dations.

161. As regards the power of superintendence, direction and control vested in the Secretary of State, the Committee recommended "that where the Government of India find themselves in agreement with a conclusion of the Legislative Assembly, their

¹ Crewe Report, § 9.

² Report, § 291.

joint decision should ordinarily prevail."¹ They then proceeded to add that in order "to give proper emphasis to the legislative authority of the Assembly, we recommend that whenever legislation has the support of a majority of the non-official members of the Legislative Assembly assent should be refused only in cases in which the Secretary of State feels that his responsibility to Parliament for the peace order and good government of India, or paramount considerations of Imperial policy require him to secure reconsideration of the matter at issue by the Legislative Assembly."² In matters other than legislation the Committee recommended "that a joint decision of the Government of India and a majority of the non-official members of the Assembly, reached by discussion of a resolution, should be given the same degree of authority as similar decisions on legislative proposals."³ Similar change in the procedure was recommended in the matter of the exercise of delegation powers in "that previous sanction to decisions taken in India should be required in fewer cases than in the past, and that in some matters it will suffice in future if the Secretary of State asserts his control by means of a veto—if necessary."⁴ In this respect the Committee recommended that in all cases in which the previous sanction of the Secretary of State was essential, only a previous consultation with him should suffice, and that the Secretary of State should from time to time revise the lists of subjects on which he requires such previous consultation." The position before the Reforms was that while Britain nominally directed the Indian policy through the Secretary of State, it could exercise no real control, as the Secretary's salary was not even borne on the estimates. The Crewe Committee recommended that it should be so borne; and it was, but his Council still remained outside the control of Parliament with the result that frequent constitutional deadlocks still remained possible, only averted as Lord Crewe found by the Council avoiding a conflict with the Ministry.

162. The basic principle of all the recommendations was to modify the direction of Indian policy by Britain by insuring that in all matters whether legislative or administrative the view of the non-official majority of the Assembly should receive weight and that it should be ordinarily decisive of the question if concurred in by the Government of India. Accordingly, Section 19A of the Government of India empowered the Secretary of State in Council to "regulate and restrict the exercise of the powers of superintendence, direction and control . . . in such manner as may appear necessary to or expedient in order to give effect to the purpose of the Government of India Act, 1919." The Committee recommended the abolition of the India Council and the constitution of an Advisory Committee in its place, of which not less than one-third of the members should

No recommendation carried out.

¹ Crewe Report, § 13. ² *Ib.* 291. ³ *Ib.* § 13. ⁴ *Ib.* § 17.

be selected out of a panel elected by the non-official members of the Assembly.¹ They, however, added, that "As the focus of the Government of India's responsibility shifted from the Secretary of State to the Legislative Assembly the need for the corporate control of the Secretary of State in Council would lapse."² The Committee thought that in the transitional period "it would be advantageous if occasion were now and then taken to appoint an Indian to one of the posts which stand as intermediary between the Secretary of State and the Heads of Departments."³ The late Mr. B. N. Basu, then a member of the India Council, and a member of the Crewe Committee wrote a minute in which, while approving of the recommendation of the committee for abolition of the India Council, he opposed the creation of an Advisory Committee. He was of opinion that in order to give Indians a responsible part in the higher control of the India Office, it should be definitely laid down that there should always be an additional Indian permanent Under-Secretary of State ; ordinarily, he should not be an Indian Official.⁴

163. It is needless to add that so far as we are aware none of these recommendations were eventually carried out. The Secretary of State never relaxed his control as provided in Section 19A of the Act ; no Indian Under-Secretary was ever appointed. It is true that the late Lord Sinha held this office for a short while, but his appointment was made to enable him to pilot the Reforms Bill through the House of Lords, and not out of any desire to give him control of the India Office. The experience of those of us who have served in the Legislative Assembly from its very inception has been that the generous though cautious policy underlying the recommendations of the Crewe Committee have, so far as we are aware, remained a dead letter ; and that in spite of the insistent and repeated demand of the Assembly that the Secretary of State should relax his control on the Government of India, by framing rules under the Act, no rules have been framed and there was no evidence of any relaxation of his control. The Assembly has thus had some justification in denouncing the narrow and niggardly spirit in which the Act was being interpreted in practice. The Act had admittedly the short life of ten years, during which it contained sufficient materials for self-expansion. But none of its provisions were called into requisition, though the Assembly had been clamouring almost from the day of its inception for the fulfilment of the pledges made by the declaration of 1917 and the recommendations of constituted authorities thereupon. The reasons for this retrogression from the spirit of the Reforms has been made abundantly clear to us from the examination of responsible officials of the India Office and its civil and military experts. As we have been informed in private

¹ *Ib.* § 15.

² *Ib.* § 16.

³ *Ib.* § 15.

⁴ *Ib.* p. 6-35, § 17.

by those who have come into close contact with them, the entire atmosphere of the India Office is anti-Indian. But whether it is so or not, we are strongly of the opinion that there can be no hope for the success of any reforms in India so long as the centre of gravity is not materially shifted from Whitehall to India.

164. And we, therefore, think that the only course our Committee could take, is that recommended by it ; namely :— Our recommendations.

(1) that the revenues of India must no longer vest in the Secretary of State, but should vest in the Governor General of India ;

(2) that the powers of the Secretary of State be limited within the sphere of the reserved department and that they should be defined ;

(3) that the India Council be abolished ;

(4) that so long as there is any subject held as reserved in the Government of India, the Secretary of State should be assisted by two non-official Indian Under-Secretaries drawn from public life of the country ; and that a place should be found for one in Parliament ;

(5) that India should, indeed, be directly represented in Parliament, if the latter is still further to retain any measure of control over the affairs of India.

II.

THE INDIA COUNCIL.

165. The Council of India is a relic of the old Court of Directors of the East India Company, and came into being on the transfer of the territorial possessions in India to the Crown by the enactment of the Government of India Act of 1858, which provided for the appointment of fifteen members, eight appointed by the Crown and seven elected, in the first instance by the Court of Directors, and subsequently by the Council itself. By the Act of 1869 their appointment was entrusted to the Secretary of State. By an Act of 1889 their number was reduced to ten. In 1907 two Indians were for the first time appointed to the Council. Another Indian was appointed later on, with the result that seven Europeans and three Indians now form the Council. We are informed that some important rules of business as framed in 1859 remain in force up to date with the result that though the constitution of the Indian Government has undergone considerable modification the Council rules of business remain. But this is of little moment since the Council has little power except where its vote is statutorily required, and even in those cases its consent is ordinarily given without much discussion. Its meetings are said to last only a few seconds—not minutes.

Origin of the
India
Council.

Montagu
Report on
the India
Council.

166. The Montagu Report does not deal with the India Council as such. In Chapter IX a Section deals with the India Office¹ in the course of which recommendations are made for modifications in the Secretary of State's power of supervision, direction and control to the extent the subjects are transferred to the Ministers. As our proposals involve the transfer of all subjects in the provinces and the transfer of most in the Central Government, it follows that the Secretary of State's control will to that extent abate, and as our proposal makes the Government of India financially independent of the Secretary of State there is no longer any necessity for the continuance of the India Council. This is admitted in a weighty memorandum in which the following sentences occur : "so long as the Government of India and local Governments were not dependent on the co-operation of a legislature predominantly elective, there were obvious reasons why the control of the Secretary of State over the one, and the control of the Government of India over the other should be fully maintained ; because in such circumstances both the Government of India and the local Governments alike were simply the agents to the will of the British electorate as represented in Parliament. But when with the Montagu-Chelmsford Report the local Governments and the Government of India became in varying degrees partially amenable to elective legislatures in India, it followed inevitably that the control of the Government of India in the case of the one, and that of the Secretary of State and Parliament in the case of the other, should be modified in so far as was necessary to allow the new principle of amenability to Indian legislature free play."

Its present
powers.

167. The position of the India Council is at present stated to be as follows. The Secretary of State is statutorily given the amplest power of supervision, direction and control over the Government of India. This control he may exercise independently of his Council, or with the concurrence of the majority of his Council in the few cases mentioned in Section 21, Section 28 (1), Section 29 (1) and Section 96 (E) of the Government of India Act. Where such concurrence is not legally required, the Secretary of State, even though acting as Secretary of State in Council, has the authority to over-rule his Council (S. 9 (1)). Under Section 6 (1) the powers of the Secretary of State in Council must be exercised at meetings of the Council. But we were told that in practice the Secretary of State decides what business (other than business to which the concurrence of a majority is required) will come before the Council. As the only questions on which the concurrence of the Council is a pre-requisite are those affecting the revenues of India and contracts, it follows that the Council cannot exercise any decisive voice in the domain of general adminis-

¹ Report, §§ 290—295.

tration. The Council is a purely nominated body, and in the exercise of its function it is responsible to nobody, neither to the British Parliament nor to the Indian Legislature. "It is obvious, and may be readily admitted, that a system under which a nominated body like the Council of India is armed with statutory powers which it may exercise in a way that may conflict with the wishes of His Majesty's Government is something of a constitutional anomaly." The Crewe Committee which examined this point wrote: "The Secretary of State, as distinct from the Secretary-of-State in Council, is generally responsible as a Minister for the co-ordination of Indian and Imperial policy. The Council are by law in a position to obstruct his policy, or indeed the policy of His Majesty's Government by interposing their financial veto if Indian revenues are affected. But in practice they have acknowledged the supremacy of the Indian Executive by accepting proposals communicated to them as decisions of the Ministry, in so far as those proposals raise issues on which they are legally competent to decide."

168. As to this it is said that the arrangement has proved workable in practice because both parties to it have exercised reasonable forbearance. But as against this it has been stated that the forbearance exercised by the Council has been in the direction stated by Lord Crewe's Committee. We were told that the meetings of the Council are purely formal and its business is usually disposed of in a few seconds (not even a minute).

169. It is true that there are several Committees; but we were told that since the majority of members in each Committee are Europeans, and neither the Secretary of State nor the Under-Secretary is present, and the decisions merely record that a matter was decided by a majority, it follows that the Indian point of view can never be pressed or adequately defended.

Council's
work in
Committees.

170. It is admitted on all hands that the constitution of the Indian Council is an anomaly, and its function only limited to safeguarding the revenues of India. Lord Crewe's Committee thought, and the evidence before us proves it, that it is not able even to do this in view of that very anomaly and the forces against which it may have to contend even if it dared to resist them. Apart, however, from its past record, we have already stated that as we have recommended the vesting of the revenues of India in the Government of India, there is no longer any necessity to retain a body in England whose primary function was to conserve those revenues. Indeed, we would commend this course in view of the present defects of the system. Even apart from the Council the India Office check, meticulous, though redundant, as it is, would have to be greatly relaxed except in the reserved field. On this point we have in mind the evidence of an expert

witness who said :—

“ I believe the system works with so much friction as to be, in many cases, thoroughly bad in its results. Perhaps it is the detailed control of the expenditure which jumps to the eyes.”

The Military
Burden of
India.

171. The question of the military expenditure which bulks so largely in the Indian Budget, has been the subject of anxious solicitude on the part of the Assembly, and it is now admitted that though the Indian Government have protested against the inequity of the capitation charges, the question has remained undecided for twenty odd years, and meanwhile, the Indian revenues continue to be mulcted to the tune of about two million pounds every year. It is said that the matter cannot be solved because there is no satisfactory means of solving it so long as the British Treasury can exact the payment and the Secretary of State, in whom are vested the revenues of India, cannot resist it. That this is a serious drain on the revenues of India is undoubted ; but how is India to escape the payment for which she is not liable ? We were told that members of the India Council have avoided a conflict with the British Treasury by entering into a reasonable compromise with it. But this is an instance in which there is still no compromise in sight, and, meanwhile, India has to pay the piper though Great Britain calls the tune. A high financial authority who was examined on the subject had to admit the justice of the Indian claim.

Weakness of
the Govern-
ment of
India.

172. But this is only one of the conundrums of the situation. There is one principle when England deals with her colonies, another when she has to deal with India. And Indians will never feel satisfied until they are given a decisive voice in the solution of Empire problems in which the interests of the British and the Indian taxpayers are at variance. A high official in the India Office has given us his views on the future relations of the Government of India *vis-à-vis* the Provincial Government on the one hand and the Secretary of State on the other, though we cannot endorse his conclusions which imply reversion to the old system of centralised bureaucracy relieved of the control in practice of the Secretary of State and independent of the Legislature by a reconstitution of the Assembly. He is of the opinion that the present position of the Government of India sensitive to the views of the Assembly on the one hand and amenable to the control of the Secretary of State and Parliament on the other hand is anomalous. It cannot in practice look both ways at once. It is very desirable to get rid of the present dualism (which has been largely created by the policy of the Government of India and is fundamentally false) between a weak Government of India *plus* the Indian Legislature, whose servant it is said to have become on the one hand, and the Secretary of State on the other, a dualism which is bound sooner or later to lead to direct conflict between the British and the Indian Legislature—the most

dangerous conflict possible. A written constitution cannot take account of divided loyalty, and a divided loyalty will not work in practice. These are not our words, but they exactly convey our own sentiments, and we feel that after the experience of the last decade under the reforms, the Government of India should no longer be left between the Scylla of the Assembly and the Charybdis of the India Office. It is admitted on all hands, and it was so admitted, that the present members of the India Council are in excess of what is required for the work. With the further transference of power from Whitehall to India the Council itself must vanish and its place must be taken up by someone more suited to the task of guiding the conscience of the Secretary of State in the limited sphere within which he will still be entitled to exercise his authority.

173. As has been well said : " It is for consideration whether the shadow of the extinct Company should still be cast over the administration of India. The Council performed invaluable work in days when the constitution and the prevalent conception of administration required the India Office to do over again the work already done in India. Those days are gone, and with them the necessity of a body with the functions assigned to it in Section 5 of the Act."

Abolition
suggested.

174. There remain questions in which His Majesty's Government and the Government of India are at variance. It is suggested that such questions should be left to the decision of an arbitral body to be set up by the statute. The suggestion is well worthy of further examination, but we have not been able to examine it in our committee with the sufficiency of detail to enable us to embody it as one of our recommendations. But we are quite alive to the seriousness of the issue raised ; and its very seriousness has made us pause before proceeding to a decision for lack of fuller details as to how such questions are determined if and when they arise, as undoubtedly they must have arisen in the past, between His Majesty's Government and the other Dominions. We are aware of individual cases so referred to and decided, but we are not aware of any constitution in which a standing body is brought into being for the adjudication of all future disputes.

175. Finally then, we have no hesitation in recommending the abolition of the India Council as an anachronism and as one which has outlived its usefulness, whatever usefulness it may have had in the past. If we had felt the necessity of continuing it we would have recommended its reconstruction. But with the financial and general control of the Secretary of State now restricted to the much narrower field of defence, and political relations, there is no longer any necessity for a Council similar to that which remains attached to the India Office. At the same time we recognise that the office of the Secretary of State may at times be held, indeed is usually held, by one who has not had first hand knowledge of Indian conditions, and even if he had,

he would still require someone to refresh his memory and present to him the Indian viewpoint. Consequently, we recommend that means should be found to appoint two Indian Under-Secretaries, one of whom might sit in the Chamber in which he might find a place without having to face the vortex of a contested election. And so long as the Indian constitution falls short of that accorded to the Dominions the committee would commend its resolution for the representation of India in the British Parliament. The proposal, though novel, is not unsupported by the precedent of France and Portugal to the Parliaments of which representatives of their Indian possessions are elected alongside of those who represent the home constituencies.

III.

THE HIGH COMMISSIONER'S POWERS.

176. We have had the advantage of examining the High Commissioner for India, and we felt impressed by several points raised by him upon which the other evidence taken by us had left us in doubt. We would recommend that his agency should in future be employed for the recruitment of British officials in all the transferred field, and, generally speaking, his duties should henceforth approximate more closely to those discharged by the Colonial High Commissioners. In regard to Indian loans his agency would both ensure economy and expeditiousness. A high authority on Indian finance speaking of the present system regards it as not only unauthorised but also both cumbrous and dilatory and not at all times conducive to the interest of India.

His power
to raise
loans.

Power of
recruitment.

177. Then in the field of recruitment from England there is no reason why the services of the High Commissioner should not be more largely availed of, that all recruitment should not, as a rule, be through his agency. As we visualise the future of the British services in India we think that if India is left free to herself she will draw largely upon England for her superior Police Service, because Indians appreciate the superior organising capacity and power of maintaining discipline in that service, and their co-operation may, in the initial stages, be necessary for political reasons as well. As regards the recruitment of officers for the discharge of the duties now entrusted to the Civil Service, India is well able to man her own Judicial Service, but outside that service it may still be necessary to employ wholetime British officers whose qualifying test should include their sympathy with the new constitution. The old Service with its old tradition has ceased to be of any real value to India, as these men would have to work as partners and not as masters of the ministers, and their recruitment must be entrusted to an agency amenable to the Indian Parliament. It has been said that it would be difficult to find men to serve India under her altered constitution, and that unless the conditions of recruitment are those of the present Civil Service and the security offered that of the Secretary of

State, men of the right type would not be forthcoming to hazard their future. We know that the High Commissioner who has been recruiting for some listed all-India posts, experiences no difficulty of the nature apprehended. Of course, India will cease to possess the same glamour which it does to the young Englishmen to-day, but we hope that it would add to the good of both countries that the Civil Servant of the future should not regard his employment in the Indian Civil Service as more attractive than in the Home or Colonial Civil Service. It may be that with the vision glorious of the Governorship of a province gone, and social amenities diminished, the Englishman may lack the incentive now offered to him. But India's progress cannot be arrested nor her condition continue to remain adapted to any class of her servants, who must be prepared to adapt themselves to their altered environment. If this calls for a higher scale of pay India will not grudge it, but what she does grudge is the recruitment of a band of men who will strive to perpetuate an obsolete system and it may be quite unconsciously, undermine the new order with which they as a class never had any traditional sympathy.

178. The other agency work which we recommend for transfer to the High Commissioner is the payment of leave and pension allowances to the military officers. The High Commissioner should be used as a *liaison* officer in the same way as the Dominion High Commissioners are used in respect of international organisations and the Government of India should use him as a channel of communication with them. This arrangement will be conducive to some economy in the reduction of the India Office establishment and bring India more on a line with the other self-governing dominions of His Majesty.

Other
agency
business.

IV.

THE PUBLIC SERVICES.

179. Some members of the Indian Civil Service who have occupied some of the highest positions open to members of that Service have addressed us a memorandum on the main questions on the solution of which we are engaged. They say: "We accept the policy proclaimed in 1917, but we are anxious that the risks attendant on particular measures—risks which may, we think, manifest themselves with surprising swiftness and on a widespread scale—should be fully appreciated before such measures are taken." "We have stated our views of these risks with deliberated moderation from a desire to avoid giving offence to those who are anxious to see a marked advance. But we feel that the risks are very serious, and the difficulties of retracing any mistaken step forward are very great."

Risks re-
stated.

180. The risks they refer to are inherent in the transfer of any subject in the Provinces or in the Government of India ; for they truly observe : " Following the decision taken in connection with the Lee Commission the transfer of a subject must mean the cessation of recruitment of any All India Service dealing with it. This is only logical, ministers must choose and have control over their own agents." As for the continuance of the British Services they repeat what had been made very clear in the memorandum of the Indian Civil Service Association whose members have repeated by word of mouth what their leader has committed to writing that all the tradition of that service were bureaucratic. The three distinguished authors of the Memorandum lay emphasis on the same characteristics of their Service in the following words : " In some instances provincial legislatures have manifested an attitude of hostility to the British Services ; and probably in all cases, transfer has brought about changes in policy and in the character and methods of administration with which the British Services with their different traditions and ideas cannot be properly in sympathy, and with which they would in fact not to be associated." This is perfectly true, the British Services have made no secret of their want of sympathy to the reforms, and the choice lies between the reforms and the British Services. That was the alternative presented to Mr. Montagu and the British Parliament in 1919. That objection still remains, and indeed it attains a greater strength with each step forward in the direction of responsibility. As the Madras Government points out : " Responsible self-government, if it implies anything, implies that the province must be free to recruit its own servants as and where it likes. There can be no imposing upon it a body of men recruited under regulations, from sources and at rates of pay prescribed by some outside authority."¹ One thing is therefore clear, responsibility of India is incompatible with the continuance of the British Services recruited and maintained upon their present basis. There can be no doubt that the members of the British Services have by tradition regarded themselves as members of a governing class. They have for a century before the reforms ruled India as benevolent despots formulating their own policy if any, and putting it into execution.

181. As Mr. Montagu wrote : " The changing times cannot, we know, be altogether agreeable to many men who have grown up in the older tradition which made them the protectors and governors of the people." But time and the Civil Service Memorandum have alike disproved Mr. Montagu's optimism as to its adaptability to a now changed order of things. " We regard it," he said, " as a libel on the Indian Civil Service as a body to-day that they have resisted or will resist the policy

¹ Madras Government Memorandum, p. 26.

announced last August. They have welcomed it because no one knew better than they how badly a declaration of policy was needed ; and they will carry it out with determination just as they have always carried out the policy laid down for them.”¹ But as is now only too apparent, that while the British Services have no objection to a mere *declaration* of policy they have the greatest of all objections to its *execution* ; for have not the three distinguished protagonists of that Service and their colleagues who have written and spoken on the subject made it abundantly clear that they were wholly out of sympathy with the transfer of power from the officials which is postulated in the Report ?

182. The recommendation of several Provincial Governments in favour of provincial autonomy coupled with the recommendation that the agency employed should continue to include the All India Services recruited and protected by the Secretary of State is refuted as inconsistent, for the three signatories to the memorandum made no secret of the fact, on the contrary emphasised it, that the reforms cannot be worked by British Services ; and so long as they continue in service, to that extent they impair provincial autonomy. This is admitted in the memorandum in which this conclusion is stated in identical terms : “ We assume that to men already appointed by the Secretary of State, the protection of the Secretary of State, would still be extended * and provincial autonomy to that extent impaired.” This aspect of the question was entirely lost sight of in the Montagu Report in which it was assumed, now shown to be erroneously, that the Civil Service would be a valuable ally of the reforms, as if the victim who has to carry his own cross would be enamoured of his burden. It need scarcely be added that the policy which the Civil Service carried out was largely their own. That policy, or to be more accurate, its absence, was euphemistically described as a benevolent despotism. It was a rule by one race over another, the rule of the conqueror and *voe victis* if the conquered resisted. It can hardly be described as a set policy. However, whatever may have been the hope aroused in the minds of those responsible for the reforms of 1919, the plain fact is now too clearly borne in upon us that the alternative before the British people is plain, they must choose between the rule of the people by the people, or their rule by the Civil Service. A democratic institution cannot be controlled by a bureaucratic service. The Civil Service Association and their protagonists have clearly admitted it, and even if they had not, that fact can no longer be obscured.

Arguments
against pro-
vincialisa-
tion.

183. It was this one reason which has united all responsible bodies in demanding that members of the Civil Service should never be appointed to govern a province, since it is not possible to

Public
men as
Governors.

convert even by a royal warrant a sun-dried bureaucrat into a democrat, and he who has been nurtured in the school of centralised autocracy can never be trained to unlearn the lesson of his life and guide a popular government which only a man trained in the school of public life and imbued with parliamentary traditions can be expected to do. It may be that some of them may be found possessed of the qualities of constructive statesmanship which may shoot forth if they are not surrounded by a phalanx of bureaucrats to advise and guide, and if necessary, control them. That dyarchy has failed in a Province like Bengal is not relevant, as it is not claimed that granted a Parliamentary Governor other causes may not destroy the fabric; but what is claimed is that other things being equal, a Governor drawn from the rank of the Civil Service ordinarily retards, whereas a Governor drawn from the public ordinarily assists, the growth of self-government. That in spite of these draw-backs the Provinces have, as a rule, evinced creditable results only proves that the people possess latent faculty for self-government which, given time and opportunity, would assuredly make the experiment of Home Rule as successful in India as it has been everywhere else.

British
qualities.

134. The members of the Civil Service contend that the British element possesses the innate quality of government which the Indian element lacks, and that therefore "no purely Indian staff will be regarded as possessing the same inherent quality of government." This is on the civil side, and it is the verdict of those who after holding some of the highest positions in India are now the members of the India Council and so shape the policy of the Government of India. The same superiority complex on the military side is emphasised by one who, after long and meritorious service in India is now deemed an expert authority on military questions. He has permitted himself to say that he cannot foresee a time when India would have a Dominion Army of her own and be able to undertake its own defence without the stiffening of the British Army, and until India is able to undertake its own defence without the stiffening of the British Army, and until India is able to defend herself her aspiration for self-government is an idle dream. But if these arguments be sound then the conclusion is, not that there should be no further reforms but that there should not have been any reforms at all. Since, according to these experts, India will never be able to defend herself, it follows that India can never hope for self-government. In this respect India does not stand alone, for it is even opined that if you take the 40th degree of latitude North of the Equator and go round the world, the people who live south of that line, not in the hilly climates, not living in mountains, are very much more effeminate in war and not quite so brave as those who live in more temperate climates further north.

185. Then again a complaint is frequently made that the Indian temperament does not throw out under the modern conditions of warfare the quality of leadership. But when it is pointed out that, until 1918, Indians were held ineligible even for the King's Commission, we are told that that is true, the reason being that they were so absolutely illiterate. But when one is asked why the literate classes were not drawn upon for officer-ing the Army we are told that in India when a man becomes literate he becomes effeminate.

Defects in
Indian
character.

186. The position is then this—India being below 40 degrees latitude it can never produce the requisite war material. It may turn out soldiers, brave and courageous within limits, but they must be led by British Officers. Indian Officers cannot lead them because the sepoy cannot be promoted to that rank as he is illiterate, and if he be made literate he would become effeminate. And as this view is largely responsible for shaping the military policy of India, we are not surprised that it has been steadfastly reactionary. A great soldier may easily moralise upon the capacity of a people who have been disarmed for a century, and who have been in every way discouraged to undertake their military training; and when the exigency of the Great War called for the exploitation of the man power of India, the Indian soldier not only distinguished himself, but showed his capacity for leadership in the most trying circumstances, as the official record of the war, summarised by another great soldier, entitled “The Indian Corps in France” amply testifies.

187. We hold that the only question we have to consider is not the inherent incapacity of the Indian people to provide an efficient Dominion army but other considerations to which we shall have to advert in another connection when we shall be dealing with the Army of India.¹ We have interposed this subject here for the purpose of showing the attitude of eminent military experts towards India, and how little Indians can expect from these so-called guardians of Indian interests.

Objection
refuted.

188. It may be that such view is current in a wider circle of British army men. If so, do they pause to consider that countries like Turkey, Arabia, Persia and Japan all lie within the effeminate belt, still Turkey has only recently exhibited unexampled prowess and unsuspected capacity for organisation in her war with Greece; while the Saracens have left traces of their conquering march throughout Southern Europe, and Japan's memorable conflict with the northern Colossus is one of the glorious pages in her history. Africa and Australia have both the misfortune to lie within the so-called effeminate zone but their contribution in the Great War, their heroism and sacrifice, must have been forgotten too soon by those who would condemn a given geographical area to perpetual lack of high martial qualities. It

¹ See Ch. V (VII).

is true that climate has an enervating effect upon its denizens, and it may be that temperate climate develops physique and the capacity for endurance to a degree lacking in the inhabitants of a warmer climate, but modern mechanised warfare is scarcely a trial of physical strength ; other qualities count and these cannot be said to vary with the latitude of its people. Even if it did, it has now very little to do with the question in hand. Even small nations like Belgium, Denmark and Switzerland are entitled to their freedom though their armies may not be sufficient to defend their independence. That is the one great principle, one of the fourteen points of President Wilson to which the world stands committed, and England stands specially committed to India since it is her policy of wholesale disarmament which has added to the emasculation of its people.

189. But these questions apart, even if these experts in their respective spheres are taken at their face value, it follows that India can never hope to govern herself. If so, the pledge of self-government given in 1917 can never be made good, and if so why retain it on the statute book ? The civilians declare that they accept the pledge but that they consider its fulfilment impossible ; while civilians like Lord Sydenham would go further and even abolish the Assembly because it is a danger to the peace of India. In the opinion of these gentlemen India must settle down to a firm conviction that Providence has made it to be a Dependency of Britain and Dependency it must remain. All the old arguments which confronted the reformers of a decade ago are once more trotted out in all their grim nakedness. But if these arguments be sound then the question is not that there should be a further reform but that the reform given must be rescinded, and it is the burden of the civilian's contention to which we must now apply our minds.

190. They contend that British servants are necessary because of the congeries of communities in India and their mutual antagonism, the illiteracy and ignorance of the masses who trust the British official who is detached from their communal conflicts and takes an impartial view and independent action at all times, and more so during the exuberance of communal tension which has grown under the reformed regime, and more than ever calls for the presence of the British neutral to restore confidence in the British administration of justice. The creation of provincial autonomy would only transfer real power from the bureaucracy to an oligarchy, since "the electorate is still notoriously unprepared for the business of controlling the legislature. It votes at present mainly according to religion or from personal reasons, and it has no grasp of public questions. Ministers and legislators not being controlled by an electorate with the intelligence and capacity required to exercise control, naturally feel little or no respect for the electors

and the converse proposition is equally true. The voter feels no particular respect for or an allegiance to the ministers whom he regards mainly as office-holders and not as agents chosen by himself. A government composed of ministers, without the support of European colleagues, secretaries, heads of departments and district agencies, will be essentially a committee of placemen, rooted neither in the proved vitality of the electoral system nor in the confidence of the people as a whole."¹ It may at once be conceded that all these objections are sound so far as they go, but they are not new and existed and could have been and were indeed foreseen in 1917 when the pledge was given.

191. A reference to the memoranda then published shows that every one of these objections was stated with even greater emphasis and all of them were marshalled against the introduction of any reforms in India. But Parliament not only made the famous Declaration of its policy but followed it up by enacting the Reforms Act two years later. The history of those reforms during the last 10 years is now contained in a considered review of the several governments to which we have already referred in another place. We feel convinced that the objections though formidable at the inception of the reforms have since lost most of their piquancy and that with the further transfer of power the civic sense already brought into action will develop and grow ; and that in the realm of politics as in the other realms of human endeavour all misgivings can receive only one solution—*solvitur ambulando*.

192. The Civil Service Memorandum states that the "Hindu-Moslem Feud," which runs through most of India has hitherto made it necessary to put the present electoral rolls on a religious basis. Communal electorates are clearly a violation of a really democratic system ; and in themselves they are a denial of real "provincial autonomy," because the proportions of parties in the legislature are fixed by external authority. The prescription of definite proportions between religious parties in local bodies and universities, and sometimes even in public services is a further denial of the basis of true democratic faith. But even more serious in practice are the effects on the administration, communal feeling prevents the formation of truly political parties (except on a religious basis, which is the worst basis of all). It prevents cohesion amongst ministers and it impedes confidence between a minister and his departmental and service staffs, and in times of stress it will paralyse a purely Indian executive.

193. As to this, while we feel constrained to acknowledge the evil effects of training public life with religious bias, we cannot forget that communal representation both in the public bodies

¹ Memorandum, p. 9.

and the public services is a legacy left to the Reformed India from pre-reform days, and while the authors of the Montagu Report had severely deprecated its perpetuation they were faced with hard facts. But these facts have only tended to aggravate the evil and intensify the tension and degrade public service, creating a festering sore in the body politic which if suffered to continue any longer would bring about its collapse and disintegration. To this extent we are in entire agreement with the memorialists and we have recommended a course which we trust will result in the creation and growth of a truly national spirit without all talk of a national ideal and a national government is but a tinkling cymbal.

194. The crucial difference between ourselves and the civilian protagonists is stated by the latter in answer to a question by one of us that if we accepted the civilians' claim for the retention of the British element with its past tradition we should be perpetuating a bureaucracy to which we were told : " You cannot govern without a bureaucracy and the Indian masses desire the extension of the British element in that bureaucracy." This is an old cry and one which was raised at the time of the first reforms. But there is no evidence to show that the masses desire the retention of the British element and when the civilian representatives were pressed they had to admit that the Legislatures are against them but it was said that the depressed classes favoured them. We have on our committee their representative and we are assured that what the depressed classes want is honest, clean administration but equally an administration that is sympathetic and progressive and makes it its primary concern to uplift their social and economic condition. The bureaucracy has ruled India for a century and a half ; and when we deplore the appalling illiteracy of the masses, their ignorance, misery and life spent in squalor and dirt, the condition of their women and children, the appalling mortality amongst them and the efforts made by the reformed governments we can only regret that under the avowed policy of the bureaucracy of *laissez faire* the state of the country has made slower progress than might have been possible and the future government will have to make up a great deal of leeway which a more vigorous policy would have avoided.

*Esprit de
corps.*

195. It is stated that men not recruited to a service will not possess the *esprit de corps* or observe the traditions of the service and might not resist the temptation and uphold the high standard of integrity and efficiency laid down for them by the members of an organised service. We have no doubt that these fears are not wholly groundless, but as a set off we cannot overlook the fact that officials of the future would have something far more exacting than the mere tradition of their service and their own consciences for their guides, for they will have to work before the gaze of the public ; and we may

be sure that the Ministers and the Legislatures combined will prove a stronger corrective than a mere tradition ; and as for the *esprit de corps* if it means anything more than cordial co-operation with other members of the service, it is a frailty and not a virtue which has contributed to the unpopularity of the services, since it is to that feeling amongst his comrades that a slack and inefficient officer in the last resort appeals for his escape from the consequence to which he would otherwise be exposed. We are not sure in what measure the civilian's unpopularity in the judicial service in India is due to his lack of application and ignorance of the Indian law and want of familiarity of the customs, habits and usages of the people, and in what measure to his feeling of *esprit de corps* which inclines him to uphold the decisions of the man on the spot. Members of the Civil Service Association earnestly plead for the retention (even expansion) of the British element in the security services in which they would include the Indian Medical Service. We agree with the Lee Commission that the Medical Service should be immediately provincialized and we are wholly opposed to the retention of the judicial quota of the Indian Civil Service. We think that the civilian is still required in the executive branch but to what extent, must be left for the decision of the provinces concerned ; we have already dealt with the Police.

196. Having disposed of all the objections, both against the Indianization of the services and their provincialization, we have very little to add in support of our constructive proposals which follow the line of recommendations made by two Royal Commissions presided over by Lord Islington and Lord Lee, which have dealt with their Indianization and provincialization respectively. Referring to Indianization the Lee Commission said:—

Lee Commission's
Recommendations.

“ We do not propose to argue the case for Indianization *de novo*. The question was among those remitted for consideration to the Islington Commission, and the various relevant considerations were fully discussed in that Report.”¹

That Report was signed two years before the Declaration of August, 1917, which, as the Lee Commission observe “ had entirely changed the constitutional outlook.” “ In the days of the Islington Commission the question was how many Indians should be admitted into the Public Services ? ” It has now become “ what is the minimum number of Englishmen which must still be recruited ? ”² This disposes of all arguments against Indianization. There remains the second question of provincialization on which the Lee Commission have made a considered pronouncement which we accept. It is not, therefore, necessary for us to cover the same ground over again and re-argue a case which the two previous Commissions have settled for us. We have, therefore, no hesitation in recommending that

1 Report, § 32 p. 17.

2 *Ib.* § 34.

the Provinces to which we are transferring full autonomy should be left entirely free to recruit their own services, and that it is for them to decide whether they need Europeans for any service, or for any post and to make their own arrangements accordingly.

"The
Dilemma of
India."

197. We do not know how far the attitude of the Civil Service generally towards the Reforms is voiced by a distinguished member of that Service who headed a deputation of the Retired Service Association, and was good enough to educate us in the views of his service which the deputation assured us were held by the members of his service generally. As this evidence was given *in camera* we cannot refer to it in our Report. But what we are free to do is to refer to his recently published work styled the *Dilemma of India* in which he condemns the announcement of 1917 as the outcome of ignorant idealism,¹ the subsequent reforms which followed it as to tower built before its authors had counted the cost, and which is now proving to be a second Tower of Babel. To him and to those who think with him the term "responsible government" as applied to India is "a complete fraud and sham" because India has no single nation, or a group of nations, to assume the responsibility of governing themselves. He opposes Indianization of the Services and opines that the Indian character lacks the moral fibre or driving power which has made the British services in India so efficient and pure. To him the Indianization of the services, even to the extent recommended by the Lee Commission, of which he was a member, and to their recommendations a consenting party, was a mistake. "You may instil Western doctrines in to the minds of these oriental people; they may alter their form of speech, but they do not alter their actions and reactions."² Character, he says, does not change in five years. He is a firm and uncompromising apostle of firm rule by the British. All he wants, all he cares for, all that matters to him is honesty and efficiency. To him good government is a far better substitute for self-government for India.³ "The people in India hate changes, they are not groaning, they are prospering. Why should they wish to embark on so dangerous an experiment which may place them under the iron heel of some oppressor almost as alien as the British?"⁴

Its Scheme
of Reforms.

198. He then suggests a scheme of the so-called reforms which he seriously thinks will fulfil both in the letter and in spirit the assurances given in Queen Victoria's Proclamation and the Preamble of the Reforms Act. He would create an Indo-British partnership in which the composition of the Council will be so jerrimandered as to be absolutely impotent. For instance, he gives an imaginary composition of a Provincial Council in which out of, say, 100 members, 65 will be elected, dividing them between 30 for land, 10 for commerce and 20 for the professions, subdividing them again between Hindus and Muhammedans

in the case of the land, between Indians and Europeans in the case of Commerce, "while the professional intelligensia being enlightened should require no communal electorates".¹ Of the Executive, half shall be British and the other half Indians, over which and above them all there would remain the ever abiding power of supervision, direction and control of the Central Government. He knows that his scheme would be denounced as going back to the Morley-Minto scheme, so he is content to deny it, adding that it is merely the change of route.² As for the Central Government he would stiffen it by the same process, reconstituting the Assembly of 120 composed of 25 officials, 25 official nominees and 39 added by indirect elections; in addition to which he would constitute a "Darbar" of elder statesmen of nominated men who will act as the revising chamber. "The situation in India is approaching a crisis", he adds. So it is, but his scheme would precipitate it. A final appeal addressed to the Statutory Commission in the interest of the "masses of India", of which the writer considers himself the accredited spokesman, makes a passionate appeal for "great firmness", and pleads "for the maintenance of our British Services in full security".³

199. We would have hardly paused to reply to so sweeping a diatribe against India and the Indians, but human memories are short, and few may remember that the present agitation against further advance is merely a recrudescence of a similar propaganda which faced the pioneers of the new reform movement 10 years ago. A reference to the fugitive literature then printed shows, however, that the protagonists of the present opposition have nothing better than a *rechauffé* of the old arguments to offer. Then, as now, we are treated to individual views of Indians who decry all advance and fear that India is moving headlong to its political perdition by recasting its governmental machinery. Then, as now, a perverid appeal is made in the name of the masses who are declared to be happy and contented with the rule of a foreign Bureaucracy, and all agitation for progress is ascribed to the machination and mischief of a set of lawyers and carpet-bag politicians who are anxious to feather their own nests by disturbing the *Pax Britannica* which the British Civil Service has established. But unfortunately for their apologists the masses of India are now far more aggressive than the despised intelligensia, and during our long tour in the country when the masses were given special facilities to send up their representatives, there was not a single individual that we can remember who unfolded to us his desire to go back on the reforms, or to arrest their forward march. On the other hand, wherever we went, we heard complaints of their inadequacy, and the ever-ringing cries for Swaraj. In the face of this evidence we cannot admit the writer's *ipse dixit* of what India wants and what will satisfy India for we know that the facts are far otherwise.

Old
objections
again.

That the writer is perfectly entitled to plead for and protect the interest of his own service is perfectly natural ; and we have given due weight to his representation, and in making our recommendations we have not forgotten to safeguard the interests of all its present incumbents who might be affected by the possibility of further reforms.

The Civil
Service and
the
Reforms.

200. It is true that with each stage towards responsibility both the number and influence of the Civil Service must diminish, and the greater the success of the reforms the greater must be the pace of its elimination as a privileged service. Members of the Service know it too well, and still we have not met one of their number in active service who has echoed such reactionary views. On the other hand, they have, as a rule, recommended the grant of provincial autonomy with or without the reservation of law and order. We must, therefore, in fairness to the distinguished service, of which Sir Reginald Craddock is himself a retired member, add that it would be wrong and misleading if an impression got abroad that the views expressed in the *Dilemma of India* are generally held by a considerable section of civil servants, and even those who may share his views cannot help realizing that we are not writing upon a clean slate, and that it is now too late to set back the hands of the clock, and that the only counsel we can give to those who, like the writer, suffer from a dilemma is in a refrain suggested to us by one of our colleagues :—

If we go forward, we die,

If we go backward, we die,

Better go forward—and die !

Ministers'
views.

201. We have hitherto confined our remarks to the objections of the services and their claim for continuance ; but it does not exhaust the subject or the limit of our inquiry. Five years back when the Lee Commission drew up their Report, they found abundant evidence to show that while the Services were perfectly satisfied with their treatment by ministers, the ministers felt that they could not discharge their obligations to the Legislative Councils or to the country without being given direct control over their own agents. They claimed to be set free to appoint their own agents on their own terms. We have heard less on this subject in the course of our own inquiry, because everybody concerned had assumed that the Lee Commission had already said the last word on the subject. But it was a common complaint then, which has gained momentum with the passage of time, that all the highly paid services need to be reorganized. Both in the Central Legislature and in the Local Councils resolutions have been passed for the abolition of several highly paid posts such as those of Divisional Commissionerships, expenditure upon which runs into several million sterling annually. These recommendations received a

striking support from the several Retrenchment Committees in which the services were adequately represented and over many of which high service men presided. Several local governments have explained their inability to give effect to these counsels of economy on the ground that the posts were created and can only be abolished by the Secretary of State. That a large body of officers at one time necessary to formulate a policy and exercise a general control has become unnecessary, and delays, if it does not hamper, the speedy transaction of public business is now apparent, and it is only fair that the Provinces who have to pay for their services must be free to decide in what measure and to what extent they require their services. This aspect of the question is too obvious to be overlooked ; but it is overlooked in a general discussion on efficiency, which must never be permitted to give the go-by to an equally important consideration of economy. Then again, we are too apt to forget that a thing good at one time is not necessarily good for all time ; and whatever may be the merits of the British Services, and they are undeniable, they undoubtedly suited a skeleton constitution in which mobility and general knowledge were all that were required to the conditions then existing. But the days of Admirable Crichtons are passed—we now live in an age of specialization and our services must be specialized to suit the altered outlook of the age. That the British officers still clinging to old traditions and the old method of government are experiencing great difficulties in discharging their duties before the censorious eyes of the Legislatures is acknowledged by their own spokesmen. And it has, therefore, really become a question whether the growing friction which must chagrin these honourable men should not be removed by giving the Provinces the option to which in all conscience they are entitled.

Abolition of
superfluous
posts.

202. In coming to our conclusion our judgment has been naturally weighed by considerations other than the naked appeal to efficiency ; though we have not overlooked or subordinated that essential condition of all public services which is the bed-rock of good government.

203. We will now conclude our observations with the following summary of our conclusions on this head :—

Summary of
Recom-
mendations.

(1) We consider that the two questions of Indianization and provincialization were sufficiently threshed out by two Royal Commissions ; and we abide by their decisions.

(2) That following their recommendations we recommend that all Provincial Governments should be set free to recruit and control their own Public Services.

(3) That in making appointments thereto the prime factor of efficiency should not be sacrificed to communal or class claims ;

(4) But that otherwise, being in the nature of public patronage, the claims of all communities should be adequately considered, and so far as possible, met.

(5) That the present incumbents in the cadre of the All-India Services should continue their present rights and privileges as regards pay, control and pensions so long as they are entitled to continue in service.

(6) But that otherwise all future recruitments whether Provincial or on the basis of the All-India Services, to the extent necessary or desirable, should be left to be made by the Governments of India or the Provincial Governments in the enjoyment of full provincial autonomy.

(7) That the business of such recruitment should, as far as possible, be entrusted to a Public Service Commission, a body the constitution of which must be left to the Governments concerned. //

CHAPTER V.

THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

I.

THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY.

204. The constitution of the Legislative Assembly under the Reforms Act closely follows the recommendations made in the Montagu Report. The Assembly and the Council of State are the natural successors of the old Imperial Legislative Council in which the official element had a preponderating majority comprising, as it did, of 60 members, of which only 27 were returned by a method of indirect elections made by delegates of local bodies. The Montagu Report advocated a distinct departure from the beaten track of mere consultative bodies, which guided but could neither materially influence or control the policy of the nomination. This fact is recognised—for the authors of the Report say: “It is no longer sufficient to administer India, it is necessary also to satisfy the political aspirations; and because we were all too slow in taking cognizance of the changes that were occurring, the task is all the heavier because there is lee-way to make up.”¹ Its history.

In the opinion of the Indians that lee-way was never in fact made up and it had gone on widening, with the result that we have to make up for the past and provide against the future breakdown of the entire system.

205. However, as it was, the Montagu Report postulated the continuance of bureaucracy in the Central Government, slightly relieving it by making it more responsive to the voice of the Legislative Assembly. This they proposed to do—

(a) By providing that the Secretary of State should act “not merely in accordance with British views but with regard also to the expressed views of those who represent constituencies in India.”²

(b) By providing that the wishes of India should be further represented in the Cabinet of the Country.³ This was to be assured by the appointment of more Indians to the Viceroy’s Executive Council.⁴

(c) By securing that the majority of members of the Legislative Assembly shall be elected.⁵

206. But at the same time, in order to insure the passage of Bills which the Government of India considered it essential for the discharge of their responsibility to Parliament, a second chamber was constituted with a clear official majority. As will Value of a
Second
Chamber.

¹ Report, § 965.

⁴ *Ib.* § 272.

² *Ib.* § 270.

³ *Ib.* § 272.

⁵ *Ib.* § 273.

be presently seen, the proposal as to the majority was not, however, concurred in by the Joint Parliamentary Committee and in the result a second chamber with a small non-official majority was constituted.

207. The experience of one of us who has sat in the Legislative Assembly ever since its inception and of those who have sat in it since, has convinced us that the first two provisos have remained a dead letter. The action of the Secretary of State has not been visibly influenced by the decisions of the Assembly, while the substitution of three Indian members for the European members of the Viceroy's Executive Council has not been invariably, and in later years, at all, made with the view that "the wishes of India should be further represented in the Cabinet of the country."

Viceroy's
Council.

208. These appointments have rather been influenced by the rule of political expediency, with the result that a wider chasm has been created between the Viceroy's Council and the Viceroy's popular Assembly. Opinion in India is almost unanimous—an opinion which is largely voiced by the representatives of European Associations—that the Indian personnel of the Viceroy's Council has not been drawn, as well as it might have been, from the elected representatives of the Indian Legislature. The invariable rule has been to recruit men from outside and not always from the ranks of public men.

Even if this were the case, had they been more responsive though not responsible to the Legislative Assembly, the fact would have greatly increased the confidence which the Assembly members would feel in them—and confidence in nine points of politics.

It might be said that our proposal would not obviate this objection; since what we propose to establish is a dyarchy in the Central Government which from all accounts stands condemned in the provinces where it was first tried. We can only say that though our proposal might at first be open to that objection, we find that even if it were formidable it would be a case of Hobson's choice—for we have no other alternative. But at the same time it would seem to us that there is a marked difference between administration and control and while dyarchy presents all the objections stated against it, the same objections do not necessarily apply to the working of a department the functions of which are different.

Justification
for advance.

209. As a matter of fact, the fact that bureaucratic control with joint responsibility in the Central Government has so long held the field, makes us feel that it may not be so difficult to remove bureaucracy, transferring the ultimate control from the British to the Indian Parliament which would more closely guide the ministers in the formulation and execution of their policy. No other course is possible. We have granted a full measure of responsibility to the provinces and with Mr. Montagu "we cannot think that States on the way to responsible Government

which have imbibed a large element of responsibility into their constitution, can be controlled by a purely autocratic power. So also with the duties extending over the whole of India which will be discharged by the Government of India as its special concern. It is impossible that while other duties which differ from them mainly in being local in scope or subject to provincial differentiation are being administered by responsible Governments, those which fall to the Government of India should be administered autocratically. It follows, therefore, that a change in the Provinces implies change in the Government of India, but it does not imply that the change should be simultaneous or in equal proportion. On the contrary, the change need simply be so much as to render the Government of India a suitable instrument for controlling the provinces at the stage at which they have for the time being arrived."¹

210. Experience of the last nine years has sufficiently refuted the closing conclusions of the Report. The establishment of a dyarchical form of Government in the Provinces made the autocracy in the centre, never popular, suffer by contrast. It became intolerable. The grant of full provincial responsibility would make the retention of autocracy in any form in the Centre impossible, while apprehensive of the danger that must flow from the retention of three departments in the control of autocracy, we have adopted a line, which we hope might suffice to assure those who dread a change to a new order, while it might equally encourage those who wish to go forward to move with greater confidence. The change we propose is merely a palliative and not a cure ; we wish we could have gone further, and some of us feel that the control reserved may recoil on the control transferred to the ministry. But we had to strike a balance, for without such balance our Committee would not have even ventured upon the uncharted sea of an adventure in the Central Government. Reconsideration of the conflicting views, representative of the advanced as also of the conservative schools, was only possible in adopting the intermediate course which has commanded a majority in the Committee and it is that view that we must justify here.

Defence of
Central
Dyarchy.

211. The Committee propose to leave three main subjects out of the reforms, namely, foreign, political and military. Foreign subjects have not been categorised, but would, we presume, comprise such subjects as peace and war and India's relations with foreign nations. Political subjects comprise the relationship of British India with the Indian States, while the military are well understood to comprise the Army, the Navy and the Air Forces, together with such auxiliary subjects as ordnance, factories, forts and strategic outposts. All these are at present most valuable and comprise the most important items in the annual budget.

¹ Report, § 350.

212. Taking the three subjects in their reverse order, we have first to consider how far we feel justified in keeping the military expenditure out of the vote of the Assembly. The latter complains that the Army in India is maintained partially, and the British garrison mainly, as a part of the Imperial forces in the East, and that India is unjustly saddled with the entire cost of the British garrison stationed in India ; including even its recruitment, training and travelling to and fro. These items, known as the capitation charges, entail the annually recurring cost of about two million pounds. Indians complain that no possessions of Great Britain—South Africa, Australia, Ceylon and the Malaya States—maintain any standing army because they know that the Indian Army stands by to defend them in case of need ; and yet these possessions do not contribute a cent towards the discharge of this Imperial obligation, the cost of which is met out of the revenues of India. Burma wishes to be separated because she hopes to profit by the example of her neighbours and save her contribution to the Indian Exchequer in which the military demand bulks so largely.

213. That India needs an army to defend her frontiers admits of no doubt. But what the Indians complain of is that 65,000 white troops are not necessarily the minimum required for that work, and that half of them are distinctly maintained for Imperial purposes. The drain on India is thus severe, made more severe by the fact that the cost of our British soldier is no less than five and a half (really more than six) times the cost of an Indian sepoy. The officering of the Indian Army is another grievance on the part of India, since it is claimed that an Indian Army should be officered by Indians and not by the more costly Europeans. Then again, the general policy as regards the Indian Army is controlled by the British War Office, and in spite of the declarations made that the War Office only advise the Secretary of State, the fact remains that the advice of this department is not given with the sole desire to safeguard the revenue of India, for if the choice lies between England and India it is but natural that the British should support England. But although our Committee has formally reserved the Army, it must not be assumed that the entire Army Budget should escape the scrutiny of the Assembly, which should be free to vote upon the military grant ; but the Governor-General should be armed with the larger power of certification up to the minimum cost which might be settled by agreement or convention. The question whether the Governor-General should be singly responsible for the administration of Foreign and Political Departments, or should not be made free to call in aid a body of experts will be found discussed under another head.¹

¹ Ch. V. (III).

II.

A. SECOND CHAMBER.

214. The necessity for a Second Chamber is justified both on historical and *a priori* grounds—on historical grounds, because it is a long tradition handed down to us by the Romans who had two Consuls, because they felt that neither of them should be exposed to the corrupting influence of undivided power, even for the space of a single year. That policy has been followed in the institution of the judiciary where benches of two or more judges are appointed to decide questions between parties. The two chambers in the British Parliament, however, owe their origin to the accident of history. They were not instituted upon considerations such as influenced the appointment of Roman Consuls. In Germany, as in America, the bi-cameral legislature has become real but there too the system has grown out of a diet of ambassadors representing separate and virtually independent states. The Second Chambers in the Overseas Dominions of England have followed both the precedent and moral of the British dual Houses, not for any special reasons, but following the general policy of adopting and embodying as far as possible and as much of the British Constitution as possible. Sir Henry Jenkins says :—

True
purpose of a
Second
Chamber.

“ The genius of Earl Grey not only devised for the greater colonies a system of Government which reproduces as nearly as possible the external features of our own, but breathed into the copy the inner essence of the original
 . . . possibility of silent constitutional growth.”

215. In none of the great Dominions has there been any attempt to introduce the principle of uni-cameral legislatures so that its utility has never been put to the test. In France the French Senate and the Chamber of Deputies present another parallel of bi-cameral legislation. The historian notes the constitutional conflict between the two Houses and sneers at the reduction of political science to a laboratory of constitutional experiments, but all the same the two Chambers have become the guiding principle of all parliamentary governments and remain so despite their past errors. As Sir Henry Maine remarked, “ There was much reason to believe that the British House of Lords would have been exclusively or much more extensively copied in the constitutions of the Continent but for one remarkable difficulty. This is not in the least any dislike or hatred of the hereditary principle, but the extreme numerousness of the nobility in most Continental Societies and the consequent difficulty of selecting a portion of them to be exclusively privileged.” But these words were written long before the War. Mr. Lecky says, “ The necessity of a Second Chamber
 . . . has acquired almost the position of an axiom.” On

the whole, these Chambers in the Continental Constitutions have worked well, though they have in general not yet had a very long experience, and most of them—especially those of a composite character—have included a large proportion of the chief elements of weight and ability in their respective countries.

Hereditary
and elected
Second
Chamber.

216. The British House of Lords, and the Upper House constituted in the British Colonies and in America essentially differ in that, while the British House of Lords is hereditary, the Second Chambers of the Continent of Europe and elsewhere are elected or nominated much on the same lines as the Lower Houses. The persistence of the Second Chambers in the Constitutions of the World owe their justification to the fact that while the popular House of Representatives may at times pass hasty legislation to satisfy the popular clamour, the Upper House acts as a brake and modifies, revises or over-rules the hasty and ill-considered decisions of the other and more representative Chamber. It is also perhaps one of the reasons why the Second Chambers have continued to exist, and have worked so well as they have, because the personnel thereof is drawn from a smaller body of experienced jurists, politicians and publicists who had retired from the more controversial arena of life and are prepared to give their mature judgment upon affairs of State. But the Second Chamber, in order that it should command public confidence and public respect of the considered opinion of the people, must be at least mainly elected. As Mr. Henry Sidgwick points out : " the Second Chamber in order to be able to maintain a real co-ordinate position against the pressure of the popularly-elected assembly must itself be also in some way, perhaps indirectly, the result of popular election . . . in order to get the full advantage of the system of two Chambers with co-ordinate powers it seems desirable they should be elected on the different plans in respect both of extent, renewal, operation and power, so that while the primary representative Chamber being chosen for a comparatively short period may more frequently represent the opinions and sentiments of the majority of the electorate, the Senate elected for a considerably longer period and on the system of partial renewal may be able to withstand the influence of transient gust of popular passion or sentiment."¹

Second
Chambers in
other
countries.

" The constitution of the Second Chamber so widely differs in the different countries that it is difficult, if not impossible, to generalize upon it. Thus, for example, the American and the Australian Senates represent the states, every state large or small being equally represented. The French Senate is elected by a method of indirect elections through the medium of delegates elected by the towns. In neither system does the Senate represent the people on a basis strictly proportioned to population though the French system approaches that basis much more nearly

¹ Elements of Politics, pp. 474—476.

than the American and the Australian Senates. That method of election, says Lord Bryce, "was justified as giving a representation of the people not merely by numbers but by local social groups, each of which had a common interest and so a collective opinion. The idea was in so far a good one that it brought in many men of personal distinction, who gave lustre to the body in the eyes of the nation and helped to form in its members habits of decorum and gravity as well as to set a high intellectual standard in its Debates."¹

217. According to Lord Bryce, the French Senate is not used as an originating Chamber, though it has acted wisely as a revising authority on the hasty and, at times, ill-conceived measures brought to it by the Chamber of Deputies. The French Cabinet is drawn mostly from the Deputies but three or four Ministers are equally taken from the Senate to which distinguished men drawn from all ranks are attracted. "Veterans of renown seek its less troubled and turbid waters, instead of the atmosphere of strife in which the larger House lives, and which make its Debates exciting. There reigns in the Senate a sedate and sometimes almost languid tranquility befitting the comparatively advanced age of its members. (The average age of the Senators is 63.) Some critics say it has the obsolete air of a *theatre de la rive gauche*, or describe it by terms corresponding to the American "side show," because it wants the vivacity of the Chamber, and draws far less of the attention of the nation. Nevertheless the position of a Senator is coveted, and his authority considerable. The level of the discussions is well maintained, not only as respects matter but also in the form and diction of the speeches. Brilliant oratory has been rare, but no other legislative body has in modern times shown a higher average standard of ability and the knowledge among its members."²

The French Senate.

218. The examination of the Constitutions of the world would show that these observations have more or less been followed in respect of Second Chambers everywhere. In France and the Netherlands such Chambers are elected by indirect or secondary elections, and in France, a Senator is elected for nine years, while a deputy is only elected for four. In the United States of America the terms are six years and four years respectively. The electoral area for the two cases is different. It seems also apparent from these considerations that nominated members in such Chambers are reduced to a minimum as it has been felt that nominated members too readily lend themselves to party convenience. In India, before the advent of the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms, there was a single Chamber both in the Central and Provincial Governments. The Montagu-Chelmsford Report for the first time introduced the element of bi-cameral legislation in the Government of India and the Statutory Commission was to advise whether the expedient of a second

Second Chamber a settled fact.

¹ Modern Democracies, p. 282.

² *Ib.* p. 266.

Chamber was desirable or not in the Local Legislatures. From the terms of reference in Section 84A of the Government of India Act it would appear that the continuance of a Second Chamber in the Government of India is to be regarded as a settled fact, and that its extension to the Provinces is a matter for report. The Montagu-Chelmsford Report, however, recommended the constitution of a Second Chamber as a substitute for withdrawing the Government majority from the popular House. They added : " that we do not propose to institute a complete bicameral system but to create a Second Chamber which shall take its part in ordinary legislation and shall be the final legislative authority in matters which the Government regard as essential."¹

Composition
of the
Council of
State.

219. They then set out the constitution and composition of the Council of State. The Joint Parliamentary Committee, however, made one important modification in the composition of that body. They did not approve of the standing Government majority in the Second Chamber and advised the strengthening of the elective element, holding that if it was necessary for the Government to secure the passage of legislation which the Legislative Assembly refused and which they regarded as essential for the discharge of their duty they should do so by certification rather than resort to the unworthy method of concealing their responsibility through the action of the Council of State so established and devised to secure the necessary power. " They believed," they added, " that in such a case it would add strength to the Government of India to act before the world on its own responsibility."

Council of
State ; its
work in the
past.

220. It is our duty now to examine the work of the Council of State and see how far it has responded to the expectations raised of it as a revising Chamber. We feel constrained to admit that our experience of the working of that body for the last nine years has led us to the conclusion that in spite of the small unofficial majority in the Chamber it has invariably supported the Government and has virtually taken the place of the official bloc removed from one Chamber to another. Out of sixty-three members of the Council of State, thirty-three are nominally elected while twenty-seven nominated by Government. But as the elected members are drawn from the landed and leisured classes who do not feel the same incentive to leave their homes to go to far-off Delhi or Simla as do the nominated and official members who act under discipline, the total strength of members present at any meeting in the Council of State has always maintained a preponderating majority for the Government. Moreover, it is only on rare occasions that the nominated members have had the courage of their conviction to oppose the official view. They owe their nomination to the Government ; nominations are presumably carefully made and the nominees themselves

¹ Joint Select Committee's Report, § 26.

feel the obligation to their nominator and live up to their nomination by supporting the officials in the hope they would thereby secure re-nomination for a further term of years. Whatever may be the reason, the Council of State has aroused deep hostility in the country and has frequently antagonised their representatives in the Legislative Assembly. Measures passed by that body have been turned down for no reason other than that the Government opposed them. Instances can be multiplied but a few would suffice to illustrate our point. The Princes Protection Bill was thrown out of the Legislative Assembly at its first reading. It was passed by the Council of State. A small Bill amending the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Evidence Act was similarly passed by the Council of State when its very legality was challenged with success in the Legislative Assembly. A measure to grant protection to British subjects drawn on the lines of the Habeas Corpus Act was several times passed by the Assembly but was thrown out by the Council of State as often as it was passed. Every page of the proceedings of the Council of State would show its reluctance to assert itself. We are not able to advise the retention of the Council of State in its present form, and we would suggest that radical changes be made to ensure that that body entirely answers the purpose for which the Second Chamber has been devised in the other Constitutions of the world.

221. Our Committee has adopted a resolution, without discussion, recommending an addition to its numerical strength but otherwise retaining its composition. Some of us think that this decision cannot be supported. With our recommendation for the devolution of power to a ministry responsible to the Assembly, from which the official bloc has been removed, we cannot see in logic or in justice its retention in the revising Chamber ; at the same time with the transfer of large powers to popular control we feel the necessity of a strong revising Chamber which we think might well follow the model of the French Senate. But whatever model is followed, there must be a greater correlation between its function and the competency of those called upon to discharge it. We think that the sub-division of the electorates into classes and communities is not here essential. If any community is to receive protection it must be by a reservation of seats, but otherwise the election should attract the distinguished veterans who are so attractive a feature of the French Senate.

Our proposals in-
conclusive.

222. And in order to ensure greater *cameraderie* between the two Chambers we feel predisposed to favour the election of a certain number from the Assembly to the Council of State. Some of us think that for the same reason a certain number of the Assembly members might be similarly elected by the provincial Councils. But these are questions of detail upon which our Committee have not had the time to bestow critical consideration. But those of us who have made a study of the constitution would be best able to go into details if the broad principle of their recommendation meets with acceptance.

III.

THE INDIAN STATES.

The Indian
States.

223. Under Section 33 of the Government of India Act "the superintendence, direction and control of the Civil and Military Government of India is vested in the Governor-General in Council who is required to pay due obedience to all such orders as he may receive from the Secretary of State."

Within the
terms of
reference.

224. By Section 124 of the Amending Act¹ the word "India" as used in Sections I and II of the Government of India Act includes not only British India but also "any territories of any native Prince or Chief under the suzerainty of His Majesty exercised through the Governor-General of India or through any Governor or Officer subordinate to the Governor-General of India." References to "India" as distinct from "British India" occur in several sections of the Government of India Act. In s. 20 (3) of the Act "the revenues of India" are defined to include the tributes paid by the Indian States; and under s. 67 (2) (d) it is not competent to the Indian Legislature without the previous sanction of the Governor-General to introduce a measure affecting "the relation of the Government with foreign Princes or States." It is further provided *inter alia* by s. I. of the Government of India Act, 1858, that "all powers in relation to Government vested in or exercised by the East India Company, and all rights vested in it, which if this Act had not been passed, might have been exercised by the said Company in relation to any territories shall become vested in Her Majesty and be exercised in her name, and for the purposes of this Act India shall mean the territories vested in Her Majesty by virtue of any such rights as aforesaid." It is, therefore, clear that ever since the Statute of 1858 up to date the Government of India as constituted by the several Parliamentary Acts enacted from time to time have exercised all the rights which the East India Company under the treaties with the Indian States where they exist, otherwise by sufrance, usage and political practice, acquired or possessed; and continue to exercise them up to date.

Indian States
under the
Government
of India.

225. As such, the relations of the Indian States have always been managed by the Political Department of the Government of India. That Department has always been a part of the regular machinery of that Government; and since the superintendence, direction and control of the Government of India is vested in the Governor-General in Council it follows that any change made in the constitution of that Council must necessarily affect the Indian States. But since under s. 84 (A) (2) of the Government of India Act the enquiry to be made by the Statutory Commission is limited to British India, it is possible to argue

that the Commission cannot go into the question of the relationship of the Indian States with the Government of India or with the Governor-General in Council when acting in relation to them. In other words, the Governor-General in Council is charged with the dual function *first* of governing British India and *secondly* of managing the relations with the Indian States. But this duality of functions is nowhere adumbrated in the Parliamentary Act which deals with British India, nor would it be in consonance with legitimate construction of the Statutes to assign to a body a dual personality or functions. We therefore think, that as we have recommended the reconstitution of the Government of India, we shall be within our rights if we take up the relationship of such Government with the Indian States. And as we shall presently show, this is in any case inevitable.

226. In order to understand the problems that arise out of the position of the Indian States and their future in relation to reformed India we may take as our starting point the Montagu Report, in which the subject occupies a separate chapter¹ which contains the following concrete recommendations :—

Montagu
Report and
the States.

(1) That some of the states were hitherto in political relations with local governments, and others with the Government of India : as a general principle those which are important should be placed in direct political relations with the Central Government.²

(2) This recommendation was supported for the reason “ that relations with the native states should not be matters of provincial concern in the sense that they are intended ever to be transferred to the control of the legislative council.”³

(3) They next recommended the institution of two bodies, the Chamber of Princes and the Indian Privy Council, to advise the Viceroy on questions of policy, including that affecting the two halves of India. They pointed out that the question of status of the Indian Princes as independent rulers within their own domain could not be decided only by reference to their treaties, but also usage and precedent which “ may be exercising a levelling and corroding influence upon the treaty rights of individual states.”⁴ They, therefore, recommended an examination of the question “ not necessarily with a view to any change of policy, but in order to simplify, standardise and codify existing practice for the future.”⁵

227. But since both the functions of the Chamber of Princes and the Indian Privy Council were merely advisory, they could not settle disputes “ which may arise between two or more states, or between a state and a local government or the Government of India, and with a situation caused when a state

¹ Report, Ch. X ; §§ 296-312.

² *Ib.* § 310.

⁴ *Ib.* § 304.

² *Ib.* § 310.

⁵ *Ib.* § 305.

is dissatisfied with the ruling of a Government of India or the advice of any of its local representatives". In such cases there exists at the present moment no satisfactory method of obtaining an exhaustive and judicial enquiry into the issues, such as might satisfy the States, particularly in cases where the Government of India itself is involved, that the issues have been considered in an independent and impartial manner. Wherever, therefore, in such cases the Viceroy felt that such an enquiry was desirable, we recommend that he should appoint a commission, on which both parties would be represented, to enquire into the matter in dispute and to report its conclusions to him. If the Viceroy were unable to accept the finding, the matter would be referred for decision by the Secretary of State. The Commission that we have in mind would be composed of a judicial officer of rank not lower than a High Court Judge and one nominee of each of the parties concerned.¹ These were tentative and transitory suggestions pending the growth of further responsibility in British India when the authors hoped that the Indian States and British India might be brought into more direct relation in a system which might present "the external semblance of some form of federation".² The first two of these recommendations affect only the states of the Princes with which British India is not directly concerned. But the remaining recommendations directly affect the relationship between the two halves of India which must be reckoned with. The authors of the reforms themselves recognise that with the expansion of reforms in the Government of India the relationship between the Indian States and British India would grow into an acute problem. But as they had contemplated, but not actually recommended, the transfer of any measure of responsibility to the Central Government their scheme necessarily left out the examination which should bring into play a new order.

228. They, however, recommended certain changes and indicated others which in their view would be sufficient for the transitory period, which alone they had in mind for the functioning of the reformed government they proposed to create. But at the same time they were not slow to peer into the future of British India. "Looking ahead to the future," they wrote, "we can picture India to ourselves only as presenting the external semblance of some form of 'federation'. The provinces will become ultimately self-governing units, held together by the Central Government which will deal solely with matters of common concern to all of them. But the matters common to the British provinces are also to a great extent those in which the Native States are interested—defence, tariffs, exchange, opium, salt, railways and post and telegraphs. The gradual concentration of the Government of India upon such matters will

¹ *Ib.* § 308.

² *Ib.* § 300.

therefore make it easier for the States, while retaining the autonomy which they cherish in internal matters, to enter into closer association with the Central Government if they wish to do so. But though we have no hesitation in forecasting such a development as possible, the last thing that we desire is to attempt to force the pace. Influences are at work which need no artificial stimulation. All that we need or can do is to open the door to the natural developments of the future."¹

229. The door was opened in two recommendations, one of which was effective, while the other remained dormant, though this was their main recommendation if one may judge from the context and the precedence allotted to it in the report. For in the very next paragraph the report suggests the establishment of a Privy Council for India. It is pointed out that Lord Lytton had made a similar proposal, though it had resulted in an abortive and still born creation of a body known as "Councillors of the Empress"; other Viceroys had ventured in the same field, but the authors of the report considered the time then opportune for the establishment of a Privy Council. "From time to time," they observed, "prospects of this kind have been mooted and laid aside; but with the changed conditions we believe that such a body would serve a valuable purpose and do useful work. . . . The Privy Council's Office would be to advise the Governor General when he saw fit to consult it on questions of policy and administration."²

Proposal for
a Privy
Council.

230. It will be observed that under Section 67 of the Government of India Act, not only the relations of the Government with foreign Princes or States, but two other important matters, namely, (1) the religion or religious rites and usages of the people and (2) the discipline and maintenance of the Army, Navy and Air Forces are excluded from the cognizance of the Indian Legislature. In all these respects the Governor-General is technically vested with sole authority subject only to the direct control of the Secretary of State and the shadowy control of the British Parliament. Under the reforms as theretofore the autocratic authority of the Governor General remained; but while the Indian Legislatures received a substantial accession of elected strength, no link was established between them and the Indian States for the discussion, much less settlement, of fiscal and administrative questions in which the action of the Indian Legislature might have repercussion in the Indian States. Indeed, the other recommendation of the Montagu Report given effect to in the installation of a Chamber of Princes had in some respects even a detrimental effect upon the course of events in British India, as, for instance, the enactment of the Princes' Protection Act, which the Legislative Assembly had thrown out, but which Lord Reading had to certify because he stood committed to a promise made to the Chamber of Princes long before he had any opportunity of consulting the Legislatures, and he had no other popular

Defects of
the Chamber
of Princes.

body of men who could have apprised him of the view of British India. Another similar measure intending to amend the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Indian Evidence Act legalising the prosecution of a witness examined in British India on a commission issued by an Indian States Court, though passed in the Council of State, had to be withdrawn from the Legislative Assembly when one of us had pointed out that it was *ultra vires* of the Indian Legislature to enact a law legalising the trial of a British subject, for an offence committed with reference to a British enactment in British territory, in an Indian State where British enactments had no force.

231. These and other questions, including those specifically mentioned in the Montagu Report, admit of no solution by any constituted authority in which the two Indias are represented, and the establishment of the Chamber of Princes in accordance with its second recommendation has added to rather than alleviated the difficulties, since as a piece of machinery it remains un-coordinated with the institutions of British India. For, according to the report, the Chamber of Princes was brought into being to advise the Viceroy upon "questions which affect the States generally, and other questions which are of concern either to the Empire as a whole, or to British India and the States in common upon which," the authors added, "we conceive the opinion of such a body would be of the utmost value. The Viceroy would refer such questions to the Council (*i.e.*, the Council of Princes), and we should have the advantage of their considered opinion."¹

232. In other words, the Chamber of Princes which was solely representative of the Indian States was to advise the Viceroy on the solution of problems affecting not only the Indian States but British India as well. This was an inherent defect of the scheme, which has already borne the bitter fruit from which India has been a sufferer, and may conceivably be a still greater sufferer in the future. Meanwhile, the Indian Princes are themselves not satisfied with the machinery set up for their consultation, for though the Chamber may advise, it can only do so in matters upon which its advice is sought. It has no initiative of its own.

233. We have already shown that a decisive step in the direction of responsibility of the Central Government necessarily brings into the forefront the relationship of the Indian States towards the Reformed Central Government in British India. Following on the hint thrown out in the Montagu Report and in partial and half-hearted compliance with the repeated requests of the Princes, a committee presided over by Sir Harcourt Butler was appointed.

The Report of this Committee deals with two main heads :—

(a) The Relationship between the Paramount Power and the Indian States,

(b) The financial relations between the States and British India.

As to the first, the findings of the Committee are as follows :—

(1) That the States have no independent sovereignty, and only a quasi-international status.¹

(2) That sovereignty is divided between the Crown and the States, so that the States possess a measure of internal sovereignty limited by the terms of their treaties where such exist, modified by what is vaguely termed political practice.²

(3) That the treaties are with the Crown whose Agent is the Secretary of State for India and the Governor-General in Council responsible to the Parliament of Great Britain.³

(4) That the treaties are binding and secure to those Princes who have them—

(a) Security against external aggression and internal disorder.⁴

(b) The rights guaranteed by the treaty itself.⁵

But while the Committee regard the treaties as binding upon the States, it proceeds to introduce an element of confusion by asserting, in another passage, that the treaties hold good only to the extent they are not modified or varied by political practice necessitated by changing circumstances.⁶

Apart from treaties and independently of them the Committee believes the Paramount power possesses the inherent right of intervention,—

(a) For the benefit of the Prince.⁷

(b) For the benefit of the State.⁸

(c) For the benefit of India as a whole—that is, British India *plus* the Indian States.⁹

The duty of the Paramount Power to protect the States is subject to their obligation to observe the treaty provisions—in short, subject to good government.¹⁰

234. Apart from good government if the people of a State demand reforms in the State Government it is the duty of the Paramount Power “to suggest such measures as would satisfy this demand without eliminating the Prince.”¹¹

States
subjects
view point.

In this connection it may be noticed that on the request of the Chancellor of the Chamber of Princes, H. E. Lord Irwin personally drew up, a short time ago, a note upon the principles of good administration. On the basis of this note, H. H. the Maharaja of Bikaner moved a resolution, which the Chamber

¹Indian States Committee's Report, §§ 59, 44.

²*Ib.* § 44.

³*Ib.* §§ 38, 18, 19.

⁴*Ib.* § 38.

⁵*Ib.* § 38.

⁶*Ib.* §§ 40-45.

⁷*Ib.* § 52.

⁸*Ib.* § 53.

⁹*Ib.* § 55.

¹⁰§ 49 and Lord Reading's letter to the Nizam (printed as App. II of the Report 5).

¹¹*Ib.* § 50.

accepted, urging that in those States where such conditions did not already exist—

- (a) The Princes should have a fixed privy purse.
- (b) There should be security in the public services; and
- (c) There should be an independent judiciary.

That the Paramount Power has unquestionably the right of intervention in the internal machinery of a State for the benefit of India as a whole may arouse controversy but the proposition flows from the Committee's conception of paramountcy, since the paramount power may interfere with a state on international grounds, or because it is necessary for national defence,¹ and a fortiori its own security.

235. Lastly the Report concludes by recommending that the Princes should not be transferred without their agreement to a relationship with a new government in British India responsible to an Indian Legislature.

The authors, however, say that the change "would raise questions of law and policy which we cannot now and here foreshadow in detail".² They have, however, indicated that the question of their federation is at present "wholly premature".³

The rest of their recommendations which would arouse still further controversy are as follows :—

(a) That the Viceroy, and not the Governor-General in Council, for the present, should be the agent of the Crown, for the adjustment of financial and economic questions arising between British India and Indian States.

(b) That the political department should be separately recruited directly in England.

(c) That disputes between British India and the States should be referred to *ad hoc* Committees, but the ultimate decision should rest with the Secretary of State.

This Report was the subject of consideration by the Princes at their informal conference held in Bombay on the 27th June, 1929, when in a series of Resolutions they expressed their views, which in effect accepted the finding given in accordance with their contention that their treaties are with the Crown, and accepted that the Viceroy should in future represent the Crown in India in relation to them. But they regretted the failure of the Committee—and this is a vital criticism—to draw a dividing line between the sovereignty of the Crown and the sovereignty of the States in such fashion that either party could determine exactly what its rights are in any given case ; they disputed the right of the Paramount Power to interfere contrary to the provisions of the Treaties ; they deplored the failure of the Committee to provide an impartial tribunal to adjudicate disputes between the two sides of India ; and its failure to suggest means for bringing the Indian States and British India into effective co-operation.

236. The views of the people of the States have never been ascertained. But an organisation which claims to speak for them, and expresses views which generally coincide with those of the people of British India, does not controvert their findings but disapprove of the recommendations which, it fears, are not only reactionary but may produce a conflict in the same person acting as Viceroy and the Governor-General in Council. And apart from the conflict, there is a feeling that the centralization of so much power in a single individual, and the complete isolation of not only the Viceroy but the entire Political Department directly recruited from England is undesirable. Both the Princes and the people unite in condemning the appointments of *ad hoc* committees to settle their disputes, while they are equally averse from the final authority vesting in an executive officer such as the Secretary of State. On the other hand, what the Princes demand is more certainty in the constitution and an impartial, judicial, non-executive machinery for the settling of their disputes. The States people probably want the same, though they would shift the centre of gravity to their own side. The organisation referred to demands that in addition to the three reforms suggested by Lord Irwin the Princes should modernize their machinery of Government by the establishment of representative assemblies.

Popular
view of the
States.

237. Some States have already parted with some of their autocratic power in favour of Councils which follow the models of British India ; but the complaint of those who are not satisfied with these bodies is that they are mere make-believes—specious in appearance but with no perceptible reality in them. Whatever may be their character it is not for us to comment on the internal autonomy of the States. But what we are really concerned with is the position of Reformed British India *vis-à-vis* the States. Apart from their resolutions passed at an Informal Conference to which a reference has already been made, the States have not so far made any considered official pronouncement on their combined attitude, but judging from the comments in the press, Indian opinion would resolutely oppose any retrograde step in the direction of transfer from the Governor-General in Council to the Viceroy, the authority to deal with the States. Such a course is to say the least imprudent and impracticable. It is imprudent because while all important decisions affecting the States are at present taken by the Governor-General in Council, which includes three Indian members, the suggestion implies the complete withdrawal of that control, casting on the Viceroy the sole responsibility of making, it may be at times momentous, decisions which might affect and even endanger the peace and progress of India.

238. We think that it is too late in the day to restore benevolent despotism which may at times clog the entire machinery of the Government and would be a constant source of anxiety and

Restoration
of despotism
deprecated.

apprehension both to the Indian Cabinet as to the States Durbars. Mr. Montagu forecasted the growth of federations, and if this is still premature, we do not see what objection there can be to the creation of a Privy Council to advise the Viceroy in such matters, and on which besides the members and ministers of his Council there should be scope for the representation of both the Indian legislatures.

View on the
Para-¹
mountcy.

239. The Butler Committee have made their own pronouncement regarding the elucidation of the vexed question upon which the Government of India and the Indian Princes have been at variance. It was the contention of the Indian Princes that being in treaty with the Crown the Government of India was not the proper authority to settle disputes or decide questions arising between themselves and the Paramount Power. In other words, the Indian States question the ultimate authority of the Government of India. The question was distinctly raised in one form and rejected by Lord Reading with the concurrence of the then Secretary of State on the subject of Berar. The decision of the Viceroy dated March 27th, 1928, made with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, will be found printed as Appendix 2 of the Butler Committee's Report with which that committee is in entire agreement. Passing in review the several cases that had previously raised the same question though in one place the Committee observe that it is impossible to define paramountcy,¹ in another place they say :—

“ The Paramount Power means the Crown acting through the Secretary of State for India and the Governor-General in Council who are responsible to the Parliament of Great Britain. Until 1835 the East India Company acted as trustees of and agents for the Crown, but the Crown was, through the Company the Paramount Power. The Act of 1858, which put an end to the administration of the Company, did not give the Crown any new powers which it had not previously possessed. It merely changed the machinery through which the Crown exercised its powers.”²

In this view the Crown being then Paramount it has acted in relation to the Indian States through the Secretary of State for India and the Governor-General in Council who are responsible to the Government of Great Britain. In other words, these bodies are accredited agents of the Crown in relation to the Indian States.

240. Historically the Crown as such, has no direct control over the Indian States. Its power as such has long since passed to Parliament. The Austinian notion of Sovereignty has long since been superseded by the modern conception which regards Sovereignty as divisible and Sovereign Rights distributable amongst the members of the State, or amongst certain members thereof according to the constitution of the State concerned.

¹ Report, § 57.

² *Ib.* § 18, p. 13.

Even assuming that the mediaeval notion of Sovereignty had still persisted, it does not follow that the Sovereign is not entitled to consult any person it pleases or delegate some of its functions to him. In either view the fact remains, and the Butler Report emphasises it, that in practice the relations of the Indian States are with the Secretary of State and the Governor-General in Council. The States may well claim that the former being accredited agents of the Crown the agency ought not, without their consent, be transferred, or materially altered by the transference of ultimate control from the English to the Indian Parliament.

241. This raises the other large question whether the Parliament of Great Britain is competent to transfer by its own authority and power to other Parliaments constituted by it. That it has undoubtedly power is amply demonstrated by the existence of the Dominion Parliaments which have been declared at the recent Imperial Conference as Sovereign bodies within their own sphere. This question will have to be further discussed in the sequel, for the present it is sufficient to state that the authors of the Montagu Report, though they do not actually advert to this aspect of the question, had nevertheless something of that kind in their minds when they advocated the establishment of a Privy Council in India.¹ The question is by no means an easy one, but reference to it can no longer be avoided in the ensuing discussion where the inter-relation of the Indian States and the reformed British India will have to be considered. For the present it seems clear that we cannot steer clear of the Indian States because the Indian States themselves have raised several questions which vitally affect the revenue and development of British India, and might in the near future, failing the provision of adequate machinery for adjustment, bring the two into direct conflict. Indeed, the Indian States are already pressing for a satisfactory settlement in respect of the maritime customs, the income-tax, income from railways, mints and coinage, posts and telegraph and the profits of the saving bank, from opium and excise and other miscellaneous sources of revenue and general administration of British India. The Butler Report has no doubt suggested means for dealing with some of these questions, but it is too early to state how far their solutions would be acceptable to the Indian States, and even if accepted by them, how far they would be in consonance with the interest of British India. One fact is clear, that if the Governor-General-in-Council now responsible to the British Parliament is made responsible to the Indian Parliament it would affect the Indian States in the sense in which the Butler Committee have defined the power of the Crown, and as our proposals contemplate the transference of such power we cannot evade the discussion of the question of the relation of the Indian Parliament with the Indian States.

Scheme of a
Privy
Council.

¹Montagu Report, § 287.

242. A Privy Council has always been the accredited adviser of the Crown. It advised the British Sovereign till its authority was displaced by Parliament. Even in the most modern constitution of Canada the Privy Council is created to aid and advise Government upon matters excluded from the authority of the Legislature.

243. If analogies have to be looked for in the institution of a Privy Council they will be amply found in the constitutions of other countries. For example, the constitution of Malta, which almost synchronized with that granted to India, provides for a Privy Council which advises the Governor upon reserved matters of imperial property and interests and kindred issues. Similarly, the Imperial Act of 1927 provides for a Privy Council for Northern Ireland.

244. The functions of the Privy Council will have to be defined, and as both the Ministry and the Assembly would naturally become more sensitive of their power, the subjects, as also the procedure fit for consultation of the Privy Council, will have to be carefully set out. We have this clearly in our mind, but we should perhaps be travelling beyond our immediate purpose if we yielded to the temptation of loading our Report with fuller details than what are set out in the next note.

IV.

A PRIVY COUNCIL FOR INDIA.

Its place in
modern
constitu-
tions.

245. Our suggestions for the establishment of a Privy Council in India have the background of history and are supported by similar attempts made in the past in that direction. In English Constitutional history we have, happily, a parallel which might suitably be adapted to the political conditions of India. It will be remembered that before the rise of Parliament the King normally administered the country with the help of his chosen counsellors who were called his Privy Counsellors. In the course of time, in consequence of the conflict between the King and the barons, a mixed Privy Council had to be established in which the Crown brought in the popular element to strengthen itself against the barons, and as the conception of the popular rule gained strength, it led to the establishment of a Parliament which, in course of time, began to control the Privy Council, and as the strength of Parliament grew, so the power of the Privy Council was transferred to an inner committee responsible to Parliament, known as the Cabinet, with the result that, in the course of 400 years, the Privy Council has been reduced to a mere ceremonial body, while the Parliament of Great Britain has risen to possess sovereign authority.

246. Of modern constitutions we have already referred to the Canadian constitution, which provides for a Privy Council which is called in to advise the Governor, and in the more modern constitution of Malta contains a similar provision.

The establishment of a Privy Council for India has, therefore, a strong historic background ; and, as already observed, Mr. Montagu in his Report recommends the establishment of a Privy Council for India in two places.¹

247. In his chapter on the Indian States² Mr. Montagu foresaw the federation of British India with the Indian States.³ He then referred to the desire "to give greater reality to the consciousness of common interests" as stirring among the Princes, which he proposed to do by the establishment of an Indian Privy Council. That there has long been a growing desire on the part of the Indian Princes for the creation of an agency through which their collective views, whether affecting their States or their interests, might be made known to the Government of India and brought into harmony with the interests of the country as a whole, admits of no doubt ; and Mr. Montagu recommended the institution of the Council of Princes and of a Privy Council as the two media which might be usefully employed for consultation upon "questions which affect the States generally, and other questions which are of concern either to the Empire as a whole, or to British India and the States in common." Holding that the federation of the States into a united India was not immediately possible, he, at any rate, paved the way for future federation by recommending the establishment of a Chamber of Princes and the institution of a Privy Council, adding "that when a Council of Princes has been established, and when a Council of State and a Privy Council have been created, the machinery will exist for bringing the senatorial institutions of British India into closer relations when necessary with the Rulers of the Native States."⁴

248. In an earlier paragraph he had written on the same subjects as follows : "We have a further recommendation to make. We would ask that His Majesty may be graciously pleased to approve the institution of a Privy Council for India. From time to time projects of this kind have been mooted and laid aside ; but with changed conditions we believe that such a body would serve a valuable purpose and do useful work. India, for all its changing ideas, is still ready to look up with the pride and affection to any authority clothed with attributes that it can respect and admire."⁵

249. In the first Legislative Assembly one of us pointed out the necessity of such a Council to advise the Viceroy upon matters excepted from the jurisdiction of the Indian Legislature. The Government were not opposed to the establishment of a Privy Council, but unfortunately the members of the Legislative Assembly failed to realize its importance and, indeed, could not visualise the full effect of the proposal which was then made, and the proposal was, therefore, rejected.

¹ Report, §§ 287, 301.

² *Ib.* §§ 296-312.

³ *Ib.* § 300.

⁴ *Ib.* § 311.

⁵ *Ib.* § 287.

Mr.
Montagu's
recommend-
ation.

250. But the time which Mr. Montagu foresaw for the federation of India has been brought much closer by the minds of both Indias being stirred by the approach of new reforms. The Indian Princes have made claims which, if pressed, might paralyse the revenues of British India : if refused, their grievance remains. The Butler Committee have themselves suggested the formation of *ad hoc* committees to decide such questions ; but since the function of such committees would be merely advisory, the ultimate decision resting with the Secretary of State, it follows that the recommendation, if accepted, would seriously encroach on the financial autonomy of India, and seriously retard its political progress. The recommendation is itself conditioned on the present constitution, any further development of which along the line of responsibility must necessarily involve a solution of these questions more appropriate to the new constitution. Now under the constitution as we have recommended we have excepted for the time being such subjects as are mentioned in section 67 (c) (d), i.e. : " the relations of the Government with foreign Princes or States and the discipline or maintenance of the Army. At present these subjects are under the control of the Executive not responsible to the Legislature. But with the practical substitution for this Executive of a Ministry responsible to the Legislative Assembly the " Governor General in Council " as now existing would be transformed into a different government. If then the two subjects still continue reserved a new machinery must be set up to assist the Governor-General in the Reserved field. He cannot act with the advice of a council in which the majority of his Councillors would be Ministers, for, if he did so, there would be no sense in reserving those subjects. Nor can he act alone without any constituted authority to advise him, for it would amount to a centralization of power for which there is no precedent even in India. He must, therefore, have advisers ; and such advisers would be formed in a Privy Council which would advise the Governor-General in all matters for the time being treated as Reserved.

251. The establishment of a Privy Council will, with one stroke, settle the vexed question of relationship between British India and the Indian States. It will be the arbiter between the two contending bodies. It will be the counsellor in all matters in which the Viceroy takes at present single and secret decisions. It will inspire the people of India with the confidence that the Privy Council is the only temporary custodian of their eventual rights, and if the constitution of the Privy Council is based upon a popular basis, it will give them a direct interest in it equal to that possessed by the Indian States.

252. If the principle of a Privy Council is accepted, its constitution might be somewhat on the following lines :—Assume that the Privy Council consists of 30 members. One third of them might be elected by the Legislature. Central

or Provincial, or both ; one third elected by the Indian States ; and the remaining third nominated by the Viceroy. All rules must be framed under the revised Government of India Act. The powers and functions of the Privy Council should be set out. This should safeguard the interest of the Indian Legislature by providing against its interference by the Privy Council on the one hand, and by the Indian States in matters affecting only British India on the other ; while the Privy Council should strictly limit itself to the decision of questions which are reserved or in which the mutual interests of British India and those Indian States call for a decision.

253. In other words, the Privy Council will not interfere with the powers of the Indian Legislature ; it will only advise upon matters excepted for the time being from the cognisance of the Indian Legislature. And then only the British Indian section of the Privy Council may be called upon to advise the Viceroy upon matters affecting British India ; while the whole Privy Council may have to decide questions affecting both British and feudatory India.

Privy Council supplements the Legislature.

In other words, the Privy Council would function in the following cases and to the following extent :—

(a) Where the matter affects British India, but is excepted from the purview of the Legislature, in that case only 20 out of the 30 members representative of British India will ordinarily take part.

(b) If it affects both British India and the Indian States then all the 30 members will take part.

(c) But if it only affects the domestic policy of Princely India, then the British Indian elected section would not ordinarily take part.

The Privy Council should be acceptable to the Indian States and would be in conformity with the underlined recommendation of the Butler Committee.

V.

A SUPREME COURT FOR INDIA.

254. The question of a Supreme Court for India has, so far as the British Government are concerned, been set at rest by a declaration made at the Imperial Conference of 1923, at which the following statement was made : " Another matter which we discussed, in which a general constitutional principle was raised, concerned the conditions governing appeals from judgments in the Dominions to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. From these discussions it became clear that it was no part of the policy of His Majesty's Government in Great Britain that questions affecting judicial appeals should be determined otherwise than in accordance with the wishes of the part of the Empire primarily affected. It was, however, generally recognised that, where changes in the existing system were proposed which,

Proposal for an Imperial Court.

while primarily affecting one part, raised issues in which other parts were also concerned, such changes ought only to be carried out after consultation and discussion. So far as the work of the committee was concerned, this general understanding expressed all that was required."

255. As is well known at the Imperial Conference of 1918, a proposal was made to symbolise the unity of the British Empire by the establishment of an Imperial Court of Appeal.¹ But that proposal raised a storm of protest from the three Colonies which had established a Supreme Court of their own, and since then the few cases reserved for decision of that body have not tended to heighten its prestige in the Colonies, Mr. B. O'Brien in his work on the *Irish Constitution*² writes : " It has irritated public opinion in all of them. South Africa has practically abolished the Appeal altogether. Australia, where all constitutional questions have been withdrawn from the Judicial Committee, has gone a long way to get rid of it, and Canada, too, with the exception of the province of Quebec, has, to quote Sir Robert Borden, " had just about enough of Appeal Courts." Professor Keith, in his *Responsible Government*,³ says : " It is idle to deny that the taking of appeals to the Privy Council is a mark of inferior status and partial servitude." " That a suppliant should be at liberty to beg the King to do him justice which the Dominion Courts have refused to him, far from being an idea likely to bind together the Empire, is one calculated to stamp the Dominion Courts as inferior and vicious, while in practice it means that wealthy litigants have a very unfair advantage over poor suitors."

Professor Keith does not consider that the judicial committee has justified itself by its decisions. He says : " that on the whole the Privy Council is not quite so effective a court as the House of Lords." ⁴ He then passes in review the several dominion appeals in which it is said to have gone wrong, and in some places to have given conflicting decisions.

Indian view
on a
Supreme
Court.

256. A recommendation for the establishment of a Supreme Court for India now finds part in almost every scheme of Reforms of which published records are available. Such recommendation occurs in the Nehru Report,⁵ and is embodied in a resolution of the Moslem League and in the Memorandum of the European Association and of the Associated Chambers of Commerce. The scheme of the Indian Princes involves the establishment of such a tribunal, while the fact that all the major colonies of England, such as Canada, Australia and South Africa, have had the scheme for the establishment of a Supreme Court embodied as a part of their constitution affords a sufficient background in historical precedents in its favour.

¹ Resolution No. 22, Conference Proceedings, p. 8.

³ 2nd Vol. (2nd ed.), p. 1102.

⁵ Arts. 46-52, pp. 112, 113.

² pp. 119, 120.

⁴ *Ib.* p. 1104.

257. The agitation for the establishment of such a Court in India was started in the first Assembly, when a Resolution was made to that effect.¹ The Government promised to sound public opinions thereon, which they did, with the result that the proposal was supported by a strong body of public opinion, though, as might well have been expected, a considerable body of opinion considered the proposal premature or inopportune, while a small body opposed it on principle holding that the nerve centre of the Empire must remain at the head of the Empire.

The arguments *pro* and *con* have been the subject of several debates in the Legislative Assembly and two debates in the Council of State.² It is apparent from a perusal of these discussions and the printed copy of opinions on the subject given on the invitation of the Government of India, that the establishment of the Supreme Court is pressed on the ground of both necessity and general convenience.

258. The necessity arises from the fact that under the present constitution of the Government of India all matters in dispute between the Executive and the Legislature are left to be decided by the Executive. In the absence of an impartial tribunal possessed of authority over the whole of India, this was the only course possible, much in the same way that the ultimate decision between an Indian Prince and his subjects is at present left to the decision of the Prince. In a rude age the State being the ultimate authority it was only natural that the State which had the requisite force at its command should be left free to be the final arbiter in his own dispute. But with the devolution of sovereign authority and its transfer to other heads it is no longer possible to maintain that a party whatever his *status* should be a judge in his own case ; and with the creation of provincial autonomy and a stricter definition of the authority of the Provincial and Central executive numerous questions of great intricacy and complexity will arise in which the intervention of an impartial tribunal offers the only satisfactory solution. Even where such questions do not affect the Government but involve the interpretation of a constitution we have no means at present for obtaining an authoritative decision. The Supreme Court is, ordinarily, vested with the power of upholding and interpreting the constitution. In the Indian States Inquiry Report the necessity for referring certain disputes to an impartial tribunal is adumbrated though the necessity for making this tribunal judicial in character and final in its decisions, has not been appreciated despite the arguments of the States. And though the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court will be limited to British India, cases are conceivable in which its aid might be readily sought by the disputants much as references on points of law can be made to the Privy Council under Section 4 of the Privy Council Act. Its necessity.

¹ Resolution dated 26th March, 1921. (Assembly Debates pp. 1606-1615).

² See Assembly Debates, dated 26th March, 1927, *et. seq.* ; Council of State Debates, dated 31st August, 1927.

259. Such a Court, if established, will supply a serious *lacuna* at present existing in the administration of criminal justice in India. With the amendment of the Code of Criminal Procedure Code in 1923, appeals against acquittals in Session cases are now appealable to the High Court, but should the High Court convict, the convicted person has then no right of appeal. Even in cases of conviction in Sessions trial involving confirmation of the sentence of death, the final judgment or order is that passed by the High Court and yet there is no provision entitling the condemned to appeal for his life.

Shortcomings
of the
Industrial
Committee.

260. In recent years such persons have made desperate attempts to move the Privy Council, but that body has set its face against such appeals holding it not entitled to carry on the work of a Court of criminal appeal for India, and that they would only intervene within the narrow limits prescribed by them in *Dillet's* case, that is to say, in cases *not* in which an erroneous finding is given or in which there has been a failure of justice ; but only in those which involve the violation of some principle of public justice. That in the ordinary cases of such convictions there may be an appeal in England is now placed beyond controversy by the establishment of a Court of Criminal Appeal, 1907. It was a *lacuna* in the English law and it would seem, copied in India, but while the English law has been amended the Indian law remains unamended for want of a court to administer it.

261. We consider that no time should be lost in establishing a Central Court of Criminal Appeal—the more so because the administration of criminal justice in certain provinces still remains entrusted to courts inferior in personnel and status to the High Court.

Then again in civil cases, there are a large number of cases which from their very nature cannot be the subject of adequate decisions. For example, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council have themselves referred to cases arising under the Land Acquisition Act, cases of mesne profits and those involving the valuation of property in all of which they have confessed their inability to be the final judges.

In other cases, such as appeals arising under the Indian Divorce Act (which expressly provides for an appeal to the Privy Council) and the Income Tax Act, an appeal to that Committee is a far cry both because of the expense and delay ; and those are the very cases where justice delayed is justice denied to the needy litigant.

262. There is then the undeniable argument in making India self-contained, and bringing her as far as it may be in a line with the other self-governing Dominions of the British Commonwealth. In miscellaneous cases and in executions, an appeal to the Privy Council is possible under the existing law. But its expense is prohibitive and has served as a deterrent, giving a party an appeal

which, in fact, he cannot make. The visualization of justice by the parties concerned tends to beget confidence. This is not possible in the case of a court sitting 6,000 miles away.

In India the Statute and case law have grown to dimensions which makes a thorough mastery of it a life-study and law can best be administered by those who live on the spot. The habits and customs of the people differ from those of the West, and it is only fair that a court which is the ultimate court of appeal should not be stationed in another and distant land.

The multiplication of courts in India and the conflict of decisions between them creates uncertainty and is a pitfall to the unwary. The establishment of an all-India Court would go far to minimize the conflict, which bewilders the lay litigant and reduces the administration of justice to a more hazardous enterprise than it ought to be.

263. We hope the establishment of such a court would tend to raise the general level of judicial efficiency. It may ensure a larger measure of uniformity in the administration of justice ; and as we have recommended the centralization of the High Courts we think that the equipment of the judicial system would not be complete without a court wielding ultimate authority. Two objections have come to notice since the question was raised. Its necessity was admitted ; but it was suggested that such a court would not possess the independence which a distant court like the Privy Council free from the control of the Executive undoubtedly possesses. But whatever may have been the apprehensions of our countrymen in the past, we must not commit the error of judging of the future from the past. We have recommended that the main Executive should be made responsible to the Legislature. It should go far to remove if not eliminate at least one cause for such an apprehension. Then it is contended that the introduction of communalism in the judiciary has already defiled the fount of justice and it runs the risk of a further pollution by that spirit of communalism being taken one step higher. But the evil of communalism is we trust only a transitory phase of Indian life and even if it remained it has to be reckoned with and combated, not less in a court to which only a couple of hundred cases would be taken, and which is a mere drop in the ocean compared to the vast mass of litigation which concentrates in the High Court. Moreover, the responsibility of the judges of the Supreme Court would not be higher than that wielded by members of the Executive Council, and in future to be transferred to the Ministers. Judges are like actors who have to play their part before a crowded House. Their work is exposed to the scrutiny of the Bar and criticisms of the Press—an advantage denied to the Judicial Committee who hear cases in empty courts and whose judgments arouse comments, far from where they were pronounced and long after they have ceased to possess any interest to the layman.

Value of a
Supreme
Court.

264. We are convinced that India needs a Supreme Court and one must be established. We would, however, suggest that it is well worthy of consideration whether the litigant should not be given the option whether to appeal to the local court or to the Judicial Committee in England. It should eliminate any objection of those who fear that a local Court may lack the independence of a distant tribunal. It may also be possible to attract some judges from England. But these are details which we do not regard as by any means essential to the completion of the judicial organisation of the country.

VI.

THE HIGH COURTS.

Uniformity
of status
recommended.

265. We have decided that all High Courts, exercising the same jurisdiction should, as far as possible, be equalized in status. The confidence which the public repose in its highest judiciary not only depends upon the quality of their work but also upon the dignity attaching to the office. The superior Courts in India fall into three grades, all exercising similar jurisdiction while administering Civil and Criminal Law. In the first rank stand the chartered High Courts, of which there are at present seven in India. Falling below them in status is a Chief Court, of which there is one at Lucknow. The lowest in status of the High Courts are the two Courts of the Judicial Commissioners at Nagpur and Karachi. There was a proposal to raise both one degree higher ; but following the lead of the Nagpur Bar Association, the local Council threw out the proposal, holding that both provincial dignity and judicial necessity demanded the raising of that Court to a High Court. The proposal for the raising of the Sind Court has been adopted by the Council, but the delay in giving effect to the measure is ascribed to financial stringency. The cases of the two sub-provincial Courts at Lucknow and Karachi are exceptional. But there is no reason why the Court at Nagpur, which is the final Court of Appeal for two combined Provinces, should not be raised to that of a High Court.

The only objection apparent to us is that it would involve the raising of the pay of the Governor and the Executive Councillors. As our scheme eliminates the latter's posts, the question is so far simplified. We think that all Courts exercising the same jurisdiction should, as far as possible, possess the same status, and we recommend accordingly.

Removal of
a limitation.

266. Another point which our Committee has unanimously decided is that there is no longer any need for reserving a third of the judgeships in a High Court to members of the Indian Civil Service who, since the policy of provincialization, are not employed in the same number to fill the posts of District and Sessions Judgeships, from which the service judges are usually drawn.

The reservation of these judicial appointments to members of the Civil Service dates back to a period when the Indian Bar was in its infancy. It has since developed and multiplied and produced a large number of eminent lawyers. It would assist towards the maintenance of its high tradition and standard if the majority of Judgeships are reserved to members of that body. We have, therefore, provided that at least two-thirds of Judges of a High Court must be members of the Bar; and out of these a third must be Barristers. The inclusion of this provision requires a word by way of an explanation. It must be clearly understood that the term "Barristers" is intended to apply to all Barristers, both Indian and British. Their appointment to the Bench would be a source of strength, as Barristers nurtured in the freer atmosphere of the West, belonging as they do to an older Bar with a long and honourable tradition and a high standard of integrity and efficiency with a wider outlook, would be an asset which must be maintained.

267. Under our recommendation not less than two-thirds of the judges must be drawn from the Bar, while a remaining third are left free to be drawn from the services of the Bar alike.

Hitherto, the Chief Justice of a High Court has always been a Barrister. As some doubt has been raised on the interpretation of Section 101 (4) of the Government of India Act we recommend that the ambiguity, if any, should be removed by legalizing the practice.

268. Having disposed of the constitution of the High Court and the composition of its Judges we next turn to our recommendation that all the High Courts should in future be placed under the Central Government. We have received weighty suggestions commending this course; and we think that it would not only be in accordance with the practice of other countries, but conducive to their greater efficiency and independence if the courts which may have to decide questions affecting the local Governments or the local legislatures should be free from the contact of either. At the same time we have not failed to consider that the centralisation of the High Courts might, considering the distance many of them are situated from the seat of the Central Government, leave them wholly free from its control in the matters in which all except the Calcutta High Court are at present under the control of the local Government.

Their centralisation

269. We think that the Central Government might well delegate its control in this respect to the Supreme Court the institution of which we regard as a matter of Imperial necessity. The delegation of such power will tend to make the judiciary more independent of the executive, and whether that executive is bureaucratic or ministerial, we think that the absolute independence of the judiciary must not only be safeguarded, but placed beyond all question or controversy.

VII.

THE ARMY IN INDIA.

Cost of the
Indian
Army.

270. The military burden on account of the Army in India has within the last two decades risen by alarming degrees. The following table drawn from official statistics available to us gives at a glance its sudden rise since the Great War.

Year.	Military Expenditure.		Remarks.
	Gross.	Net.	
	£	£	
1910-11(a)	20,486,071	19,265,042	(a) Rupees converted into £ at Rs. 15=£1.
1911-12(a)	20,901,637	19,558,580	
1912-13(a)	20,953,100	19,565,466	
1913-14(a)	21,265,765	19,896,113	
1914-15(a)	21,809,603	20,434,915	
1915-16(a)	23,503,093	22,261,353	
1916-17(a)	26,566,757	24,993,811	
1917-18(a)	30,763,650	29,043,141	
1918-19(a)	46,830,210	44,480,238	
1919-20(a)	60,686,699	57,986,087	
	Rs.	Rs.	
1920-21(b)	88,23,24,251	81,75,37,319	(b) Sterling converted into rupees at £1=Rs. 10 and adjusted for exchange.
1921-22(c)	77,87,98,340	69,81,04,508	(c) Sterling converted into rupees at £1=Rs. 10 and adjusted for exchange.
1922-23(c)	71,00,58,955	65,26,80,090	
1923-24(c)	61,04,31,760	56,22,75,363	
1924-25(c)	59,66,54,877	55,63,40,218	
1925-26(c)	60,32,37,045	55,99,85,654	
1926-27(c)	60,91,63,899	55,96,95,835	
1927-28(d)	56,33,94,893	54,79,45,581	(d) Sterling converted into rupees at £1=Rs. 13½.
1928-29(e) (Revised Estimate).	58,46,44,000	55,10,00,000	(e) Sterling converted into rupees at £1=Rs. 13½.

271. In the Brussels Financial Conference to which India was a party it was pointed out that a country that expends more than 20 per cent. of her revenue upon her Army is riding for a fall. India's percentage, even with the Provincial revenues taken into account, is more than double of that ratio. And according to the Indian critics the expenditure officially classed as such would have to be implemented by the addition of expenditure classed under other heads; *e.g.*, the strategic railways, roads, cantonments, and frontier posts, frontier armed constabulary, wireless service, hospitals and hill stations primarily maintained for the convenience of the British garrison, and the like.

But even eliminating all such charges which tend further to cripple India's resources the military expenditure so returned is sufficiently alarming to call for a thorough examination into its necessity.

272. One of us was the author of a resolution adopted in the Assembly which covered this inquiry, though its scope, as we shall presently show, was necessarily limited. It resulted in the appointment of a Committee, presided over by Lord Inchcape, and popularly known as the Inchcape Committee, which recommended the gradual reduction of the military expenditure which had then exceeded 70 crores to 50 crores.

273. The Committee had of course formulated their recommendation without going into the policy, which they could not do under their terms of reference. Nevertheless, they did suggest the reduction of three British Cavalry Regiments with the concurrence of the late Lord Rawlinson, then the Commander-in-Chief of India. This reduction was at first resisted by the Home Government for whom Lieut.-Colonel Guinness, Under-Secretary of State for War, made the following statement in the House of Commons on the 15th March, 1923 :—

“ The Hon. and gallant Member for Kirkcaldy Burghs (Sir R. Hutchison) asked about the reduction of establishments in India. That question is still under consideration. So far we have agreed to the reduction of infantry battalions out there which will bring about a saving of 5,000 men. The question of the reduction of cavalry and artillery is still under consideration. We cannot agree to the reduction suggested by the Indian Government in the number of units, but we are discussing possible savings by cutting down establishments. It must be remembered that the British regiments in India are all part of our reserve-making machinery. Their reduction must delay the building up of our reserves, and also has a serious effect upon our power of mobilisation. If we agree to the Indian Government making excessive decreases, it must mean eventually further cost being thrown on our Budget for making up reserves in other ways ”

This statement confirmed the belief widely prevalent in India that the strength and equipment of the Army in India was being maintained for Imperial and not solely Indian purposes, and that nevertheless its cost which should be met at least to that extent by the British Exchequer was saddled upon India.

274. The history of this controversy, in which the Government of India are believed to have supported the Indian view, is a long and inglorious chapter in the history of the British connection with India. The British Exchequer has been exacting from India an annual contribution amounting to two millions sterling on account of what has come to be known as the Capitation Charges. The equity of this demand has been in dispute for

Indian view
stated.

over twenty years ; meanwhile the amount is being paid, because the revenues of India are statutorily vested in the Secretary of State and not in the Government of India, and no machinery has yet been set up to settle the dispute. It would appear to be reasonable that until its settlement, the payment should have been withheld for and not made ; for in strict logic nothing can be said to be due until it is legally payable ; but India being a mere dependency of England, she cannot stand upon or enforce her own right to the same extent as her other Dominions can do.

Apart from the capitation charges, there is the larger question of India's liability to pay for the British troops, and indeed, for the Indian Army, the maintenance of which in its present strength, and its equipment adequate to enable it to take its place in any theatre of war, is an Imperial necessity for which India cannot any more than the other Colonies be held liable.

This raises two large issues upon which there is bound to be a difference of opinion, but these issues have to be impartially settled in the interest of India and to the honour of England which must not let her own obligations obscure her duty to her great Dependency.

Two issues
stated.

275. The two issues which arise in this connection are :—

(1) What portion of the Indian Army is being maintained in India for Imperial purposes—that is to say for the defence of Imperial interests as distinct from the Defence of India.

(2) What should be the composition of an Army maintained only for the Defence of India.

It cannot be denied that the determination of the first issue is not an easy task, but the task though difficult is not impossible. That the Indian Army does defend India admits of no doubt ; but the question still remains whether its strength and equipment is not in excess of the requirements of India. Looking backwards we have no doubt what should be our answer. It will be remembered that during the progress of the Great War the Indian Army was for a period of over three years employed overseas. The only Army retained in India for her defence comprised white troops and Indian troops. And this is what Lord Hardinge as the Viceroy of India said on that occasion :—

Indian
Army and
the War.

“ In my speech to this Council on the 8th September, I mentioned that it was a source of legitimate pride and satisfaction to India as a whole that we had been in a position to send a military force of over 70,000 combatants to fight for the Empire across the seas. Since I used those words we have done much more than that ; thanks to the energy and powers of organisation of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief and the military authorities, British and Indian troops have been fighting side by side in no

less than five theatres of war, in France, Egypt, East Africa, the Persian Gulf and in China. We have despatched or are despatching nearly 200,000 men overseas to fight for the Empire of which we are proud to be a living and virile unit. These have been relieved by a certain number of fresh troops from England. At the same time we have maintained our military forces on the frontier unimpaired to protect our line and to be ready, as a defensive force, to meet any emergency that may arise in that direction. We are all proud of our military forces and of their gallantry in the field, and I can only repeat what I have said before, namely, that the fact that the Government of India are in a position to help the mother country by the despatch of such a large proportion of our armed forces is a supreme mark of my absolute confidence in the fidelity and gallantry of our troops and in the loyalty of the Indian people. That confidence is being every day more and more justified."¹

And in another work we read :—

“ The Viceroy was able, and had the courage, not only to keep up a steady flow of Indian reinforcements to the Western front, but to denude India almost entirely of regular British troops and of her large reserves of artillery and ammunition and transport.”²

276. If, then, this Army was considered sufficient during the stress and danger and uncertainties of the Great War, how can we say that a larger standing Army is now required ? We put this point of view and we were reminded of the future. We needed no such reminder. In all countries and in all ages there is such a thing as an Army for peace-time and an Army to meet war and remote eventualities. The contingency our friends have in view cannot be met by our standing Army ; other forces will have to be mobilized for that purpose. At the present moment heavy expenditure is being incurred on the mechanization of the Indian Army. Now it is the view of competent authorities that a mechanized army cannot operate in a mountainous country such as we have in the transfrontier. Its mechanization is made in pursuance of the Imperial Chain of Defence. But why should India be made to pay for such imperial necessity ?

277. That the cost of such units is being thrown upon the slender resources of India was strikingly demonstrated by the one instance to which we have quoted. That we have no other instances to quote must not be taken as implying that other instances do not exist. We are not free to refer to the evidence of military experts who placed their views *in camera*, still we have the following views published by another

Indian Army
and the
Imperial
Defence.

¹ Speech delivered to the Imperial Legislative Council, Delhi, on 12th January, 1915.

² India, by Sir Valentine Chirol, p. 159.

expert, Brigadier-General N. Rowan-Robinson, C.M.G., D.S.O., no friend of the Indian aspirations, who in his article entitled, "The Place of India in the Defence of the Empire," contributed to a monthly Journal named "India", gives expression to the following views which support our own. He says:—

"The British Empire from the military point of view is a dual empire compounded of East and West. As is natural in a realm born of the sea the divisions are oceanic. Very roughly, the shores washed by the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, the Pacific and Indian Oceans limit the eastern. The parent and dominant empire in the West is centred in Britain; the younger and dependent empire in the East is centred in India. Both centres are in direct contact with great defence problems, and incidentally, apart from the air menace to Britain, are well placed for dealing with them. . . . Both British and Indian troops in India exist primarily for the defence of that country; but, when she is not directly threatened, are available for imperial purposes, just as the troops of the home army are available for service in India should they not be engaged in a campaign in Europe. Indian troops have been employed in the British service all the world over; but their limits would be set normally in eastern theatres. We might thus expect to find them operating—in China, as at the present moment; on the east coast of Africa, as in the War of 1914; or in Australasia or Iraq; in each case based on and supplied by India. And both Australia and South Africa would naturally be prepared to reciprocate. The former is specially interested in Indian defence, partly because India furnishes an essential link in the Imperial air chain, but mainly because, with India and consequently Singapore in other hands, she would be open to attack from every direction. Australasian troops might therefore be found among the first reinforcements to an army repulsing a great assault on the North-West Frontier."

"The value of India as an imperial military asset was strikingly demonstrated in the Great War. As the country was united in loyalty and was not threatened externally, it was possible, firstly, to utilise Indian troops in the trenches in France pending the arrival there of the new armies; secondly, to withdraw British regular troops from India and replace them by territorials, two matters of primary importance in view of the scarcity of well-trained troops at the time; thirdly, by means of Indian troops, to maintain pressure on the enemy in every theatre outside Europe; and, lastly, to use India as the main base of operations for all eastern campaigns."¹

Threefold
functions of
the Army.

276. It has been said that, roughly speaking, the Indian Army may be taken to have a threefold object in view, in that a third

¹ India, July, 1929; pp. 15, 16.

thereof is maintained for the maintenance of internal security in the country, a third for the defence of its frontiers, and the remaining third are covering troops to replace wastage, assist and, if necessary, relieve the field army. Frequent statements to this effect have been made in the Central Legislature ; as often as they have made they have met with the demand of the Assembly that there is no reason why the security troops should not be replaced by a cheaper agency such as the Gendarmes or the Police. As it is, General Robinson points out that the numeral necessity of such troops is no longer justifiable. He says :—

“ With regard to the first problem, we may note that the suppression of local rebellion, riot and disorder, has been greatly simplified by the advent of the aeroplane and the armoured car ; for these weapons, apart from their fire-power and their immunity from counteraction, possess that capability of striking a swift blow which, especially in the East, multiplies greatly the value of force. Internal troubles present their gravest dangers when expressed in non-co-operative, in interference with communications and in sabotage of works. Such action can only be defeated by a firm administration in Delhi and in London.”¹

279. As regards the heavy cost of the mechanization of the Indian Army the following extract drawn from the same source is suggestive :—

“ There is a last military question to be considered, not indeed of defence, but of means and method. The Home Army, to meet the requirements of European warfare, is undergoing a process of mechanization. To enable the process to be continued, either India must follow suit as regards British troops, or the Cardwell system, on which the Army has so long been based and which has proved its worth so well, must be scrapped. In spite of her mountainous war-theatres India has, after considerable thought, decided to mechanize. And, fortunately, there is a solution ready to hand for the satisfaction of her conflicting tasks in mountain and plain ; for the mechanization of a large part of the British troops will strengthen them greatly for duties of internal security on which they are largely employed ; and it will add to their value in all roaded areas on and beyond the border and in such countries as Palestine and Iraq, while the Indian Army, unmechanized, will continue to furnish all the cavalry, infantry and pack artillery likely to be needed in rougher terrain either in the East or Middle East.”²

280. It has been said that India must be ready for the next war. There is scarcely any secrecy about what is expected

¹ India, July, 1929, p. 18.

² *Ib.* p. 19.

to be the next theatre of conflict in which India is likely to be involved. This is what the General says in the same article :—

“ The nature of the Russian problem is well known. The Muscovite regards us as the main block to his policy of world-communism. He has failed in England, and now hopes, either by propaganda or by arms, to destroy our rule in India. Hitherto, the waves of Sovietism, though very ably directed, have broken on the Afghan frontier and then surged eastwards. But the Soviet Government is a power in Asia. It has an oriental scorn of time and can await its opportunity. In the meantime, by patient and virulent underplay, it may hope to undermine our rule.”¹

281. These views are currently held in high military circles, and we are bound to respect their special knowledge. But what do they prove ? Only this, that the strength and equipment of the Indian Army go beyond the immediate or proximate requirements of India, that it is maintained to protect all England's Eastern Empire and that though over-equipped for her Indian requirements, it is equipped and mechanized to provide against a possible conflict with a European power. When the military experts were under examination one of us had drawn the attention of the conference to this picture of the Indian Army, in the face of which it is idle to assume that the growing military expenditure is justifiable for the defence of India. The fact appears to be, that ever since Lord Esher's Committee drew up their Report the Indian Army has begun to be regarded as a wing of the Imperial forces and both its strength maintained and its equipment received in order to suit the requirements of European warfare. That it is so in the case of the British troops lent to India is admitted, and it is said that the Indian Army cannot be permitted to lag behind because it might any moment be called upon to take the field alongside of the British Army ; which is once more restating the same problem upon which the Legislative Assembly has joined issue.

282. We are, therefore, convinced that a clear case has been made out for an impartial inquiry into the military requirements of India. Such inquiries have been made before : but they have not been productive of much practical good to India. But we ascribe their futility to the powerful influence of the British War Office. We have examined their accredited representatives and after hearing them and considering their evidence, we feel constrained to record it as our opinion that India should expect no substantial relief in her military burden unless her revenues vest in the Government of India and that Government is made responsible to the Legislature.

¹ India, pp. 18, 19.

In our recommendation on the subject we have excepted the military ; but we have only done so with a clear understanding that the military expenditure is not wholly taken out of the vote of the Assembly. It is possible to fix a minimum of India's military requirements as to which a convention might be established for a given number of years.

But though this may bring some financial relief, other questions remain and have to be grappled with. It is contended that India's aspiration for self-government cannot be gratified until India is able to defend herself. We quote Professor Keith for an answer :—

“ But these considerations should have rendered all the more eager the endeavour to open up military careers for Indians and to train the people to defend themselves as a necessary condition of self-government.”¹

As he wrote in an earlier page :—

“ The rule of Britain in India began with the commercial transactions of a company, and interesting as is the history of the East India Company, it is impossible not to recognise that this commercial origin was hostile to the development of a true political sense.”²

As others see us.

283. That is the historian's verdict of England's government of India. We have already referred to Mr. Montagu's words spoken to the same effect in the House of Commons (§ 14) and to the argument as to their inherent incapacity. (§ 187.)

We would only add to what we have said there that the Indian soldier is well able to hold his own against the pick of the European Army is recognised and was duly acknowledged at the time ; to give only one instance, out of the many to hand we quote the following message from Field-Marshal Sir John French, dated 16th March, 1915, quoted by H. E. Lord Hardinge in his speech at his Legislative Council on the 18th of that month :—

“ I am glad to be able to inform Your Excellency that the Indian troops under General Sir James Willcocks fought with great gallantry and marked success in the capture of Neuve Chapelle and subsequent fighting which took place on the 10th, 11th, 12th and 13th of this month. The fighting was very severe and the losses heavy, but nothing daunted them. The tenacity, courage and endurance were admirable and worthy of the best tradition of the soldiers of India.”

284. We feel constrained to observe that India's present inability to defend herself is neither inherent nor due to any causes for which she is accountable. Her lack of preparedness must be ascribed to her lack of opportunity. It was said that while the Indian soldier was brave he lacked leadership

Indian Defence and Indian Reforms.

¹ Responsible Government in the Dominions, 2nd Ed., p. 49. ² *Ib.* p. 44.

because he was uneducated and as soon as the Indian is educated he becomes effeminate. The glorious record of the "*Indian Corps in France*" is a conclusive refutation of such calumny. We are then driven to the conclusion that for her military equipment India does not lack the crude material ; but she has lagged behind and has now to make up for much lost time and opportunity. How is she going to do it. The majority of us think that a fair beginning is possible with the establishment of a military college in India and the adoption of a more liberal policy in the matter of the selection of cadets than what has been hitherto the practice. We have been assured that a beginning in this direction has already been made. We can only hope that it will be continued. The other recommendations of the Skeen Committee include the abandonment of the eight units scheme. Two reasons have been suggested for the initiation of this scheme. The first, that of not unduly impairing the efficiency of the Army which as a war machine must be maintained in the highest pitch of efficiency which would not be possible if raw recruits are indiscriminately distributed among the various regiments of the Army ; and secondly, it is said that the isolation of the eight units would give Indians the best chance for displaying their capacity for organisation and leadership, which is not possible if they are employed in mixed regiments. The Indians complain that the segregation of all Indian cadets by limiting their employment in the eight regiments is due to the objection of British Officers who do not view with equanimity the possibility of their serving under an Indian Commander ; and that apart from that remote contingency there would be a serious falling off in the recruitment of British cadets if they were faced with the problem of having to serve with subalterns of other nationality.

285. It is hardly necessary to recall the identical objection raised to the employment of Indians in the All-India Services. It is even less necessary to point to their futility ; since whatever prejudice the Englishman may feel of serving under or with an Indian, he has the good sense and the breadth of vision to reconcile himself to the inevitable. And as the civilian has bowed to the inevitable without loss to his prestige and efficiency, so we think the subaltern will, if only he is taught to think that way. Moreover, it is not one of India's demand that the Indian Army should for all time be commanded by Englishmen. Both the dictates of sentiment and economy demand the necessity of the Indianization of all ranks. India can wait but it will not linger. She is ready to pocket her pride for the sake of efficiency but efficiency must not act as a drag demanding the sacrifice of her self-respect.

CHAPTER VI.

PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS.

286. We have been favoured with voluminous documents descriptive of the working of reforms in the nine provinces and in the Central Government, and, with the solitary exception of the Central Provinces and Berar, with proposals which more or less favour a general advance in the direction of larger autonomy. Provincial views.

The Madras Government, whose proposals are as thorough going as they are logical, had in the descriptive volume prepared the ground for their ultimate recommendation by giving a full and lucid picture of the working of dyarchy which had undoubtedly worked well in that presidency in spite of its inherent drawbacks and facility for conflict. The non-co-operation movement, which had become well established before the advent of the reformed councils, appears to have found uncongenial soil for the display of its virulence amongst the level-headed politicians of Madras.

287. The term "autonomy" must be understood in this connection as connoting no more than provincial self-government, subject to such safeguards and the residuary powers as may qualify unlimited authority, and in the absence of the subject or context connoting otherwise it will be used in this sense throughout this report.

The *bête noire* of communism was, however, by no means absent here. Where the real conflict however took the form of an internecine jealousy between the Brahmins who had for long monopolised almost all avenues for public employment and the non-Brahmins who challenged their supremacy, and attacked their monopoly by a well-directed force of organised opposition which completely staggered the old time monopolists and drove them out of their stronghold by the advancing avalanche of opposition.

288. And behind the non-Brahmins stood millions of the despised and depressed classes whom both the Brahmins and non-Brahmins had oppressed for centuries. Their very shadow was a pollution to the so-called high caste Hindus who conspired to deny these unfortunate people the use of public wells and even the use of public roads. They were backward, illiterate, poor and unorganised ; their number was large but their influence negligible. They watched the social upheaval between the two caste belligerents, and profiting by their example bestirred themselves and started an aggressive campaign both against the Brahmins and the non-Brahmins which threatened to storm the bulwark of all orthodoxy. But during the last decade they have not succeeded in gaining a substantial foothold either in the public services or in the Councils which might have

served as a sounding board for the ventilation of their grievances. The fact is that the depressed peoples have developed a class consciousness within the last few years. When Mr. Montagu was on his mission to India the depressed classes sent their representatives to interview him, but they boycotted the Southborough Committee and they did not appear before the Joint Parliamentary Committee, with the result that they were allotted only seats by nomination and their representatives naturally suffered from the dual wrong of insufficient, inadequate and insecure representation. They have since made good their past apathy. They have broken away from the leading strings of their Hindu compatriots, and their representatives met us at every centre and treated us to a long recital of their grievances, many of them social and some of them such as no wise legislator can afford to ignore. We have already adverted to their case more fully in an earlier chapter.

Madras
Review.

289. But neither the cleavage between Brahmins and non-Brahmins nor the mute spectre of the downtrodden pariah in the background marred the progress of the reforms in Madras. As the Madras Government observed "in conclusion, it may be said that the degree to which the council reflects educated opinion has increased with each council."¹ But the Report goes on to add that even the non-Brahmins who had grasped the opportunity to form a government of their own and had been instrumental in bidding them God-speed became restive when they found them insufficient for the display of their talents or the employment of their energies. Their federation demanded full provincial autonomy, and their members slowly gravitated towards the Congress which at one time stood for complete dominion status and nothing short of it ; though a strong wing of congressmen in Madras have since gone even further in demanding complete independence for India outside the Empire. For example, in 1926, the Provincial Congress Committees of the two main divisions of the Presidency, Tamil and Telegu, both passed resolutions advocating such independence.² This resolution was defeated in the Calcutta Congress of 1929 by a majority, though the minority were left free to carry on their propaganda and educate public opinion in favour of their separatist movement.

¹ Report, p. 83.

² *Ib.* p. 84.

CHAPTER VII.

OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS.

I.

FINALITY OF THE CONSTITUTION.

290. The Reforms Act of 1919 was professedly temporary. As Value of provided in Section 84A, it was subject to revision at the end of Finality. 10 years. The authors of the Montagu Report said that the next revision should be equally transitory. They say : " We regard it as essential, if the terms of the announcement of August 20 are to be made good, that there should from time to time come into being some outside authority charged with the duty of re-surveying the political situation in India and of re-adjusting the machinery to the new requirements."¹ There can be no doubt that under the declaration " the time and measure of each advance can be determined only by Parliament," the right is reserved to Parliament, but it is a right which the Parliament can waive ; since it is unquestionable that the transitoriness of the constitution has become its own weakness, and if the constitution had not been declaredly temporary though it might have been subject to an *arrere pense* the agitation for more reforms would not have received the same incentive to boycott as the constitution actually made.

291. Temporary constitutions please nobody. The giver thinks that if he has given too little it does not matter as after all it is only for a short time ; the taker thinks that the little given might well be refused because the giver will then give the next instalment. Moreover, a short-lived constitution affords both parties time to marshall their forces and each time that it comes up for revision the same objections are again trotted out against further reforms as were urged against any reforms at all. For instance, we have been treated to a serious diatribe against the Indians' inherent incapacity to rule themselves, of their love for bureaucratic rule, of their illiteracy, their religious feuds and the presence of an impartial arbiter, the danger of lowering the British standard of efficiency ; and many more of the same kind which had confronted the pioneers of the present reforms.

292. If the constitution is to have the finality which we recommend the following questions *inter alia* would have to be embodied in the new Act :—

- (1) A procedure for amendment of the Constitution in progressive stages.
- (2) Reservations : how to remove them, and when.
- (3) Provision for a possible federation of the Indian States.
- (4) Safeguards : e.g., a provision for safeguarding the Home Charges, and the like.

¹ Report, § 261.

What India wants is an organic constitution capable of self-development and self-expansion without reference to extraneous authority. Our recommendation must be understood in this sense.

II.

THE SEPARATION OF BURMA.

Origin of the agitation.

293. We have opposed the separation of Burma, taking into consideration numerous aspects of the question, (1) Financial, (2) Economic, (3) Political, (4) Strategic, (5) Social, and sixthly and lastly, Sentimental.

294. The credit for the inception of an agitation for the separation of Burma from India must be given to other interests than the Burmans. It was started on the eve of the first reforms ; but the agitation has since been taken up by one section of the Burmans, though another section belonging to the Nationalist group have opposed its severance at this juncture, holding it more advantageous to Burma to remain a part of India, whose support it can count on and has received for its deliverance from autocracy.

295. Burma is a polyglot province with an admixture of population in which the Burmans are naturally in numeral majority. But the trade and commerce is in other hands. The mineral wealth of the country is being exploited by Europeans ; its rice trade is in the combined hands of Europeans and Indians, while India supplies its labour force not only for the oil and mineral industry, but also for harvesting the paddy.

296. All enterprises are being financed by non-Burmans. The Europeans control the higher banking while the Indians, mostly the Chetties from Madras, do the money lending. Rangoon, the capital of Burma, is more an Indian than a Burmese city ; of its population of 350,000, no less than 200,000 are Indians. These are employed as clerks and cartmen, tram conductors and mechanics, and they are preferred to the Burmese for manual labour because they are both more industrious and hard working and capable of sustained labour which the Burmans are not.

297. Burma is at present an undeveloped country extending to about 263,000 square miles, of which about 184,000 square miles are in British possession, while 16,000 is unadministered, and 63,000 is covered by semi-independent Native States. Its population at the last census (1921) was 13,169,099, distributed as follows :—

	Per 1,000.					
Buddhists	851
Animists	53
Mahommedans	38
Hindus	26
Christians	26
Others	1

298. Its average revenue is approximately 10,38 lakhs. The density of its population all told is only 57 per square mile, against 608 and 426 of the thickly populated Provinces of India, e.g., Bengal and the United Provinces. Admittedly there is considerable scope for immigration and industrial, agricultural and other general development.

299. The latest phase of the Burmese agitation in favour of separation has taken a form of an anti-Indian agitation. It is said that the Indian is flooding the country and exploiting its natural resources. Curiously, nothing is said about the Europeans. Indians complain that the separatist movement was engineered by some Europeans, with the dual object of slicing it off from India for themselves and for thwarting the growing competition of the Indians with them. But whether it is so or not, we have to take note of the fact that an agitation exists, a demand for separation has been addressed to us, and though it has been opposed by the Indians, we cannot resist the demand if it would be in the interest of Burma that it should be partitioned off from India.

300. A strong grievance of Burma and the Burmese Government who have supported their claim for separation rests on the ground that there is nothing in common between the two countries, that Burma is the furthest extremity of India, has no material voice in the management of her own affairs, being controlled by the Government of India who have treated her as a Cinderella Province, neglected her special interests, and made her a milch cow for India's interest ; that Burma is in no way menaced by the existence of a vulnerable frontier like India for the defence of which she has to contribute an amount out of all proportion to the benefit received, or the protection afforded to her ; that the unpenetrable chain of hills which separate her from India in the West and from China and Siam in the East, reduce the question of her defence to a minor issue ; but so long as she remains a part of India she would not be able to shake off the ever-growing incubus of the Government of India's military expenditure ; that Indian competition with Burmans is prejudicial to the latter, since the Burman has a higher standard of living and cannot fairly compete with the Indian labourer.

No unity of interest.

This is in short Burma's case for her separation from India.

301. Against this it is recognized that the Burmans are still backward, cannot be entrusted with the full measure of self-government, that the Indian competition is keen but by no means unfair or unnecessary, that the Indian trader and the labourer contributes to its growing wealth and prosperity, and that if the Indians are not employed in the higher services their places can only be filled by Europeans which would add to the cost of the administration. It is admitted that the Chetty exacts a higher rate of interest, but the Chetty retorts

India's exploitation.

that the Burman is under no obligation to take it, and that considering the risk run the interest, though high, is not excessive. Lastly, there is the question of Burma's heavy indebtedness to India, which would bankrupt her resources with separation.

The *pros* and *cons* of the question were gone into by us in meticulous details ; but it is neither necessary, nor, indeed, would it be expedient for us to do more than categorise the grounds urged and our own opinion thereon.

Burma is
the milch
cow of
India.

302. Of the several grounds urged in favour of separation, the one of finance is the oldest, and it is one which has received the strong backing of the local Government. The complaint that Burma is being fleeced by the Government of India on account of its excessive military expenditure is a complaint echoed by almost every province of India. But as one of us pointed out, it is a complaint not against India, but the Indian Government, with the constitution with which we ourselves are not satisfied ; otherwise we would not have recommended a change. While the Burmans ask for their separation from India, they in the same breath ask for the retention of the control of the Secretary of State for India over their divided selves. If so, we fail to see what financial advantage would result to them therefrom ; since the revenues of India at present vest in the Secretary of State, and he is equally responsible now for the allocation of the Provincial Revenues. With its separation from India, it is not likely that the same individual will so alter his policy as to favour Burma at the expense of India. But this question apart, the financial burden of Burma can be relieved, and, indeed, if unfair, ought to be relieved, whether Burma is separate or joint. It is an iniquity of which many Provinces have complained, and it has got nothing to do with the demand for separation.

Economic
drain.

303. As regards the economic drain of Burma by the Indians the opinion of the Burmans is warped by prejudice engendered by the periodic sight of large bodies of Indian coolies entering Burma during the harvest season and leaving it thereafter. This is given as the chief reason why Burmans regard the Indian coolie as a drain. We have already referred to the opinion of Europeans who are employers of Indian labour but who do not take it in that light. Nor do they support the contention that the Indian labourer unfairly competes with the Burman who is not capable of the same degree of physical endurance or sustained work. We were told that the Burman was a charming fellow—easy happy-go-lucky—not used to hard labour or long hours of work, and that he is neither thrifty nor provident by habit, for as soon as he has made a little money, he thinks it is quite enough and goes to a race or a *pué* to enjoy himself till the pressure of want drives him back to his work. That the Burmans have not yet become

inured to the hardship of factory life or military discipline is another matter upon which we find abundant evidence. In the face of these facts it is idle to contend that Burma would be gainer in the economic field by her separation from India.

304. As regards her political advance, two points were made by the witnesses. It was said that literacy is much higher in Burma and that there is no Hindu-Muslim question to retard her political advance, and since these causes are holding back the progress of India, there is no reason why Burma should wait with India for a substantial advance in the direction of self-government. Political.

305. That Burma is more literate than India is admitted, and so is the fact that Burma does not suffer from the disintegrating influence of caste or the corroding effect of communalism. None the less the Burmans cannot forget that it was Burma that was left out of the reforms in 1919, and it was India's championship of her cause which made their extension to Burma possible. The junction of Burma with India is not a source of her political weakness, but of her strength. Left alone she will fall an easy prey to those who cannot possess the same sympathy with her aspirations as the Indians feel. We do not think that with her union with India Burma has been politically a sufferer in the past, or that she is likely to suffer in the future. On the other hand, we fear that her separation will in this respect be entirely to her disadvantage.

306. Some Burmans turn to Ceylon for an example of what a separated province can achieve. But Ceylon has not yet achieved a form of Government superior to that of India; and it is too early to see whether the Ceylon Reforms Committee's recommendations, even if given effect to, would give that Island a Constitution comparable to that we have recommended for Burma. Our advice to Burma then is—wait and see, and don't be stampeded into an agitation which will do Burma no good and place the Burmans at the mercy of people who have less in common with the Burmans than the people of India.

307. It is admitted on all hands that Burma's defence is India's defence and that with her separation the question of her military defence would still remain. Expert opinion taken by us inclines to the view that with her separation Burma is not likely to be the gainer financially. That is the view of authorities whose representatives have given us the benefit of their advice. Strategic position.

In our Chapter on the Army in India we have shown to what extent India can and should be relieved of its burden of military charges. If our contention prevails Burma with the rest of India stands to gain by any relief obtained by the Indian Revenue.

We know that there is a line of argument to which some separatists have given vocal expression. They say that Burma is as distinct from India as is Ceylon and Burma is no more interested

in the defence of India than is Ceylon. But the argument misses our main contention. Those of us who plead for the reduction of the Army Expenditure of India contend that the British garrison in India, though stationed in and maintained at the cost of India, is in reality maintained equally if not mainly for the defence of England's Eastern possessions. Ceylon has no army of her own being certain that the Indian Army is there to defend her integrity. South Africa, the Malaya Federated States and even Australia depend upon that Army and yet not one of them contributes a cent towards its upkeep.

Financial.

308. In complaining of the economic drain of India, Burma forgets that she owes her position of comparative affluence to the Indian connection. It is India's money which paid for the Burmese war, and for several years made good her recurring deficits. Financial experts have advised us that if Burma has to repay her debt it would once more launch her into the era of annually recurring deficits from which she has only recently emerged. That Burma is heavily indebted to India admits of no doubt, only the extent of her indebtedness is in dispute. It is claimed for Burma that she is not liable to pay for India's war of conquest ; but it is forgotten that it was not India's war but Great Britain's, and India was only responsible for footing the bill. She advanced the money to which she is entitled, whoever pays it Burma or England. Other questions remain which would equally cripple Burma's resources, and all things considered, we think that her separation will not bring her the prized relief from financial embarrassment of which she complains on account of her union with India.

Defence of
Burma.

309. Again Burma does not occupy the same position of isolation as Ceylon and the other countries to which we have referred. She is geographically a part of India. Her eastern frontier is vulnerable and within a striking distance of another contiguous power. The invasion of Burma by the Chinese is not yet a mere memory. It has left its mark upon its political geography. And there are numerous tribes to cope with. The eastern frontier of India is the eastern frontier of Burma. A chalk line cannot be drawn where the Indian frontier ends and the Burmese frontier begins.

Burma even if separate will have to remain militarily a part of India. The financial relief which she hopes to obtain by her separation is, therefore, illusory.

Social
disaffinity.

310. Next, Burma complains that the Burmans have nothing in common with India. They belong to a widely different race. Their outlook is different and there is no reason why they should be tacked on to India. That the Burmans belong to a different race is apparent ; but India contains a congeries of various races. How many of her people are of the same race ? Still they cannot on that ground demand their separation from India, any more than the French-Canadian can demand a partition of Canada,

because they belong to the Latin race. Burma would have a solid ground for demanding separation if her religion, culture or language, were exposed to interference on the part of India. Her complaint at present is against the Government of India as now constituted. Let her enjoy her new found freedom and if she suffers from her federation with India it would be time for her to complain. But let her first try the reforms we recommend which, if granted, would satisfy her ambition for autonomy and dispel the doubt in her mind, if any, that India's communal problems retard her progress.

311. Her sentiment for a separate life and a separate Government would then be both gratified. And what is more, it would allay the fears naturally present in the minds of the Indians that with her separation the Burmans will join with the Europeans in squeezing the Indians out. With the bitter example of Kenya before them Indians must be excused for being naturally apprehensive of their future in separated Burma. As it is, the process of squeezing out the Indians has already commenced. In the new rules framed for the recruitment to the Burma Provincial Service the educational qualification for eligibility expressly excludes graduates of the Indian universities. The Sea Passengers Act which was passed in spite of Indian protest had at last to be vetoed by the Governor-General. It was a piece of discriminatory legislation, the effect of which would have been to levy a special poll tax upon Indian immigrants. With such examples before them, Indians may well feel alarmed at the separatist movement which the Burmans themselves will live to rue, but then it would be too late.

III.

REFORMS IN THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE.

312. The five settled districts now constituting the North-Western Frontier were a part of the Punjab until 1900, when they were staved off into separate provinces for strategic reasons, as the Government of India were of the opinion that the frequent raids from the trans-frontier tribes to which they had become too frequently subject could not be brought under control unless the frontier area was directly governed from the centre. There was then no opposition to the separation except from Sir Mackworth Young, then the Lieutenant-Governor of Punjab. The Government of India claim that the administration of this area by a Chief Commissioner, who is also the Political Agent for the trans-frontier zone extending up to the Durand line, has justified their policy. There can be no doubt that the published statistics of the raids since show a marked improvement, while the town of Peshawar feels more secure from such incursions. A semi-military government has insured the maintenance of peace in the trans-border area, which we visited during our tour. Some of us

went far into the interior to view the numerous rifle factories which were being set up within a few yards of the Peshawar Kohat highway. The machinery used was of the crudest but the firearms turned out were to all appearance equal in finish to those manufactured in Europe. We went cross-country to see for ourselves the actual condition of the tribesmen who were all seen slinging their rifles from their shoulders. We inquired why they carried them and were told that owing to blood feuds life in the valley was insecure and that every man, and indeed every boy from 10 upwards, had to learn the use of a rifle which they used for self-defence and plunder by which they eked out their scanty existence. These tribesmen are a fine race and we were greatly struck by their embarrassing proffers of hospitality which we were assured was a special feature of the Pathans who inhabit the five settled districts and the unsettled tribal territory, to the west right up to Afghanistan, the people of which are by race and affinity of the same stock. The general characteristic of these tribes is they are a brave people who love fighting even if it be for the skin of a goat. They attack one another, preferably by night, and consequently all villages are fortified and provided with watch towers as a look out for the marauder. Life, we were told, is wholly insecure in these rocky, waterless wastes, presenting as they do a striking contrast to the settled districts where we saw every sign of a settled life. But even here a constant vigilance has to be maintained, and the chief town of Peshawar, though a large cantonment, is strongly protected by a wide belt of barbed fencing and other entanglements, in addition to which searchlights sweep every corner of the horizon to give a timely warning of approaching raids.

313. We spent several days in Peshawar and its environs to become personally acquainted with some of the problems on which we have now to embody in our report. Sir Norman Bolton was good enough to appear before us, and with the co-operation of a nominated Provincial Committee we were able to examine a large number of witnesses on the subject of further reforms.

314. We have perused all the literature on the subject, including the report of the Bray Committee, and we have come to the conclusion that while the settled districts are still most backward and have not even entered upon their political novitiate in local self-government, still the people there cannot be left out in the cold while the rest of India is making rapid strides towards responsible Government. At the same time we cannot delude ourselves into a belief that the jute that thrives in Bengal will equally thrive in Peshawar ; we have to take into account not only the geographical conditions but also those arising out of the strategic importance of the frontier, and the desirability of maintaining a continuous policy which has proved so successful. These considerations would have had less

weight were not the civil administration of the province in perpetual heavy deficit, met out of the funds of the Central Government.

We had pointed out this difficulty to several witnesses who replied to us in a set formula that somebody had to pay the watchman's wages. But the frontier districts are not the watchers but the watched, for whose safety special provision has to be made, which partially accounts for the annually recurring deficit in the provincial budget made good out of the Central Revenues.

It is extremely unlikely that the Legislative Assembly will consent to the surrender of its power of control over this deficit or agree to transfer it to the provincial budget for disposal at the will of the local council. This seems in itself an insuperable objection to the grant of any reform on the present lines.

Moreover, it must not be forgotten that the rest of India had itself to pass through the school of politics stage by stage. Its promotion has been slow and gradual. Each forward step has been taken after the effect of that preceding it had been fully tested and tried. We have in our previous chapters passed in review the varied stages in the evolution of its constitution. Judged by that standard the five frontier districts have not yet come up even equal to the reforms associated with the Morley-Minto scheme.

315. It has been said that if the five districts had remained a part of the Punjab they would have shared in these and other reforms equally with the Punjab. The answer is that the districts would then have probably learned more quickly by their association with it. But we are not really free to conjecture what would have been their position both under the reforms of 1909 and 1919. One thing is certain, that if the phrase "progressive realization of self-Government" has any meaning, any advance in the Frontier Province cannot be otherwise than by stages. We may overlook their backwardness, hope that the blood feuds would subside and that the steel that is smelted to forge swords will be turned to fashion sickles, hope again that religious sobriety will replace religious rancour, still the fact remains that the Frontier districts must show by example that they have learnt the lesson of civic responsibility. This they can amply do if we recommend the immediate extension to them of the reforms which the rest of India obtained under the Morley-Minto scheme of 1909.

316. We further recommend that the question must be re-examined after ten years with a view to exploring the possibility of further reforms. That is the drill through which India has passed, and we do not see why our friends in the North-Western Frontier should not do the same.

CONCLUDING REMARKS.

317. Finally, Your Excellency, we may be permitted to close this Report on a personal note. All of us have been devoted servants of India ; some of us her sons who have devoted all that was best in them to the service of their Motherland. Twelve months since when we took office we were made the targets of cheap ribaldry and organized obloquy—wherever we went we found ourselves surrounded by hooting crowds. Some of us were threatened with personal violence ; some threatened with death. Some had to endure the tempestuous outburst of popular disfavour in the estrangement of old friends, the snapping of lifelong ties, but we have successfully weathered the storm, finished our labours and have our consciences as our witness that we have striven to work loyally and faithfully in the interest of our people and the service of our Motherland.

318. We have now submitted proposals the full effect of which some of us may not live to see. But we have this satisfaction that our contribution to the solutions of the great constitutional problems which confront Your Excellency's Government may not be in vain.

We know that men greater than ourselves had to march to the pillory or mount the scaffold for the courageous exposition of their views. We have faced the one and not escaped some of the pangs of the other, and now that our task is done, we feel some relief ; though we still suffer from a feeling that our recommendations will be denounced as revolutionary by some and reactionary by others. But we were conscious of this when we penned our Report. And if we could not give India more we could not give her less. Her self-respect and manhood alike demand it. May the Mother of Parliaments display in her case that prevision which the occasion needs and may her Counsellors remember that the safety of the State lies in the contentment of its people.

319. We had subjoined our Report with a summary of our recommendations. As these have since been embodied in the Secretary's Report we do not wish to duplicate them here. But what we should like to have done is to distinguish the recommendations which were unanimously adopted from those which were adopted by a majority.

HARI SINGH GOUR.

CHAPTER IX.

Sir Hari Singh Gour's Notes of Dissent.

I.

FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS.

320. I regret I have to enter my protest against the amendment made to the Fundamental Clause as drafted by me.

As originally drafted, the clause only protected all citizens of the State, and in the second place it placed no disqualification upon the legislative power of the Indian Legislature to repeal all such laws as it may find not to be in consonance with the spirit of the reformed Government. The amendment makes the clause too wide, by extending the statutory protection to all British subjects, and it further saves certain laws, however obnoxious they may grow to the people, from repeal.

321. As to the first, it is now the established principle embodied in the written constitutions of many countries and, so far as the British Commonwealth is concerned, recognised by the Imperial Conference, that all Dominions, including India, possess the right of controlling their own population and may for that purpose place any restriction they choose upon immigration from other countries. For example, the Imperial Conference of 1918 passed the following resolution :—

“ It is an inherent function of the Governments of the several communities of the British Commonwealth, including India, that each should enjoy complete control of the composition of its own population by means of restriction on immigration from any of the other communities. ”¹

322. This resolution was reaffirmed by the same Conference in 1921. It recognised India's right to enact any discriminatory legislation it pleased to restrict or prohibit the immigration of foreigners whether British subjects, or otherwise. Apart from the resolution no one, not a citizen, can constitutionally claim the same protection from a State to which he owes no allegiance ; since allegiance and protection are mutual rights, and there can be no protection as of right without allegiance. Following this declaration, India has already passed an Act (Act III of 1924), the object of which was to ensure reciprocity between India and the other parts of the Empire.² If the amended resolution is given effect to it would absolutely protect all British subjects in India without Indians obtaining the same protection anywhere else in the British Dominions.

The second amendment is equally unacceptable to me in that it tends to place a limit upon the legislative authority of the

¹ Resolution 21 passed on 24th July, 1918, Report 6, 8.

² See Assembly Debates, dated 27th July, 1923, pp. 39, 50, 68.

Indian Legislature which does not exist even now. I cannot consent to India's future Parliament being truncated in the manner proposed.

II.

THE SEPARATION OF SIND.

Constitutional objection.

323. While we were taking evidence this question was sought to be raised by a witness when one of us raised a constitutional objection whether it was competent to us to go into the question at all. As that objection still remains undecided I may be permitted to restate it. It will be seen that under Section 53 of the Government of India Act, the power to constitute a new province vests in the Governor-General in Council subject to the previous sanction of the Secretary of State. The Parliament has already parted with that power and vested it in a specified authority. Under section 84A of the Government of India Act all that the Statutory Commission (and by implication our committee with them) are entitled to report is "to what extent it is desirable to establish the principle of responsible Government," that is to say, to what extent the Governor-General in Council shall be made responsible to the legislature. This is one thing ; but to advise how that Government, when formed, or for the matter of that, the Governor-General in Council as now constituted, shall exercise that discretion is a matter solely within his authority and discretion and we should be travelling beyond the scope of our inquiry, and, I submit, overstraining our authority if we went into this and such questions. I may add that this objection was reiterated again and again in Bihar and Burma, and with the same result. I, therefore, feel constrained to enter our protest against the Parliament being called upon to decide a purely domestic issue which might conceivably affect the discretion of the Indian Government and compel it to adopt a course which it might have otherwise considered inexpedient. I have stated my view here because there is a movement set on foot that if India is to receive a substantial measure of self-government, let Burma at least be separated. I shall deal with this question under its appropriate heading. As I am now dealing with an Indian Province I should like to make it plain that our objection applies equally to all proposals for the creation of new Provinces and, in view of Section 60, to the redistribution of the existing Provinces.

324. I had raised this objection in our Committee during the course of discussions, but as it proceeded to adopt the safer course of formulating their recommendations upon all questions on which evidence was led, it must not be assumed that my objection was overruled even by our Committee.

Subject to this objection I now proceed to state my views on the Separation of Sind.

325. Though the Committee have by five votes to four (including the three votes of our Mahomedan colleagues) decided in favour of the separation of Sind, the reasons which have influenced the majority to accord their support to that decision would, in my humble judgment, lead to a *non sequitur*. Our three Mahomedan colleagues voted for separation presumably because it is a common feature of the Nehru Report and the Delhi Muslim Conference. Now in the first place the separation of Sind is not recommended in the unqualified terms in which our resolution is couched, since the Nehru Report is more guarded in its recommendation, for it says :—

Sind a deficit Province.

“ We feel, therefore, that the argument for the separation of Sind is very strong. In the absence of sufficient data regarding the financial position we are unable to give a definite opinion on it. But it is unlikely, to say the least of it, that financial considerations will be such as to overrule all other important factors which we have discussed. ”¹

326. The data which were then lacking are available to us now, and we would say with the Nehru Report that they present the “ insurmountable difficulty ” which must overbear the consideration of their sentiment, which influenced the majority of our colleagues. Our Chairman supported them because as he then said, he stood for the principle of self-determination. Now self-determination is a fine phrase added to the political vocabulary by President Wilson in his enumeration of the Fourteen Points upon the acceptance of which he led America to join the War. But what does self-determination imply ? There must of necessity be an undivided self, and that self of Sind is sharply divided ; and the two selves have through their accredited representatives opposed the separation, since both the Bombay Government and the Bombay Provincial Committee have unanimously recommended against separation, and the Chairman of the Bombay Committee, Khan Bahadur Bhutto, is himself a leading Sindhi representative member of the Bombay Legislative Council. The Bombay Government have examined the question in great detail and strongly oppose its separation. Sind is a small area, even smaller than Assam, which is the smallest existing Province in India. Its area is only 47,000 square miles as against 54,000 of Assam, of which 10,000 square miles are desert and uninhabited. Its population of 3,279,377, again is small as compared with Assam the population of which is 7,500,000. Financially it is a deficit Province since its revenue is computed by the Finance Secretary to be only 185.4 lacs, while expenditure thereon was 222.8 lacs ; and this deficit would greatly increase—it is estimated by at least 50 lacs per annum in normal years—and on account of its devastation by the floods this figure is now clearly an under-estimate. And since it is

to be provided, as is recommended, with all the paraphernalia of a Governor's Province a further allowance must be made for additional expenditure for which no provision is made.

View of the
majority.

327. Now, the majority of my colleagues who were moved by a sentimental attachment to their religion or the theory of self-determination have neither considered nor explained to us in the course of our discussion how this annual deficit is to be met. I am aware of the answer usually returned by theorists that the Central Government must find the money. But that Government has so far failed to find a Pandora's box whence to meet the claims of all comers ; nor, indeed, do we see why the whole of India should be saddled with the cost of a separation, which only dogmatists and doctrinaires can ever justify. As we have remarked before, the Bombay Provincial Committee, which included three Mahomedans and a European representative from Sind itself, have set their face against separation. There is only one note of dissent by Mr. Mian Mahomed Shah, but while he has struggled to combat the arguments against separation he has urged none in favour of it, and the burden of making out a strong *prima facie* case for separation is upon those who want it. In the Nehru Report, separation was acceded to as a peace offering to the Mussalmans. In the Muslim Conference Report we find only a bald statement demanding separation.

Bombay
view.

328. Except the one dissentient member, the Bombay Committee are then unanimously opposed to the separation of Sind for reasons stated by the Bombay Government to which they add its comparative backwardness. This view is shared by no less a person than Khan Bahadur S. N. Bhutto himself, a full fledged Sindhi Muslim representative in the Bombay Council and Chairman of the Bombay Committee.

The movement for the separation of Sind was a part of the original plan for carving out a Moslem province of its own, but our Moslem brethren do not realise that a separation would weaken their influence in the Bombay Presidency. As it is, the number of Moslems in that Presidency is only 19.6 per cent., and as the population of the Moslems in Sind is 74 per cent. it follows that in the process of the separation of Sind the ratio of the Moslems will be materially reduced. Whether Mahomedans will profit by localised influence rather than the general influence which they exert over the whole Presidency, and indeed throughout India, is a question upon which it is possible to hold two opinions. But the fact remains that the separation of Sind would not be such an unmixed blessing for the Moslems as they anticipate.

Punjab
claim.

329. It need scarcely be added that the separatists would not welcome the annexation of Sind to the Punjab to which it is so geographically proximate, and one of us had raised the question of such possibility as even in some degree desirable. When the Sukkur barrage was projected the Punjab

Government had raised an objection because it would starve that Punjab of water which they needed for the execution of their own irrigation scheme which the Secretary of State disallowed because he considered Sind was in greater need of water from the Indus for the irrigation of its arid desert. But the Punjab has not received this decision with equanimity, and the two riverain provinces might in the near future come to closer grips, if we separate Sind and give, as we have recommended, provincial autonomy to the Punjab. It may then be that Sind may not receive the same supply of water from the Indus which it is expected to receive now. This contingency was expressly mentioned in Sind, but there was no satisfactory answer, since the only answer given was that the two provinces would be left free to settle their own quarrels, which they may well do by the Punjab, which is a higher riparian owner, taking all the water it needs, and leaving Sind to console itself with the overflow, in which case all anticipations of Sind being able to balance its budget out of the wet rate to be levied would be falsified.

330. Another objection freely raised, though not much pressed, by some separatist protagonists was that Sind, being inaccessible from Bombay, had become the Cinderella Province of that Presidency. But the projected railway, linking up Bombay with Karachi, would soon eliminate this objection. I feel convinced with the Bombay Government that Sind has everything to lose and nothing to gain by separation, and I, therefore, oppose its separation for the present. At the same time, I would leave the Government in India free to examine that question in all its bearings and if they favour separation they are, of course, free to do so. Separation or no separation, it is their business, not ours.

New railway link.

III.

A SECOND CHAMBER FOR THE UNITED PROVINCES.

331. I regret I have to differ from my colleagues on the necessity or utility of a second Chamber for the United Provinces. The main reasons which have induced the majority of my colleagues to take this course are obscure to me ; but those which may have led the majority to vote for the establishment of bicameral legislature for that one Province might be :—

(a) The existence of a large and influential body of Taluqdars in Oudh ;

(b) The ubiquitous argument about communal feuds.

No other reason occurs to me, other than the general ones to which we have elsewhere adverted. But these reasons could not have influenced the majority to single out one province out of nine for the trial of such experiment. I therefore dismiss them as not germane to the discussion.

332. As for the existence of a large and influential class of landholders in the United Provinces, it is scarcely a reason for the creation of a Second Chamber. Equally large, though perhaps not so influential, a body of men will be found scattered in several other Provinces. But apart from giving their class special representation, proposals for the creation of a Second Chamber were in all other cases considered and rejected.

333. The fact that the Taluqdars of Oudh are a more consolidated body is no reason to constitute them a revising chamber, and under the constitution adopted for such chamber give them that power. Now, as we have already stated, a Second Chamber must, if it is to possess any value at all, be a chamber drawn from men who have made their mark in every walk of life. By their age, experience and wisdom they are held to possess the confidence of that small but thinking part of a nation that might be described as their inner soul. But to arm a small body of men merely drawn from a landowning class, who may not possess any of those attributes with the functions of a Revising Chamber, is, to say the least, a novel procedure and would in its effect be reactionary.

That these leisured gentlemen, many of whom have not even acquired the modicum of education, much less experience of public business, are to control the behests of a popular chamber, savours of the establishment of a hereditary chamber in a Province possessed of five universities and in which higher education is advancing with giant strides.

334. The second argument that communalism justifies the creation of a Second Chamber is nowhere, since the communal virus has penetrated the other Provinces as well, for instance, in the Punjab, more deeply than in the Gangetic plain. Moreover, the Second Chamber can at best only control legislation and not general administration, which remains and is made responsible to the Council.

Being opposed to the establishment of a Second Chamber in a local Legislature I am equally opposed to its establishment in the United Provinces.

IV.

THE RESERVATION OF LAW AND ORDER IN BENGAL.

335. I regret I am unable to acquiesce in the decision of the majority of my colleagues in recommending the reservation of Law and Order in Bengal when they have agreed to transfer it in all other provinces. They regard Bengal as exceptional ; so do I, though in a different sense. To them the alarming feature of Bengal is the periodic recurrence of anarchical crime, added to which they regard the Hindu-Muslim equation at the polls as creating a situation of antagonism which would bring a minister, belonging to one of the two communities as one of serious perplexity. Suppose, it is said, that a Hindu minister in

charge of the Home Department were to order the opening of fire on Moslem rioters, would it not lead even to a wider disturbance of peace, and *vice versa* ? The objection overlooks the fact that we have throughout vested the ministry with joint responsibility so that no individual minister can take a decision in so serious a case without the concurrence of his colleagues in which Muslims may be assured of finding a place. Further, such minister will have to face the Council and reckon with the Muslim wing there. Then it might be urged that these very facts may conduce to his supineness leading to the vacillation or inaction resulting in similar disaster. I am aware of the municipal fakir case and have learnt a lesson the effect of which has not been lost upon me. Nor am I unaware of the disastrous effect of politics on the municipal administration of Calcutta. But deeply though I deplore these failings due to causes to which we have adverted in our review of the local bodies, they furnish no more reason for reserving law and order in Bengal than in the other Northern Provinces, say Bihar, the United Provinces or the Punjab, where the inter-racial conflicts are equally common. Further, all the Governments have, as it were with one breath, condemned the perpetuation of Dyarchy which has been found to be unworkable, and this view has prevailed with my colleagues who have counselled its abolition, and still they have voted for its retention in Bengal, and in respect of a subject the subtle influence of which would render the transfer of other department nugatory.

336. I fear that my colleagues' minds throughout our discussions have been coloured by a lurid picture of the inter-racial relations in the past. But I look ahead and trust and more than trust, feel convinced, that with the assumption of joint control and joint responsibility and with the elimination of the prime cause of feuds, the separate electorates, the future would not be a mere replica of the past but that the two communities will, with the growing consciousness of their power and the sole weight of their responsibility thrown upon them, settle down to work in harmony by practising mutual tolerance, and that in course of time the two peoples will grow up to understand, what other democratic countries have long since understood, that a man who blends his politics with religion is like a man who mixes vinegar with his wine, since the two can never be combined in a country torn by the diversity of tongues and creeds in which a little free thinking is the only antidote to fanatical religiousness.

337. But whatever may be the risk of adopting the course which I regard as the only logical outcome of our view, I do not think that that risk is greater than the risk which we should have to face if Bengal is singled out for the retention of Dyarchy. It is the one Province which has vied with the Central Provinces in turning out one ministry after another as a protest against Dyarchy. Can anyone realise what it might not do in its frenzy if the Dyarchy it hates so well is given the last quarter there ?

338. I do not think Bengal is behind any other Province in the matter of education and experience of self-government. I do not think there is anything in the Bengali character to disqualify them for self-government. I do not think the risk we take is greater than the risk we should run if we withheld full autonomy from Bengal. I therefore strongly urge that Bengal should get the same degree of autonomy as is granted to the other Provinces.

V.

THE ALL-INDIA SERVICES IN MADRAS.

339. Our Committee has recommended that, following the principle settled by the Lee Commission that all services in the transferred field should be provincialized,¹ there is no longer any necessity for the retention of the All-India Services as such, the maintenance of which and the extent to which they should be maintained must be left to the Provincial Governments in which we have recommended the transfer of the subjects now held as reserved. Accordingly, our resolution to this effect applies to all the Provinces with the exception of the Madras Presidency, the exception being merely an accident, since it happened to be the first Province we had taken up for deliberation. The question of these services there has been set at rest by the Madras Government's memorandum, which, I understand, has since been published. For these reasons, the cogency of which is acknowledged even by those who favour the extension of these services under their present tenure, I feel that the Provinces should be able to choose their own agents for carrying out their own policy, and that it would be wrong and might lead to friction and the clogging of the machinery of government if we forced upon them an organized service amenable to extraneous authority, and which is accustomed to other traditions. In any case, if our recommendation regarding the eight provinces holds good I am unable to single out Madras for differential treatment in this respect. Some of my colleagues who had voted for the retention of the All-India Services in Madras have informed me that if we could revise our recommendation they would extend the formula adopted for the rest of the provinces equally to Madras. But apart from their concurrence I cannot defend the departure and think that Madras cannot be logically excluded from our otherwise general recommendation on the public services.

HARI SINGH GOUR.

¹ Lee Commission's Report, §§ 14-17.

. NOTE ON THE DEPRESSED CLASSES BY RAO
BAHADUR M. C. RAJAH, M.L.A.

The Depressed Classes in India present a definite problem in political and social evolution. They are the resultants of historical forces, religious, economic and social. They are the embodiment of exploded social ideas and the disabilities imposed on them by the original framers of Hindu polity have been aggravated by long centuries of segregation and neglect. The origin of these Classes and the beginning of their woes rightly belong to the domain of historical research but their betterment, economic and educational, is an imperative political problem. Their class consciousness is growing, stimulated partly by the sympathy of the Government and partly by the belated awakening of the Hindu social conscience. Still the new forces are encountering great opposition from the hostility of orthodoxy on the one side and the inertia of ignorance on the other. Every political party admits the existence of the problem and the need for special ameliorative measures.

Difficulties have been raised as to who exactly constitute the "Depressed Classes." The terms "Depressed Classes," and "Backward Classes" are bandied together and not infrequently cause confusion. The doubt whether a certain section came under the classification or not has often been brought out as an excuse to show there is nothing like Depressed Classes and that no such problem exists at all. The first attempt to enumerate these Classes was made in the census report of 1901 and the next report (1911) showed that the classes (Untouchables) who came under this category numbered 45 millions of the total Hindu population. The existence of the problem itself was recognised much earlier when the Madras Adi-Dravida Jana Sabha, now called the Registered All India Adi-Dravida Mahajana Sabha, was organised by Mr. P. V. Soobramaniam Pillay in December, 1892, incorporated under Act XXI of 1860, and began making periodical recommendations to Government regarding the protection of the interests of the Untouchables otherwise known as the Depressed Classes. The question was first raised on the floor of the Legislature when the Hon. Mr. (now Sir) Dadabhoy moved a resolution in the Imperial Legislative Council in 1916 asking for a survey of the problem. As a result of the resolution the Government of India circularised all the Provincial Governments and the replies of these Governments for the first time revealed the magnitude and gravity of the problem (*vide* Government of India Memorandum: The Depressed Classes). Subsequent Government reports, educational and political, have only served to emphasise the importance of the problem. Owing to the extreme backwardness of the communities and the prevalence of untouchability the education of these Classes presented special difficulties. In his quinquennial review of education, 1912-17, the Education Commissioner, Sir Henry Sharp, by grouping together those

whose educational needs presented difficulties owing to the fact of their being Untouchables arrived at a total of $31\frac{1}{2}$ millions of Hindus. In this classification the aborigines, the Hill tribes and the criminal tribes had been omitted. The figures collected by the Franchise Committee in 1919 appointed in the wake of the Montagu-Chelmsford Report, yielded a total of 42 millions comprising the group "Others" as a third Hindu group, identified by them with the Depressed Classes mentioned in para. 11 of their Report and again these do not include the aborigines or the animists or the Hill tribes. The Franchise Committee followed these figures in the matter of framing franchise and apportioning representation. There was fresh enumeration again in the census of 1921 and the Commissioner, Mr. J. T. Marten, puts the figure at what he himself calls a "low and conservative minimum of 43 millions in British India." "We may," he adds, "confidently place the numbers of these Depressed Classes, all of whom are considered impure, at something between 55 and 60 millions in India proper." This coincides with the figures of Mr. J. Coatman in his book "India in 1926-27." The Reforms Enquiry Committee of 1924 accepted these revised figures in paragraph 64 of their Report and the minority and the majority alike amply recognised the importance and seriousness of the question. On 23rd February, 1928, Mr. M. R. Jayakar moved a resolution in the Legislative Assembly recommending that local Governments be instructed to provide special facilities for the education of the Depressed Classes and also for opening all public services to them especially the police; and the late Lala Lajpat Rai moved an amendment thereto recommending the setting apart of a sum of a crore of rupees for affording special educational facilities for these classes. The Government spokesman, Mr. G. S. Bajpai, opposing the amendment, for the first time attempted to lower the figure and belittle the problem. Mr. Bajpai took his figures from the Educational Department, of which he happened to be the Secretary, and represented that the total for British India, excluding Burma and Assam, was only $28\frac{1}{2}$ millions. The accuracy of this figure was challenged and disproved when I sent in an interpellation on 4th September, 1928, in answering which the Home Member of the Government of India estimated the total of Depressed Classes at 60 millions for India proper. This coincides with the Census Commissioner Mr. Marten's estimate quoted above. Still the incorrect figure of $28\frac{1}{2}$ millions is persisted in, in the Auxiliary Education Committee's Report. But that is so because the Educational Officer, who compiled the figures in respect of Mr. Bajpai's figures also, happens to be the Secretary of the Auxiliary Education Committee. The Secretary of the Indian Central Committee early in January, 1929, circularised the various Provincial Governments asking for the latest figures and these yielded $44\frac{1}{2}$ millions. This does not include the aboriginal and criminal tribes' population.

A detailed examination of the figures collected by the Hartog Committee reveals two serious errors. In the case of the United Provinces the figures given by the local Government show the Depressed Classes as thirteen millions. But the Hartog Committee erroneously takes them at the lower and incorrect figure. In the case of Assam the error is more serious. The Committee have altogether denied the existence of anything like Depressed Classes in this Province. The figures of the local Government enumerating the various subcastes coming under this category gives them a total of 1.55 millions. Again deputations of Depressed Classes waited before the Joint Free Conference in Shillong on 4th January, 1929, and detailed their grievances.

As I am writing this I have received intimation that on the 17th August, 1929, the Governor of Assam has nominated for the first time a member of the Depressed Classes to the local Legislative Council. In the face of this irrefutable testimony to say that there are no Depressed Classes in Assam is clearly incorrect.

THE POPULATION OF THE DEPRESSED CLASSES (UNTOUCHABLES)
IN MILLIONS.

Provinces.	Franchise Com- mittee's figures 1919.	Census figures of 1921.	Reforms Enquiry Com- mittee's figures 1924.	Hartog Com- mittee's figures 1928.	Indian Central Com- mittee's figures 1929.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Madras	6.4	6.4	6.4	6.53	6.50
Bombay6	2.8	2.8	1.46	1.47
Bengal	9.9	9.0	9.0	6.64	11.50
United Provinces ..	10.1	9.0	9.0	7.89	13.00
Punjab	1.7	2.8	2.8	1.70	2.80
Bihar and Orissa ..	9.4	8.0	8.0	2.53	5.00
Central Provinces ..	3.8	3.3	3.3	3.01	2.67
Assam3	2.0	2.0	*	1.55
	42.2	43.3	43.3	29.76	44.50

*It is stated in the Hartog Report that there are practically no Untouchables in Assam (*vide* page 218, Table XCI of the Report of the Auxiliary Committee of the Indian Statutory Commission).

Figures under (5) have been taken from the printed list supplied by the Secretary, Indian Central Committee, to the members.

Without even going so far as to debate the accuracy of these figures, one has only to look at the numerous social and civic disabilities (of which typical instances are furnished later) prevailing almost everywhere in India to realise the magnitude of the problem. The records of the Reformed Legislative Councils are replete with evidence testifying to the undeniable existence of these hardships and debates on proposed ameliorative measures.

Interpellations covering specific statutory or social disability hampering members of these classes and resolutions and bills recommending removal of general disabilities form a regular feature of every session of every Provincial Council. The Rules framed under the Government of India Act make provision for special protection of their interests and enjoin upon heads of local governments the necessity for making provision for adequate representation of these classes in the Legislatures and the various Local Bodies.

1. The Governor of Madras, under Rule 3 of the Madras Electoral Rules, is instructed to nominate "ten to represent the following communities, namely, the Paraiyans, Pallans, Valluvans, Malas, Madigas, Chakkiliyans, Tottiyans, Cherumans and Holeyas."

2. By virtue of Rule 3 of the United Provinces Electoral Rules, the Governor is instructed to nominate one to represent "classes which, in the opinion of the Governor, are Depressed Classes."

3. The Governor of Bombay is instructed to nominate two to represent classes which, "in the opinion of the Governor, are Depressed Classes." (*Vide* Memorandum prepared by the Government of Bombay for submission to the Indian Statutory Commission, 1928, para. 387.)

4. The Governor of Bengal nominates a member of the Depressed Classes. (*Vide* Report on the working of the Reformed Constitution in Bengal, 1921-27, para. 178.)

5. The Governor of the Central Provinces nominates members of the Depressed Classes, and "the number of members nominated from the Depressed Classes has been raised from two to four in the third Council. (*Vide* Memorandum on the working of the Reformed Government in the Central Provinces and Berar, Vol. I, page 23.)

6. The Governor of Bihar and Orissa nominates two members "believed to be in sympathy with the class (Depressed Class), though not as a rule actually of that class."—(*Vide* Memorandum for the Indian Statutory Commission on the working of the Reforms in Bihar and Orissa, para. 154).

The Representation of the Depressed Classes as it is at present.

Legislatures.	Total Population.	Population of the Depressed Classes.	Total number of seats at present.	Seats for Depressed Classes.
1. Madras	42 millions	6.50 millions	132	10
2. Bombay	16 "	1.47 "	114	2
3. Bengal	45 "	11.50 "	140	1
4. United Provinces ..	47 "	13.00 "	123	1
5. Punjab	20 "	2.80 "	94	<i>Nil</i>
6. Bihar and Orissa ..	33 "	5.00 "	103	2
7. Central Provinces ..	12 "	2.67 "	73	4
8. Assam	7 "	1.55 "	53	<i>Nil</i>

These facts alone furnish an overwhelming answer to those witnesses who, speaking on behalf of certain Provincial Governments, sought to make out that the problem was non-existent in their province.

The lines of division which mark off the Depressed Classes from the rest of the Hindus are clear and unmistakable. Roughly, all those Hindus who are outside the pale of the four varnas, or castes, whose touch or proximity carries pollution, and those whose occupations are considered unclean and impure, constitute the Depressed Classes. They have not the right of the King's highway, nor have they the rights for public waterways and springs. They live segregated in the cheris in the Madras Presidency ; in bastis in the Punjab ; in mohalls or tolis in the United Provinces ; and in the pallis and paras of Bengal. Social rights they have none, and of civic and political rights little. The catalogue could be lengthened by adding local grievances in every province. But the idea of carrying pollution by touch or proximity and the denial of entry to temples or Dev Darshan constitute the G. C. M. of the factors which make up untouchability. This was also the principle of enumeration adopted by the various Census Commissioners. (*Vide* Franchise Committee's Report, dated 22nd February, 1919 ; Statistical Summary footnotes and Census Reports for 1911 and 1921.)

Despite the fact that there has been a steady enlargement of popular control over the present system of Government, the claims of the Depressed Classes have so far not been adequately recognised. In the public bodies they are inadequately represented, and in the public services they are not encouraged. In both the spheres the existing handicaps are heavy, and in the present low position of these classes they cannot overcome them unaided. Though popular representatives were admitted into the Legislative Councils as early as 1861, no member of the Depressed Classes ever found an opportunity to serve on these Councils. Though the Morley-Minto Councils were so formed as to enlarge the popular element so as to constitute a non-official majority, still no room was found to have the Depressed Classes represented. It was only in the last year of those councils that Lord Willingdon recognised their claims and nominated one member to his Council in Madras. The Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms for the first time made statutory provisions for the representation of their interests and enjoined upon the Local Governments the necessity to give them a voice in the Legislative Councils. The number of seats allotted varied in each province ; but in many it was not more than one or two and in some nil. In the Central Legislature there was no member of the Depressed Classes till I was nominated in 1927. The rightful claims of the Depressed Classes are dealt with later. Here I only indicate the existence of the grievance. In the various Local Boards these Classes get no representation. All this deprives them of making

their troubles known and demanding redress. In the public services the grievance is more acute. The educational and economic position of candidates from the depressed Classes makes it incumbent on the authorities that their claims should be treated preferentially. Not only is there no such preference, but in actual practice their so-called social inferiority is brought up as a bar and results in the anomaly of even higher qualifications being neglected to make room for social prejudice. A question in the Punjab Council ; a resolution in the United Provinces Council ; the reply of an Inspector-General of Police to an applicant for a Deputy-Superintendent's post in Assam ; a District Collector's reply to an applicant for an Honorary Magistrate's post in Bombay ; and a recent instance of selection of sub-registrars in Bengal furnish typical instances of the difficulty. The instances are cited from different provinces and furnish unmistakable proof of their universality.

Punjab Council.—Question No. 466, Lala Mohan Lal : “ Will the Honourable Member for Finance be pleased to state if members of the Depressed Classes are taken in police ? If not, does the Government intend to direct that, in the matter of recruitment of police constables, the members of the Depressed Classes should also be taken ? ”

The Honourable Sir Geoffrey de Montmorency : “ Members of the Depressed Classes are not enrolled in the police. When there is evidence that the Depressed Classes are treated on an equal footing by all sections of the community, or when Government is satisfied that enrolment of members of these classes will satisfy the requirements of efficiency and be in the best interests of the composition of the service, Government will be quite prepared to throw open recruitment to them, provided they come up to the physical and other standards required of all recruits.”

United Provinces Council.—On December 17, 1925, a Resolution was moved in the United Provinces Council for the removal of caste restrictions for admission to the police and other public services. (*Vide Reports on the working of the Reformed Constitution, 1927, pages 226, 227.*)

Assam.—The following is the reply of the Inspector-General of Police, Assam, to Mr. Sonadher Das, Secretary, Bania (Depressed Class), Samaj. The candidate was a member of the Depressed Classes and a Master of Arts.

From The Hon'ble Lt.-Colonel D. Herbert, I.A., Inspector General of Police, Assam.

To The Secretary to the Brittil Bania Community of Assam Proper, Shillong.

Dated Shillong, the 23rd October, 1918.

Sir,

With reference to your letter, dated the 4th October, 1918, I have the honour to inform you that while I sympathise with

the aspirations of the Assam Brittil Bania Community, I regret that so many considerations govern the appointments of Deputy Superintendents of Police at present, *e.g.*, the fact that suitable candidates with war service have preference, that I am unable to give any definite reply. I do not, however, think that in the present conditions of Indian Society a member of a community suffering from social depression, as referred to in the letter under reply, could make a successful Deputy Superintendent of Police. I, therefore, recommend the candidate you refer to to press his application for appointment to some other branch of Government service.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

(Signed) D. HERBERT,
Inspector-General of Police, Assam.

Bombay.

The Collector of Khandish District, Bombay Presidency, in his reply dated 25th September, 1928, to Mr. Medhi, a member of the Depressed Classes, who applied to him for the post of an Honorary Bench Magistrate, wrote thus :—

“ The Collector has every sympathy with the aspirations of the Depressed Classes and is glad to recognise and appreciate Mr. Medhi's good work in the various fields of public activities ; but in his opinion time has not yet come when a member of the Depressed Classes can be given a seat on the bench of Magistrates, and until Government makes some pronouncement favourable to the aspirations of the Depressed Classes in this Presidency, he must regretfully express his inability to recommend such an appointment.” (*Vide* Evidence, Depressed Classes Deputation, Bombay.)

Bengal.

The following is an extract from the evidence of the Depressed Classes Deputation, Bengal, that appeared before the Joint Conference on the 21st January, 1929, led by Mr. M. B. Mullick, M.A., B.L., President, All-Bengal Namasudra Association :—

“ Q. 76. I suppose there are a number of graduates in your community ?—A. There are a fair number.

“ Q. 77. 400 to 500 ?—A. Yes.

“ Q. 78. There are M.A.'s and B.A.'s ?—A. Yes.

“ Q. 79. Are there many of them in the public service ?—A. Only a few.

“ Q. 80. I should like to know whether they find any difficulty in entering the provincial or subordinate services ?—A. Yes, they do find difficulty.

“ Q. 81. I understand, as recently as January, 1928, they recruited some sub-registrars ?—A. Yes.

“ Q. 82. And for that the Government asked the various Commissioners to send up nominations ?—A. Yes.

" Q. 83. The Commissioners in turn asked the various Collectors ?—A. Yes.

" Q. 84. That is, qualified candidates for these posts ?—A. That is so.

" Q. 85. In the Dacca division I understand the Commissioners sent in four nominations ?—A. Yes.

" Q. 86. Two Hindus and two Muhammadans ?—A. Yes, that is so.

" Q. 87. Out of these two Hindus only an M.A. belonged to your community ?—A. To one of the Depressed Classes.

" Q. 88. And the other was a B.A., a Kayastha ?—A. Yes.

" Q. 89. Of the other two Muhammadans, one was an M.A. and the other a B.A. ?—A. Yes.

" Q. 90. And out of these, two were appointed ?—A. Yes.

" Q. 91. Although in the notification it was said that preference would be given to Backward and Depressed Classes ?—A. I believe that was the notification.

" Q. 92. In spite of that they thought it fit to offer the appointment to the B.A. Kayastha, overlooking the Depressed Class M.A.'s claims ?—A. Yes, it was published in the last gazette.

" Q. 93. Again, in June, 1928, in the Dacca civil court there were a number of vacancies for clerks, but they did not even care to advertise ?—A. That was what we knew.

" Q. 94. There were a number of graduates belonging to the Depressed Classes who sent in their application for these clerkships, but the son of an official who was a Matriculate was preferred ?—A. That we discovered later.

" Q. 95. And a brother-in-law of the head clerk, an undergraduate, was preferred ?—A. Yes.

" Q. 96. And the graduates belonging to the Depressed Classes did not get a chance —A. No.

" Q. 97. And recently, about five months ago, there were some appointments under the Controller of Currency, in Bengal ?—A. Yes, and also under the Accountant-General, Bengal.

" Q. 98. There, also, members of the Depressed Classes who were graduates applied for those posts ?—A. They did.

" Q. 99. And they did not get them ?—A. No, although an advertisement was made, and it was said in the advertisement that some appointments would be reserved for them.

" Q. 100. Also, as regards sub-registrars in Khulna, Faridpur and Jessore districts, several members of the Depressed Classes, graduates, applied for these appointments, but they were not preferred ?—A. They were

“nominated by the Collectors, but I do know what happened after that.”

The Inspector-General of Police, Bombay, when examined by the Commission said that the members of the Depressed Classes are not admitted in the Police service in the Bombay Presidency. The Inspector-General of the Punjab also said that the Depressed Classes are not admitted in the police department in the Punjab.

The superstition attaching to so-called pollution results in innumerable social and civic disabilities ; though these are slowly disappearing, yet they are generally prevalent. The children of the Depressed Classes cannot go to the same schools. (*Vide* Memorandum submitted by B. Ram Charan, B.A., LL.B., M.L.C. (U.P.).) The members of the Depressed Classes cannot engage in occupations which would bring them into close contact with other Hindus. That bars out all possibilities of social intercourse or economic betterment. The system of forced labour or Begar is still prevalent in the Punjab, and the Depressed Classes are daily being harassed by officers throughout the province. (*Vide* Memorandum, The Depressed Classes Mission, Lahore, page 2.) A Resolution was also moved in the Central Province Legislative Council for the abolition of Begar. In the lower courts Depressed Class witnesses must stand aloof when they give evidence. (*Vide* Evidence, Depressed Classes Deputation, Bombay.) No untouchable can come into any public office for the transaction of business in the villages and minor towns. He cannot enter a post office to buy a stamp or post a letter. (*Vide* Evidence, Depressed Classes Deputation, Bengal.) Hospitals maintained out of public funds have no accommodation for him. The right of using public rest-houses is denied to him. (*Vide* Memorandum prepared by the Government of Bombay for submission to the Indian Statutory Commission, page 527, (9).) I am depicting no imaginary or historical grievances. Caste Hindus of Bombay, led by such an enlightened and progressive leader as Sir Manmohandas Ramji, protested against a resolution passed by the Corporation of Bombay abolishing the practice of compelling the Untouchable children to drink water out of different cups in the Corporation school. The Share-brokers of the city took a day off to mark their protest against the Corporation Resolution, and my colleague, Mr. Kikabhai Premchand, is an ex-President of the Share Brokers' Association. (*Vide* “Indian Daily Mail,” 19/10/28.) This happened when the Statutory Commission was sitting at Poona. Caste fury assumed a graver aspect when an Untouchable woman was discovered walking in the streets of holy Benares. The offended Hindus belaboured the poor woman most mercilessly. (*Vide* “The Aj”, 26/10/27.) In a recent case in my own province an Untouchable paid with

his life for the temerity of polluting a street with his presence. ("Madras Mail," weekly, 1st Aug., 1929.) Even to-day the Madras Council is debating a bill introduced by a private member demanding that all highways be thrown open to the Depressed Classes. In the United Provinces the instance was cited to us by the United Provinces Government (*vide* Report on the working of the System of Government, United Provinces of Agra and Oudh, 1921-28, Vol. III, Addendum, page 50) of Untouchables leaving their pots near the public wells in the hope that some charitable samaritan would fill them. Resolutions were moved in the Madras Council, Bombay Council, Central Provinces Council, and the Punjab Council to allow the members of the Depressed Classes to draw water from the public wells maintained by the Local Bodies. The Untouchable children attending common schools are victimised. (Memorandum prepared by the Government of Bombay for submission to the Indian Statutory Commission, page 528, (21).) In the Punjab there are restrictive laws and customary rules that stand in the way of the advancement of the Depressed Classes. The Depressed Classes are forced to hold the lowest place in society, because of certain customary rules, which are enforceable in Courts of Law, debarring them from purchasing lands in village communities. The attention of the Government was drawn to the matter in the Punjab Legislative Council on 3rd March, 1928. The result of the customary rules which have the force of law is that the Depressed Classes are unable to purchase lands or even residential sites in villages. (*Vide* Memorandum submitted by the National Reforms Party, Punjab, page 22.) The Land Alienation Act of Punjab prevents the Depressed Classes from purchasing lands from the privileged castes notified under the Act as agriculturalists, though the Depressed Classes are themselves agriculturalists. (*Vide* *Ibid*, page 22.)

The Depressed Classes, though Hindus, cannot participate in common worship, nor can they come into the Temples. They are not even admitted into a public conveyance (Memorandum prepared by the Government of Bombay for submission to the Indian Statutory Commission, page 428 (19)), not to speak of the Barbers' Saloon and Indian Restaurants and Refreshment Rooms under the management of so-called caste Hindus. Rigorous segregation and enforced poverty have reduced these communities to nothing more than a physical existence. Aspirations and hopes of progress have been stifled under the load of superstitions and have all but died out. Thought has been fettered and resources crippled, resulting in stagnation and decay. Ninety per cent. of India's wealth is reported to be her agricultural produce and 90 per cent. of India's tillers of the soil are the Depressed Classes. But of that wealth they get no proper share. Generation after

generation they have been forced to live in dirt and squalor and to grow up in ignorance and fear. Ignorant habits and insanitary surroundings make them fall an easy prey to epidemic, and their poverty exposes them to chronic famine.

It is often contended that these disabilities spring from deep-rooted social prejudices and that political remedies are of little avail against them. It is asserted that legislation and administration cannot force the pace of social reform, and premature efforts in that direction often retard progress. That was true when States were organised on a limited basis and operated in a limited perspective. But the modern State, organised on democratic basis, embraces every sphere of national and social activity, and as such is the most powerful engine of social reform. It not only embodies and preserves prevalent social ideas but by its credentials it is authorised to mould and direct social tendencies. Under the more advanced conditions in the Western countries it has taken upon itself the duty of caring for the old and training the young. It acts as an agency in the more equitable distribution of the national dividend. Free education, adult franchise, old age pensions and unemployment insurance bear irrefutable testimony to its solicitude towards those who would, otherwise, under the relentless operation of economic laws soon become the Depressed Classes of Europe. The Government in India is progressing towards that ideal, and must sooner than later face this task of levelling up. The history of the last hundred years has shown that education, transport, commerce and political power have acted as solvents of age-long caste prejudices, and it is only by aiding the Depressed Classes to participate in an increasing measure in these activities that the stigma attaching to them could be removed. This is fully recognised in the evidence prepared by the Bombay Government, where they admit "the problem of Untouchability is not merely a social one. It has an important political aspect. Owing to the prevalence of untouchability a large section of the population is denied the enjoyment of its legitimate civic rights. Untouchability, which is also peculiar to the Hindus, is intimately bound up with the caste system, and has, therefore, in the minds of some people, a religious basis. The untouchable or depressed classes, who form about a thirteenth part of the total population of the Presidency, are denied many of the ordinary civic rights and privileges." (*Vide* Memorandum prepared by the Government of Bombay for submission to the Indian Statutory Commission, 1928, page 382.)

The general remedy that suggests itself is the immediate and total withdrawal of legal and administrative recognition to the superstition of pollution. The laws as they are administered to-day uphold these superstitions and punish the untouchables who dare to disregard them. Whenever a member of the Depressed Classes attempts to enforce his civic rights, the law steps in under the guise of preserving the peace which, it fears,

would otherwise be broken. In practice it amounts to legal protection to the superstition and denial of an elementary right to a member of the community. But, as this aspect is more concerned with internal legal reform and not with the main constitutional re-adjustment, I leave it with a mere indication. In the matter of political power the position of the Depressed Classes has to be safeguarded in (a) Legislatures and (b) Public Services. I have already pointed out that in Legislatures the Depressed Classes never had an opportunity of having their voice heard till Lord Willingdon nominated the first Adi-Dravida member to his council in 1919. Later the number nominated was increased under the Reforms Act, and to-day in most of the councils they have representatives who look after their interests. The suggested reform here is increase in numbers and change in method of representation so as to be more in consonance with democratic practice and better representative of the interests concerned. The change in the method is of more vital importance and demands closer attention. The method hitherto followed was nomination by the Governor, advised by his Executive Councillors, of either untouchables themselves or those who in the opinion of the Governor might be expected to look after their interests. The defects of this method are obvious, but it was first welcomed and later tolerated on the principle that the blabberer is preferable to the dumb. Nomination has lived its day of usefulness and has done its part in quickening political life in the community. The preference to-day is for the privilege of direct election. The nominated member, while he did voice the needs of his brethren, bore no representative character and had not the same living touch with those whom he represented as the elected member had. In the Councils he was more prone to follow the lead of those who nominated him. He was not eligible for the Ministry. In a predominantly elected Chamber the nominated members naturally tended to a second place. True, there was no legal difference in status, but their views did not carry the same weight, though their votes did. Nominated representation was welcomed when there was none and was accepted when there was not sufficient data to demand election. But the working of the Reforms during the last ten years has demonstrated the future possibilities, and my demand is fully borne out by the conditions of to-day. There is one more reason why nomination must be abolished in the future, and its validity from the constitutional point of view, I venture to say, could be hardly questioned. In the future councils, according to our recommendations, there is to be no nominated bloc. The Chamber would consist only of elected members. Also the Governor's Executive Council would not be there. The government would be vested in the Governor acting with his Ministers. So any nomination that the Governor would make could only be on the advice of his Ministers. And the easiest way for the Minister would be to get his party adherents nominated; and the constitutional device meant to

protect the weaker elements would only serve as a means of co-option for the largest group in the Council to the detriment of the community and Government alike. The privilege of nomination vested in the hands of a political group would be nothing less than a menace. In recommending the system of nomination the statesmen of the day were not blind to its defects. They admitted the existence of these defects, but their only plea was that they had no alternative. "In assigning the number of seats in each Council to which non-official representatives may be appointed by nomination, we have been guided by the existence of the important classes or interests which could not be expected to obtain representation by any practicable system of election. Thus we have been driven to the expedient of nomination for the representation of the Depressed Classes, because in no case did we find it possible to provide an electorate on any satisfactory system of franchise" (*vide* para. 24, Franchise Committee Report). That was what the Franchise Committee found in 1919. The Joint Parliamentary Committee had the same difficulty. The Depressed Classes appeared before Mr. Montagu, but refused to go before the Franchise Committee, and said:—"We would appear before the Franchise Committee provided the two persons, Messrs. V. S. Sreenivasa Sastriar and Surendra Nath Bannerjee, to whose presence on the Committee we have already objected, are removed from the Committee during our appearance before it. We have already stated that Mr. Sreenivasa Sastriar, as a champion and apologist of Brahmin oligarchy in preference to British bureaucracy, and Mr. Bannerjee as one who advised our Sabha and the community which it represents 'to enlist themselves in the German army fighting against freedom and civilization' because we said in our address to Lord Chelmsford and the Rt. Hon. Mr. Montagu that 'we would fight to the last drop of our blood any attempt to transfer the seat of authority in this country from British hands to the so-called high caste Hindus who had been oppressing us in the past and would do so again but for the British Government,' are unfit to sit in judgment over any representation we may make. If they continue to sit on the Committee, we have no other alternative as self-respecting and loyal citizens of the British Empire, than that of respectfully declining to appear before the aforesaid Committee" (*vide* Appendix XV, Franchise Committee Report).

But conditions have improved considerably to-day. The representatives of the Depressed Classes waited in deputations and gave evidence before the Joint Conference at every centre in India and demanded that a definite step in the direction of democracy must be taken. It is suggested as a half-way measure that nomination might be made from a panel of members suggested by Communal Associations or Electoral Colleges, but the suggestion is open to the same objections. Added to them is the danger of mushroom or make-believe associations suggesting their own nominees and creating confusion.

A third alternative would be reservation of seats in Joint Electorates. It undoubtedly marks an advance on the present position but it is not altogether without objectionable features. In the total electorate the proportion of Depressed Class voters would be small. And the fear is not unnaturally entertained that the candidates who would fill the reserved seats would in reality be the nominees of the majority of the electorate. The constituencies being predominantly caste-Hindu, no one could hope to get elected who did not pander to or at least respect caste prejudices. Again a Depressed Class member elected on the strength of caste Hindu votes would not be beholden to his community. There is thus the danger of the seats being occupied by the dummies of the higher castes. Such a result would largely nullify the power granted to the Depressed Classes in the shape of the franchise. Joint electorates if they are to work successfully require broadmindedness on the part of the majority community. It is my view that to-day such a favourable atmosphere does not exist.

The following evidence of the Depressed Classes Deputation before the Joint Conference in Bengal on January 21st, 1929, will clear the position:—

Q. 201. Is it not a fact that there are half-a-dozen Depressed Classes men who are members of the Provincial Council here in Bengal?—A. No, we have one nominated and two elected only, and those two came in with the other people.

Q. 202. Are not those two helping you?—A. No, not in the least.

Q. 203. Why?—A. Because they came in with the caste Hindus.

Q. 204. You mean because they came into the Council with the support of the caste Hindus?—A. Yes.

205. And therefore they are subservient to the caste Hindus there?—A. Yes.

Q. 206. And they are not in a position to help you?—A. Not at all.

The creation of Separate Electorates is the only other means which can ensure direct election and at the same time secure adequate protection. Objections, both theoretical and practical, are raised against the demand for separate electorates. But on closer examination they could be found to be not insurmountable and since the demand for it is only for a temporary period even these objections lose their validity. Theoretically it is pointed out that separate electorates tend to perpetuate differences and hinder the growth of nationalism. There is weight in the objection but it is more than counterbalanced by the advantages secured under it. Separate electorates are not new to the Indian constitution. The Muslims, the Sikhs, Indian Christians, Anglo-Indians and Europeans possess them and

they have given these communities a sense of security which alone has made all talk of advance possible. The peculiar position of the Depressed Classes to-day demands that their interests have to be protected against their Hindu co-religionists. In a common electorate where the voters were actuated by common interests division will follow opinions about the merits of the issues involved. But where conflict of interests is involved the voting will go by interests. When the existence of the conflict is accepted, it is clear that minority interests will never succeed in getting representation. The voter who happened to belong to the minority community would feel that his vote was being thrown away. He would even refuse to exercise his franchise when he is certain that the dice is already loaded against him. The resulting insecurity will not conduce to communal harmony. Where he is afforded the protection of separate electorates this danger disappears. He is sure that whoever wins the election has been elected on the community's own votes and not by the votes of the caste Hindus. The vote would thus secure a value in his eye and would give him a sense of security. Political education would then be more rapid and the creation of sufficient self-confidence in the community would soon render the artificial protection unnecessary. The practical objections are less weighty. It is said that the creation of separate electorates is an impossible task as it is not possible to demarcate the Depressed Classes exactly in each province. This is hardly convincing. The existence of these classes is proved beyond doubt. All that is necessary is that the Provincial Governments should prepare the complete lists of classes who according to local custom and usage come under the category of Untouchables and carve out constituencies for them. Such lists have already been prepared by the Governments in furnishing the information asked for by the late Lala Lajpat Rai. A suggestion was made that if it was known that Depressed Classes were being given special representation then there would be a scramble among some of the higher classes to get listed under the term "Depressed". This can hardly be so. It is inconceivable that for the sake of a vote any caste Hindu will be anxious to enrol himself in the Depressed Classes Register. Untouchables live apart from others and there is no possibility of mixing the Untouchable and the Touchable. The next objection is that there are not sufficient voters, and that even the small number is so scattered as to make the task of carving out constituencies well-nigh impossible. Full data concerning the voters and how they are scattered has not been made available by all the Governments. The Madras Government, however, have given the whole data and an examination of the same shows that the difficulty is only imaginary.


Under the present electoral qualifications the Depressed Classes in the Madras Presidency have 56,756 votes ; the Muhammadans in Madras Presidency have 63,626 votes ; Indian Christians

have 24,860 votes ; and Anglo-Indians have 2,816 votes. Constituencies have been carved out for the Muhammadans, Indian Christians and Anglo-Indians in the Madras Presidency ; and they secure representation by election. The Muhammadans, with a voting strength of 63,626, elect 13 ; the Indian Christians, with 24,860 votes, elect 7 ; the Anglo-Indians, with 2,816 votes, elect one. On the other hand, though the Depressed Classes have a voting strength of 56,756 this privilege is denied to them and their representation is secured by nomination.

The Reforms Officer of the Madras Government has supplied the Indian Statutory Commission with a statement showing the total number of Depressed Class voters in each District of the Madras Presidency (*vide* his letter of 25/28th February, 1929). From this statement we find the voting strength of the Depressed Classes in Cuddapah, South Kanara, Malabar and Nilgiris is under 500 ; in Bellary, Coimbatore, Kurnool and Madras it is between 500 and 1,000 ; in Anantapore, North Arcot, Chittoor, Godavari West, Ramnad, Salem, Tanjore and Trichinopoly it is between 1,000 and 2,000 ; in South Arcot, Chingleput, Ganjam, Guntur, Kistna, Nellore and Tinnevely it is between 2,000 and 3,000 ; in Madura it is between 3,000 and 4,000 ; in Godavari East it is between 4,000 and 5,000 ; and in Vizagapatam it is over 15,000. The total for the 26 districts is 56,756. This is with reference to the present restricted franchise. If the present franchise is enlarged, then there would be a rise in their voting strength.

From the above facts and figures it is very clear that the Government of Madras would experience no greater administrative difficulty in forming constituencies for the Depressed Classes than is experienced in making similar arrangements for the Muhammadans, Indian Christians, and Anglo-Indians. So even if the present franchise is maintained, it would certainly be possible to provide separate constituencies for the Depressed Classes in the Madras Presidency.

The Bengal Government, on page 11 of the Report on the working of the Reformed Constitution in Bengal, 1921-27, have given this map :—



This shows the concentration or the density of the Depressed Classes population in the various Districts or Divisions of Bengal, and the map gives a very clear idea as to the formation of Separate Constituencies for the Depressed Classes in Bengal. In the Committee I proposed Separate Electorates for the Depressed Classes in Bengal. Four members of the Committee voted for Separate Electorates and the other four voted against it.

In this connection let me quote what the Minority Report of the Reforms Enquiry Committee signed by Sir Tej Bahadur

Sapru, Sir P. S. Sivasawamy Iyer, Mr. M. A. Jinnah and Dr. R. P. Paranjpye says on this question. It says :—

“ As regards the representation of the Depressed and working classes, we are of the opinion that the correct principle to follow would be to lower the franchise so as to give them a chance, through the open door of election in general electorates ; but where practical considerations point to a different conclusion, we would suggest that for the next few years only special constituencies might be formed for them.” (Report of the Reforms Enquiry Committee—page 180 (c).)

In finally deciding this question, our Committee have recommended Separate Electorates in the Madras Presidency for ten years and Reservation of seats in Joint Electorates in the other provinces. I wanted separate electorates for ten years in all provinces. My colleagues were more impressed with the objections against the proposal but in the case of Madras three reasons seem to have induced them to give in. The Government of Madras themselves had admitted that separate constituencies were possible in certain instances ; there is a sufficiently large number of voters and the carving out of the necessary constituencies also has been shown to be possible. Finally, they were agreed that the caste differences were most acute in the Southern Presidency and that some protection (as is afforded by separate electorates) was necessary. There can be little doubt that a common electoral roll should be the ideal and that it must be reached as early as possible. I hold that separate electorates for a limited period will give the necessary political education and self-confidence, to enable the weaker elements to come into the common roll of their own consent. It is not the aim of the Depressed Classes to develop separateness of interests ; on the other hand, they wish to lose their sense of separateness. It is really in the hands of the caste Hindu electors as to how long the Depressed Classes would wish to claim protection. If the working of joint electorates in the other provinces shows that they in no way jeopardise the interests of the Depressed Classes that would quicken the abandonment of separate electorates. If, on the other hand, the fears that the Untouchables would be swamped proves true, then the protection afforded to them in Madras would have to be extended to the other provinces.

*The Representation of the Depressed Classes as recommended
by the Indian Central Committee.*

No. 1/11.	Legislatures.	Total Population.	Population of Depressed Classes.	Total Number of Seats allotted.	Total Number of Seats for the Depressed Classes.
1	Madras ..	42 millions	6½ millions	150	14
2	Bombay ..	16 "	1½ "	114	8*
3	Bengal ..	45 "	11½ "	200	8
4	United Provinces	47 "	13 "	182	10
	U. P. Second Chamber.	50	2
5	Punjab ..	20 "	2½ "	150	6
6	Bihar and Orissa	33 "	5 "	150	6
7	Central Provinces	12 "	2½ "	120	8
8	Assam ..	7 "	1½ "	75	9†
9	Burma
10	N.-W. Frontier
11	Central Legisla- tive Assembly.	246 "	44½ "	300	12

* Calculated on the population basis.

† Includes seats for the backward classes and the indigenous primitive races.

Next to the question of electorates is the question of franchise. Owing to their low economic condition and their illiteracy the voting ratio of the Depressed Classes is extremely small in proportion to their population ratio. In the province of Madras their population is six and a half millions and the number of voters is 56,756.

There is no reason to believe that the position of the Depressed Classes in the other provinces is above that in Madras and on that assumption we could see how little political power they possess. The need therefore is to lower the franchise. The lowering of the franchise would not only add to the number of voters but also increase the voting ratio. The Committee have at present recommended doubling the electorate but the process of enlarging the electorate must be carried on till it embraces the whole adult population in the country both male and female.

The position in regard to the Public Services also calls for immediate remedies. The real nature of the grievances which the Depressed Class candidates suffer from I have already indicated. While their present position entitles them to preferential treatment, their actual experience has been the other way. Even when possessing the necessary qualifications their claims have been overlooked because of the superstition of Untouchability. Under the guise of administrative convenience, departmental heads in the various provinces have not hesitated to nullify section 96 of the Government of India Act, 1919, that "no native of British India nor any subject of His Majesty resident

therein, shall, by reason only of his religion, place of birth, descent, colour, or any of them, be disabled from holding any office under the Crown in India" and the assurance contained in the Queen's proclamation that no person shall be disqualified from any post by reason of his birth. This should not be permitted to continue any longer and I trust that the Fundamental Rights declaration we are recommending shall be fully observed and guarantee the members of the Depressed Classes the enjoyment of their legitimate civic and political rights. The fact that social prejudice exists should not serve as an excuse to brush aside their claims. Efficiency cannot be overlooked but to admit the claims of social prejudice is downright reactionarism. Government service in India carries a dignity unknown in the West and authority invests it with a prestige which acts as a powerful antidote against social prejudice. A Depressed Class lawyer or doctor could be boycotted and driven out of the profession by a concerted campaign but a Depressed Class Deputy Collector or Police Superintendent cannot be got rid of so easily. His position and opportunities of service will largely contribute to the disappearance of untouchability in the circle in which he moves. In the general campaign against this evil this aid cannot be overlooked. The Public Services Commission with the Central Government, as also with the various Provincial Governments, must take these factors into consideration in their task of recruiting for the Services. The Commissions themselves must contain members of the Depressed Classes, who could see the claims of the community where properly safeguarded. By way of administrative measures Government could carry through much ameliorative work. In the matter of education, sanitation and medical relief, facilities should be provided in the shape of scholarships and special grants. Government should sternly discourage the idea of segregation in schools and should withdraw recognition from such schools as recognise untouchability. Village Co-operative Societies and Panchayats as well as the various Local Boards and Municipal Councils must be compelled to make adequate provision for the representation of the Depressed Classes. Remembering that the Depressed Classes are mostly identified with agriculture, steps must be taken to ensure them fair economic conditions. Fixity of tenure and a fair living wage must be guaranteed by law and the necessary legislation should be taken in hand without delay in the various provinces. Many of these Classes contain fine material for the Army, and a liberal recruitment from them would considerably enhance the prestige of the community and also relieve the pressure on agricultural labour. Finally I would urge that in every future investigation, political or economic, the Depressed Classes should be properly represented. In the past their claims have been persistently overlooked. The various Commissions and Committees in recent years did not number any Untouchable among their members. But when the present Statutory Commission was constituted Lord Birkenhead, the then Secretary

of State for India, explaining the difficulties in the way of appointing Indians on the Commission pointed out the various interests that had to be represented and mentioned specially the Depressed Classes when he said, "Let me take another case of the depressed classes. There is in India a vast population, even in relation to the number with which we are dealing, a population of 60,000,000 people in India, of the depressed classes. Their condition is not quite as terrible, not quite as poignant as it has been in the past, but it is still terrible and poignant. They are repelled from all social intercourse. If they come between the gracious light of the sun and one who despises them, the sun is disfigured for that man for they cannot drink at the public water supply, they must make diversions of miles in order to satisfy their thirst, and they are tragically known, and they have been known for generations, as 'Untouchables.' There are 60,000,000 of them in India. Am I to have a representative of them upon this Commission? Never, never would I form a Commission, nor would any one in a democratic country, nor would my friends opposite recommend it, from which you excluded a member of this class which, more than any other, requires representation, if you are indeed to put the matter to a mixed jury of the kind which I am indicating." (Speech in the House of Lords on the 24th November, 1927). The thanks of the community are due to His Excellency Lord Irwin for the watchful interest he has shown in getting them representation in the present Committee. The value of representation on such investigatory Committees could hardly be over rated. My own personal experience on the Committee has shown that I have only to make known the facts and state my view to secure sympathetic recognition at the hands of most of my colleagues. The presence of a minority representative on a committee, even where it does not succeed in securing all claims, prevents much unintentional injustice being done, by making known the true position. The question of communal harmony in a country like India which is so sharply divided is so important that I think that every effort must be concentrated in securing it. I should even venture to recommend that one of the Ministers of the future must make it his special concern and devote his activities to ensure communal justice.

The peaceful progress of the Untouchable Classes is a *sine qua non* of the orderly development of Indian Nationalism. Paradoxically as it may sound the aim of the Depressed Classes and those working for their future, should be their abolition. They are an excretion of Hindu Society and they must aim at becoming one with it. The ideal should be to become not merely an integral part of it but to become an indistinguishable part. Indeed the restoration of civic and political rights in a measure is vouchsafed to them by alien religious (European) missionaries, but conversion can never be and never ought to be a matter of politics. Recent research has indicated that Untouchability has but shadowy support in ancient Hindu scriptures and that its

strength lies in observance and the latter day smiritis. Now that the recognition has come that Untouchability is a blot on Hinduism it must be the work of every one concerned in the welfare of the Depressed Classes to spread and strengthen the idea. Whatever could be done by legislation or administrative measures to remove the false idea about the sanctity of the custom will help in the regeneration of these Classes. First attempts at reclamation of the Depressed Classes were made by the European Christian Missionaries. Though Untouchability is as old as Hinduism no protestants ever arose in that fold to denounce its evil effects. A faint attempt seems to have been made when the Vaishnavite reformer, Sri Ramanuja, sought to recruit his disciples from these Classes also but the attempt died with him. The majority of Hindus realised the enormity of the custom only when they saw what a handicap the existence of the Classes was in the path of democratic self-government. British administrators have all along been struck with the peculiar disabilities of these Untouchables and had been doing their best to ameliorate their sufferings. But Governments have always to look to the preservation of peace, and no great measure of reform could be enforced since caste prejudices were strong. More and more as democracy was accepted as the political idea the various political parties in the country began to display an active interest in the amelioration of the Depressed Classes. Individual social reformers had been ploughing their lonely furrows but it was only with the growing interest taken by the political parties, desire for reform became general. When the Non-Brahmin Party was started in 1917, Dr. T. M. Nair placed the removal of Untouchability in the forefront of his political programme. Later, under the inspiration of Mahatma Gandhi, the Congress took up the question, and though there has been little in the shape of practical achievement there is no doubt the propaganda carried on has made progress in the future easier. A most hopeful sign is the practical unanimity with which educated Hindu India has come to condemn the practice. Hindu leaders like the late Lala Lajpat Rai and Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya have thrown their weight on the side of reform. Pandit Motilal Nehru recognises in his All Parties Conference Report "that the Hindus are chiefly responsible for this suppression of a large class." And Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru once aptly remarked, "I do say what is my most sincere conviction, that unless you are able to solve your own social problems about the Depressed Classes and the Untouchables, I do not see any real prospect for real genuine constitutional advance, and any constitution that you may get will certainly not arouse any interest in me, because I do feel, howsoever good, howsoever perfect, howsoever ideal your constitution may be, unless you have got the support of the minorities and unless you command the confidence of those whom in your vanity you may describe as Depressed Classes, your constitution will not be worth a day's purchase."

The following resolutions passed by the Hindu Maha Sabha at its session in Jubbulpore in April, 1928, are a clear indication of the awakening of the Hindu social conscience :—

“ This Hindu Maha Sabha declares that the so-called Untouchables have equal rights with other Hindus to study in public schools, to take water from public wells and other sources of drinking water, to sit with others in public meetings and to walk on public roads. The Maha Sabha calls upon all Hindus to remove such restrictions as may be existing anywhere at present in the way of the so-called Untouchable Hindus exercising these rights.

“ 2. This Maha Sabha declares that the so-called Untouchables are fully entitled to have Dev Darshan, and the Maha Sabha calls upon all Hindus in general and all Hindu Sabhas in particular to provide the same facilities for Dev Darshan to them as are enjoyed at present by other Hindus.

“ 3. This Maha Sabha calls upon Purohits (Priests), barbers and washermen to offer their services to the so-called Untouchables also.

“ 4. This Hindu Maha Sabha is of opinion that every Hindu to whatever caste he may belong has equal social and political rights.

“ 5. This Maha Sabha appeals to all Municipal Boards to provide healthy quarters to the so-called Untouchables, especially the sweepers, and directs the local branches of the Hindu Maha Sabha to draw special attention of their Local Boards towards this matter.

“ 6. This Maha Sabha looks upon the practice of nomination of the representatives of the Depressed Classes by the Government to the Local Bodies, Provincial Councils and the Assembly as most harmful and injurious to the true interests of the country and considers that this practice will become a source of creating a great gulf in the near future between other Hindus and the so-called Untouchable Classes. In the opinion of the Maha Sabha the right course to stop this practice is to put forward and back proper candidates belonging to the so-called Untouchable Classes to the elected bodies named above.”

But no amount of outside help or sympathy can help the Depressed classes if they did not possess within themselves the requisites for development. The necessary requisites they do possess and their recent activities show that the spirit of progress though crippled is not crushed out of them. Wherever given an opportunity representatives of the Depressed Classes have always acquitted themselves with credit and have proved worthy champions of their community's progress. “ During my long service I have seen a great advance among the Depressed Classes, an advance to my mind greater than has been made by any other community within the same

period . . . Your education is increasing rapidly," said Sir F. Sly, the Governor of Central Provinces to the Depressed Classes Deputation in 1924. The masses themselves are neither inert nor incapable of progress. It is true they are not educated in the conventional sense and are not literate. But within the limits afforded to them they display wonderful native shrewdness and capacity for culture. India has not yet entered the era of industrialised agriculture, but observers have always noted the unlettered Indian peasants' (Depressed Classes) cleverness in the science of the seed, soil and seasons. Proper opportunities for education and acquaintance with modern machinery will improve the peasants' usefulness and ensure their prosperity. Nor is theirs a tradition of illiteracy from times immemorial. Great poets and Saints have sprung from among them and enriched our literature and our heritage of song. In the foremost rank of Tamil poets stand Valluvar, Kapilar and the poetess Auvvai—all born among Untouchables. Saint Nandanar and Tiruppanazavar and with them many others adorn the galaxy of devotees generally known as the Alwars and Nayanars, while Ravidas of Oudh, Chokha Mela of Maharastra and Thakur of Bengal represent the tradition of devotion and learning in the North. In the limited sphere made possible to them the young men of these communities have acquired literary education, and to-day there is a virile body of educated young men all over the country who form the nucleus of future progress. While the possibilities of orderly future development are indeed immense, at the same time the danger of obstructing their progress cannot be overlooked. The Depressed Classes of India constitute what in modern political parlance is called the "proletariat," the class which labours without enjoying the fruits of its toil. Everywhere in India the Untouchable ploughs, sows and reaps, but only to hand over the produce to his landlord. The Iron Law of wages has not yet gone out of vogue in India, and what the tiller gets is just what would keep the soul in the body. The questions which the poet addressed to the workers, "Wherefore do you plough? Wherefore do you sow?" can be addressed and addressed with deadly effect to the Depressed Classes in India. Denied fair living wage, denied legitimate opportunities of development, denied hopes of progress, those questions would arise among them naturally and no one should be surprised if they in their ignorance seek answer in violent revolution and in the wiping out of the *ancient regime*. By instinct and tradition the Depressed Classes are bound to peaceful pursuits. Hope has been reborn into them to-day and they have acquired new ambitions. Political and social conditions must be readjusted to accommodate their legitimate aspirations. And it is the task of the statesmen of the future to guarantee them ways and means of peaceful uplift.

M. C. RAJAH,

London,

30th September, 1929.

REPORT ON CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS FOR INDIA

BY KIKABHAI PREMCHAND.

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

	Page.
<i>Introduction</i>	391
Policy of establishing responsible Government needs new forms of Provincial and Central Government; the steps to be taken.	
 <i>I.—The Need for Reform.</i>	
State of Parties; Development of Responsibility	392-394
 <i>II.—The Provincial Governments.</i>	
The Transfer of all Reserved Departments, including Law and Order—discussion of difficulties and safeguards	394-396
The Franchise and the Electorates	397
Extension of the Franchise	397-398
Indirect Elections	398
Qualification of Members	398-399
Joint <i>versus</i> Communal Electorates	399-401
The Depressed Classes	401-402
Europeans	402
Special Interests	402-406
Non-Brahmins; Labour; Anglo-Indians and Indian Christians; Commerce; Landholders; Universities; Sikhs; Parsees; Women.	
 <i>III.—Structure of the Provincial Governments.</i>	
Keynote of recommendations—autonomy and responsibility	406-407
Discussion of Second Chamber	407
The Governor and his Powers	407-408
Size of the Council	408
The Official Bloc	408-409
Formation of the Ministry	409
Distribution of Portfolios, and Rules of Business	409
The President	409
Summary of Proposals for Provincial Governments.	
Executive Council; Salaries of Ministers; President of the Cabinet; Secretary to the Cabinet; Resignation of the Ministry	409-410
Life of the Council	410
Inter-Provincial Relations	410-411
Finance	411-412
Education	412-413
 <i>IV.—The Central Government.</i>	
Development of Responsibility	413-414
Defence, Foreign Affairs and Political Reserved	414-415
Military Expenditure	415-416
Imperial Preference	416
Allocation of Subjects between Central and Provincial Governments	416
Disputes between Provinces	416-417
The Legislative Assembly and its Constitution	417-418
The Council of State	418

	Page.
The Ministry 418-419
Checks on Hasty Legislation 419
The Viceroy 419-420
The India Office and Secretary of State 420-421
Summary of Proposals for Central Government 421-422
The Privy Council 422-423
The Services 423-424
Sind 425
Burma 425-426
North-West Frontier Province 426-427
Baluchistan 427
V.—Conclusions 427-428

INTRODUCTION.

The task remitted to the members of the Indian Central Committee was clearly defined by the recent steps in the development of the Indian constitution. The goal of British policy in India was authoritatively set forth in the Declaration of August 1917, repeated in the Preamble to the Act of 1919, and crystallised in the Proclamation of His Majesty the King, Emperor of India, in December of that year. That policy is :—

“ the increasing association of Indians in every branch of the administration, and the gradual development of self-governing institutions, with a view to the progressive realisation of responsible government in British India as an integral part of the British Empire.”

It is for the members of the Central Committee to consider not the end of British policy in India ; that has been done ; but rather what form the responsible government to be developed should take, and what immediate steps should be trodden to establish it. The actual terms of reference for our guidance are :—

“ to enquire into the working of the system of government, the growth of education, and the development of representative institutions in British India, and matters connected therewith, and the Commission shall report as to whether and to what extent it is desirable to establish the principle of responsible government or to extend, modify, or restrict the degree of responsible government then existing therein, including the question whether the establishment of Second Chambers of the Local Legislatures is or is not desirable.”

As the result of the voluminous evidence taken in India and in England, and the protracted discussions thereof, I find myself on many points,—some of them embodying important questions of principle,—unable to accept the conclusions of my colleagues. It seems to me therefore that I shall make my views clearer if, instead of indicating in a report which is not unanimous my own points of agreement and dissent, and the reasons therefor, I express in the form of this separate Report my own conclusions, based on the evidence and my knowledge of the Indian situation. In so doing, I have preferred to avoid so far as possible matters of administrative detail which can only be worked out by experts, and I have confined my observations to broad questions of the policy and to the principles which, I submit, should govern the action imperatively necessary to secure the harmonious development of India to the full Dominion status which is so ardently desired.

1.—THE NEED FOR REFORM.

None who is acquainted with the present condition of India will be found to question the urgent need of expanding the Indian constitution in order to meet the legitimate demand of all classes of her people. The reforms embodied in the Government of India Act of 1919 were admittedly of a transient character, designed to bridge the space between the modified bureaucratic government which preceded them, and the full responsibility to which they were directed. It is because it was a transitory constitution that the Statutory Commission was constituted, and we were invited to co-operate with it. In the decade which has passed since that Act was passed, India has not stood at gaze any more than other parts of the world, yet despite the progress that has been made, India is not yet a real partner in the British Commonwealth. The dyarchical system of administration which it set up in the Provinces is neither an efficient bureaucracy, nor a really responsible government. The existence of the official *blacs* has prevented the evolution of the strong, organised political parties which are essential to the working of democratic constitutions. In the Central Legislatures, opportunities of criticism, and even of obstruction, have been increased, without giving to the elected representatives of the people in the Legislative Assembly and the Council of State that real sense of responsibility which alone can induce sobriety of speech and action in politics. In effect, the dyarchical system in the Provinces, and the lack of any real responsibility in the Central Legislatures, have led to a sense of unreality in the working of the Act of 1919 which has had unfortunate political consequences. The important Liberal Party in India feels that it can make no headway in the country as long as it has no effective power to carry reforms on major questions ; it has become disheartened and alienated and inclined to retire altogether from participation in politics. It is therefore of the first importance so to develop the Indian constitution that all men of experience, patriotism and goodwill shall feel that it is a matter of practical politics, as well as a public duty, to take an active part in the governance of their country. The National Party, and the Swarajists, have adopted an attitude of frank and active hostility to the Government, and have won over a considerable number of impatient idealists who sometimes despair of attaining their objective by constitutional methods. The Extreme Wing in Indian politics, freed from all sense of real responsibility, more spectacular in its political programmes than it would otherwise be, has attracted the support of large numbers of the populace who are uneducated and politically inexperienced. The danger of this situation is obvious. Unless and until extremism is corrected by actual participation in the affairs of government, and the responsibility which invariably accrues from this sobering experience, it tends to drift into more and more violent forms of political action, if indeed it does not become revolutionary in its ideas.

There are further reasons why no time should be lost in boldly expanding the Indian constitution in the direction of full responsible government. No one who loves his country and desires to serve it can fail to be appalled at the growth of communalism in India, which, whilst perhaps most marked in the Central and Provincial Legislatures, is pervading in a most deplorable degree every phase of the national life. A determined effort must be made to scotch this evil before it becomes ineradicable. There is the widespread feeling that Indian industry stands in need of more systematic encouragement from the Government, and of protection from the competition of foreign countries who work within high tariff walls, and often with direct State assistance. The Land Revenue Policy stands in need of reconsideration, so as to develop the agricultural wealth of the land, for agriculture is, and for generations must remain, the staple industry of the Indian people. Military expenses still absorb too large a proportion of the limited resources of the community. The cause of social reform must necessarily lack legislative support when the Government is pledged to strict neutrality. For all these, and many other reasons into which there is no need to enter here, I am convinced that there can be no improvement in the political situation in India unless the constitution is radically developed in the direction of real responsibility, both in the Provinces and in the Central Government, with due precaution to secure the stability of the administration, and peace, order and good government.

In advancing the concrete proposals which follow, I shall first discuss the position in the Provinces, because it is the Provincial administrations, rather than the Central Government, which come into closest contact with the lives of the people and where the most rapid advance to full responsibility can immediately be made. There are, of course, considerable differences between province and province, and exact details in regard to each province can be worked out only with special attention to such local characteristics. There are however certain problems common to all. Before outlining my proposals in regard to the future constitution of the Provincial Governments, it is desirable to examine these common problems, the most important of which are communal representation, the franchise, the protection of minorities, and the transfer of "reserved" subjects, especially the transfer of Law and Order, to popular control.

The keynote to all my proposals is the immediate establishment of full provincial autonomy and responsibility under conditions which will guarantee the security and stability of the administration. The experience of every country shows that the greatest weakness in any form of government is the power of criticism without the onus of executive responsibility for that criticism. Wherever this system has been attempted it has failed. I am fully aware that there are certain risks attaching to these proposals. There are risks in every form of human

government. But I am convinced that there is far less risk in boldly advancing towards the goal marked out for us, than in temporary expedients which satisfy nobody and lead nowhere ; that the surest means of establishing political peace and contentment in India lie in establishing at once, in the fullest possible manner, real and effective responsibility, in the confidence that it will rally all the best elements in the country to the government and induce wisdom in the exercise of these powers from the very obligations which they involve. Turning from the Provincial to the Central Government, my proposals involve the establishment of a very wide degree of responsibility under conditions securing the safety of the majestic fabric of the administration, covering every branch of the administration except Defence, Foreign Affairs and the Political Relations with the Indian States, where for special reasons temporary measures are needed to meet present difficulties, but these reservations should be temporary only, and these branches of the administration should, in course of time, pass under the control of the legislatures.

II.—THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS.

The goal at which we are aiming is the establishment of full provincial autonomy and responsibility. Therefore I recommend that the distinction between "Reserved" and "Transferred" subjects should be completely abolished. There should be a homogeneous and unitary government, entirely responsible under the Governor for the whole provincial administration. No reservations whatsoever should be maintained, and the department of Law and Order should pass under the control of Ministers, and through Ministers to the Legislative Councils, in common with the other branches of the administration. Responsible government, without responsibility for law and order, would be a contradiction in terms.

I quite recognise the fundamental importance of this function of government. The rule of law is the most cherished possession of free peoples. Unless the King's writ runs without hesitation throughout the length and breadth of the land, there must be a rule of "no law" which would be fatal to our liberties. I quite recognise that at a time like this, when communal feeling is so deplorably rife, and when Labour is being driven into violent courses under the instigation of foreign communists, and when our provincial legislatures will be new to full responsibility, certain apprehensions are entertained lest this burden should be too heavy for our Provinces firmly to bear. I do not hold this view, neither do the Governments of Bombay and Madras, nor of the Government of the Punjab (with certain modifications) nor do all the Members of the Associated Chambers of Commerce of India and Ceylon.

I recommend that this policy should be made of general application throughout India. It has been suggested that whilst

some Provinces are ripe for this responsibility, there are others where special circumstances make it desirable to reserve Law and Order for the present. If, owing to local conditions, any Province should feel that it is undesirable immediately to transfer Law and Order, the wishes of that Province should be respected and Law and Order "reserved" for the time being. But I wish to emphasise that if and when this course is followed, it should be an individual and temporary expedient to meet special and transient conditions. My view is that true responsibility and stability are most likely to be ensured where the sense of responsibility is fullest, and that can only be gained where such an essential function of government as the preservation of Law and Order is under popular control. Moreover, any marked differentiation between province and province is bound to produce jealousy; I cannot think that any province will be long content to rest under the stigma that it is not ready to shoulder a burden which is confidently borne by its neighbours.

If any is anxious lest in Provinces where there is a Hindu majority, or a Moslem majority, the rights of the minority, whichever it may happen to be, will be insecure with this transfer of Law and Order to popular control, my answer is that with responsibility fully conferred under the conditions which I shall outline, there must inevitably grow up an increasing sense of the imperative necessity of the impartial administration of justice in the interests of the whole community. After all, Hindus and Moslems alike are Indians, both vitally concerned in the peace and prosperity of the land in which they dwell. Their real interests, apart from gusts of communal passion, are identical. Therefore I cannot agree that such an apprehension, where it may exist, should divert us from the path we are resolved to tread, or weigh with us in the final recommendations which we are making.

But I recommend that the transfer of Law and Order should be accompanied by two conditions essential to secure the stability we have in view: they are the placing of the judiciary under the control of the High Courts, and the appointment of a Head of the Police force from the All India Services to assist the Minister in charge of this portfolio.

The complete independence of the judiciary from any possibility of any political control or bias is the hallmark of a constitutional State. My recommendation is that the Minister for Law and Order should be freed from the control of the judiciary which should be vested in the jurisdiction of the High Courts, and through them be made directly responsible to the Crown. To the High Courts should be entrusted the full administration of the judicial services, including the District and Sessions Judges, the Sub-Judges, and the Courts of Small Causes, or in effect, the whole of the judiciary throughout the provinces. This will definitely secure that the administration of law cannot be affected by any political complexion of the

Legislative Council, or of the Minister in charge of Law and Order, and will guarantee that complete independence of the judiciary which is essential if confidence in its impartiality is everywhere to be felt.

I also recommend that the heads of the Provincial Police Force should be members of the All India Services, because that will guarantee their complete freedom from any trace of Provincial particularism or communalism, and bring to the control of the Department the wide official outlook which comes from membership of and experience in the superior services. It has been argued that the transfer of Law and Order will be incomplete, even a sham, if the Minister in charge is to work through an officer of this calibre. I cannot agree. The tradition of the All India Services is one of complete loyalty to those set in authority over them, and I have no doubt that the Heads of the Police so appointed will be fully loyal to the Government and the Ministers they serve. The danger of encroaching on the authority of the Minister is illusory, and the advantages of securing the freedom of the Police from any suspicion of communal bias are so great that this measure should be one of the conditions of the general transfer of Law and Order which I recommend.

Nor should it in any circumstances be circumscribed, as proposed in Bengal, by the appointment of a small Advisory Committee to work with a Minister in charge of this important subject. The administration of Law and Order is an essential function of Government, and cannot be qualified by or referred to any subordinate outside authority. The establishment of such an authority would weaken and not strengthen the hands of the Minister in charge; in cases of emergency it would paralyse his action when effective measures were imperatively called for, and it is essential in my view that the Minister of Law and Order should have full and unqualified responsibility in his own Department.

Neither can I agree with the recommendation of the committee appointed by the Bombay Legislative Council that the time is not yet ripe for the transference of Law and Order to the control of Ministers in the Bombay Presidency. Admittedly the problems raised by the Hindu-Moslem feuds present great difficulties, but they should be faced, and the Legislative Council of the Bombay Presidency is as well, if not better, equipped to face them than any other. The Presidency contains the largest commercial community and one of the wealthiest commercial cities in the Indian Empire. Its population comprises a large body of people of high intelligence, trained in political affairs. Moreover, the City of Bombay is the most cosmopolitan in India, and in my opinion it is essential that the Legislative Council assume the administration of Law and Order immediately. There is no risk in it doing so if the transference is accompanied by the conditions I have outlined.

The Franchise and the Electorates.

The question of the franchise is of fundamental importance. It is from the electorate that a constitutional government draws the strength it possesses and the authority it wields. I am of opinion that no case has been made out for the extension of the franchise at present, and that the balance of argument is against it. Under the system of administration proposed, greater responsibilities will devolve upon the government than ever before, and it is imperative that the electorate shall be capable of understanding the value and use of the vote.

All experience goes to show that the extension of the franchise should keep pace with, but not go ahead of, the spread of education and the development of political knowledge. In Great Britain it was a very gradual process covering a long period of time. In 1832 only 3 per cent. of the population were enfranchised ; 9 per cent. in 1868 and 16 per cent. in 1884. Since the introduction of the Reforms in India there has been no such change in the educational knowledge, economic conditions and political experience of the people as would make it desirable to lower the franchise. Even in the Bombay Presidency it is calculated that only two-thirds of the present electorate are literate. If the franchise were still further lowered it would inevitably mean the transfer of power to the illiterate and the inexperienced, and would tend to exclude from the Legislature men with a sense of responsibility and experience of administration. It must be remembered in this connection that certain classes, unfavourably placed in the present franchise scheme, are to have seats reserved for them so that their interests will be in no danger of being neglected. To my mind the franchise should remain substantially as at present, which, roughly speaking, gives the vote to 6.4 per cent. of the adult population of British India.

I am strongly opposed to giving the Provincial Legislative Councils power to alter the franchise until the expiration of a stated period of time, more particularly because I do not propose the establishment of Second Chambers in any Province. This limitation of their powers would probably be welcomed by them in the present disturbed state of politics, as it would relieve them of the onus of resisting any popular but unconsidered demand. An examination of all the evidence placed before the Committee has given me the impression that none of the various Provinces is wholeheartedly in favour of the extension of the franchise at present, and those who propose it, do so with misgiving. The proposal to double the electorate is as far as most of them have gone, and even that might not have been put forward without the accompaniment of Second Chambers.

The Legislative Councils should, however, be empowered to increase the franchise by not more than one fourth of the adult population at the expiry of each two terms of their existence,

providing that the present qualifications for candidates is not lowered. The extension of education should make this franchise proportionate to the number of educated people in India, and would permit of adult suffrage at the end of eight terms of the new Councils, if desired. The new Indian Governments, with their vastly increased responsibilities, can in my opinion be much more securely based on the intelligence and experience of the few than on the illiteracy and inexperience of the many.

Indirect Elections.

I am opposed to the principle of indirect elections, at least in the Provinces. The educative value of the vote is of great importance, and direct elections awaken a political consciousness and compel the people to organise for political purposes. When the constituencies are large and the elections direct, candidates can be selected on their merits. If a secondary electorate through electoral colleges were introduced, representatives would be selected for their local influence ; the members collectively would be guided by personal rather than political considerations ; and a much greater opportunity would be given for graft. In a country where there are divisions like caste or communities, there is the possibility in small constituencies of a wide political outlook being lost in a parochial or communal feeling. If electoral colleges were established, influences other than political would be likely to sway the electors and there would be a slackening of interest in political questions. Electoral colleges also prevent the emergence of well organised political parties, as in England, and the creation of such parties is in my opinion essential to the firm establishment of responsible government. Elections should therefore be direct as at present.

Qualification of Members.

I recommend that the residential qualification for members should be removed as it has not resulted in the return of the best men from the districts. The leading men in the large cities are drawn from the districts and many of them retain homes in their own area and exercise great power and influence there. There is no reason why such men, fully qualified to contribute to the successful working of the constitution, should be deprived of the opportunity of representing their native district, because they have removed elsewhere for business or other reasons. The argument that they would not be in touch with the needs of the mofussil is not sound. Owing to the structure of the social system in India, the man who migrates to a presidency town has to maintain constant touch with his own people and his own district, and in any case a candidate who sought to represent a constituency would be obliged to nurse it and keep in contact with it. In England candidates who are defeated in one constituency can seek a seat elsewhere, and it has been found a useful and convenient practice. It will be

impossible to establish this wholesome usage in India unless the residential qualification is removed.

Joint versus Communal Electorates.

Bound up with the question of the franchise is the nature of the constituencies. In India electorates are of two kinds—communal and general. The former were established for the protection of the interests, real or supposed, of particular classes.

It is my emphatic opinion that joint electorates should be universally established. *In no circumstances whatever am I prepared to agree to the perpetuation of communal electorates, either for Mahomedans or Europeans or any other body, or to any extension of Communal electorates at the present stage.*

Perhaps the most distressing feature of our political development since 1921 has been the growth of communal jealousy and consequent communal trouble. There runs through Indian Society to-day a series of cleavages—of origin, race and caste—which constantly threaten its stability. The two communities, Mahomedan and Hindu, are in a state of perpetual opposition which blazes periodically into actual hostilities. The rivalry has assumed grievous proportions in recent years. The political agreement for the division of power known as the Lucknow Pact of 1916 put a certain check on this rivalry, but since the appointment of the Simon Commission the struggle has been intensified and has developed into a race for power. It is difficult to say to what extent these exhibitions of communal jealousy have been natural and spontaneous, and to what extent they have been worked up by the more irresponsible section of the Indian Press. In any case they cannot be ignored.

An extended trial of communal electorates has done nothing to diminish friction. Originally created for the protection of minorities, these separate electorates have become a menace to the State. They hinder national development by preventing the formation of a national consciousness. They are the negation of responsible government. Minorities protected by communal electorates fast become privileged castes, with interests diverse from those of the people as a whole. Whether formed for religious, racial, cultural or historical reasons, they foster a narrow outlook. Members of these protected minorities settle into satisfied security. They need make no effort towards political compromise, nor can they be spurred to national endeavour. Their divided allegiance is fatal to the interests of India as a nation.

Separate electorates have done nothing to mitigate communal suspicion. The Mahomedans fear that the Hindus will thrust their nominees upon them under any system of joint electorates. It would be equally true to say that the Mahomedans will in such conditions impose their nominees upon the Hindus. Such

fears are groundless. I am convinced that once joint electorates are established it will be found that, as in England, an elected member will consider himself the representative of *all* his constituents whatever their race or religion. There will be a rapid awakening of political intelligence and these petty suspicions will disappear. There are over 70 million Mahommedans in India. It is idle to suppose that a great nation like India can flourish unless religious tolerance is learned ; it will be impossible in practice to override, or to neglect, the just interests of such a great community as the Mahommedans.

We are, however, aiming at political contentment, progress and security, and I recognise that if a joint electorate is forced on the Mahommedans, and if an overwhelming majority of them are against it, this may render the working of the new Government difficult. As it is desirable to mobilise behind the constitution the widest possible measure of public support, I am, for this purpose only, prepared to accept modified communal electorates, on certain conditions. That is to say, I agree to retain the separate electorates for a period of five years, if it is provided by statute that, at the end of that period, the joint electorates come automatically and universally into force. In other words, in order to satisfy the apprehension of the Mahommedan community, they will retain communal representation on the present scale all over the country for five years, after which period they will be allocated a reservation of seats on a population basis in the general electorate, with absolute freedom to offer themselves as candidates for seats in excess of that number. If, however, the Mahommedans are prepared to accept representation on a population basis instead of the present scale, I agree to the extension of the communal electorate for ten years, after which it will be merged in the general electorate on the principles set out above. The same principle applies, of course, to the Hindus in Provinces where they are in a minority.

I am entirely opposed to the proposal that Mahommedan seats in the general electorate shall be hedged in by artificial and unworkable conditions, such as some which have been put before us. The suggestion that no Mahommedan candidate standing in the general electorate should be declared to have been duly elected unless he secures at least ninety per cent. of the Mahommedan votes polled ; and to preserve a fictitious appearance of equality, that no Hindu candidate should be declared to have been duly elected unless he secures at least ninety per cent. of the Hindu votes polled, has nothing to commend it. These distinctions and subtleties should have no place in the electoral system, and could only introduce confusion and unreality in the exercise of a franchise already accompanied by many difficulties. Rather than accept such subterfuges I would retain the communal franchise and the separate electorates outright ; at least they have the merit of being straightforward, strongly opposed in principle as I am towards them.

Naturally the prominence given to the Hindu-Moslem controversy has infected other communities. The Depressed Classes, the non-Brahmin, the Indian Christians, the Anglo-Indian and the Sikhs, to mention only a few, have all put forward their claims and separate electorates are becoming an obsession.

The Depressed Classes.

Among the claimants for the protection of a communal franchise the Depressed Classes are prominent. They claim a separate franchise and reserved seats on the grounds that the representatives of the Hindu community cannot be trusted to preserve their interests. This I believe to be an error. In all the Provinces advanced Hindus have during the last fifty years always advocated and worked for the uplift of the Depressed Classes. The Bombay Municipality, dominated by Hindus, has always stood for the education of the Depressed Classes in the City, and that is true of most of the Provinces. Admittedly a small section of extremely orthodox Hindus oppose, on religious grounds, the removal of "untouchability", but in point of fact "untouchability" is, at the instance of the leaders of higher castes, fast disappearing. Only in some of the backward villages of the Deccan, where for historic reasons the Brahmin retains his orthodoxy, is "untouchability" still found. The Depressed Classes are governed by Hindu Law and follow the same religion as other Hindus. On examination, it would, I am sure, be found that except for the political ambitions raised by the reforms, they have no political grievance against the higher castes. "Untouchability" has been made a political slogan by those among the Depressed Classes who see an opportunity to be regarded as a separate political group in order to command a short cut to political power and office. It is sounder statesmanship to assist the movement within the Hindu community to remove "untouchability" and promote the uplift of the Depressed Classes than to encourage destruction in the Hindu fold. Any antagonism between the Higher and the Depressed Classes must be prejudicial to the interests of the Depressed Classes themselves, because it will deprive them of the encouragement which they now receive from the Higher Classes. Moreover, the Depressed Classes have neither the educational qualifications nor the political experience necessary to form useful constituencies.

This said, I am, however, of the opinion that, in order to promote security and contentment, certain seats should be reserved for the Depressed Classes in the Legislative Assembly and Provincial Councils. But these should be in the general electorate, not in separate constituencies; in no case should they exceed four per cent. of the total membership of the Provincial Council, and this special representation should be for five years only. Whilst the Hindu-Moslem problem is a controversy throughout the length and breadth of India, that of the Depressed Classes is more peculiar to Madras. It should not be encouraged to assume menacing proportions elsewhere. When

joint electorates are universally established, the Depressed Classes will be merged into the general population and it would be an ill service to them to stamp them for ever as Depressed Classes, by singling them out for special treatment.

Europeans.

The European community is in a unique position amongst the communities claiming special consideration. Of a different race and unfamiliar with any Indian language, their interests are, in fact, as well as nominally, distinct from those of the Indians. At the same time they fill a great place in Indian commerce and industry, and many of them play an honourable part in our public life. As they are few in number they cannot exercise an influence on legislation commensurate with their importance unless special representation is arranged for them. I am in favour of this being done by reserved seats in the joint electorate.

As I have accepted the principle for Mahomedans, I recommend that the European community should retain the existing separate electorates and the existing representative strength in the councils for the next five years. Thereafter, representation should be by reserved seats in the joint electorate. It is only just, however, that when this stage is reached the candidates offering themselves for election should be genuinely representative of the community. The best means of attaining this end is, I suggest, the formation of a Panel of representative Europeans, and only those whose names are on the Panel will be eligible for election. The community will retain, in addition, the special constituencies formed by the Chambers of Commerce and the European Association, the qualifications of candidates being the same as at present. This ultimate merging of the European community in the general electorate will bring them into closer touch with India and make for sympathetic and friendly relations.

Special Interests.

Other classes claiming special consideration are the non-Brahmins of the Deccan ; Labour ; the Zemindars ; the Anglo-Indians ; the Indian Christians ; and the Sikhs.

Non-Brahmins.—Of the non-Brahmins, only the Marathas of the Deccan and Madras have been selected for separate representation. The word non-Brahmin is a misnomer. The non-Brahmins of Gujarat and Sind, the Patidars, Banias, Amils, and others, are all classed as Brahmins. This shows the artificial nature of a distinction between Brahmins and non-Brahmins. There was very little antagonism in the Deccan between the Marathas and the Brahmins until the distinction was introduced by the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms. In Gujarat, where no separate representation was given for non-Brahmins, all the electorates have worked in complete harmony and there is no sectional antagonism. In my view, therefore, no distinction should be made amongst Hindus, nor should any seats be reserved for any section of the community.

Labour.—The Labouring classes should be adequately represented. Whether this should be through separate electorates, or through the reservation of seats in the general electorate, is a question on which I have an open mind. Generally speaking, I am opposed in principle to the multiplication of separate electorates, and in the case of Labour think it might be difficult to constitute such a body which would function efficiently in the present unorganised condition of the labouring classes. Therefore I recommend that this question should be remitted to the Franchise Committees which will be constituted to deal with the other complicated questions grouped under this head, with a special expression in favour of representation through the general electorate rather than through a special electorate. A "Labourer" should be defined in the statute, and only those coming within this category should be qualified to stand for Labour seats. The Labour representatives should be actual manual workers themselves.

Anglo-Indians and Indian Christians.—I think both these classes are ill-advised in seeking to retain separate electorates. I supported my Committee's resolution for reserved seats for Anglo-Indians in Madras, but on reconsideration it appears to me undesirable in their own interests. As these form an intelligent class I do not doubt that, merged in the joint electorates, they will exercise the influence due to their considerable powers. Moreover, they are classed as Indians, and it is only fitting that they should regard themselves as Indians in every sense of the term, and not as a particularist section of the body politic. Every Indian, whatever community he may belong to, has an equal interest in the good government of his Province and of India, and the idea that a man is entitled to enter a Council merely because he is an Anglo-Indian, an Indian Christian, Hindu, Mahommedan, or a Sikh, should be emphatically rejected.

Commerce.—The commercial communities, though influential, have no adequate representation in the present system. They should naturally furnish the most experienced and stable elements in the Councils. I recommend that an increased number of seats should be reserved for them. In the larger Presidencies, like Bombay and Bengal, each trade has its organised and regulated Association. These form natural and representative constituencies, and there is no reason why they should not return one member each. Some Associations are predominantly European, others predominantly Indian. At present in some places the European commercial bodies have an undue proportion of seats, in view of the large and growing Indian interests. This should be rectified, and Associations predominantly Indian should have at least an equal number of seats in the Presidencies. I recommend that the proposal of the Madras Government should be modified by increasing the representation of trade and commerce from 5 seats to 6, the additional seat to be given to the South Indian Chamber of Commerce, a purely Indian body. That

would give 3 seats to bodies predominantly Indian, and would be as follows :—

Madras Chamber of Commerce	2
South Indian Chamber of Commerce	2
Madras Trades Association	1
Piece Goods Merchants Association	1

In Bombay six seats should be reserved for Indian commerce, and distributed as follows :—

Bombay Mill Owners Association	1
Ahmedabad Mill Owners Association	1
Indian Merchants Chamber	1
East India Cotton Association	1
Finance and Banking	1
Seeds, Grain and Sugar Merchants, and Piece Goods Merchants Associations	1

My colleagues recommend that 8 seats should be allocated to Indian Commerce, and 13 to European commercial bodies in Bengal. Whilst recognising the very important industrial and commercial interests under European control in Bengal, Indian interests in this field are very large, and in my opinion the number of Indian seats should be increased.

In all the other Provinces provision should be made for the reservation of a number of seats adequate to the Indian commercial interests involved.

Landholders.—Another interest claiming separate electorates is the Landholders. They have at present 6 constituencies in Madras where over one-third of the land is held in the form of large estates under permanent settlements of various kinds, giving rise to important questions of self-government. Similar conditions obtain in other Provinces. I agree that seats should be reserved for Landholders on the present basis, but this special representation should not be increased. I am however opposed to the proposal that in Bengal all questions connected with the Permanent Settlement should be treated as a Central subject and removed from the control of the Provincial Legislative Council. The land question is essentially a provincial matter, and the land revenue is a very important element in the finances of the Provinces. The removal of so considerable an element of the administration from the jurisdiction of the Legislative Council would be a serious infringement of the responsibility and autonomy of the Province. The power reserved to the Governor to veto discriminatory legislation forms ample protection for all who hold land under the Permanent Settlement, and none other is required.

Universities.—I agree that the Universities should retain their seats, but the members should be elected by the Senate and not by the graduates.

Sikhs.—The Sikh question is peculiar to the Punjab ; in other Provinces their numbers are inconsiderable. No case has been

made out for reservation of seats outside this Province, where they are already established. Elsewhere the Sikhs should be merged in the general electorate at once, and in the Punjab at the end of five years.

Parsees.—It is interesting to notice that the Parsees, with a total population of 100,000 have made no claim for communal representation. This small community is so well disciplined and advanced everywhere, and specially within the city of Bombay where the largest numbers are found, that not only are they represented on every local body, but there have been complaints that they get ten times their due share. For instance, on the Bombay Legislative Council there are at present from the City of Bombay, four Parsee representatives. If they had communal representation based on numbers, they would not be entitled to more than one seat. In the mofussil this advanced community enjoys representation far in advance of its numerical strength, and this is due to their culture, their great natural abilities, and their identity with the interests of India as a whole.

It is also remarkable that in the Bombay City Municipality, where there are no separate electorates, Hindu and Mahommedan members work in complete harmony; the Mahommedan members are elected by Hindus as well as Mahommedan voters and command the confidence of both.

Finally, on this vexed question I would add that it is of good augury that a halt has at last been called to the growth of communal electorates. On the recommendation of Lord Donoughmore's Committee, which enquired into the constitution of Ceylon, communal representation was abolished in the Legislative Council. In their Report, the Committee commented on the disintegrating effect of communal representation on the communities so singled out, as instanced by the Muslims in Ceylon, and expressed the opinion that they would be much better off when linked with the other elements in a population, which though diverse in character, had yet a common country and should possess a common national consciousness. If, according to this authoritative pronouncement, minorities in Ceylon, a backward country politically, are in a better position under joint electorates, still stronger is the argument for the abolition of communal electorates in India.

I am emphatically of opinion that communalism in India is a passing phase, and communal electorates are no more than a temporary expedient to meet it; and I am confident that with the gradual extinction of separate electorates the present attitude of mutual hostility will pass away, and the Indian communities will be fused in one homogeneous, patriotic nation.

Women.—Several proposals have been put before us to secure the adequate representation of women in the new Councils, amongst them the suggestion that five per cent. of the total number of seats should be reserved for them to be filled by joint

or separate electorates if possible, or otherwise by nomination. Everyone must agree on the desirability of the woman's point of view being adequately heard in the new system, especially in that important field of social reform which comes within the purview of legislation. But whether this should be done by a fixed reservation of seats, regardless of the conditions within the Province itself, is another matter. Whilst I am not opposed in principle to such reservation of seats in the Provinces which are ripe for it, I can see no good, and indeed positive harm, in the obligatory reservation of seats where the social conditions under which they live are ill-adjusted to women taking part in public life. Nor is it consistent with the general lines of progress which I have out-lined that there should be differences between province and province. On the whole therefore, I incline to the view that since the emancipation of women is proceeding at a rapid pace in India, and many of them are taking a prominent position in our public life, their position is secured by the exercise of the franchise, and that their whole future is more likely to be safeguarded by the obligation of winning their own way in politics, as they have done in other countries, rather than by earmarking specific representation, for which some parts of India are not ripe.

III.—STRUCTURE OF THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS.

With this statement of my conclusions on the general principles which should govern the form of government to be set up in all the Provinces, the way is clear to consider in more detail the actual structure of these administrations. Any survey of Indian conditions shows that there is a wide difference between Province and Province, and this was clearly brought out in the evidence which we received. Provinces like Bombay, Bengal and Madras, with their powerful manufacturing industries, their flourishing commerce, their large cities and educated populations with a considerable political tradition behind them have a relatively advanced and complicated social and economic system. Others, with a predominantly rural population, a less advanced educational system and an undeveloped economic state, stand in a different category. Consequently there is a natural difference of opinion as to whether one form of constitution is equally applicable to all, and as to whether there should not be different forms of administration applicable to the special provincial conditions. My first conclusion was that no general system should be proposed, but that each Province should be considered by itself and we should seek to frame a special constitution suitable to its special case, leaving it to be developed to the full autonomy and responsibility in view in the course of time and with the growth of experience. Fuller consideration however has led me to the conclusion that this course would not be wise. It would induce jealousy between Province and Province, and for the reasons set out in the general survey I am convinced that no Province

would be content to rest under the stigma that it was not ripe for the constitution proposed for others on the ground that they are politically, economically and socially more advanced. My recommendation, therefore, is that the same form of administration should be set up in all the Provinces at the same time, fully autonomous and responsible, with the whole administration transferred to the control of the Legislative Council, including Law and Order. I am confident that there will be no danger to the stability of the administration in pursuing this course in the conditions I have outlined to secure the stability of the administration, independence of the judiciary, and the efficient impartiality of the Police.

The keynote of my recommendations being full autonomy and responsibility, the first question to be considered is whether there should be one Chamber or two. There is a divergence of opinion on this subject, and with the establishment of a close approximation to a sovereign Legislative Council, the need of a revising and delaying authority will be admitted. But whether this should take the form of a second chamber is another question. For a second chamber to be effective, and to command authority, it must be constituted on different principles from the Legislative Council. It must be derived from wider constituencies, based on a higher franchise, and drawing its membership from a different class of the community. A second chamber either wholly or largely nominated would be out of harmony with the spirit of the constitution, and having no tradition behind it would fail to command authority or respect. Moreover, in the present stage of our political life the field of selection for the legislatures is none too large, and a two-chamber system of administration would probably lead to the impoverishing of the personnel of both. Further, there is the question of expense. It is desirable to keep the overhead cost of the administration as low as possible compatible with efficiency, and the cost of a second chamber would be considerable. For all these reasons, I am led to the conclusion that a second chamber in the Provinces is neither desirable nor practicable, and that the functions which it is destined to discharge can be more appropriately vested in the Governor.

At the head of the Provincial Administration will be the Governor. This will, in the new constitution, be a position of even greater power and responsibility than at present. It is imperative that the Governor should stand above personalities parties and politics, entirely free from particularist prepossessions, well versed in the parliamentary or public life of a constitutional country. It would therefore be most impolitic to narrow the field of selection. I am firmly of opinion therefore that for as far ahead as we can see the Governor, certainly for the Presidencies, should invariably be drawn from the ranks of Englishmen of experience and position outside the Services who have been trained in the broad outlook and free institutions

of Great Britain. I am fully conscious of the fact that this opinion is not universally popular in India, but in the onerous task which lies before us in the working of the new constitution it seems to me that we should take the widest and most liberal views and call upon all the resources of the Empire by enlisting the ablest of her sons to co-operate with us. Insistence on the immediate and general appointment of Indian Governors to all the Provinces seems to me to be a narrow view, and definitely retrogressive inasmuch as it will confine us to a very limited category in filling offices of such great importance.

As I do not propose the establishment of second chambers, the revising and delaying functions exercised by such bodies where they exist will be vested in the Governor, and for their efficient discharge he should command the same powers of veto and of certification under reasonable safeguards as are conferred on him under the Government of India Act of 1919. I cannot admit that these powers are either illiberal or anti-democratic ; some power of veto, and, in present conditions, of securing the passage of legislation essential to peace, order and good government, must exist, and their very existence within the authority of the Governor, safeguarded to prevent their despotic exercise, will ensure that they will rarely if ever be called into use.

Nor can I admit that the continuance of these powers is incompatible with the establishment of a really effective provincial autonomy and responsibility. We have to consider them in the light of very great changes proposed in the powers of the Legislative Councils and the structure of the Provincial Governments. With the establishment of a powerful controlling Legislature and a Ministry drawn from that Legislature in the Provinces, no Governor will use either his veto or power of certification without a sense of paramount necessity, because it would antagonise the Council with which he must necessarily work if his administration is to function harmoniously. For these reasons I cannot accept the argument that with these powers reserved, provincial autonomy and responsibility are unreal.

Size of the Council.—Owing to varying conditions in the Provinces themselves, such as the number of the population, the areas of the constituencies, the number and variety of the interests to be represented, there is a considerable difference between the size of the Legislative Councils. It is desirable to increase the size of these Councils without making them unwieldy, and to expand the representation in order to carve out new constituencies and give the system elasticity. These ends will be attained by providing for a general increase in the strength of the Councils of about twenty-five per cent.

The Official Bloc.—With the advent of responsible government and the transfer of all subjects, the official blocs in all the Legislative Councils will naturally disappear. It may

however be desirable to make provision for the services of experts when particular measures are under discussion. The most appropriate field for the employment of such experts is as witnesses before, or even members of, the Select Committees to which such measures will be referred in the ordinary course of legislation. But if it is found desirable to reserve seats for them in the Councils, they should be present in an advisory capacity only, and not as members with voting rights. It would be inconsistent with the principle of responsible government if such experts had the power through the vote to determine the course of legislation for which the Cabinet alone should be responsible.

Formation of the Ministry.—The Governor will select the Chief Minister from the Party in a majority in the Council. The remaining Ministers forming the Cabinet will be appointed by the Governor, on the recommendation of the Chief Minister, and together will form a Cabinet with joint responsibility. Nothing should be allowed to impair this principle of joint responsibility. There should be no reservation of any portfolio for any Minister of any class or minority. For instance, to make statutory provision for the appointment of a Mohammedan, or a Sikh, or a non-Brahmin, or a representative of the Depressed Classes in the Ministry, would be totally incompatible with the principle of joint responsibility, and would carry the principle of communal representation right into the Ministry with all its destructive consequences.

Distribution of Business.—The distribution of portfolios will rest with the Chief Minister, and the rules for the transaction of business and amendments thereto will be framed by the Cabinet and approved by the Governor.

The President.—The Legislative Council will elect its own President from among themselves.

To sum up :—

Executive Council.—The Government will rest in a Governor appointed by the Crown and a Cabinet of Ministers.

Salaries of Ministers.—Ministers will be paid a salary which will be voted by the Legislative Council, and which may be varied within certain limits.

President of the Cabinet.—The Prime Minister will be President of the Cabinet.

Secretary to the Cabinet.—There will be an official Secretary to the Cabinet, under the control of the Chief Minister.

Resignation of the Ministry.—In considering the relation of the Ministry to the Legislative Council, there is a two-fold objective. The first is that the Ministry shall be effectively responsible to the Council, and shall not remain in office after it has exhausted its mandate, or ceased to command the confidence of the electorate. The second is that it should be a

stable administration, not susceptible of being thrown from office by a fortuitous combination of individuals or groups against it. There should therefore be no obligation on the Ministry to resign if it is defeated on an ordinary administrative measure, or fails to carry any legislative measure which it introduces. The question whether or not resignation should follow such defeat or failure should be left to the discretion of the Chief Minister. Nor should any direct vote of "no confidence" be permitted without adequate notice. On the other hand, if after such notice, and adequate debate, a vote of "no confidence" be carried against the Ministry, it should have binding effect, necessitating the resignation of the whole Ministry. I have given careful consideration to the proposal that in order to secure stability and continuity in the administration, a "no confidence" vote to be mandatory should command a vote of two-thirds of the Council as a whole. The balance of argument seems to me to be against it. One effect of such provision would probably be that by the manœuvring of groups a Ministry could retain office after it had exhausted its mandate, and thus defeat the object of the reforms. The community will be further protected against the danger of a Ministry clinging to office after it has lost its authority by the limitations on the life of the Legislative Council; the Ministry will go out of office when the Council is dissolved; the power of dissolution will be vested in the Governor.

Life of the Council.—The life of the Legislative Councils should be four years, instead of three as at present. Three years is too short a period for the efficient working of a legislative body; very soon after it has settled down to work it is unsettled by the imminence of an election. Triennial elections are costly and unnecessary. On the other hand, the life of the Councils should not be prolonged after they have ceased to reflect public opinion. The British Parliament is elected for five years; the legislatures of the United States of America, France, Germany and Canada, for four years. Four years therefore suggests itself as the most convenient period for the life of our Legislative Councils.

Inter-Provincial Relations.—In a country like India, where the border districts of the different Provinces abut on each other, and are sometimes interlaced, questions must arise where the actions of one Provincial Government materially affect the interests of its neighbour. Where these are of minor importance, the Provincial Governments concerned will deal directly with each other, as they do at present, and only when they are unable to agree will the matter in dispute be admitted to the arbitrament of the Viceroy. When grave issues arise however, the aggrieved Province will appeal direct to the Viceroy. For the discharge of these sovereign functions it is necessary to vest in the Viceroy unrestricted power to interfere, even over the head of the Governor and the Ministry, when the

interests of a Province are gravely affected, or when questions of all-India concern arise. In cases of supreme importance to India as a whole, such as the breakdown of authority in any Province, the Viceroy should even have the power to supersede the defaulting Local Government, and to carry on the administration himself until a stable government is re-established within the Province.

Finance.—With the establishment of autonomy and responsibility in the Provinces, the present financial relations between the Central and the Provincial Governments will stand in need of revision. For the principal growing sources of revenue, *i.e.*, Income Tax, Customs, Railways, etc., are vested in the Government of India, whilst the growing heads of expenditure, *i.e.*, education, public health, and industrial development, are charges on the Provinces. Many of the Provincial Governments are inadequately provided with the funds necessary for the discharge of these obligations, nor have they under their own control untapped sources of taxation which by any ingenuity can furnish the large sums necessary to support these nation-building activities.

In these circumstances it is clear that the Provincial Governments will have to look to the Government of India for grants from these growing heads of revenue, which admittedly are central in their character, for the funds they must have if they are to discharge their heavy responsibilities. The question is too complicated to be settled by the *obiter dicta* of any individual, and needs exhaustive examination. I propose the appointment of a small committee, one member appointed by the Secretary of State, a second by the Government of India, and the third by the Province concerned, to allocate to each Provincial Government a share of the Central Revenues proportionate to its needs. This method of financing the Provinces, *i.e.*, by grants from the Central Government, is necessitated by a study of the financial organisation of British India. The sources of revenue indicated above—Income Tax, Customs, Railways, etc.—are definitely central, or federal, in their nature. They are the natural prerogative of the Central Government, because amongst other reasons the taxes are not necessarily paid by people within the Province where they originate. Moreover it is of paramount importance to ensure that they are evenly collected, wherever they are garnered ; it would be intolerably unjust if there was one standard of Income Tax or Customs collection in Bengal and another in Bombay ; such iniquities have existed in the past and they must not be revived. For many reasons therefore I am entirely unable to accept the proposal that the Provinces should retain the whole of the revenues collected within their borders, and pay to the Government of India such portion as may be decided upon. All-India taxes must be collected by, and appertain to, the Central Government, the Provinces receiving therefrom assignments according to their

needs, determined in the manner aforesaid. Nor could we visualise with equanimity a Province being in a position to withhold from the Central Government its share of the revenues, and thereby forcing it into surrender by financial starvation, or impose it the unpleasant necessity of collecting its share by force.

Education.—The question of adequate finance for the Provincial Governments is one of paramount importance when we turn to the subject of education. Everyone is agreed that the facilities for education, especially primary education, should be extended as rapidly as possible. The problem of mass education in India is largely a rural one. Only 12 per cent. of the population live in the towns, as compared with 79 per cent. in England and Wales ; 51 per cent. in the United States of America ; 42 per cent. in France ; and 45 per cent. in Germany. In British India 74 per cent. of the population is dependent on agriculture for its livelihood, 10 per cent. on industries and 5½ per cent. on trade. There are only 29 cities with a population of 100,000 and over, and the number of villages is in the neighbourhood of half a million.

Education in the towns is comparatively easy to organise, and it is substantially a question of funds. On the other hand, in the rural areas many difficulties exist. The majority of parents are poor and illiterate themselves. There are indifferent means of communication ; epidemics and seasonal illnesses interfere with the continuity of the work ; there are numerous languages, religions and castes. Faced with these difficulties the progress made is disappointing. According to the census of 1921 the percentage of literates of both sexes and of all ages was only 7.2. It does not follow, of course, that the illiterate are incapable of managing their own affairs ; there is a great volume of shrewdness and practicability amongst them. But an illiterate community is an unsubstantial foundation on which to build a democratic State, and the rapid spread of education is essential to the functioning of our new institutions.

Interest in education is increasing. In 1917 the total expenditure, direct and indirect, under this head was a little over 11 crores of rupees. By 1927 this sum had increased by over 117 per cent. to Rs. 24.5 crores. This is evidence that the country is willing enough to make sacrifices for the cause of education, and most of the Provincial Governments are active in developing their policy.

This survey shows that the demand for immediate and compulsory primary education sometimes put forward is an ideal, rather than a question of practical politics. Nevertheless there is abundant scope for progress within the present system. The first step is to check the present wastage. Statistics show that an increase in the number of schools produces no proportionate increase in literacy, for only a small number of the first-year pupils reach Standard Four, when they can be considered

literate. The Secondary Schools are not in a much better position, if the large number of failures at the Matriculation examinations are any criterion. From this it follows that the present measures should be directed to improvements within the present system, and especially to checking the wastage which leads to such inadequate results from the present expenditure.

I recommend that special schools should be started for the Depressed Classes and a special grant made for the purpose. They would thus be encouraged to raise themselves through education and to take their full place in the community. At present, when they are allowed to attend the existing schools, their position is often made one of difficulty through ostracism by the other children.

But I see no occasion for special and separate schools for the Mohammedans. There are at present over 37,000 such schools, of which 21,000 are in Bengal. The Mohammedan community gains no advantage from this system ; whilst the number of schools is disproportionately large in relation to the population, the pupils tend to drop out in an excessive degree in the higher standards. It is of importance to note in this connection that in the Punjab, where no reservations are made for Mohammedans in the ordinary schools, the number of Mohammedan pupils rose from 160,000 in 1917 to 517,000 in 1927.

IV.—THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT.

In the preceding pages I have adumbrated my conclusions on the changes necessary in the structure of the Provincial Governments. Turning to the Central Government, certain evidence has been put before us to the effect that this should be left substantially untouched—that autonomy and responsibility in the Provinces should be left to “find themselves” before the reconstruction of the Government of India is attempted. This reasoning I am entirely unable to accept. It has been said, and with a considerable measure of truth, that any constitution will function if behind it there is the will to work it ; on the other hand, the best constitution devised by the wit of man, will fail if it lacks the driving force of the will to work it. If for no other reason, it is imperative to mobilise behind the new constitution, behind the Government of India no less than behind the Provinces, the will to work it in all men of reasonable views. In the introductory passages to this report, I have sketched the driving forces in Indian politics. They are the irresistible surge towards self-government within the Empire, the almost passionate desire for full Dominion status, if not immediately, then within a brief period of years. From the influence of these forces the Central Government cannot remain immune, even with the establishment of responsibility in the Provinces. Even men of the most conservative views are bent on the development of the Central Government in the direction of the establishment

of full responsibility. Whilst these natural aspirations remain unsatisfied, men of the most moderate views will not react wholeheartedly to the side of the Government. There is in India a large body of politically-minded people who have faith in the British connection, and who desire the ordered development of India within the orbit of the Commonwealth. But faced by what they regard as the imponderability of the Government, they are at best drifting into an attitude of aloofness from participation in the government, at worst into a state of complete hostility. If that large element in Indian public life which represents in the true sense the Liberal position is not enlisted in support of the constitutional changes proposed, then the growing influence of extremism will drive them out of politics altogether, and the political future of India will become a matter of the gravest concern. Reforms therefore which do not embody a very substantial measure of responsibility in the Central Government, with the assurance of complete responsibility within a specified period, will be still-born; they can have no firm basis in popular approval, and must limp forward to confusion.

In addition to these general considerations impelling the introduction of responsibility in the Central Government, there are two others of considerable force. We are aiming at full responsibility in the Provinces, and at the same time in the scheme outlined in the preceding pages I have recommended that the Government of India shall have an over-riding authority, even to the extent of temporarily superseding the Provincial Government if necessary in the interests of the country as a whole. Now this measure of responsibility in the Provinces, under such conditions, is completely incompatible with the existence of a Central Government as at present constituted, non-responsible to the legislatures in every branch of its functions. The existence of responsibility in the Provinces necessarily connotes the establishment of responsibility in the Central Government, with its custody of All-India affairs, and ultimate authority over the Provinces in which self-governing institutions are to be set up.

The second consideration arises from any survey of the working of the Government of India Act since 1919. Nowhere have the disadvantages of the system of unlimited powers of criticism, and substantial powers of obstruction in the legislatures, without any chastening sense of responsibility been more apparent. We have seen witnesses of the Government of India criticised, attacked, and often defeated in the legislatures, whilst none of their critics has been charged with the necessity of accepting responsibility for the barbs launched at those in authority. This is damaging to those in power and equally damaging to those in the Legislatures. It prejudices the prestige of the Government itself, and it induces in legislators a sense of comparative indifference to the political effect of the charges which they make.

For all these reasons, I am convinced that a drastic change of the Government of India is an imperative necessity, and that this

change should take the form, with proper safeguards, of the fullest practicable measure of responsibility. At the same time, I recognise that there are three branches of the administration where it is desirable to hasten slowly ; they are Defence, Foreign Affairs, and the relations between British India and the Indian States. I recommend that these three subjects should be " reserved " for a limited period, to be embodied in the statute, and that all other branches of the administration should be fully transferred to the control of the legislatures.

But this reservation needs to be qualified by one condition. There is a strong feeling in India to-day that the burden of military expenditure is unduly heavy in the changed world conditions, and the almost universal desire for a reduction in armaments, and that it is disproportionate to the financial resources of the country. There is one charge in particular which is unanimously regarded as unjustifiable by Indian opinion, namely the capitation charges on British recruits for India. The Military Budget is approximately fifty-five crores of rupees. Of that sum we may take the round figure of fifty crores as absolutely necessary so long as the present responsibilities are imposed on the Army, and certainly so long as the Frontier position remains as onerous and difficult as it now is. I recommend therefore that this sum of fifty crores should be " Reserved ". It should however be a statutory obligation on the Military Authorities to reduce their expenditure by five crores of rupees during the next seven years. Economy with efficiency is more likely to be secured by leaving it to the Military Authorities to make this reduction in their own way, and within this period at their own time, rather than to carry out the process by arbitrary " cuts " at the discretion of an authority not cognisant of the detailed working of the military machine.

The measures necessary to Indianise the Army in India, and thereby to make the country ripe for that entire responsibility for her own defence which is the necessary accompaniment of Dominion status, have already formed the subject of authoritative inquiry by the Sken Committee, which produces a unanimous report. I am strongly in favour of the scheme there recommended being pressed forward with the least possible delay.

The Army in India, as so constituted, should be the only military body in the country. There is no room, in present conditions, for Provincial Armies, or even Provincial Militias. The existence of two bodies of armed men, independent of each other and under separate control, would inevitably lead to confusion and unnecessary expense ; moreover it might, in circumstances which can easily be visualised, become a source of conflict and a danger to peace and order. At a later date, when the Provincial Governments have grown habituated to the exercise of their new powers, it may be desirable to establish provincial militias, on the lines of the British Territorial Force, to act as a second line to the Regular Army, and to strengthen the

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Local Government in times of emergency. But that time is not yet, and if and when it is reached the Provincial Militias should be under the direct control of the Commander-in-Chief, so as to provide against any division of authority.

The Indian Navy is a new Defence Force, and there are no established obligations which demand reservation in any circumstances. The whole Navy Budget should therefore be made votable by the Legislatures.

When Finance is transferred, certain charges, such as interest on debt, sinking funds, pay of services, the principal of the debt, and other obligatory charges will be first charges on the revenues on the lines of the consolidated fund in Great Britain.

Then in regard to the reservation of Foreign Affairs, there is an important qualification. No commercial treaties with any Power should be ratified unless they have the approval of the Legislatures. India is in an increasing degree thinking economically, and there is an uneasy feeling that her economic interests have not always been carefully safeguarded in the commercial treaties negotiated by the Imperial Government. This apprehension can only be exorcised by bringing commercial treaties under legislative control.

But whilst jealous of the right of the Legislatures to protect Indian interests under commercial treaties, even whilst Foreign Affairs are reserved, I am a strong believer in the policy of imperial preference as between India and the British Commonwealth. The stronger we can make the commercial ties between the nations forming the Commonwealth, the stronger can we make the Commonwealth as a whole, and each partner in it. As an economic unit the Commonwealth can defy the world ; separated into isolated units, each pursuing a particularist policy, we are subject to the fiscal policies of countries each raising its tariff wall higher and higher against us, and within that wall developing manufacturing resources which compete with our industries even in the home market. An analysis of the trade conditions of India show that there are few if any branches where British manufactured goods seriously compete with the products of our own people ; our real competitors come from without the Commonwealth. Strongly believing in the protection of our own industries I believe no less strongly in the granting of preference to Empire products within the tariffs necessary for the security of our own manufactures, and recommend that the policy of preference should form an integral part of our fiscal system.

It will be necessary to re-examine the allocation of subjects between the Central Government and the Provincial Government, and this should be done by an expert Committee. I am of opinion that all subjects not specified as Central shall be deemed to be Provincial.

If any difference should arise between a Province and a Governor-General as to what constitutes a Provincial or a

Central subject the difference should be referred to a Tribunal consisting of three Chief Justices of the High Court in India whose decision shall be final.

With these general remarks, I now proceed to indicate my conclusions on the structure of the Central Government and its relations with the Imperial Parliament.

The Legislative Assembly.

Constitution.—The numbers of the Legislative Assembly should be increased from 143 to 250. The population of British India is approximately 250,000,000 and therefore an Assembly of 250 members will give one member to each million of the population. My view is that it is unnecessary and undesirable to make the Assembly over large. There is no great leisured class in India, and the men of knowledge, experience and capacity are for the most part busied with other affairs. The inexorable facts of geography—Delhi is approximately nine hundred miles from the commercial cities—mean that men serving in the Legislatures are withdrawn during the sessions from their ordinary avocations. Consequently the number of men of capacity and distinction who can be spared for Council work is comparatively small, and it would be a disservice to India to impose an undue drain upon them, and to starve the Provincial Legislative Councils in order to man the Central Legislature. Of these 250 members, I recommend that 115 should be elected on the same democratic basis as at present. It has been represented that all the members of the Legislative Assembly should be chosen through indirect election in order to secure greater stability. I cannot accept this view. Every modern democracy regards the direct vote as the bulwark of its rights and privileges. Any attempt to supersede it would be regarded with suspicion and hostility, and there are the educative advantages in the direct vote to which I have referred in considering the composition of the Provincial Legislative Councils. We cannot with reason consider so retrograde a step as abolishing the direct vote which has been established. Under the present constitution 104 members are directly elected; in my proposals the number would be increased to 115. This increase is suggested so that new seats can be created in order to provide for interests not now represented. The re-arrangement of the constituencies is a complex matter, which should be remitted to a special committee for examination.

It is a matter of reasoned criticism that the complete divorce between the Central Legislatures and the Provincial Legislative Councils set up under the Act of 1919 has not been entirely satisfactory. It has withdrawn from the Central Legislatures men with a practical knowledge of the working of Government in the Provinces, and made it less easy for men of the calibre of those who under the old system were sent to the Central Legislatures from the Provincial Bodies to secure election. It is desirable to remedy both these defects, and I propose that 126

members of the Legislative Assembly shall be elected by the Provincial Legislative Councils on a population basis. This will establish the direct liaison between the Central Government and the Provincial Bodies which is admittedly desirable, and will bring to the Central Legislatures men who have won their spurs in provincial life, and have an intimate knowledge of the needs of their own administrations. It will secure the presence of a strong element of experience and knowledge which will be a stabilising influence and contribute powerfully to the more efficient working of the Central Legislatures. The elections—through the Legislative Councils—should be so arranged that all important interests, especially trade, commerce and industry, are fairly represented.

In the cadre proposed there would then remain nine seats. These should be filled by nomination by the Viceroy in order to redress any inequalities revealed by the general elections.

The Council of State.—The present Council of State consists of 60 members, 33 of whom are elected. Of the 27 nominated members 20 may be officials and 17 actually are.

In the new Council of State the number of members should be increased to 100, in order to establish a fair proportion with the enlarged Legislative Assembly. Of these 100 members, 66 should be elected, substantially by an electorate corresponding to the one now in force. The new constituencies, as in the case of the Legislative Assembly, would be worked out by a special committee appointed for the purpose. The remaining 34 members would be nominated by the Viceroy. As the official *blocs* in the Legislative Councils will be abolished under these proposals, it is desirable to give the official class, with their expert knowledge, an opportunity of making their voice heard on the affairs of the country. I recommend that of the nominated members 6 officials shall be appointed by the Viceroy, and shall include the members of the Viceroy's Council, and 14 nominated by him on the recommendation of the Provincial Governments. The balance of 14 seats will be filled by the Viceroy from the non-official members of the community.

The Ministry.—The Ministry should be constituted on the lines indicated for the Provinces, i.e., a Prime Minister, appointed by the Viceroy from the largest Party in the Assembly, and five members selected by him. No seats should be specifically reserved for the members of any community. In all material respects the constitution and working of the Ministry should be on the principles adumbrated for the Provinces : the Ministry to have joint responsibility and only to be removed by direct votes of "no confidence" exercised with the measures to secure stability indicated for the Provinces. Although the constitution of the Central Government will be dyarchical, that should not impair the basic principle of joint responsibility in the Ministry to which all subjects other than those specified, are transferred. There should be no question

of the Viceroy selecting the Ministers either from within or without the Assembly, or acting independently of the Prime Minister. It is essential to my scheme that the Prime Minister alone shall select his Ministers from amongst the members of the Legislature. Only in this way can the vital principle of joint responsibility be established and preserved. The Ministry as so constituted should only be removed by a direct vote of "no confidence" exercised with the conditions suggested in order to secure stability in the Provincial Governments.

Legislation.—Legislation may be introduced in either the Council of State or the Legislative Assembly, but Money Bills must originate in the Assembly. All Bills must be passed by both Houses and receive the assent of the Viceroy before becoming law. If a case arises where a Bill passed by the Assembly is rejected by the Council of State, or vice versa, the Prime Minister may, if he considers it a matter of importance, convene a joint session of both Houses. If the Bill is then passed by a *two-thirds* majority of the Joint Session, it will be sent to the Viceroy for his approval.

The Viceroy.—The Viceroy should continue to be appointed by the Crown as heretofore.

Under the recommendations I have made, three branches of the administration will be reserved for the period prescribed in the statute—Defence (other than the Indian Navy) ; Foreign Affairs ; and relations between British India and the Indian States. These should, during such period, be administered by the Viceroy with the assistance of an Executive Council of three members, each in charge of one of these departments.

I fully recognise that during this transition stage, until responsibility is established in all branches of the administration, the Viceroy's Executive Council will be responsible to the Viceroy only, and through him to the Secretary of State and the Imperial Parliament. The Executive Council and the Ministry will work independently, but they should not unnecessarily be framed in watertight compartments. For instance, it is not necessary that the Executive Council should sit in the presence of the Cabinet, though the Viceroy should be free to invite the Prime Minister alone, or the Prime Minister and his colleagues, to be present at special sittings, on the precedent of the Committee of Imperial Defence. Similarly, the Viceroy and his Executive Council should not have the right to be present at sittings of the Ministry, except by invitation. Inevitably, the relations of the Executive Council with the Ministry will be delicate, but that is no reason why they should not be harmonious. We have a right to assume that both the Executive Council and the Ministry will be animated by a desire to make the system work, and given goodwill on both sides, we should confidently assume that it will function harmoniously for the better government of India. If

goodwill and confidence are lacking, neither this nor any other constitution will operate. Obviously, there must be some method of communication and consultation between the two authorities, and I have no doubt that conventions will be established to this end.

The powers reserved to the Viceroy and Governor-General in the Act of 1919 should remain intact ; I regard this as essential to the working of the advanced responsible democratic constitution recommended in the foregoing pages.

The India Office.—It is clear that such great changes in the constitution of the Government of India must connote corresponding changes in the position of the Secretary of State for India, the Secretary of State's Council, and the control which Parliament exercises through him over the Government of India. There will be no place in the new fabric for the Secretary of State's Council. Presumed to be a body of men of great administrative experience and first-hand knowledge of India, to advise the Secretary of State on certain matters specified by statute and to safeguard in certain particulars the revenues of India for which the Secretary of State is responsible, it has outlived its usefulness. As Finance is, under my proposals, to be transferred to the Central Legislatures, that part of the work of the India Office will disappear. The Agency work of the Government of India is now transacted by the High Commissioner. The presence of a body of expert advisers to the Secretary of State in London, behind the largely responsible Government to be established in India, is at complete variance with the whole principle of the reforms indicated, and without entering into any criticism of the India Council, and its peculiar relations with the Secretary of State, I am of opinion that it is an essential part of the new system that the Council should be abolished.

But I am in favour of the present retention by the Secretary of State of the over-riding powers which he, as the representative of Parliament, now possesses. Further, it should be open to any member of the All-India Services, and to officers of the Indian Army, to appeal directly to him when they feel that they have a strong grievance. These powers however should be exercised only in matters of Imperial concern and not to interfere in the ordinary routine of Indian administration. As each step forward to full Dominion status is taken, so should the interference of the Secretary of State for India in Indian affairs be reduced, until his position ultimately approximates to that of Secretary of State for the Dominions.

It has been suggested that the Under Secretary of State should always be an Indian and a member of the British Parliament. In my view that is both impracticable and unnecessary. Owing to the impossibility of arranging for his election by a British constitution, the Under Secretary would have to be

created a British peer. That would bring no advantage to India. The position of Under Secretary carries no power or responsibilities, and the holder of that position would certainly not be considered as in any way an adviser to the Secretary of State.

To sum up, my proposals for the Central Government are :—

(1) That the Legislative Assembly shall consist of 250 members.

(2) That 115 members shall be elected on the existing franchise with separate electorates as at present, that is to say, Mahommedans and Europeans may be allowed communal representation on the present scale for five years, after which period the Mahommedans will obtain a reservation of seats on a population basis in joint electorates, and European candidates, chosen from a Panel, will have reserved seats on their present strength in joint electorates. There shall also be a reservation of seats for the Depressed Classes and Labour as in the Provinces. The seats reserved for the Depressed Classes should be increased from their present number of 1 to 10, thus giving them 4 per cent. of the total number of seats, and for Labour reserved seats should be increased from 1 to 4. There is no case for giving separate electorates or reserved seats to Sikhs in the Assembly. They are Hindus, governed by Hindu Law with no special political aims apart from the rest of the community. Neither should any seats in the Assembly be reserved for women, though they should not be debarred from taking their seats should they secure election.

(3) That indirect election shall be introduced in the following manner : 126 members to be elected by the Provincial Councils, the members to be allocated between them in proportion to the number of the adult populations of their respective Provinces. These members shall include the representatives of commercial and industrial bodies, landed and agricultural interests in each Province, the Provincial Councils acting as electoral colleges for all of them. A Committee, appointed by the present Government of India will decide on the allocation of seats between the Provinces and between the communities on the lines indicated earlier, and also on the number of seats to be allotted to the various commercial and industrial bodies, landed and agricultural interests in each Province.

(4) That the remaining nine members shall be nominated by the Viceroy, in order to remove inequalities in constituencies as between communities and other interests.

(5) That the term of the Assembly shall be four years instead of three as at present.

(6) That the President of the Assembly shall be elected by the Members from amongst themselves.

(7) That Bills shall be passed by a bare majority.

(8) That the Council of State shall consist of 100 members.

(9) That 66 of these shall be elected on the existing franchise and with the same provisions regarding communities and interests as for the Assembly.

(10) That 34 members shall be nominated by the Viceroy, 20 of whom shall be officials. Of these 20, the Viceroy will nominate :—

(a) 14 on the recommendations of the Provincial Governments,

(b) the members of the Viceroy's Council,

(c) the remaining members at his discretion.

The other 14 members will be nominated by the Viceroy from non-official members of the whole community.

(11) That the Executive shall consist of five members, chosen by the Prime Minister from Members of the Legislative Assembly following the principle laid down for Provincial Governments, and there shall be joint responsibility.

(12) That all Bills must be passed by both Houses and receive the assent of the Viceroy. In cases where Bills passed by the Assembly are thrown out by the Council of State, the Prime Minister may, if he considers the matter of sufficient importance, call a joint sitting of both Houses. If the Bill is then passed by a two-thirds majority it may be sent to the Viceroy for his assent. The Viceroy will have the power of veto.

(13) That Ministers shall be able to speak in either House.

(14) That the Viceroy shall be appointed by the Crown as at present.

(15) That the Viceroy's Council shall consist of Members with portfolios of the "Reserved" subjects—Foreign, Political and Defence. Until these subjects are finally transferred, the Viceroy's Council will be in the position of a Cabinet responsible to the Viceroy only.

(16) That the members of the Viceroy's Council shall be Members of the Council of State, with power to speak in the Assembly.

The Privy Council.—In the passages outlining the constitution and functions of the Provincial Governments I have indicated my views on the paramount necessity of preserving the independence of the judiciary by placing it under the jurisdiction of the High Courts and through them making the jurisdiction directly responsible to the Crown. I cannot too strongly emphasise this recommendation, which is one of the cardinal points of my proposals. I am in favour of the retention of the right of appeal to the Privy Council under this

system, for there is no doubt that the Council is the greatest tribunal of law in the world. The objections raised to these appeals are chiefly on the ground of expense, but we should expect the number of appeals to be gradually reduced, and to be confined to major cases only, instead of the wide use of this right which is now practised.

The Services.—The future of the Indian Civil Service, of the All-India Police, and their position in the administration remain to be considered. Few will be found to challenge the opinion that the Indian Civil Service has rendered great services to the country for over a century. It has given the country the support of a *corps d'élite* of able men, dominated by the highest sense of duty and rectitude, devoted to their work and stamped by the highest ideals. It is to their work that we owe the existence of an administrative fabric so efficient that the transfer to responsible and autonomous government can be confidently contemplated. The most noteworthy characteristic of the Civil Services is their loyalty to the government as by law established, and the members have shown great adaptability in accepting and working the transfer of power embodied in the Act of 1919. Indeed, I might go so far as to say that the smooth working of the Reforms where they have been most successful could not have been obtained without the skilled and efficient co-operation of the All-India Services with Ministers. Moreover there are great advantages in All-India Services. The wider scope for service held out, and the better emoluments which naturally go with these responsible positions, have attracted to the Services men of high character as well as of exceptional ability. We could not hope to enlist the co-operation of men of equal calibre in purely Provincial Services, with their necessarily narrower scope. All experience in India goes to show that small Services never reach the efficiency nor establish the *esprit de corps* of All-India Services, and English experience also proves that even in specialised Departments, like the Post Office, the administration gains in vigour and outlook from the infusion of an element drawn from the Senior Civil Service.

I therefore recommend that whilst adhering to the programme laid down by the Lee Commission for their Indianisation, the two Security Services, viz., the Indian Civil Service and the Indian Police, should be retained and remain All-India Services as at present; also that the higher posts in the Provinces should continue to be manned, as at present, from them. But in order to ensure that a Minister should be able to reckon confidently on having his policy executed by the Permanent Officials, as in Great Britain, the Governor should have the power, on the recommendation of a Minister, to replace a member of All-India Service by another drawn from the same Service, if and when the Permanent Official finds

himself at serious variance with the policy of the Minister, or if he fails to co-operate harmoniously with him.

Two objections have been urged against this proposal—one being the difficulty of finding employment for the official transferred, and the other the possibility that no Member of the Services might be forthcoming to fill the vacancy. I do not consider that there is any real weight in either objection. Transfers of officials from one post to another are matters of frequent occurrence for divers reasons ; indeed they are the ordinary events in official life, and are sometimes so common that they arouse protest. Certainly I do not discern in this argument any sufficient cause to outweigh the manifest advantages to the administration from an infusion of All-India officials to which I have alluded above.

The All-India Services have attracted men of the highest attainments, because they have felt that once their Covenant was sealed, their position was secured against all vicissitudes, except those arising from serious incapacity or misfeasance on their own part. It would be an error, reflecting on the personnel of the Services, if this confidence were shaken. Inasmuch as the majority of the members of these Services will be working in Provincial Governments under responsible Ministers, it is essential that they should retain unimpaired their right of appeal to the Viceroy and the Secretary of State direct. The Public Services Commission should remain as heretofore, and no Provincial Services Commission should be established. In short, the present statutory rights of the All-India Services should be meticulously observed. I am satisfied that the autonomy and responsibility of the Provincial Governments will not be impaired by a leaven of All-India officials in the administration, as they will be working under the orders of Ministers, with the right of asking for their transfer if friction arises. On the contrary, the administration of the Provincial Governments will gain, and the task of Ministers will be made easier, by the command of the assistance of men of the highest probity and efficiency, free from Provincial particularism. In addition to the All-India Services there must necessarily be certain Provincial Services for the local administration. I am emphatically of opinion that in no circumstances should these or any Services be recruited on communal principles, or on any other basis other than that of merit and efficiency. All Services should be open to all subjects of the Crown irrespective of race, class, caste or creed ; efficiency should be the only criterion of governing through selection. Communalism and representation should have no place whatsoever in a Service where the only criterion is one of capacity to do the work called for. It is in addition most important that the Provincial Government with their new responsibilities should command the services of the best men possible in the ranks of the administration. To introduce irrelevant considerations of race, class, caste or

wereed would not only be a source of unending dispute, but utterly destructive of good administration.

Sind.—The separation of Sind from the Bombay Presidency is undesirable. Despite the inexorable facts of geography, leading to a certain isolation from the remainder of the Presidency, Sind shares in the strong provincial patriotism of the Province as a whole, and would be still more detached from any other Province to which it might be linked. As it has an area of only 47,000 square miles and a population of three and a quarter millions, a separate government appears to be extravagant and unnecessary ; moreover a small administrative area of this nature would lose the services of the highly-trained officials now available from the Bombay cadre.

However, if for any special reason it is decided to separate Sind from the Bombay Presidency, I offer no rooted objection, provided that Bombay is relieved of the financial responsibilities it has undertaken for the benefit of that area. It would be necessary to ask the Government of India to guarantee the securities of the heavy loans raised for the Sukkur barrage and the complementary irrigation works ; a small and relatively poor area like Sind could not provide the necessary security, and it would be most unfair to charge it to Bombay if Sind were separated from its jurisdiction.

Burma.—I do not approve of the separation of Burma from the Indian Empire. When confusion in Burma compelled the interference of the British, many crores of rupees and many lives were spent in establishing peace and order in that land. Ever since the conquest, Burma has enjoyed the advantages of the All-India Services, and of the protection of the Indian Army ; it has also received the immense benefit of freedom within the Indian fiscal system. The demand for separation, I feel sure, is mainly political and not economic, even though there should be some justification for the complaint that a fair share of the revenues accruing within Burma are not spent within the Province. That is no more than a financial adjustment. An independent Burma might be followed by a fiscal policy which would be seriously detrimental to Indian commerce and industry, and to the important British and Indian commercial interests which have been built up there. Moreover, Indians fear, and not without reason, that the independence of Burma would be followed by a policy restrictive of the entry of Indians into the country. For all these reasons, I am opposed to separation ; if it were contemplated, justice would demand the repayment to India, with interest, the large sums spent in the pacification of the province.

If Burma is not separated from India I recommend that it should be given a constitution on the same lines, and under the same conditions, as those of the other Provinces. Indians in Burma should retain their separate electorates for five years, and after that period have reserved seats on a population basis in

the joint electorates. It has been argued that they should retain their separate electorates on the grounds that they differ in language from the Burmans, but in most cases they have one common tongue, namely English, and there should be little difficulty in their learning Burmese if they elect to live in the country. When seats are reserved, Indian representatives should be chosen from a panel on the lines of those suggested for Europeans in British India. Similarly, the European and Anglo-Burmans should retain their separate electorates for five years, merging after that period into the joint electorate with reservation of seats.

At the present time there are no representatives of European commerce in the Burmese Council. In the new Council two commercial seats should be reserved for the representatives of important interests such as the oil, mining and export and import industries.

North West Frontier Province.—I do not agree that this area should be formed into a Province with a legislature of its own on the lines recommended for the other Provinces, nor that it should be re-incorporated with the Punjab. The North West Frontier Province is, and for so long ahead as we can see must remain, a distinctive area by itself. It is pre-eminently a frontier Province, running through its entire length along the difficult and dangerous Borderland. True, the Borderland has enjoyed a considerable period of peace, which we profoundly hope will remain unbroken. But the peace of the Frontier hangs by a very thin thread, and recent developments in that part of the globe, which there is no need to particularise, have made that thread thinner than ever. The first necessity in this area is an administration swift for attack and defence when the security of India is menaced. These are not the characteristics of a democratic constitutional administration. Nor has the North West Frontier Province reached a cultural and economic position which makes it desirable to treat it politically by the same methods as apply to the other Local Governments in India.

The powerful reasons which impelled the Government of India to sever the North West Frontier Province from the Punjab and take it under their direct control are far stronger to-day than they were then. A whole generation has passed since that decisive step was taken. During that period the Government of the Punjab has lost the military tradition and experience which characterised it when it was the Warden of the Marches. Its problems to-day are not military, but political, economic and social. It is less equipped than it was for the discharge of these Frontier responsibilities, and in no circumstances should it be re-invested with them.

The Province should therefore continue to be under the administration of a Commissioner appointed by the Government of India. But even in the conditions I have sketched above the North West Frontier Province has not stood at gaze any more

than other parts of India and its people have expressed a strong desire for participation in the general advance of the Indian constitution. Whilst therefore the conditions within this area do not, in my opinion, justify the recommendation placed upon the same constitutional basis as the other Provinces there is good reason for establishing therein a constitution on the principles set up in other parts of India under what are known as the Morley Minto Reforms. This was suggested by Sir Norman Bolton, the present Commissioner. After a statutory period, say 10 years, the question of the administration in the Province should be reviewed by the Viceroy and his Council.

Baluchistan.—This area should remain under the administration of a Commissioner appointed by the Viceroy ; it has not reached a development, either political or economic, justifying a more complex form of administration.

V.—*Conclusion.*

In the foregoing pages I have tried to indicate the conclusions to which my study of the Indian situation and the detailed inquiries of the Central Committee have led me. I would emphasise the reservation contained in the opening paragraph. I am not a politician but a business man desiring to the best of his capacity to serve India. I have therefore only outlined broad questions of principle, leaving experts in constitutional government and in administration to fill in the framework. Where there are complex questions like the creation of new constituencies, or the readjustment of the financial relations between the Provinces and the Central Government to be decided, they can more usefully be remitted to competent committees.

The main principles underlying these conclusions are, I hope, clear. The surge towards self-government and full Dominion Status in India is universal, and in the end must be irresistible. Rightly understood, it is the pride and glory of the British connection with India. It is the task of wisdom and statesmanship to meet it now in a spirit of generosity and confidence, and not to wait until thwarted aspirations have driven men of status and goodwill out of politics and made them the prerogative of those holding the most extreme views. My recommendations are directed to the establishment of full responsibility and autonomy in each and every Province, but at the same time to provide for the stability and progressiveness of these Provincial Governments, by freeing the judiciary from any shadow of political control, ensuring the direction of the Police without communal or particularist bias, strengthening the administration by the assistance of an element of the All-India Services which will secure the recruitment of the best men, and vesting in the Governors the powers necessary to deal with exceptional emergencies. In the Central Government my recommendations are equally directed to the establishment of a very wide measure of responsibility, reserving only for a term of years, Defence,

Foreign Affairs and Relations with the Indian States, with prudent provision for the reduction of the heavy military expenditure. In view of the immense responsibilities of the Government of India, I propose the retention of the existing bi-cameral system, and the strengthening of the Legislative Assembly by the introduction of a strong, representative element from the Provincial Legislative Councils. I am also of opinion that stability and good government necessitate the retention of the special powers vested in the Viceroy under the Government of India Act.

Finally, I am very definitely of opinion that immediate steps should be taken to deal effectively with the evil of communalism, which is such a serious barrier to our national progress. Whilst opposed in principle to all forms of communal representation, I am willing to waive those objections in order to alleviate the apprehensions of our Mohammedan fellow-citizens for a term of years, so that they may feel full confidence in the new administration. I venture to commend these conclusions to the consideration of all who are anxious to serve India, in the hope that they will be considered as a whole, and that even where they do not command agreement they will be accepted as an honest desire to contribute to the happiness, prosperity and freedom of our Motherland.

KIKABHAI PREMCHAND.

London,

10th Sept., 1929.

